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Abstract
The first part of the thesis describes the construction of Australia's first dynamic 
cohort microsimulation model. The model consists of a pseudo-cohort of 4000 
males and females, who are aged from birth to death, with the processes of 
mortality, education, marriage, divorce, fertility, labour force participation, the 
receipt of earnings and other income, the receipt of social security and education 
transfers and the payment of income tax being simulated for every individual in the 
model for every year of life.
The second part of the thesis describes some of the results which can be derived 
from the model. These include the differences in lifetime income by lifetime 
education and family status, the distribution of lifetime income, the difference 
between the lifetime and annual distributions of income, the lifetime and annual 
incidence of taxes and transfers, and the direction and extent of intra and inter­
personal redistribution of income over the lifecycle due to government transfers and 
income taxes.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Analyses of cross-section samples of the populations of industrialised countries at 
a single point in time have typically found the distribution of income to be highly 
unequal. For example, in 1984 the top 10 per cent of Australian households 
received more than 13 times as much pre-tax income as the bottom 10 per cent 
(ABS, 1987b:22), while in 1978-79 the top 10 per cent of all income units received 
more than one-quarter of total income and the bottom decile received only 1.7 per 
cent of total income (Ingles, 1981:30). Broadly comparable inequalities have also 
been found in OECD and other industrialised countries (Stark,1977; Sawyer,1976).
Similarly, the numerous studies of the income redistribution achieved by various 
government taxes and expenditures, also based upon cross-section data, have 
generally concluded that the net effect of such programs is to succesfully 
redistribute income from rich to poor (Saunders, 1984). While the studies range 
from those which simply allocate personal income taxes and cash transfers (1>, to 
those which also embrace other taxes and other types of government 
expenditure(2), the findings of the latter are strikingly similar. Thus, annual net 
fiscal incidence studies typically conclude that taxes are broadly proportional to 
income or slightly progressive (with the progressive effect of income taxes being 
offset by other regressive taxes); that cash transfers, and to a lesser extent other 
government expenditures, are progressive; and that the combined effect of both 
taxes and outlays is to transfer income from the rich to the poor.
(1). For example, see Kakwani (1983), Saunders (1982) and Collins and Drane (1981, 1982) for 
Australia.
(2) For example, see CSO (1990), O’Higgins and Ruggles (1981), Webb and Sieve (1971), Peacock 
and Browning (1954), Barna (1945) and Cartter (1955) for the UK; ABS (1987b) and Harding (1984, 
1982) for Australia; Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) and Gillespie (1965) for the USA; and Dodge 
(1975) and Ross (1980) for Canada.
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But do these conclusions still hold when a much longer time period, such as an 
entire lifetime, is considered ? For example, at any single point in time, a large 
proportion of those with low incomes are retirees, who might have enjoyed high 
incomes in the past while in the labour force, or students or teenagers, who will 
probably earn much higher incomes in the future. It thus seems likely that, if one 
could somehow measure the past and future incomes of all of those captured in 
a cross-section survey, their lifetime incomes would be much more equally 
distributed than their incomes during the single year or weeks embraced by the 
survey. But how much more equal ?
Similarly, while income taxes appear progressive in net fiscal incidence studies, 
taking a greater chunk of the income of the rich than of the poor, and income- 
tested cash transfers appear even more effective in directing resources to the 
poorest in society, it is likely that many of the cash transfer recipients of today 
were the high income taxpayers of yesterday. Thus, when a longer time period is 
considered, it is conceivable that the wide-ranging programs of government 
taxation and expenditure common to all industrialised countries simply redistribute 
resources across the lifecycle of individuals, funding the cash transfers and 
services received by each individual while they are studying or retired from the 
taxes collected from that same individual during their peak working years. It is thus 
possible that government programs do not redistribute income from rich to poor at 
all, as net fiscal incidence studies suggest, but merely enforce the reallocation of 
income during the lifecycle - in other words, that all of the redistribution achieved 
by taxation and expenditure programs is intra-personal, rather than inter-personal.
Such doubts have been raised before. The major variations in income which may 
occur from year to year take place against the backdrop of a pronounced hump­
shaped pattern of income over the course of the lifecycle, with income rising from 
the low levels apparent during the early years of workforce entry to peak during the 
prime working years before slumping again in retirement. This variability has given 
rise to heated debate about the extent and measurement of income inequality and 
of income redistribution. For example, Friedman’s celebrated Permanent Income
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Hypothesis suggested that the distribution of well-being was better measured by 
the distribution of ’permanent’ income rather than the distribution of income at a 
single point in time (1957), because the latter was affected by both transitory 
income fluctuations and lifecycle effects which tended to increase the extent of 
measured income inequality.
Other economists have criticised the conventional cross-section measures of 
income inequality, arguing that they overstate the degree of inequality in society 
by confusing the to-be-expected intra-personal variation of income over the 
lifecycle with "the more pertinent concept of //?fer-[personal] income variation which 
underlies our idea of inequality and social class" (Paglin, 1975: 598). The same 
concerns are echoed by Polinsky, who also points out that "one cannot infer from 
a sequence of diminishing cross-sectional Gini coefficients that lifetime incomes are 
being equalized. Lifetime income inequality may in fact be staying constant or 
even increasing" (1973:221).
Still others have suggested that the cross-section studies of the redistributive 
impact of government activity may be flawed. As Layard points out, the annual 
approach first "exaggerates the basic inequality of incomes and then it exaggerates 
the amount of redistribution" (1977,46). The same concern is echoed by Reynolds 
and Smolensky, who argue that "a single year accounting period exaggerates the 
size of government redistribution by almost any definition of redistribution" 
(1977:24).
Many economists therefore agree that the distribution of well-being would be better 
measured by the distribution of lifetime income rather than annual income (Carlton 
and Hall, 1978:103); that it would be desirable to measure the lifetime 
redistributive impact of government activity rather than the annual impact; and that 
existing annual studies are likely to overstate both the degree of inter-personal 
income inequality and the extent of inter-personal income redistribution achieved 
by government.
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Apart from the major questions raised above about the degree of inequality in 
lifetime income and about the direction and magnitude of any income redistribution 
achieved by government programs, there are a host of other policy issues and 
questions which can only be addressed with the use of longitudinal, rather than 
cross-section, data. For example, to what extent is poverty a transitory or 
permanent experience ? How much lower are the lifetime incomes of women than 
men, because of their greater tendency to reduce workforce participation during the 
years of family formation and growth ? How much higher is the lifetime income of 
those with university degrees ?
Sources of Longitudinal Data
Answering such questions about how personal circumstances change over time or 
about lifetime profiles requires longitudinal data. However, as Atkinson points out, 
the "immediate problem with the lifetime approach is that of obtaining the required 
data" (1983:45). There are a number of possible sources for such data. In some 
industrialised countries lifetime data does exist (for example, in the form of income 
tax, social security or social insurance records), and if access to such confidential 
data is granted they can be used to generate lifetime profiles (Bourguignon and 
Morrisson, 1983; Schmahl, 1983; Kennedy, 1989). Unfortunately, administrative or 
tax data usually have the major disadvantage that key personal characteristics 
which are relevant to lifetime profiles are not recorded (such as education or 
marital status), because they are tangential to the original purposes for which the 
data was collected. In addition, such data rarely cover entire lifetimes.
Australia, which has a needs-based social security system quite different from the 
social insurance systems of Europe and America, as a result does not collect 
longitudinal social security records. The income tax records might represent a 
potential source of data, but they do not seem to have ever been exploited. In any 
event, in all administrative data the records of those who have not yet died are 
necessarily incomplete, so that simulation techniques are usually still required if 
one wishes to generate lifetime profiles.
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A second source of longitudinal data is to survey regularly the same individuals 
over a number of years, thereby producing panel data. Such panels are not very 
numerous, partly because it is not until some years after the commencement of a 
study that any interesting longitudinal data become available, and also because 
such panels require a major and long-term funding commitment by governments 
or other sponsoring bodies. In addition, such panels suffer from a number of 
difficulties, including the problem of attrition of the original sample and the likely 
impact of such attrition upon the reliability of the results (Atkinson et al, 1990:73)
The best known panel study is the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), which has surveyed a representative sample of US households and their 
offspring every year since 1968 (Morgan, 1974; Elder, 1985). Reflecting the 
growing interest in longitudinal data in the last decade, the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation longitudinal study was also set up in the US in the mid 
1980s (David, 1985), while panel studies have also been carried out in the 1980s 
or are currently being conducted in West Germany, Luxembourg, the Lorraine 
region in France, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium. For most of these 
surveys, any results are currently available for only a few years.
In the UK, the OPCS longitudinal study has provided a wealth of invaluable 
information, but has the critical limitation of not including income data (Brown and 
Fox, 1984). The forthcoming British Household Survey panel study, which will ask 
a very wide range of questions about income and other household characteristics, 
will not produce usable longitudinal data for another couple of years (Rose, 1989). 
In Australia there are no comprehensive longitudinal survey data, although there 
is a small panel study of 15-25 year olds which began in 1984 (McRae, 1986; 
Eyland and Johnson, 1987; Dunsmuir et al, 1988).
However, even though panel studies do provide invaluable data on transitions 
between states over time, they do not of themselves provide lifetime profiles. Even 
the Michigan panel study has surveyed only about one-fifth of the lifetimes of the 
original respondants; various econometric or simulation techniques still have to be
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applied to the longitudinal data produced from such panels in order to provide 
lifetime estimates. (1)
Consequently, it became clear that answering questions about the lifetime 
distribution of income in Australia or about the lifetime incidence of taxes and 
transfers, particularly in the absence of any comprehensive longitudinal data, would 
require the simulation of lifetime profiles. A number of methods of simulating 
lifetime profiles were investigated.
Simulating Longitudinal Data
Economists have frequently attempted to simulate longitudinal profiles for either 
one cohort (ie. a group of individuals born in the same or adjacent years) or a 
range of cohorts. One possible approach is to simulate particular features of the 
lifecycle, such as the distribution of earnings or of labour supply over the entire 
lifetime. For example, Blomquist used wage rate, labour supply, assets, inheritance 
and tax functions to simulate the distribution of lifetime income in Sweden (1976).
Similarly, Blinder (1974) pioneered a lifecycle model of consumer behaviour for the 
US, simulating earnings and inheritance for individuals with different taste 
parameters (eg. between labour and leisure), while Davies simulated the lifetime 
distribution of income and wealth for Canada, extending the Blinder model to 
include transfers and self-employment income, and basing it upon married couples 
rather than individuals (so as to incorporate the impact of changes in family size 
over the lifecycle) (1979).
Such models may employ longitudinal data collected over two or more time 
periods (David, 1971; Lillard, 1977) and use these to estimate lifetime earnings, 
labour supply or other functions. Others may simply utilise cross-section data for
(1). A third possible source of data is recall surveys, in which individuals attempt to remember the date 
of major events such as labour force entry and exit, changes in marital status and family size, etc. 
Such surveys suffer from obvious problems of measurement error.
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one year and create synthetic cohorts (Miller, 1981; Ghez and Becker, 1975). In 
this method the characteristics of the sample are attributed to the simulated 
cohort, ie. it is assumed that the behaviour of the five to 15 cohorts whose 
characteristics are captured in one cross-section survey can be linked together to 
accurately represent the lifetime behaviour of a single cohort. For example, this 
means it is assumed that at the age of 20 the synthetic cohort will be earning what 
males aged 20 were earning in 1988 and that at the age of 60 they will be earning 
what males aged 60 were earning in 1988.(1)
While the above approaches shed light on particular aspects of lifetime profiles 
and are thus of great interest, they fail, to a greater or lesser extent, to capture the 
enormous degree of change in the circumstances of individuals over time. For 
example, plotting the lifetime earnings profile of married men fails to take account 
of the fact that very few men stay constantly married and constantly in the labour 
force for their entire working lives. Thus, men may move between the married 
and non-married states a number of times during their lives with the death or 
divorce of their spouse, may become disabled and drop out of the labour force, 
and so on.
Ignoring the degree of change over time in personal circumstances when 
attempting to provide a picture of lifetime welfare is an important ommission. 
Perhaps the major lesson from the longitudinal data which has been collected is 
the astonishing degree of change over time. The PSID data from the US, for 
example, shows that:
- families are constantly dissolving and reforming;
(1) Since wages actually tend to increase over time with the economic growth rate (Moss, 1978:124), 
such models sometimes attempt to take account of this by imputing an assumed rate of earnings 
growth over the lifecycle. For example, with some particular rate of economic growth, the imputed 
earnings at age 60 of the simulated cohort might end up being double the actual earnings of males 
aged 60 in 1988. In addition, such models also often incorporate a discount rate, so that the value of 
earnings or income received later in life is deflated (Blomquist, 1981; Richardson et al, 1981). This 
is to take account of individuals’ time preferences (ie. people would prefer to have an extra $10,000 
to spend now rather than in 20 years time), and also because in economic terms money received now 
is worth more than money received in 20 years time (with the difference being due to the additional 
interest which could be earned on the money during the next 20 years if it were received now).
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- earnings vary enormously from year to year, even for those who are employed 
full-time full-year;
- there is substantial relative income mobility, so that individuals and families do 
not retain their relative place in the income distribution but move up and down 
from year to year; and
- there is frequent movement into and out of the labour force, with a significant 
proportion of even prime age males entering and exiting the labour force each 
year, while the labour force status and thus earnings of more marginal groups 
is continuously changing (Duncan, 1984; Elder, 1985; see also Clark and 
Summers, 1979).
Another possible approach, which attempts to incorporate this diversity and 
change in individuals’ circumstances during the lifecycle and to categorise each 
individual by perhaps 50 to one hundred variables during any given year, is 
provided by dynamic microsimulation models. After consideration of the above 
options, it was decided to attempt to construct realistic lifetime profiles using the 
techniques of dynamic microsimulation.
1.2 MICROSIMULATION MODELS
Microsimulation models (sometimes also called microanalytic simulation models) 
were pioneered in economics by Guy Orcutt in the United States in the late 50s 
and 60s (Orcutt, 1957; Orcutt et al, 1961). The defining characteristic of such 
models is that they deal with the characteristics and behaviour of micro-units, such 
as individuals, families or households. In contrast to the better-known 
macroeconomic simulation models, which examine relationships between national 
economic sectors and agreggated variables, microsimulation models examine the 
effects of policy and economic changes at the micro level (Merz, 1988).
Given a representative sample of micro-units, such as that provided by the 1986 
Australian Income Distribution Survey (IDS), these micro-effects can then be 
aggregated for all the microunits in the sample to produce estimates for the entire 
country. For example, if the household characteristics, earnings and other income 
received by every individual recorded in a survey such as the IDS are known, then
26
the impact upon each of these individuals of a policy change such as an income 
tax cut can be calculated. After multiplying by the weighting accorded to every 
individual captured in the survey (to make the sample accurately reflect the 
characteristics of the entire Australian population) the total cost to revenue of the 
tax change can be calculated.
Static Models
There are three major types of microsimulation models. The most widely used 
are static microsimulation models, which begin with a representative sample of 
the entire population of a country and are used for estimating the immediate 
impact of policy changes. A very large number of static models have now been 
developed in industrialised countries (Hellwig, 1989a; Merz, 1988) and there 
are, for example, at least three such models in the UK, including TAXMOD 
(Atkinson and Sutherland, 1988). The Australian Department of Social Security is 
also currently developing such a model, and other models have also been 
constructed in Australia (Gallagher, 1990; King, 1990).
Static models are normally based upon detailed sample surveys, which provide 
information about the earnings, family characteristics, labour force status, 
education and housing status and so on of every micro-unit in the sample. Such 
models then typically incorporate the receipt of social security benefits and income 
tax liabilities, by applying the rules for eligibility or liability to the micro-units. In 
this way the immediate distributional impact of a policy measure, such as a 5 per 
cent increase in cash transfers to the aged or a cut in income tax rates, can be 
modelled, and reasonably precise estimates of the characteristics of winners and 
losers and of the total cost can be calculated.
While still regarded as static models, attempts are often made to age the original 
cross-section samples by a few years. This is often done because sample 
surveys are usually a little out of date, due to infrequent surveys or to the delay 
which occurs before micro-unit record tapes are issued for public use. To improve
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the accuracy of the models ’static ageing’ techniques are used, which include 
reweighting the past sample to make it more like the current world and inflating 
incomes to current levels (King, 1987; Merz, 1986). For example, if it is known 
that the proportion of sole parent families or of owner-occupiers has increased 
since a survey was conducted, the weights attached to different family types might 
be altered to reflect this (Sutherland, 1989:11).
In addition, while most static models normally show the estimated effects of a 
policy change assuming that people’s behaviour does not change, attempts are 
now being made to incorporate behavioural change in static models, eg. by 
allowing labour supply or consumption patterns to vary in response to tax changes 
(Huther et al, 1989; Piggot, 1987). Such efforts, currently being undertaken by the 
UK Institute for Fiscal Studies amongst others, are still in their infancy, but 
ulitmately will result in models which hold certain characteristics fixed (such as 
family composition) but allow other sample characteristics to vary (such as labour 
force participation and earnings).
Dynamic Population Models
The second type of microsimulation model is a dynamic population model. Such 
models start from exactly the same random samples of the population as the 
static models described above, but then attempt to project the micro-units forward 
through time. The micro-units are ’aged’ one year at a time, through the 
simulation of demographic and other events such as death, marriage, divorce, 
birth, children leaving home, etc.
This ageing is based on probabilities, which are attached to every single micro-unit 
in the sample for every year of life, and is undertaken using Monte Carlo 
selection processes and statistically estimated ’operating characteristics’. For 
example, when simulating marriage, a random number ranging between 0 and 1 
is attached to the record of every individual in the model for every year of life. 
Then, in a particular year, the probability of marriage, based upon the
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demographic characteristics and life history of a particular never married ’person’, 
is compared to this random number. If the random number is less than the 
probability of marriage, then the unmarried individual is selected to marry. If the 
random number is greater than the probability of marriage, then the person is not 
selected to marry that year and thus remains single for a further year, going 
through the whole procedure again in the next year of life. For example, if in a 
particular country there is a 5 per cent probability of single females aged 25 
marrying in that year, then five per cent of the single females aged 25 in the 
dynamic population model will be married at that age; the females selected to 
marry will be those whose random number in the year they were aged 25 was 
less than 0.05.
The various probabilities of demographic and other events happening to people 
are estimated from the official statistics, sample surveys and so on of a country 
and are then used in the dynamic model. After the major demographic events 
have been modelled, other characteristics which are heavily dependent upon 
demographic characteristics can also be imputed, such as education, labour force 
status, unemployment, and housing. Finally, the receipt of earnings and of social 
security payments can be added, subsequently followed by income tax and other 
tax liabilities.
Dynamic population models require formidable computing resources to run, as 
the characteristics of the micro-units in the initial year and every subsequent 
simulated year have to be stored, and any subsequent analysis is thus frequently 
based upon hundreds of thousands of observations. While technological change 
has meant that the cost of such models is now falling to much less prohibitive 
levels, there are still only a handful of dynamic population models in existence, 
including DYNASIM in the USA and the related PC version developed by Steven 
Caldwell (Orcutt et al, 1976; Caldwell, 1990); the SFB3 and DPMS models in West 
Germany (Galler and Wagner, 1986; Heike et al, 1987); the more recent HCSO 
model constructed by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (Gegesy et al,
1989) and the DEMOD model in Czechoslovakia, both of which are partly based
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on the DPMS code ; and the Netherlands model NEDYMAS, used for analysing 
the redistributive impact of social security (Hellwig, 1989b). However, both the 
central statistical office in Canada, Statistics Canada (Wolfson, 1989a), and the 
National Institute for Economic and Industry Research in Australia (King et al,
1990) have begun construction of such models.
Dynamic population models are particularly useful for forecasting the future 
characteristics of the population and thus for modelling the effects of policy 
change during, for example, the next 5 to 50 years. For example, in West 
Germany there were questions about whether the policy of shifting nursing of 
elderly persons needing care from nursing insitutions to family members would be 
sustainable in the longer term, in the face of a declining birth rate and a rise in 
the proportion of elderly people. The West German SFB3 model was used to 
model likely demographic and other changes to the year 2050, and indicated that 
there would be a susbstantial future increase in demand for professional nursing 
services (Galler, 1989:20). Similarly, one could use dynamic population models 
for forecasting estimated changes in schooling outlays or benefits to sole parents 
as a result of shifts in the birth rate or the divorce rate, or for estimating the cost 
in future decades of current changes to superannuation and age pension 
provisions.
Dynamic Cohort Models
The third major type of microsimulation model is a dynamic cohort model. In this 
type of model exactly the same ’ageing’ processes are simulated as in the 
dynamic population model, but only one cohort is aged rather than the entire 
population. Typically, the cohort is aged year by year from birth to death, so that 
the entire lifecycle of one cohort is simulated. While the same total lifetime 
profiles could be generated using dynamic population models, such a procedure 
is grossly inefficient when the lifetime circumstances of only one or two cohorts 
are of interest.
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Existing examples of dynamic cohort models include DEMOGEN within Statistics 
Canada, the longitudinal variant of the West German SFB3 model, the EVENT 
model in Norway (Schweder, 1989), and LIFEMOD, which is currently being 
developed by the Welfare State Programme at the LSE (Falkingham, 1990).
While dynamic population models are used to answer questions about the future 
structure of the population and typically map only a few decades of the lives of 
individuals from many different age cohorts, dynamic cohort models are generally 
used to simulate the entire lifetime of a single cohort of individuals and thus to 
answer lifetime questions. Dynamic cohort models can be used for such 
purposes as the analysis of lifetime earnings and income distributions, to 
determine whether the state is effectively redistributing between periods of relative 
want and plenty during the lifecycle and to examine the lifetime incidence of taxes 
and government spending programs.
In Canada, for example, DEMOGEN was used to assess the distributional and 
financial impact of proposals to include homemakers under the Canada and 
Quebec Pension Plans (Wolfson, 1989b). In West Germany the SFB3 dynamic 
cohort model was used to analyse the lifetime distributional effects of education 
transfers and also the degree and direction of redistribution between individuals 
contributing to the German statutory pension system (Hain and Helberger, 1986). 
Dynamic cohort models could also lend themselves, when run for two or more 
widely spaced cohorts, to the evaluation of inter-generational equity.
As with the static microsimulation models, the dynamic models currently all 
appear to assume that individuals do not vary their behaviour in response to 
changes in their environment intitiated by government policy change. Incorporating 
estimated behavioural responses to tax changes or real wage increases is 
problematic, because econometric studies designed to assess the magnitude of 
behavioural change have produced such widely divergent estimates of the relevant 
elasticities that it appears that the most that can be done is to present the results 
for a number of different estimates (Hagenaars, 1989:31).
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It is also not entirely certain whether the elasticities obtained from cross-section 
data can be assumed to reflect accurately lifetime behavioural response. For 
example, using panel data, Heckman and MaCurdy found evidence that labour 
force participation decisions are made with a very long term horizon in mind, and 
that the future expected values of variables determined current labour supply 
decisions (1980:67). It is thus possible, for example, that while higher real wages 
might lead to increased labour force participation in the short-term (as found in 
numerous studies, such as Bureau of Labour Market Research (BLMR) 1985a; 
Miller and Volker, 1983) this could nonetheless be partly or fully offset by earlier 
retirement during the later working years. Improved wages could therefore 
conceivably lead to no increase in labour force participation over the total lifetime. 
Given these difficulties, dynamic models have not yet attempted to incorporate 
behavioural response, but there is no doubt that this will be undertaken in the 
future.
1.3 PROBLEMS OF DYNAMIC MICROSIMULATION MODELS
Apart from the resources required to write and run the hundreds of pages of 
computer code which comprise dynamic microsimulation models and the 
difficulties in finding adequate software (Hellwig, 1989c), a number of 
methodological and data problems face those constructing such models, and the 
magnitude of these problems and their implications for the accuracy of any results 
produced by the models should be fully appreciated.
The Income Unit in Dynamic Models
As all those involved in lifecycle modelling have discovered, the family or 
household are both inappropriate units to use in longitudinal analysis because 
both are subject to such major changes in composition. Essentially, it is a 
hopeless task to try to follow a family through time because, for example, a family 
originally consisting of a husband, wife and two children frequently splits into two 
separate households with divorce, is further modified with the remarriage of one
32
or both of the former partners, and then is split again as the children leave home 
and start their own families.
In such circumstances, regarding all of the newly split families as all belonging to 
the same family unit is clearly nonsensical. On the other hand, family composition 
cannot be ignored in any assessment of standards of living because it has such 
a major impact upon welfare. Thus, a female with no earned income who is single 
is likely to have a very different standard of living to an apparently equally low 
income female who is married to an employed spouse. To solve this difficulty, 
Duncan and Hill proposed using "the household as the unit of measurement but 
... the individual as the unit of analysis, attributing to each individual the 
characteristics of the household in which he or she lives" (1985:362).
Dynamic models can thus incorporate the impact upon the living standards of 
individuals of changes in their family composition. Most models appear to include 
only individuals and nuclear families within their structure, so that only households 
consisting of single adults or married couples with or without children are modelled. 
Multiple income unit households and those with other dependent or non­
dependent relatives (such as grandparents) are currently not usually included, 
although it is relatively simple to add to models the relevant probabilities of 
parents returning to live in the houses of their children. This will no doubt be done 
in the near future, given the increasing concern about the care of the elderly and 
the costs of an ageing population. Most dynamic models already trace kinship 
networks, so that parents, children and siblings can all be easily linked together.
Age, Cohort and Period Effects
All dynamic models face major methodological problems in attempting to 
disentangle age, cohort and period effects (Morgan and Duncan, 1986:359). Age 
effects are changes that occur with the increasing age of individuals, such as the 
growth in earnings that occurs with increasing experience and age and the decline 
in birth rates as women become older. The shape of the cross-section
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age-earnings distribution changes over time, not just due to the impact of the 
cohort and period effects discussed below, but also due to the independent effect 
upon age-earnings profiles of changes in occupational composition, changes in 
demand, a more highly educated workforce and so on (Weiss and Lillard, 1978). 
In other words, the relationship between age and whatever variable is of interest 
(in this case, earnings) is not fixed but can vary over time.
Cohort effects are effects specific to a single cohort of individuals born in the 
same or adjacent years. Easterlin , for example, has argued that those born in 
larger cohorts, such as the baby boomers, face higher unemployment rates, lower 
age-earnings growth rates, delayed marriage and lower fertility rates due to their 
less favourable economic circumstances and a higher incidence of stress-related 
problems (1980). Similarly, after examining empirical evidence, Berger (1985) 
recently found that larger cohorts have lower earnings upon workforce entry than 
smaller cohorts and that the negative effect of cohort size appears to worsen with 
increasing experience, with larger cohorts having flatter age-earnings profiles than 
smaller cohorts (see also Freeman, 1979).
The importance of cohort effects is apparent in Figure 1.1, with the growth in the 
average wages in the five years to 1975 of those aged 21 to 25 in 1970 far 
exceeding the growth in wages of those aged 51 to 55 in 1970. In other words, 
the younger cohort fared much better than the older cohort during this five year 
period. This phenomenon is also apparent in the UK at the moment, where the 
small size of the cohort currently aged 15 to 20 is causing a relative increase in 
the wages paid to those in this age group.
Period effects are those which affect a number of different cohorts who are alive 
at the same time, and are due to living in a particular time period, such as the 
Great Depression, war or periods of buoyant economic growth. For example, in 
time periods when the rate of real economic growth is 3 per cent then wage 
earners can expect their wages, roughly speaking, to increase at about 3 per cent 
a year (Moss, 1978:124). However, when economic growth plunges to one per cent
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or zero, all cohorts are likely to experience much slower earnings growth, and the 
total amount of income earned during the life of a particular cohort is thus very 
heavily dependent upon the circumstances of the particular decades in which they 
were alive (Ruggles and Ruggles, 1977:122).
The significance of period effects is demonstrated in Figure 1.2, which is based on 
exactly the same data as Figure 1.1, where the wage increases accruing to all 
cohorts between 1955 to 1960 were lower than those won in adjacent time 
periods.
The problems created by the impact of age, cohort and period effects upon the 
data used to set the parameters in dynamic microsimulation models extend into 
every area of the models, not just earnings. For example, when trying to model 
the probability of marriage one can take the probabilities of marriage for women 
aged 25 in 1986, aged 26 in 1986, aged 27 in 1986 and so on. These are the 
annual rates for a particular year (conceptually equivalent to the cross-section 
’snapshot’ shown in Figure 1.2), which have the major advantage of being easily 
obtainable from official statistics, but are sensitive to temporary period effects. 
Thus, if only cross-section data are available, measuring the independent effect 
of age is made difficult because of cohort and period effects.
An alternative is to obtain marriage rates for a real cohort and use these to 
parameterise the lifecycle model, ie. by obtaining marriage probabilities for women 
aged 25 in 1986, aged 26 in 1987, aged 27 in 1988 and so on (conceptually 
equivalent to the ’movie’ shown in Figure 1.1). While these cohort rates 
accurately portray the lifecycle trends of one individual cohort, they are incomplete 
(eg. we do not yet know how women born in 1960 will behave once they reach 
the age of 35).
In addition, the experience of the particular cohort considered might have been 
affected by major period effects and this could mean that their experience is 
unlikely to be replicated by any other cohort. For example, divorce rates in
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Australia shot up after the introduction of the Family Law Act in 1976, so any 
model based upon divorce rates of cohorts during this period would incorporate 
a very strong but temporary period effect (Raymond, 1987:38). If these 
temporarily high divorce rates were then used in a dynamic microsimulation 
model, too many of the micro-units in the model would get divorced and the total 
proportion of the micro-units who had the marital status of divorced would be 
much higher than in the real world.
The problem for microsimulation modellers is that most of the data sources used 
to set the parameters of dynamic models reflect the combined impact of age, 
cohort and period effects, and that these effects are not easily disentangled. That 
is, if one uses longitudinal data to set the parameters, then period effects are not 
controlled for, while the cohort effects which are captured may not be replicated 
by other cohorts in the future. On the other hand, if one uses cross-section data, 
then cohort effects are not controlled for, and the period effects which are 
captured may be affected by unusual historical circumstances. While with 
sufficient years of data it is possible to attempt to correct for unusual cohort or 
period effects, there is no real solution to this problem but to accept that the world 
is ever-changing, that any panel or cross-section survey data, no matter how 
thorough, may not provide an accurate guide to future behaviour and that there 
is no perfect way to model the unknown future.
In practice, however, the great strength of dynamic microsimulation models is their 
enormous flexibility. The policy maker can make his or her own decisions about 
future trends and change the parameters in the model accordingly. For example, 
if it is felt that fertility rates are too low and have been affected by the cohort effect 
of a particular generation of women delaying their first child by an average 5 
years, then the fertility rates used in the model can be increased. Similarly, if 
labour market experts believe that the labour force participation rates of married 
women will continue to increase during the next 20 years then current rates can 
be appropriately inflated. If there is disagreement about, say, the future impact 
of a new policy on retirement age and thus on projected age pension expenditure,
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then a range of assumptions can be modelled, and such sensitivity analysis can 
provide a guide to the likely range of possible costs.
Data Availability and Quality
A third major problem with dynamic microsimulation models is that they are only 
as good as the data upon which they are based. The types of data required are 
extensive and ideally include, for example, death rates by age, sex and 
socio-economic status; marriage rates by age, sex, education level and previous 
marital status; divorce rates by age, sex, duration of marriage, and number and 
age of children; labour force participation rates by age, sex, education, marital 
status, age of children, disability status, duration of time in the current labour 
force state and previous labour force status; attendance rates at primary, 
secondary and tertiary institutions by age, sex, parental socio-economic status and 
previous education; and earnings by age, sex, marital status, hours worked, 
previous earnings, education level and so on.
Cross-section data are not usually adequate for setting the parameters in dynamic 
models, as it is the probabilities of transition between states which are critical. In 
modelling housing status, for example, it is not sufficient to have a cross-section 
survey which shows what proportion of married couples with two children in each 
age group are owner-occupiers, private renters and public renters. What is really 
required are data on the probability of entering and exiting each type of housing 
tenure by a range of relevant characteristics, such as age, income, education, 
family status, duration in the current housing sector, change in family 
circumstances such as divorce or marriage and so on.
Because the models are attempting to capture transition rates over time, the 
availability of longitudinal data is particularly important, because many of the 
relevant transition probabilities are heavily dependent upon duration in a particular 
state and/or status in the immediately preceding year. For example, in modelling 
the probability of remaining in the labour force for a further year, data which shows
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labour force status at two separate points in time is obviously required. But, in 
addition, as some research has suggested that the number of years already spent 
in the labour force significantly affects the probability of staying in the labour force 
for a further year (Picot, 1986:20), panel or recall data spanning the last 10 to 20 
years may be needed.
Similarly, there is evidence that the incidence of unemployment is very highly 
concentrated over time (OECD,1985), so that those who have been unemployed 
during a number of periods in the past have much higher probabilities of 
experiencing unemployment than other individuals. In a dynamic model it is thus 
not sufficient to make the probability of experiencing unemployment in the current 
year simply dependent upon whether the individual was unemployed last year. 
Such a methodology results in a simulated world in which a very large number 
of people experience a few years of unemployment during their lifetimes, rather 
than the more accurate picture of a much smaller number of people experiencing 
many years of unemployment during their lifetimes.
In many countries, including Australia, the necessary panel or recall data are not 
available, and the various transition probabilities in dynamic models are thus 
based upon longitudinal data collected in other countries, upon surveys which 
asked about status in only the current and immediately preceding year, or upon 
annual data which contains no information about duration in some state such as 
marriage. While attempts can be made to adjust the probabilities in line with the 
results of longitudinal data in other countries, such ad hoc measures are obviously 
not very satisfactory and reduce the predictive accuracy of the models to an 
unknown extent.
While longitudinal data are needed, extensive and recent cross-section sample 
surveys of all relevant variables are also very useful when setting up dynamic 
microsimulation models. For example, tertiary education participation rates in a 
country might have increased substantially since a panel study was started. In 
modelling tertiary education usage, a dynamic model might therefore mix together
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cross-section and longitudinal data, using up-to-date cross-section data on tertiary 
participation (sub-divided by such variables as age and sex) to set the overall 
probabilities of entering the first year of tertiary studies, but deriving the 
probabilities of remaining in tertiary studies for the second and subsequent years 
from the panel study.
When either longitudinal or cross-section surveys are used to set the parameters 
in dynamic models, the models will incorporate any sampling and coding errors 
present in the original surveys, so that the quality of the data upon which the 
models are based is an important consideration. In addition, large sample size 
is critical, so that the population can be stratified by a substantial number of 
explanatory variables and the enormous variation present in the real world can be 
adequately represented in the model.
Finally, in most countries there is not one enormous survey which covers all of the 
variables used in constructing dynamic models, but rather a large number of 
surveys, each of which address a particular area of interest. In such cases, 
statistical matching techniques have been developed to merge, for particular types 
of micro-units, the expenditure data contained in one survey to the income and 
health data contained in a second survey and the labour force data contained in 
a third survey (Paass, 1986; Klevmarken, 1983). In the Canadian static 
microsimulation model, for example, the original sample survey upon which the 
model was based was known to under-sample very high income earners (because 
of their higher non-response rate), so the more comprehensive records of high 
income earners contained in a special high income tax file were merged with the 
original sample. Such statistical matching techniques are still a relatively recent 
innovation, and the likely degree or direction of any bias introduced remains 
uncertain.
Because adequate data in every area covered by a model are not usually 
available, dynamic models tend to rely on whatever pieces of data are around and 
can be used. This obviously reduces the accuracy of the models, but they are
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normally constructed so that they can be immediately amended as soon as better 
data become available.
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
The first part of this thesis describes the procedures used to construct a dynamic 
cohort microsimulation model for Australia. The model consists of a pseudo-cohort 
of 2000 males and 2000 females, who are tracked from birth to death and 
experience major life events such as schooling, marriage and unemployment. The 
cohort are ’born’ in 1986 and live for up to 95 years in a world which remains 
exactly as it was in their birth year. Given the uncertainty surrounding future 
changes in marriage and birth rates, labour force participation rates, education 
rates and so on, this means that a steady-state world has been assumed in the 
initial version of the model. Thus, the first version of the model does not attempt 
to estimate what the actual experience of the cohort born in Australia in 1986 will 
be. Instead it seeks to answer the following question: If the demographic, labour 
force, income and other characteristics of the population and all government 
policies existing in 1986 remained unchanged for 95 years, what would the 
distribution of income be like and what income redistribution would be achieved by 
government programs ?
Although the steady-state assumption may appear unrealistic at first glance, it is 
probably the most useful benchmark against which to evaluate current government 
policies and changes to those policies. As Summers pointed out in 1956, the 
instability of the size distribution of income makes data about the the lifetime 
income distribution in the past of little help in analysing the lifetime income 
distribution of today, while the future distribution of lifetime income is unknown. 
Summers saw great potential in the construction of steady-state or ’latent’ income 
distributions, which would allow one to answer questions about lifetime income 
distribution given existing economic conditions and government policies. He 
argued in favour of constructing a latent lifetime size distribution of income, which 
"refers neither to what has happened nor to what probably will. It is a ’maybe’ size
41
distribution which has a very, very small probability of eventuating." (1956:4). 
Similarly, both the DEMOGEN and SFB3 dynamic cohort models assume a steady- 
state world when evaluating the impact of both existing and possible government 
policies (Wolfson, 1988:233; Hain and Helberger, 1986:63).
The first part of the thesis is devoted to describing the simulation in the model of 
demographic processes, disability and education, (all in Chapter 2), labour force 
participation (Chapter 3) and the earned and unearned income of the pseudo­
cohort (Chapter 4). Much of this modelling relies heavily on the. 1986 Income 
Distribution Survey (IDS) micro-data tape released by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS), and key features of this survey and the definitions of important 
variables used extensively in the model are summarised in Appendix 1. Any 
sampling, coding and other errors present in the 1986 IDS (and other data 
sources) are therefore reproduced in the model. In addition, the institutionalised 
population are excluded from both the 1986 IDS and the model, and there is thus 
no attempt to include, for example, aged persons in nursing and other institutions 
(although the movement of the elderly into and out of institutions remains a high 
priority for the next version of the model). The definitions of variables in the 
simulation, such as employed and unemployed, are also necessarily the same as 
those used by the ABS.
Because only earnings, investment, superannuation and maintenance income are 
simulated, the definition of income in the model is not fully comprehensive, in the 
sense of Simons’ classic definition (1938). Not only are less significant 
components of income not simulated, such as the receipt of accident and workers 
compensation, but such items as unrealised capital gains, fringe benefits, imputed 
rent, the value of production for home consumption, and the imputed value of 
leisure are also excluded (Scitovsky, 1973; Moon and Smolensky, 1977). While 
it is difficult to include many of these items in the income base, it must be 
recognised, as Ingles points out, that "the inclusion of some or all could 
significantly affect the shape of the measured income distribution, as well as any 
assessment of the redistributive impact of government policies" (1981:5).
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Given the demographic and economic profile of each individual built up during 
these early modules, the receipt of social security and education cash transfers 
and of education outlays is then simulated, and the procedures used to do this and 
the assumptions made regarding the allocation and valuation of government 
expenditures are discussed in the early sections of Chapter 5. The next section 
of Chapter 5 describes the imputation of income tax, and the assumptions made 
about the incidence and burden of the tax. The various income measures utilised 
in the model are also outlined in Chapter 5; because of the problems mentioned 
earlier, of taking account of family circumstances when only the lifetimes of 
individuals can be traced in any meaningful way, some of the income measures 
are quite new and can be difficult to understand when first encountered. All 
income measures in the model are expressed in constant or ’real’ 1986 dollars.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the steps, described in detail in Chapters 2 to 5, which are 
followed in the model for every individual for every year of life. Thus, if an 
individual is selected to experience another year of life, all of the following modules 
are run through to determine the characteristics of that individual in that year of life.
For example, if a 13 year old is selected to experience a fourteenth year of life, any 
change in disability status will occur during the second module, changes in 
schooling status will be assigned in the third module, and the probabilities of 
change in all subsequent modules will be zero so that, for example, the young 
teenager will remain unmarried, out of the labour force, and not in receipt of 
earnings for the whole of that year. In contrast, if a married 60 year old female is 
selected to experience another year of life, the probability of entering schooling or 
tertiary education will be zero, so that these characteristics will not change, but the 
woman might become widowed, enter or leave the workforce or commence the 
receipt of age pension.
Unfortunately, housing status has not been included in the first version of the 
model, principally because there were no adequate housing data on the 1986 IDS
43
Figure 1.3: Planned Structure of the HARDING Dynamic Cohort 
Microsimulation Model*
Fertility
Mortality
ID and Sex
Tertiary Education
Housing Status
Disability Status
Labour Force Status
Divorce
Social Security Transfers
Marriage
Childcare and Schooling
Earned and Unearned income
Income Tax and Other Taxes
Usage and incidence of Govt. 
Services eg., Health, Transport
* Child care, housing status, indirect taxes and government services apart from education are not yet 
included in the model.
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micro-data tape which could be used for the simulation of housing, and longitudinal 
data on housing were also not available. However, housing status is not as 
criticalfor simulating the social security and tax systems as in, for example, the UK, 
as the rent assistance provided to those receiving social security transfers in 
Australia is relatively minor and there is no mortgage interest tax relief for owner- 
occupiers.
In addition, although it is hoped to include indirect taxes and other government 
expenditures in the model in the near future, at the moment the simulation is 
limited to the major cash transfers, education outlays and income tax administered 
by the Federal Government. It must be fully appreciated, therefore, that most of 
the findings of the study only deal with the lifetime redistribution of cash income 
generated by the federal tax-transfer system. If the study embraced indirect taxes 
or other government expenditures, it is possible that quite different conclusions 
might be reached about the redistributive impact of all government activity or about 
the distribution of a lifetime income measure which included the imputed value of 
various government services. Inclusion of state and local government taxes and 
expenditures might also affect the conclusions.
A further issue is that in assessing the impact of government upon income 
redistribution, the distribution of income before specified government actions 
necessarily has to be compared to the distribution of income after such actions. 
This immediately raises the question of what the most appropriate ’before* 
benchmark - or counterfactual - is. Although heavily criticised (Reynolds and 
Smolensky, 1977), the most commonly used reference point is the ’zero 
government counterfactual’, which measures the redistributive effect of government 
against the original distribution of pre-tax and pre-transfer income. While it is 
clearly invalid to assume that the distribution of factor income would remain the 
same if there were no government, such an assumption has been implicitly 
adopted in this study, because there are no data available suggesting how the 
lifetime distribution of factor income in Australia would change if government 
miraculously disappeared. However, this does mean that using the model to
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examine the impact of policy changes upon the distribution of lifetime income (ie. 
differential incidence) has greater theoretical validity than using it to examine how 
existing policies have affected the distribution of lifetime income (Musgrave et al, 
1974:274).
The second part of the thesis describes some of the results produced by the 
model. As an initial exploration of some of the ways in which the model can be 
used, the sources and amount of lifetime income received by those with different 
educational achievements, various family characteristics and differing lengths of 
time unemployed are analysed in Chapter 6. While this chapter thus examines the 
lifetime incomes of those with specified lifetime characteristics, the following 
chapter approaches the issue from a different angle and instead seeks to identify 
the determinants of high and low lifetime incomes.
In Chapter 7 the simulated cohort are therefore ranked by the amount of lifetime 
equivalent income they receive and are then divided into deciles, so that the 
fortunes of those with radically different lifetime standards of living can be 
compared. This chapter thus answers the questions raised earlier about the 
distribution of lifetime income.
In Chapter 8 exactly the same records are used to create a synthetic annual 
income distribution (rather than a lifetime distribution), and the inequality of annual 
income is examined in Section 8.2. In Section 8.3 the inequality of the lifetime and 
annual income distributions is compared, by calculating Gini coefficients for the 
various lifetime and annual income measures and by constructing annual-to-lifetime 
income transition matrices. In Section 8.4, the difference between the annual and 
lifetime incidence of first cash transfers and then income taxes is assessed. 
However, such analysis makes it difficult to identify the extent of intra and inter­
personal income redistribution occurring, because the amount of income tax paid 
during the lifetime so greatly exceeds the amount of cash transfers received 
(because income taxes finance the provision of so many other services, in addition 
to cash transfers). Consequently, in Section 8.5 the combined redistributive impact
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of cash transfers and of the income taxes which financed those cash transfers is 
examined. Finally, the lifetime incidence of education outlays is analysed in 
Section 8.6.
While Chapter 7 provides a picture of total lifetime income, it tells us nothing about 
the periods of relative poverty and plenty during the lifetime. Chapter 9 therefore 
discusses the distribution of income over the lifecycle of those with varying lifetime 
characteristics, and identifies the amount of taxes paid and transfers received at 
various ages. The first part describes the lifecycle income profiles of males and 
females on average, and then also examines the fortunes of those at the top and 
bottom of the lifetime welfare ladder. The second part contrasts the experiences 
of those who never married with those who married and raised large families, and 
traces the impact of children upon living standards at different stages of the 
lifecycle. Finally, the third section discusses the very different lifecycle profiles of 
those with different educational achievements.
In Chapter 10 some of the major findings of the study are summarised.
1.5 CONCLUSION
Many economists argue that the marked degree of income inequality, and the 
apparent significant redistribution of income from those with high to those with low 
incomes achieved by government programs of taxation and expenditure, revealed 
by studies based on a single year of data, overstate both the degree of inequality 
and the degree of redistribution. It has been suggested that assessment of such 
inequality and redistribution over a longer time period, such as a lifetime, would 
provide a more accurate guide to both inter-personal income inequality and the 
degree of inter-personal income redistribution achieved by the state.
To assess such claims, real or synthetic data on lifetime profiles are required. It 
has been argued that even when genuine longitudinal data exist, such as panel, 
recall or administrative data, such data are either unlikely to span the entire
47
lifetimes of individuals or to exclude many important variables which are necessary 
to derive a complete picture of the differing lifetime circumstances of individuals. 
In addition, even where complete lifetime data do exist, the lifetime records of 
those who are now dead are likely to have been affected by the particular 
economic and social circumstances of the period during which they lived (such as 
World War 2 and the following years of major economic growth); their lifetime 
circumstances are therefore unlikely to be replicated by any cohort born in the 
1980s.
Consequently, answering such questions necessarily requires the generation of 
synthetic lifetime profiles. In Australia, where no usable longitudinal data exist, 
such a conclusion is inescapable. A number of methods of simulating such profiles 
were examined, and it was concluded that the relatively recent techniques of 
dynamic microsimulation provided the best way of simulating the constant changes 
in circumstances over time revealed by panel data.
While the techniques of static microsimulation are now well established and in 
constant use in many industrialised countries, dynamic microsimulation remains a 
relatively uncharted area and suffers from a number of serious problems. These 
include the difficulty of taking account of family circumstances when only 
individuals can be realistically tracked through time; the impact of age, cohort and 
period effects upon the data used to set the parameters in such models; and the 
vast amount of data required to simulate adequately the numerous demographic 
and economic processes which are important in the real world.
It must therefore be emphasised that that the construction of a dynamic 
microsimulation model is a daunting task. The techniques of microsimulation are 
still a comparatively recent development in economics and social policy, and the 
accuracy of the dynamic models still remains to be comprehensively tested. 
Although various techniques to validate the models have been tried 
(Wolfson,1989b:51), such validation is obviously fairly difficult when longitudinal 
data do not exist and when there are many reasons (eg. different death rates) why
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the results of the models will not neccessarily be comparable to existing cross- 
section data.
While the original purpose of constructing the HARDING dynamic cohort 
microsimulation model was to answer questions about lifetime income distribution 
and tax-transfer incidence, the extent to which the model provides accurate 
answers to these questions is unknown. This is in part due to the fact that there 
are severe limits upon the amount of the world that one person can understand 
and translate into computer code within three years. Many areas of the model are 
no doubt simplistic and will require improvement in the future. Even more 
importantly, constructing a dynamic model in the face of extremely severe data 
limitations - and in particular, in the absence of any comprehensive longitudinal 
data for Australia - means that many ad hoc assumptions have necessarily been 
made in the model.
Nonetheless, the model provides a prototype which can be built upon in the future 
as better data become available, and appears to generate the most reasonable 
answers which can be expected, given the current state of knowledge and data.
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CHAPTER 2: THE DEMOGRAPHIC, DISABILITY 
AND EDUCATION MODULES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The following sections describe how demographic processes, disability and 
education were simulated in the model. The various processes are described in 
the order in which they were simulated so that, for example, the modelling of 
education is described before that of marriage, as aspects of the simulation of 
marriage depended upon the education status of the cohort members. Section 2.2 
summarises the simulation of mortality, Section 2.3 the modelling of disability 
status, Section 2.4 the simulation of pre-school, primary and secondary schooling 
and Section 2.5 the modelling of tertiary education. In Section 2.6 the family 
formation and dissolution procedures are described, while Section 2.7 canvasses 
the simulation of fertility.
2.2 MORTALITY
In the first module, an ID number and sex are assigned at birth and retained for 
the duration of the cohort member’s life. Currently 2000 men and 2000 women 
are ’born’. Cohort members are also assigned at birth to a parental 
socio-economic status (SES) quartile with, for example, 25 per cent of the cohort 
being randomly selected at birth to have parents in the lowest quartile. (Parental 
SES is used later in the simulation of educational achievement.)
Before the age of 45, cohort members are randomly selected to die every year, 
in line with the probability of death by age and sex in 1986 (reported in ABS, 
1987d:8). As explained in Chapter 1, the simulation of mortality (and most of the
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other major processes in the model) is achieved through the use of dozens of 
streams of random numbers allied with ’Monte-Carlo’ selection processes. Thus, 
for the simulation of mortality, all cohort members are assigned a uniformly 
distributed random ’mortality’ number ranging between zero and one in every year 
of life. Then, if the probability of death for 15 year old males is one per thousand 
of the male population, then two male cohort members will be selected to die at 
age 15 (assuming that the random numbers attached to 15 year old males are 
exactly uniformly distributed); the males selected to die will be those whose 
random numbers were less than or equal to 0.001 at age 15.
A substantial amount of research has shown that the likelihood of dying is 
affected not only by age and sex, but also by a range of socio-economic factors, 
such as occupation, education, income, class and so on (Powles,1977; Kitagawa 
and Hauser,1973; Australian Institute of Health, 1987; Health Targeting and 
Implementation Committee, 1988; Hart, 1987). Dasverma analysed Australian 
mortality data by occupation and found that there were considerable differences 
in the mortality rates of various occupational groups. For example, after dividing 
those males who died between the ages of 15 and 64 between 1970 and 1972 into 
12 occupational categories, Dasverma found that those in the professional, 
technical, administrative and executive occupational categories had standardised 
mortality ratios of about 90, while those in the clerical, sales, and farmers and 
fishermen etc categories had ratios of about 100 (ie. the average). Craftsmen and 
labourers and those in service, sport and recreation occupations had ratios of 
about 120, while the ratio for those in transport and communication occupations 
reached 137, with the highest ratio of 162 being realised by miners and quarrymen 
(1982:87). Similarly, Lee et al found that in 1981 in Australia, the occupational 
groups with the lowest death rates were males in the professional (rates 29 per 
cent below the average), clerical (26 per cent below) and retail occupational 
categories (25 per cent below), while higher than average rates were experienced 
by males in mining (37 per cent above) and transport and communications (28 per 
cent above the average) (1987:20).
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Occupation is not simulated in the model. However, American research found that 
mortality varied not only by occupation , but also by education and income 
(Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973:152). These authors pointed out, however, that the 
assumption that income was inversely related to mortality could be complicated 
by a reverse causal path, because the approach of death itself could be the cause 
of decreased income during the year or years preceding death: "For this reason, 
it has been suggested that education differentials are probably more reliable 
indicators of socio-economic differences in mortality than is income" (1973:154).
Accordingly, the model uses years of education as the socio-economic variable 
affecting mortality. Unfortunately, as Dasverma pointed out, "it is not possible to 
analyse mortality differentials in Australia with respect to education or income due 
to non-availability of data" (1982:3). Given this lack of data, the American data 
were used as a guide when setting the relevant probabilities. Kitagawa and 
Hauser found that, in 1960, white males aged 25 to 64 with less than five years 
of schooling experienced mortality rates 64 per cent above those of men with four 
years of college. Among white females the relevant differential was 105 per cent. 
The difference between more comparable education levels was less extreme but 
still marked; the mortality of white males aged 25 to 64 with less than 8 years of 
school was 40 per cent higher than those with at least one year of college, while 
for females the comparable figure was 51 per cent. On this evidence the authors 
concluded that "improved socio-economic conditions associated with education 
might have a marked effect on the deaths of men 25 to 64 and on deaths to 
women of all ages 25 and over" (1973:153).
From age 45 onwards, therefore, the probability of dying in the simulation is made 
additionally dependent upon education, as well as just age and sex. This age was 
selected because by age 45 cohort members had completed their university 
education, which made the simulation of differential mortality easier. Although 
socio-economic factors presumably influence death rates before age 45, only 5 per 
cent of cohort males and 2.5 per cent of females die before this age, so that this 
simplification should have little impact.
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To impute the effect of education, cohort members were divided into education 
quartiles at the age of 44, ie. the top 500 males ranked by completed years of 
education were assigned to education quartile one. Because the difference in 
mortality rates appeared to be more marked at the extremes of the spectrum, 
those belonging to the two middle quartiles were simply assumed to have the 
average death rates for people of their age and sex. Those in the top quartile 
were assumed to have death rates 10 percent below this average and those in the 
bottom quartile 10 per cent above the average rate. This meant that from age 45 
onwards those in the bottom quartile (quartile 4) had death rates which were 22 
per cent higher than those of quartile one members. There is no way of 
determining whether this 22 per cent spread accurately captures Australian 
socio-economic differences in mortality by quartile, but on the above evidence it 
seems unlikely to be an overestimate. One of the interesting future uses of the 
model will be to change these assumptions and examine the consequential effect 
upon tax-transfer incidence. The incorporation of differential mortality has a 
significant but not overwhelming impact, as Table 2.1 shows.
Table 2.1: Impact of Differential Mortality Assumptions
Percentage of cohort still alive at ages 
60 70 80
Males
Education quartile
- 1 (top) 21.4 16.9 9.1
-2  and 3 21.1 16.1 8.1
-4  (bottom) 20.8 15.5 7.3
Females
Education quartile
- 1 (top) 23.0 20.4 14.4
-2  and 3 22.8 19.9 13.4
-4  (bottom) 22.7 19.5 12.8
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At the age of 96 all those still left alive are assumed to die, so that the model 
actually incorporates up to 96 full years of life for each sex. Although it is easy to 
continue to simulate life histories beyond this age, major computer storage 
problems were encountered during construction of the model, and truncating 
lifespans was a relatively efficient way of dealing with this problem, as only some 
5 per cent of females and 2 per cent of males were still ’alive’ at age 96, with the 
proportion dropping rapidly each year thereafter.
As a comparison of Figures 2.1 and 2.2 demonstrates, the population pyramid 
produced by application of the 1986 death rates does not match that actually 
existing in 1986. The proportion of the population who are aged 60 and over is 
higher in the simulation than in Australia in 1986, and the percentage who are 
aged 80 and over is double that of 1986. This is because the population structure 
actually existing in 1986 was a product of the higher death rates applying in earlier 
years and major events such as the two world wars (as well as birth rates and 
immigration). For example, death rates for 70 year olds were lower in 1986 than 
they had been 20 years earlier. Consequently, more of the 70 year olds in the 
model survive to reach the age of 71, thus producing a different population 
structure to the 1986 Australian population. In other words, the model shows 
what the population would look like if the death rates applying in 1986 continued 
for 95 years, rather than showing what the population did look like in 1986.
2.3 DISABILITY, HANDICAP AND INVALIDITY
This module imputes the disability, handicap and invalidity status of cohort 
members from birth to death. Construction of the module was severely restricted 
by the lack of longitudinal data about the probabilities of entry to and exit from 
various disability states. As a result, the 1988 Disabled and Aged Persons 
Survey (ABS, 1989), which is the most recent comprehensive cross-section data 
source on disability and handicap, was used to determine the percentage of 
males and females who were disabled and handicapped in each age group, but
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Figure 2.1: Population Age Structure of the Simulated Population
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Figure 2.2: Population Age Structure of Australia, 1986.
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it could shed no light on the likelihood of exit or entry. This Survey found that in 
early 1988 a higher proportion of the population regarded themselves as disabled 
and handicapped than in 1981, when the last survey was undertaken 
(ABS,1984:71). However, no adjustment to the 1988 data has been undertaken, 
so it is implicitly assumed in the model to provide an adequate representation of 
the picture in 1986.
The 1988 survey found that 15.6 per cent of the population were disabled (ie. had 
one or more of a specified list of disabilities and impairments), and that the 
incidence of disability varied by sex and increased sharply with age (ABS, 1989:1). 
Accordingly, the probability of being selected to be disabled in the simulation varies 
by age and sex. Once assigned, disabled status is retained until death.
The ABS survey also found that 84 per cent of the disabled population were 
handicapped, with handicap being defined as a disability which limited the ability 
of a person to perform specified activities and tasks in areas such as mobility, self 
care and employment (1989). In the model the relevant proportion of the disabled 
were randomly selected to be handicapped in each age and sex group. 
Handicapped status was again retained until death, except where there was a 
decline in the proportion of handicapped persons, in which case the correct 
number of handicapped cohort members were selected to exit handicapped status.
A proportion of handicapped cohort males between the ages of 16 and 64 and 
cohort females between the ages of 16 and 59 were also randomly selected to be 
eligible to be invalid pension recipients (to receive invalid pension a person of 
workforce age must be 85 per cent permanently incapacitated for work). 
Essentially, the module records a ’yes’ code in the invalidity status variable for all 
individuals randomly selected to be eligible to receive an invalid pension, a 
sheltered employment allowance or a rehabilitation allowance, in line with the 
probability of receipt by age and sex (calculated from DSS data on the 
characteristics of such recipients).
56
It is difficult to determine how long people remain on invalid pension as the 
Department of Social Security has no data on completed durations on invalid 
pension in 1986 (or any other year). However, data on the current and average 
duration of existing recipients (rather than terminated recipients) shows that 
duration on invalid pension tends to be very lengthy with, for example, the average 
duration on pension for females aged 30-39 being 10.6 years in 1986 
(DSS,1986a:31). This suggests that a very substantial proportion of such 
recipients commenced invalid pension at the earliest possible age of 16 and 
remained on it thereafter.
Terminations of invalid pension in the year to June 1986 on the grounds of ’not 
permanently incapacitated’ and ’other reasons’ (such as voluntary withdrawal of 
pension) reached 7706, amounting to 2.8 per cent of all invalid pension recipients 
(DSS, 1986b:12). The number of invalid cohort members was so low that it was 
impossible to select 2.8 per cent of cohort invalids to exit invalidity status every 
year (or even to select 14 per cent every five years). Consequently, these exits 
were cumulated, and every ten years 28 per cent of existing invalids were 
selected to exit invalid status (with other handicapped cohort members then 
entering invalid status, in order to maintain the correct proportion of invalids).
Once a person left invalid status they had the same probability as all other 
non-invalids of being chosen for another period of invalidity. In other words, the 
probability of being an invalid was Markovian, and did not depend on any periods 
of invalidity which occurred before the immediately preceding year. The above 
steps in the simulation of disability states are summarised in Figure 2.3.
Disability, handicap and invalidity are all assumed not to affect the probabilities of 
schooling usage, re/marriage, divorce, childbirth and death, principally because 
no data were available to calculate the relevant probabilities. However, people 
who are coded as invalid are precluded from participation in tertiary education. 
This is not to suggest that severely disabled people do not attend tertiary 
institutions, but as a person has to be 85 per cent permanently incapacitated for
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work to receive invalid pension, it seems reasonable to assume that the proportion 
of invalid pensioners attending tertiary institutions must be negligible.
Figure 2.3: Structure of the Disability Status Module
NOT 
D lSA B LED
t-1
DISABLED
t-1
HAND I CAPPED
t-1
IN VALID
t-1
C 2 >
t
NOT 
D ISA B LED
t
DISABLED
t
HAND I CAPPED
t
IN VALID
t
(1) Exits at ages 15 and 65 for males and age 15 for females.
(2) Exits at ages 20,30, 40, 50 and 60 (with all males exiting at age 65 and all females at age 60, when 
invalid pension is no longer payable and is effectively replaced by age pension.
In addition, as the 1986 Income Distribution Survey does allow the identification of 
those receiving invalid pension (although it does not contain data on other disability 
states), it was possible to make invalidity status affect employment status in the 
labour force participation module and thus subsequently affect earned and 
unearned income. Recent British research has shown that the workforce 
participation rates of the disabled are approximately half those of non-disabled 
people in the UK and that their earnings are lower (although this is principally due 
to fewer hours worked rather than a lower hourly wage rate) (Martin and White, 
1988). However, the applicability of these data to Australia was uncertain, and
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therefore no attempt was made to adjust the labour force participation patterns of 
those who were disabled but not invalid.
The simulation of disability in the US DYNASIM model was much more complex 
than that outlined above, because the builders of the model were fortunate enough 
to have the PSID longitudinal data, and could thereby calculate the probability of 
yearly exits and entries to disability states by a range of characteristics, including 
race, marital status, education and disability status in the preceding year. They 
found that under 35 year olds (and to a lesser extent females) had significantly 
greater odds of recovery than other disabled groups (Orcutt et al, 1976:181). 
There are, however, no comparable longitudinal Australian data and better 
modelling of such exits represents a future area for improvement of the model.
However, if it is assumed that those who are disabled when they are children are 
likely to retain those disabilities, then the age group of key interest from the 
standpoint of possible exit from disability states is 15 to 35 year olds; as only some 
6.5 per cent of the population are disabled between ages 15 and 30 (and 75 per 
cent of these are handicapped and thus perhaps rather less likely to exit disability 
status), the exclusion of recovery from disabilities in the simulation should not 
markedly affect the imputed incidence of relevant government expenditures.
2.4 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLING
This module assigns preschool, primary and secondary schooling status to cohort 
members aged four to 19. Some 75 per cent of each Australian birth cohort begin 
primary school at age five (variously termed preparatory, kindergarten, reception 
etc by the different States). However, Queensland does not have a Pre-Year 1 
grade, so that most students there commence Year 1 at age six, while in other 
states a minority of any given birth cohort commence Pre-Year 1 at ages four or 
six. Although the model does not simulate attendance by State, but only on an
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Australia-wide basis, the model captures these differential starting dates so that, 
for example, those who leave school at the end of their 16th year may have 
completed four, five or six years of secondary schooling.
Pre-School
There are limited reliable data on the usage of publicly funded preschools by age 
and sex, particularly as all three levels of government are involved in funding 
preschools. In the model it is assumed that some 74 per cent of four year old 
children use preschools, after comparison of the number of children using 
pre-school in November 1984 (ABS,1986a:7) with the number of four and five year 
olds in the population and after taking out the estimated number of five year olds 
using preschools.
Only those children attending publicly subsidised preschools are relevant to the 
calculation of expenditure incidence. On the basis of Queensland data, which 
appear to provide the only detailed breakdown by age of usage of government- 
assisted and unsubsidised preschools, 11 per cent of four year olds attending 
preschool are assumed to attend unsubsidised centres (ABS, 1986b; 12). Overall, 
therefore, 66 per cent of all cohort four year olds are selected to attend publicly 
funded preschools. Most five year olds begin primary school and are thus no 
longer at preschool, but all of those who delay primary entrance until the age of 
six are assumed to attend preschool at ages four and five.
Primary School
Beginning at the age of five, cohort members are allocated to either a 
government, Catholic or Independent school (with independent schools 
representing the private, non-Catholic schooling sector) with the probability of 
attending each sector being dependent upon sex and parental socio-economic 
status. Unpublished data supplied by the ABS from their 1986 National Schools 
Statistics Collection were used to determine the correct proportion of students in
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each of the three sectors by age and sex. These data show, for example, the 
percentage of male 13 year olds attending Catholic schools.
The ABS data do not, however, provide information about the socio-economic 
status (SES) of the families of students in each sector. Yet there is a substantial 
body of research which shows that a greater proportion of the students in private 
schools are drawn from families with high SES, that the likelihood of completing 
Year 12 is strongly correlated with SES, and that the probability of entering 
university also varies greatly by SES (eg. Williams et al,1987; Quality of Education 
Committee, 1985:46; Anderson and Vervoon, 1983:77; Hayden, 1982). Although 
SES is clearly very important, there do not appear to be any recent data about the 
socio-economic status of the parents of primary school students by schooling 
sector.
The results of the 1971-72 national survey of secondary school leavers have 
therefore been used to set the relevant primary school entrance probabilities, even 
though it must be recognised that the occupational status of parents would be likely 
to change during the period from when their children entered primary school to 
when they left secondary school. This survey showed that about 27 per cent of 
public school leavers, 36 per cent of Catholic school leavers and 70 per cent of 
independent school leavers had fathers whose occupation was categorised as 
professional, professional-technical or employer-managerial (Radford and Wilkes, 
reported in Anderson and Vervoon, 1983: 82). It also showed that very few of the 
children of skilled and unskilled manual fathers attended independent schools. 
While the above study is rather dated, research has shown that the socio­
economic distribution of students at secondary schools, universities and CAE’s 
has remained remarkably stable over time (Anderson and Vervoon, 1983).
After translating the probabilities of attendance by occupation of father (which was 
not simulated in the model) into probabilities of attendance by parental socio­
economic status (which was in the model), the following probabilities, shown in 
Table 2.2, of being assigned to a schooling sector at age 5 were used in the
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simulation (1). For example, 10 per cent of all male children whose family 
belonged to the top SES group were sent to independent schools (Table 2.2).
Table 2.2: Assumed Probability of Attending School Sectors by Sex at Age 
Five
Probability of Attending Each Schooling Sector at Age Five
Government Catholic Independent
Males
- SES 1 (top) .67 .23 .10
-SES 2 .76 .20 .04
-SES 3 .82 .16 .02
- SES 4 (bottom) .79 .20 .01
Females
- SES 1 (top) .66 .24 .11
-SES 2 .75 .20 .04
-SES 3 .81 .18 .01
- SES 4 (bottom) .78 .21 .01
While this gave the initial attendance probabilities, there are substantial shifts 
between the three schooling sectors each year, particularly at the cross-over point 
between primary and secondary schooling (Department of Education 
(Commonwealth), 1980). The Victorian Ministry of Education appears to be the 
only government department to have examined flows between the three sectors 
in detail and these data are used to parametise the model, with some adjustment 
to reported flows so that the total number of cohort students remains constant (the
(1) In using the results of the above survey to set the model parameters a method had to be found of 
mapping the occupational categories used in the survey onto the SES quartiles used in the simulation. 
To do this, it was assumed that the 25 per cent of fathers who belonged to SES Group 1 consisted 
of all of the professional fathers and about 75 per cent of the employer-managerial category. The 
remaining employer-managerial members, clerical-administrative workers, sales-clerical workers and 
about half of the skilled manual workers were assigned to SES Group 2. The other 50 per cent of 
fathers, consisting of the remaining skilled manual workers, semi and un-skilled workers and the 
unemployed were assigned to the bottom two SES Groups.
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original flow figures being affected by immigration and emigration from the state 
of Victoria) (1986). While Victoria has a greater proportion of secondary students 
in private schools than most other States, this does not mean that the proportion 
of students changing sectors in any one year will necessarily be unrepresentative.
Four possible flows are modelled - from government to Catholic and independent 
schools respectively, from Catholic to government schools and from independent 
to government schools. A negligible number of students swap between the 
Catholic and independent sectors so this flow is ignored, and in years when the 
proportion of students shifting from government schools falls belows one per cent 
then the potential flow is aggregated for a year or two until the shift exceeds one 
or two per cent. Students can currently shift sectors at ages 6 ,9 ,1 1 ,1 2  and 14.
The Victorian data also allow calculation of the number of students repeating any 
given year of primary and secondary schooling. Because the probabilities of 
repeating a year by sector are so low, no attempt is made to model students 
repeating individual years of schooling. However, the effect of repeating a year 
is captured when students exit schooling, because it affects the number of years 
of secondary schooling that a student is assumed to have completed (with the 
relevant distribution being derived from the National Schools Collection).
Secondary School
At the ages of 15 to 19 inclusive, students are allowed to either continue for 
another year of secondary schooling or drop out of school. The probability of 
continuing their education (and completing Years 10, 11 and 12 respectively) is 
based upon their age, sex, parental SES and type of school attended. The 
probabilities for age, sex and sector can be calculated from the National Schools 
Collection data, while the likely difference in these probabilities by SES is imputed 
from Williams’ results about the proportion of students completing Year 12 by a 
variable termed ’family wealth’, which is based upon housing characteristics and 
the family’s possession of material items such as dishwashers and telephones
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(1987). Williams found that 22 per cent of male students belonging to families in 
the lowest family wealth quartile had completed Year 12 by the age of 19, with the 
proportion increasing to 33 per cent for male students in families in the middle two 
quartiles and rising further to 52 per cent for male students belonging to families 
ranked in the top quartile of family wealth (1987:166). The relevant proportions for 
female students belonging to the same 1982 cohort were 28, 41 and 52 per cent 
respectively.
Once students have dropped out of school they cannot return. An additional 
simplification is that, while some one percent of 20 year olds are still in school, 
this percentage is too low to justify the additional modelling effort, so that all 
teenagers still at school at 19 are assumed to leave school at the end of that year. 
The steps involved in simulating schooling are summarised in Figure 2.4, while 
Figure 2.5 traces the passage through the schooling module of a sample of four 
males and four females from the pseudo-cohort. For example, Male No 21 
completes two years of preschool, attends a government school from ages 6 to 11 
inclusive, and then shifts to an independent school at age 12, leaving school at the 
end of his 17th year. Similarly, Female No 2010 also attends two years of 
preschool, and then attends a Catholic school from ages 6 to 16 inclusive, so that 
at the start of her 17th year she has left school.
Apparent Retention Rates
The apparent retention rates by SES and by sector produced by the model are 
shown in Table 2.3. These retention rates are comparable to those of Australia 
in 1986 in that, for example, women have higher retention rates than men, while 
independent schools have higher retention rates to Year 12 than any other sector, 
followed by Catholic and then government schools. The model appears to perform 
well, as the average retention rates by sex produced by the model to Years 10 
and 12 are almost identical to those reported by the ABS (1987a), with some 45 
per cent of males and 52 per cent of females remaining at school until Year 12.
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Figure 2.4: Structure of the Schooling Module
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Figure 2.5: Schooling Records of Eight Individuals in the Model
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The results by schooling sector are, however, very different. This is because 
apparent retention rates simply show the number of Year 12 students in a given 
sector in 1986 divided by the number of Year 7 students in 1981 in the same 
sector; this methodology means that gradual sectoral shifts, such as occurred 
during the early 1980s when the proportion of all students attending private 
schools was increasing, can distort actual retention rates. The model holds the 
sectoral shares fixed at their 1986 levels and thus shows the retention rates that 
would result if the split between sectors in 1986 remained constant for the next 
14 years.
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The retention rates by SES for each sex are also higher than those found by 
Williams (1987). This is probably largely due to the increase in retention rates 
between 1984, when the Williams sample was surveyed, and 1986. In addition, 
Williams found when he resurveyed the 1978 class at the age of 22 that 
retention rates to Year 12 were significantly higher than when he had surveyed 
the 1978 class at the age of 19. In other words, many of the sample managed 
to complete Year 12 between the ages of 19 and 22. In the model, such late 
completers are all assumed to complete before the age of 20. The results by SES 
also compare reasonably well to those produced by the Department of 
Employment, Education and Training (1987b:17), although the Department’s 
study is by SES deciles rather than SES quartiles.
Table 2.3: Apparent Retention Rates to Years 10 and 12 Produced by the 
Model and From Other Data Sources
Apparent Retention Rates Apparent
Produced by the Model Retention
_________________________ Rates From
Males Females Other Data 
Sources
By Sector, Retention to Year 12 DEET(1987a)
- Government .42 .48 .42
- Catholic .47 .53 .57
- Independent .67 .74 .91
By SES, Retention to Year 12 Williams(1987)
Male/Female(1)
- SES 1 .60 .64 .52/.52
- SES 2 .50 .56 .42/.44
-S E S  3 .40 .47 .32/.36
-S E S  4 .31 .40 .22/.28
All Students ABS(1987a)
Male/Female
- Retention to Year 12 .451 .515 .456/.521
- Retention to Year 10 .943 .953 .932/.951
1) Retention rates for the 1982 class at age 19 by the family wealth variable, ’smoothed’ to provide a 
linear increase between the top and bottom quartiles (Williams, 1987:166).(That is, Williams combined 
the results for the middle two quartiles - with the combined average completion rates for the two 
quartiles being 33 per cent for males and 41 per cent for females - whereas in the above table an 
attempt has been made to split the middle quartiles.)
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2.5 TERTIARY EDUCATION
This module assigns attendance at universities, colleges of advanced education 
(CAEs) and Technical and Further Education institutions (TAFE) from ages 15 to 
50. While it was originally intended that entrances and exits to each of the above 
three sectors should be modelled independently, giving rise to six sets of 
probability estimates when each sector was divided into full and part-time studies, 
calculation of the relevant flows between the sectors and the required probabilities 
became too complex. As a result, only the probabilities of entering and leaving 
the following four areas are calculated;
- full-time university/CAE studies;
- part-time university/CAE studies;
- full-time TAFE studies; and
- part-time TAFE studies.
Full-Time University/CAE Studies
Many of the cohort complete Year 12 at age 17 and commence full-time university 
or college of advanced education (CAE) studies at age 18. However, some leave 
school after completing Year 12 at age 16 and start university at age 17, while 
others defer entry for a number of years; such variation is captured in the model.
The probability of attending tertiary institutions by age and sex is calculated for 15 
to 24 year olds using unpublished data from the ABS June 1986 Labour Force 
Survey, which divides 15-24 year olds into those still attending school full-time, 
those attending tertiary education institutions full-time and others. For 25 to 40 
year olds the probability of attendance by age and sex is based on the ABS 
collection Tertiary Education Australia’ (1987c) and the population benchmarks 
for June 1986 presented in ABS (1988a:22-23). For both of the above age 
groups, the division into part and full-time study and between the different tertiary
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sectors is that shown in ABS (1987c).
Probability of Entry to First Year of Full-Time University Study
From ages 17 to 20 inclusive, cohort members who have completed Year 12 of 
secondary school face a probability of selection for entry to Year 1 of full-time 
university, with the probability depending upon age, sex and parental SES. 
Socio-economic status is included as a major factor affecting university entrance 
during these early years, as a substantial body of research has shown that 
students from higher SES families are greatly over-represented at university 
(Anderson and Vervoon,1983; Linke et al, 1985; Power and Robertson, 1987; 
Crockett, 1987; Hayden, 1982; Wran et al, 1988).
The initial probability of attendance by age and sex derived from ABS (1987c) is 
thus adjusted up or down for 17 to 20 year olds, in accord with the 
socio-economic status of the student’s parents. The results by Williams, on 
university/CAE attendance by sex and family wealth quartile, are used to determine 
the magnitude of these differences in probability by SES of entrance to first year 
university/CAE studies (1987:166). For example, at the age of 18, 30 per cent of 
female Year 12 graduates whose parents belong to the lowest socio-economic 
quartile and who have not yet entered full or part-time university are selected to 
enter the first year of full-time study at university, compared to 42 per cent of 
comparable females with parents in the top SES quartile.
From the age of 21 and thereafter, parental SES is not included as a factor 
affecting entrance to university, reflecting research showing that while higher SES 
groups are still over-represented among mature age students their dominance is 
far less pronounced than among students proceeding direct from school to higher 
education (Anderson and Vervoon, 1983:11). From ages 21 to 24, therefore, 
university entrance is simply based on age and sex, with those potentially eligible 
to attend comprising all cohort members who have completed Year 12 and have 
never attended university.
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From ages 25 to 40 inclusive the pool of eligibles is widened to also include those 
who left school having only completed Year 10 or 11. This modification is 
designed to reflect the growing number of mature age university entrants who are 
admitted without a Year 12 certificate (with the Quality of Education Review 
Committee reporting that 15 per cent of commencing university undergraduates 
were admitted without a Year 12 credential in 1983) (1985:95).
Probability of Entry to Second and Third Years of Full-Time University Study
After entry to the first year of full-time university studies, students can either be 
selected to continue for a further year of full-time university study or to drop out 
of university. The pool eligible to be selected for a second year of study only 
comprises those who completed Year 1 in the immediately preceding year, and, 
similarly, those eligible to enter Year 3 only consists of those who completed Year
2 in the immediately preceding year. This also means that those who drop out of 
university after completion of Year 1 or 2 can never recommence full-time 
university (although they can commence part-time study to complete their degree).
The issue of how to treat university drop-outs and whether to allow them to ever 
re-enter full-time tertiary studies is complex, and the above solution of debarring 
Year 2 and 3 drop-outs from any future attendance lies at one end of a possible 
spectrum of simulations. The methodology lying at the other end of the spectrum 
- of allowing Year 2 and 3 dropouts to be eligible for commencement of Year 2 or
3 at any time in the future - was tested, but was found to be unsuitable. This is 
because, for many of the cohort, the completion patterns which were then 
generated were atypical with, for example, students frequently commencing Year
2 three years after dropping out of Year 1, and subsequently commencing Year
3 five years after dropping out of Year 2.
Such unlikely results were generated because the probability of completing a 
further year of tertiary education clearly does vary inversely with the length of time 
since the last year of university study was completed. However, there are no 
longitudinal Australian data which would allow calculation of the relevant
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probabilities and their inclusion in the program would in any event be extremely 
complex. Faced with the same problem, the designers of the US DYNASIM 
model were also forced to compromise, and used enrollment probabilities which 
produced the final attainment rates of completed years of college and did ’not bear 
any relation to the actual attendance pattern at college’ (Orcutt et al,1976:130). 
Similarly, in the DEMOGEN model, education attainment was assigned at birth, 
and no attempt was made to simulate the year-by-year passage through 
educational institutions (Harding, 1990:41).
However, despite the data deficiencies, it was decided to attempt to simulate the 
yearly passage through tertiary studies in Australia, so that receipt of education 
cash transfers could be modelled adequately. There is relatively little firm data 
about tertiary education flows in Australia, partly because accurate measurement 
is complicated by such factors as student intra-state, inter-state and overseas 
transfers; students suspending their studies but later recommencing and 
completing; students switching from full-time to part-time study and vice versa; 
and so on. Because of this, it must be emphasised that the model only provides 
rough estimates of flow patterns. While it produces exactly the right proportion of 
males and females attending full-time university at each age, the division of those 
students into Year 1 students, Year 2 students and so on up to Year 9 students, 
is only an estimate based on very little data.
The probability of proceeding to a second year of full-time university education 
was taken from the flow charts of West et al (1986:26-27), with around 65 per 
cent of those commencing Year 1 in the simulation subsequently commencing Year 
2. West et al also found that about 90 per cent of those who completed Year 2 
had graduated within the next five years. In the model about 80 per cent of Year 
2 full-time completers are selected to continue to Year 3 the following year.
Probability of Entry to Fourth and Subsequent Years of Full-Time University
Entry to Years 4 and 5 of full-time tertiary education differs from entry to Years 2 
and 3, in that those eligible for entry comprise all of those who have ever
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completed Years 3 and 4 respectively (rather than just those who completed in the 
immediately preceeding year). This refinement was made because many 
graduates do not immediately proceed to graduate diplomas, Honours, Masters 
or Phd courses, but have a number of years in the workforce before 
recommencing their studies. The probability of completing a fourth or fifth year 
of full-time university is dependent upon sex (because slightly fewer women 
proceed to post-graduate degrees) and age (with a slightly higher proportion 
assumed to continue to further degrees at younger ages). Overall, 44 per cent 
of men and 38 per cent of women who have completed Year 3 in the model 
proceed to a fourth year of full-time university and about one third of these then 
proceed to a fifth year.
The maximum number of years of full-time university modelled is nine, and 
entrance to Years 6 to 9 is only allowed to those who have completed Years 5, 
6, 7 and 8 respectively in the immediately preceding year. This does not 
completely capture the typical time pattern of Phd completion, where about 
one-third of candidates suspend their studies for a year or so and only a minority 
submit their theses within four years (Department of Employment, Education and 
Training, 1988a, 1988b). However, the former report showed that 75 per cent of 
male Phd candidates and about 60 per cent of female candidates submit within 
five years, which is the maximum amount of time allowed in the model, and the 
number of cohort members submitting after this is too insignificant to justify the 
modelling effort. The model appears at least as reliable as the DYNASIM model, 
in which it was assumed that all of those who attended graduate school did so for 
exactly two years and then left (Orcutt et al,1976:132).
The various probabilities for continuing to the next year of full-time university study 
are also set so that under plausible assumptions about how years of completed 
full-time study match to completed degree requirements, the correct proportion of 
the cohort graduate from full-time university with various degrees and diplomas. 
Thus, two per cent of male graduates and 0.6 per cent of female graduates 
emerge with Phds, 21 per cent of male graduates and 19 per cent of female
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graduates gain masters degrees or post-graduate diplomas, and the remainder 
earn bachelors degrees, diplomas and associate diplomas. This was the 
distribution of degrees and diplomas awarded in Australia by universities and 
CAEs in 1985 (ABS, 1987c:33,67). The procedures followed in simulating full-time 
university studies for one individual are outlined in Figure 2.6.
Part-Time University/CAE Studies
All of those who drop out of full-time university are eligible for possible entry to 
part-time university. Calculating flows between full and part-time sectors and the 
size of eligible populations was so complicated that only transfers from full to part- 
time study were allowed, with possible incorporation of transfers from part to full­
time study being left for future consideration. At the moment, therefore, once a 
cohort member has completed a year of part-time university he or she can never 
attend full-time university. However, the flow modelled appears to be the most 
important one, as it allows cohort members to complete full-time degrees and later 
undertake part-time graduate diplomas or masters degrees.
Between the ages of 17 to 24 inclusive, possible entry to Year 1 of part-time 
university is allowed to all of those with Year 12 completion who have either not 
attended full-time university or have dropped out of it. The probability of 
attendance is based on age and sex. SES is not included as an explanatory 
variable, first, because research has shown that it is less important for part-time 
than full-time study and, second, because the number attending part-time 
university before the age of 21, when SES is a particularly important factor, is 
relatively small.
From ages 25 to 40 inclusive, entry to Year 1 of part-time university is extended 
to those without a Year 12 certificate, to capture the impact of mature age 
entrants. At all ages, entry to the next year of part-time university is only allowed 
to those who were in part-time studies in the immediately preceding year. In other 
words, part-time university drop-outs cannot recommence their studies. However,
73
Figure 2.6: Structure of the Full-Time University Education Module
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as many part-time students are only completing one or two year diplomas or 
postgraduate degrees this limitation is less significant than for full-time studies. 
The maximum number of part-time university years allowed is six.
For both full and part-time university studies no cohort members aged 41 or over 
are allowed to attend university, as the proportion of the cohort attending above 
these ages is so low that the random selection procedure becomes too unreliable.
The model produces results which appear plausible at younger ages, as 
summarised in Table 2.4 (there are no comparable data which can be used for 
validation at older ages). Williams results are for periods spanning some two to 
five years before 1986 and, given the increases in both secondary retention rates 
and university participation rates which occurred between the two periods and 
which particularly affected women, the model’s results seem quite good. 
However, the model does result in about half of the cohort attending at least one 
year of full or part-time university/CAE at sometime during their life. In part this 
is due to a period effect, whereby those who were in middle to older age groups 
in 1986 went to university to gain the degrees which they did not have the
Table 2.4: University and CAE Attendance Rates Produced by the Model and 
By Williams
Percent of cohort ever 
attending university 
or CAE
Model Williams (1987)
Males Females Males Females
All Persons
- by age 19 22 23 19(1) 18(1)
- by age 22 30 30 27(2) 25(2)
- all ages 49 48 n.a. n.a.
Year 12 Graduates
- by age 19 49 46 56 (1) 42(1)
- by age 22 66 61 63 (2) 53(2)
(1) Percent of 1982 sample in uni/CAE by age 19 (in year 1984)
(2) Percent of 1978 sample in uni/CAE by age 22 (in year 1983)
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opportunity to gain when they were in their twenties and access to tertiary 
education was very limited, while those in their twenties in 1986 had high 
university participation rates and will presumably thus not need to return to 
university when they are middle-aged.
Despite this problem, it has been decided not to tamper with the data to adjust for 
this period effect in the initial version of the model. The magnitude of the 
adjustment which would be required cannot be accurately calculated, and it might 
well be that the continuing widening of access to those without Year 12 certificates 
might result in university participation rates at older ages remaining at the 1986 
level, despite higher participation rates at younger ages. In addition, despite these 
higher rates, a significant number of academically talented teenagers from lower 
SES groups still do not attend university while young, and such groups might well 
wish to take up tertiary studies in later years. Finally, the overall aim of the model 
was to replicate Australian society just as it was in 1986: in every field which is 
modelled there will undoubtedly be major period and cohort effects like that 
discussed above, but attempting to correct for some but not others will simply 
raise questions about exactly what is being modelled.
Under plausible assumptions about how years of completed full and part-time 
university study correlate with completed degrees, an estimated 16 per cent of all 
men and women in the cohort graduate with 3 year bachelors degrees, around 4 
per cent of men and women with masters degrees or postgraduate diplomas, and 
0.5 per cent of men and 0.1 per cent of women with Phds. (These percentages 
show various types of graduates as a proportion of the entire cohort whereas the 
earlier figures, mentioned under full-time university study, showed various types of 
graduates as a proportion of all graduates.)
Part-Time TAFE Studies
From ages 15 to 19 inclusive, cohort members who have never attended 
university can enter the first year of part-time TAFE, irrespective of the number of
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years of secondary school completed. Males and females can complete up to four 
years of consecutive part-time TAFE (ie apprenticeships). The probability of 
attendance is based solely on age and sex. However, because those from lower 
SES families tend to leave school at 15 and 16 and enter TAFE while their higher 
SES compatriots are still attending school, attendance at TAFE varies strongly by 
SES. TAFE drop outs may re-enter TAFE at any time. The model results in 34 
per cent of all male cohort members completing three years of part-time TAFE by 
age 19, which seems to accord well with the finding by Williams that 34 per cent 
of his cohort had ever undertaken apprenticeships by age 19 (1987:166).
From ages 20 to 50 inclusive, part-time TAFE attendance is only assigned for a 
single year, with the probabilities of attendance dependent upon age and sex, and 
all of those not actually studying at university in that particular year eligible for 
entry.
Full-Time TAFE Studies
Full-time TAFE study is assigned from ages 15 to 50 inclusive, and anyone not 
in another form of tertiary study in that particular year and not still at school is 
potentially eligible to attend. While it would be desirable to make the modelling of 
TAFE flows more sophisticated than that outlined above, there were no data on 
flows which could be used to supply the relevant probabilities, although they might 
become available during the next few years as TAFE information collection 
systems improve.
Only TAFE streams 1 to 5 are modelled. Stream 6 consists of adult education 
’hobby’ courses, in which costs are largely met by participants fees, and which are 
thus less relevant to the calculation of expenditure incidence.
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Lifetime Educational Attainment of Pseudo-Cohort
After all education has been completed, about 19 per cent of both cohort males 
and females have attained a degree, while some 71 per cent of males and 68 per 
cent of females have gained some type of tertiary qualification (including a trade 
certificate) but not a degree (Figure 2.7). The remaining 10 per cent of males and 
13 per cent of females only achieve secondary school qualifications. These 
educational achievement rates are, of course, much higher than those actually 
apparent amongst the population in 1986, but simply reflect the future educational 
position of the population if current patterns of educational participation continue.
Figure 2.8 traces the tertiary education profiles of eight pseudo-cohort members.
For example, Male No 3 and Female No 2318 had both left school by the 
beginning of their sixteenth year, but subsequently went on to gain trade 
qualifications through part-time TAFE studies. Male No 25 left school at the 
beginning of his eighteenth year and immediately entered full-time university 
studies, completing four years of full-time university from ages 18 to 21 inclusive, 
and subsequently completing a part-time postgraduate qualification through three 
years of part-time university study at ages 23 to 25. Male No 1998 completed no 
further tertiary education after leaving school at the end of his seventeenth year, 
while Female No 2856 left school at the same age but gained a degree through 
six years of part-time university study from ages 20 to 25 inclusive. Finally, 
Female No 2484 was a mature-age university student, who completed no tertiary 
studies in the fifteen years after leaving school, but returned to full-time university 
studies at ages 33 to 35 and gained a degree.
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Figure 2.7: Lifetime Educational Qualifications of the Pseudo-Cohort by Sex
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Figure 2.8: Tertiary Education Records of Eight Individuals in the Model
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2.6 FAMILY FORMATION AND DISSOLUTION
The simulation of family formation and dissolution is extremely complex. 
Numerous factors influence marriage and divorce, age at first marriage, the 
likelihood of remarriage. Family formation and dissolution rates have changed 
continuously during the twentieth century. It is also not clear which is the most 
appropriate set of rates to use in modelling family formation. For example, in 
modelling the probability of marriage, one option is to take the probabilities of 
marriage for women aged 25 in 1980, 26 in 1981, 27 in 1982 and so on: such
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rates accurately portray the experience of a real cohort but they are incomplete 
(eg. we don’t know how women born in 1955 will behave once they reach the age 
of 40) and their experience might not be replicated by any other cohort because 
of major period or cohort effects.
Yet there are also major questions about the validity of using annual (ie. 
cross-section) marriage and divorce rates, as they are also likely to embody 
major period and cohort effects; for example, after the introduction of no-fault 
divorces in Australia, through the 1976 Family Law Act, divorce rates shot up, and 
any model based on divorce rates during this period would therefore incorporate 
a very strong but temporary period effect. Similarly, strong cohort effects could 
bias cross-section data with, for example, age at first marriage having steadily 
increased and first marriage and remarriage rates having steadily decreased since 
the early 1970s (ABS,1988b; Carmichael, 1986a).
In the model no attempt is made to remove cohort or period effects from marriage 
and divorce rates and no estimates are made of how these rates might change 
in the future. The model simply uses the age and sex-specific marriage, 
remarriage and divorce rates for 1986 calculated by the ABS (1988b, 1988c). 
This means that the model replicates a world in which the 1986 rates apply for 
95 years. It is, however, possible to change the various rates and examine the 
consequent impact.
Family Formation
There are essentially two main approaches to the simulation of marriage in 
dynamic microsimulation models. One approach is to synthetically ’create’ a 
marriage partner for those simulated cohort members selected to marry, generating 
the characteristics of the new spouse in the same way as the characteristics of the 
original cohort member were progressively built up. Such an approach is used in 
the Canadian DEMOGEN and West German SFB3 models. The second 
alternative is to make males and females in the simulation marry each other; this
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method is the only one which can be used in dynamic population models, but in 
dynamic cohort models a choice remains.
One problem with creating new synthetic spouses is that additional computer 
storage space has to be found to store their characteristics; as the size of the data 
set comprising the output of the HARDING model was already very large and 
creating storage problems, it was decided to make the cohort men and women 
marry each other.
All those involved in constructing dynamic microsimulation models encounter the 
classic ’two-sex’ problem in demography: because the probabilities of re/marriage 
are different for each sex at each age, it is difficult to decide what to do if more of 
one sex are selected to marry in any given year than the other. All models 
essentially solve the problem by averaging the rates or giving one sex’s rates 
priority.
For example, in the DYNASIM model, the relevant marriage rates are applied to 
both males and females and those who are thus selected to marry form a pool of 
eligibles. Matches are then made by linking eligible partners of opposite sexes 
and if there is an excess of one sex in the pool of eligibles "those for whom no 
potential mate exists are considered to have been victims of a marriage squeeze 
and are returned to the population to await next year’s lottery" (Orcutt et al, 
1976:67). This procedure thus means that the correct number of men and women 
may not get married each year and that the difference between marriage and 
remarriage rates at any given age may not be maintained.
An alternative procedure is to apply the relevant re/marriage probabilties to either 
men or women, and then ensure that all of those selected to marry find a suitable 
partner. This appears to be the procedure adopted by the SFB3 model, in which 
the need to synchronize the probabilities of marriage for men and women has 
resulted in the biographies for men being initialised by women (Hain and 
Helberger, 1986:62). The Canadian DEMOGEN model solves the problem by
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making male first marriage rates dominant for half of the sample and female first 
marriage rates dominant for the other half, thereby effectively averaging the rates 
(Wolfson, 1989b:32).
A number of methods of modelling marriage were tested when building the 
HARDING model. The model follows the SFB3 approach, in that all those 
members of the ’initialising’ sex who are selected to marry always find a spouse 
of the opposite sex. The next question was whether to make men or women the 
’initialising’ sex. When men’s re/marriage and divorce rates were used to 
determine family formation and dissolution patterns, major problems were then 
encountered in modelling childbirth. Fewer men than women marry, while men 
also tend to marry later and remarry more frequently, and these different lifetime 
patterns meant that usage of men’s rates led to too few married women during the 
critical peak childbearing years and thus to insufficient children.
On the other hand, when the option of using just women’s rates was tested, too 
many men were married and had families, relative to men’s situation in the real 
world. It seemed important that neither sex’s lifetime patterns be more greatly 
misrepresented than the other sex’s, so a decision was taken to use average 
rates. Given the two year age difference between marital partners which is 
maintained throughout the model, this means, for example, that the first marriage 
rate for men aged 22 is the average of the male first marriage rate at 22 and the 
female first marriage rate at 20 .
These ’averaged’ rates were tested when first men and then women were used 
as the initialising sex. In the event the lifetime patterns created when men were 
used as the initialising sex were more realistic. For the sex which is not the 
initialising sex, marriage and remarriage rates at a given age are the same. 
Because the difference between marriage and remarriage rates is smaller for 
women than for men, the extent of error introduced is smaller when men are used 
as the intialising sex. In fact, the random selection procedure worked well, as it 
replicated the real world in resulting in more women than men getting married and
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a greater proportion of women marrying only once.
Spouses are matched in the model by sex, age and education level. The average 
age difference between spouses in Australia is two years and the model replicates 
this two year age difference. In later versions, it might be desirable to insert a 
probability matrix allowing a wider range of variation in spouse ages, but it is not 
clear whether this would make very much difference to the lifetime incidence 
results.
Cohort males are allowed to marry from ages 17 to 80 and cohort women from 
ages 15 to 78 (with the difference between the two being due to the standard age 
gap between partners). Above age 80 the probabilities of re/marriage are too low 
to model. As cohort members cannot be divorced in the first year of marriage or 
remarried in the same year as they were divorced, cohort males can divorce at 
age 18 and above and remarry at age 19 and above. There is no limit to the 
number of remarriages which can occur but, when the 1986 rates are applied to 
the cohort, about 1.5 per cent have three or more marriages.
There is a range of research which shows that people tend to chose partners who 
share very similar characteristics to themselves and that when they do not the risk 
of marriage breakup is greater (Dyer,1988; Mugford,1980). This is also a 
mechanism for the continuation of social inequality and is thus important to a 
lifecycle study. Accordingly, partners in the model are also matched by whether 
or not they have ever attended university or colleges of advanced education. It 
is assumed that 75 per cent of males with such attendance marry women who 
have also had at least one year at a university or CAE, while the remaining 25 per 
cent marry women who have not attended such tertiary institutions. Similarly, 25 
per cent of males who have not attended university are assumed to marry women 
who have, and the remaining 75 per cent marry women who, like them, have 
never attended university.
If a 29 year old male is randomly selected for marriage, it is first checked whether
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or not he is destined to marry a university educated wife. If not, a mate is 
randomly selected from the pool of women who have not been to university and 
who are aged 26 and have the marital status of single, divorced or widowed. 
Thus, in the year the male is 29 he marries a wife who was single, divorced or 
widowed at age 26 and becomes married at age 27. The age, sex, disablity and 
education status of the wife are all known and the number and age of any children 
the woman brings to the marriage are recorded.
The marriage and remarriage rates used are the age and sex specific rates for 
Australia in 1986 (ABS, 1988b). While the remarriage rates of the divorced and 
widowed differ (King, 1980) both are given the same probability of remarriage in 
the model. Similarly, while King also showed that 90 per cent of marriages in 
1976 were between partners who had the same marital status (eg. both divorced 
or both never married), in the model the selection of wives for cohort males is not 
affected by the previous marital status of the cohort females. Both of these 
simplifying assumptions have been made to reduce the amount of complex 
programming required and could be areas for future improvement of the model.
A further major problem is created by the existence of de facto relationships, 
where the partners live together but are not legally married. As Table 2.5 shows, 
de facto relationships only comprise a significant proportion of all couple 
relationships below the age of 40. Not all de facto relationships are of great 
significance when modelling lifetime income. Relationships which only last for 
short periods of time or where the partners keep separate finances and do not 
share resources seem unlikely to significantly affect the lifetime income of either 
partner. However, it seems important to model longer term de facto relationships 
where the partners have very different incomes but do pool their resources (eg. 
because one partner is engaged in child care), because otherwise the lifetime 
welfare of both spouses is likely to be substantially misrepresented.
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Table 2.5: Proportion of Legally Married and De Facto Couples, Australia 
1986
Age of 
Male
Per Cent of Couples Who Are
Legally
Married
De Facto 
Married
15-19 25 75
20-24 69 31
25-29 87 13
30-34 93 7
35-39 95 5
40-44 96 4
45-49 97 3
50-59 98 2
60-85+ 99 1
Source: ABS 1986 Census of Population and Housing, unpublished microfiche (Table CX 0073).
There are, however, few data about the duration of de facto relationships. While 
the Australian National University’s Australian Family Project will presumably 
publish such estimates in the future, after analysis of their 1986 survey responses, 
there are few data to substantiate the impression that de facto relationships are 
of shorter duration than legal marriages or to show what proportion of de facto 
relationships ultimately become legal marriages.
In constructing the model it has been arbitrarily assumed that one-third of the de 
facto relationships when the male is aged 15 to 19 and one-half of all de facto 
relationships at later ages are committed ’marriage-like’ relationships likely to 
significantly affect the calculation of lifetime income. The probabilities of first 
marriage below age 40 have accordingly been slightly increased to achieve this 
result. This means that "married" cohort couples comprise both legally married 
couples and those living in marriage-like relationships. Upon the breakup of such 
couples, both groups are assumed to have the same probabilities of starting a 
second ’serious’ relationship, so the probabilities of remarriage have not been 
changed.
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All single and divorced cohort members who are not selected to marry in a given 
year retain their previous marital status for a further year. For those who are 
selected to marry the characteristics of the spouse are recorded and the number 
of marriages is increased by one.
Despite the various limitations described above, the model appears to produce 
reasonable results. As in the real world, women’s first marriage rates are higher 
than men’s and a greater proportion of cohort women marry. Similarly, men’s 
remarriage rates are higher than women’s and more men thus have two or more 
marriages. About 15 per cent of cohort males never marry, while around 64 per 
cent marry only once, and a further 19 per cent marry twice (Figure 2.9). The 
remainder marry three or four times. For women, as Figure 2.9 also illustrates, 
about 10 per cent never marry, almost 74 per cent marry once, about 15 per cent 
marry twice and around 1 per cent marry three or more times.
Family Dissolution
Although union dissolution rates can be calculated, official divorce statistics tend 
to simply provide age and sex specific divorce rates. As a result, as with marriage, 
dynamic modellers face the problem that the male and female partners in a 
marriage are likely to have different age-sex specific divorce rates. Taking any 
married cohort couple, if his probability of divorce in a given year according to 
official statistics is higher than her probability in the same year, whose probability 
should be given precedence? In DYNASIM the problem is solved by using the 
male probability of divorce. Both the DEMOGEN and the SFB3 models avoid the 
problem, the former by applying dissolution rates to unions rather than to 
individuals and the latter by basing divorce probabilities solely upon duration of the 
marriage. Another option is to average the two rates and, given the type of 
Australian data which are easily available, this is the procedure which has been 
followed in the model.
Cohort couples who are not legally married but living in ’marriage-like’ relationships
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Figure 2.9: Number of Marriages During the Lifetimes of Males and Females 
in the Model
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are assumed, in the absence of better data, to have the same probabilties of 
dissolution as legally married couples, and so the divorce rates have not been 
adjusted to take account of the inclusion of ’serious’ de factos.
There are numerous factors affecting the probability of divorce (Carmichael and 
McDonald, 1988). Divorce rates differ, for example, by previous marital status and 
religious conviction, and decline with increasing duration of marriage. However, 
in the model the divorce rates for the first married and remarried are the same, 
partly because of the difficulty of finding sufficiently accurate age-sex-marital 
status specific divorce rates and partly because modelling divorce is already very 
complex. Because of data deficiencies, the likelihood of divorce in the model also 
does not decline with marriage duration, but as divorce rates decline with 
increasing age this does not result in extraordinarily large numbers of divorces 
during late middle age. Nonetheless, it would be highly desirable to include 
duration of marriage as an additional explanatory variable in the next version of the 
model.
When cohort couples are randomly selected for divorce, any children remain with 
the mother. Couples not selected to divorce retain their married status for a 
further year. When tested, the model showed around one-third of all marriages 
ending in divorce. This seems to provide a realistic estimate of likely divorce rates 
for a cohort borne in 1986 (Carmichael and McDonald, 1988), and compares with 
the 38 per cent rate produced by the latest version of DEMOGEN (Wolfson, 
1989b:38).
As Figure 2.10 shows, some 71 per cent of males never experience divorce in the 
simulation, with the proportion being slightly higher than that for women because 
more men never marry. However, men are more likely to divorce more than once 
(partly because they are more likely to remarry than women), so that about 2.6 per 
cent of males experience two divorces during their entire lifetimes and 0.2 per cent 
three divorces. Only one woman in the synthetic population experienced three 
divorces.
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Figure 2.10: Number of Divorces During the Lifetimes of Males and Females 
in the Model
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Another major cause of family dissolution is death. For married couples, upon the 
death of either spouse the surviving spouse is given the code of widowed and 
returned to the pool of potentially available marriage partners. Any children 
remain with the surviving spouse, so that a number of cohort males do become 
sole parents. Sole parents who die exit the model, along with their children.
Families also change due to children leaving home. Children are allowed to leave 
home from age 15 onwards, and all are assumed to have left home by age 25. 
Based on probabilities calculated from the 1986 IDS, children of the pseudo-cohort 
are categorised as being at home but not in full-time study and not dependent; at 
home, in full-time study and dependent; or away from home.
Figure 2.11 illustrates the steps followed when simulating the yearly changes in 
family formation and dissolution in the model.
Figure 2.11: Structure of the Family Formation and Dissolution Module
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2.7 FERTILITY
A good model of fertility would contain the probabilities of giving birth by the age, 
marital status, parity and period since last childbirth of the mother (and 
additionally, by the duration of marriage for married women). However, the data 
do not exist to construct such an accurate model for Australia.
First, statistics are collected on the number of children already borne by married 
women when they register a birth, but these are only "previous issue to the 
current marriage". The children from previous marriages, earlier de facto 
relationships and so on are not counted (Carmichael, 1986b), and accurate 
estimates of births by parity are thus not possible. Second, the lack of data is 
even more serious for ex-nuptial births, where no data are collected about the 
number of children a mother has already borne. Ex-nuptial births have formed an 
increasing percentage of total births, reaching 16.8 per cent in 1986. As a result 
of these data deficiencies the birth section of the model is not fully 
comprehensive, but can be easily amended when better data become available.
The ABS has published the number of confinements by age for both married and 
unmarried women in 1986 (ABS,1987e:10 and 13) and these are used as the 
basis of the model. To calculate the probabilities of confinement by age and 
marital status, accurate estimates of the number of married and unmarried women 
(ie. of potential mothers) by age are also required. As noted in the earlier 
description of marriage, de facto relationships pose a considerable problem in 
lifecycle modelling and in the model it is assumed that one-third of all de facto 
relationships between the ages of 15 and 19 and one half at all later ages are 
serious ’marriage-like’ relationships. Partners in such ’marriage-like’ relationships 
are given the marital status of ’married’ in the model.
It is therefore important to adjust the births data, as a misleading impression would 
be created if all of the ex-nuptial births were assigned to sole parent mothers,
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when many were actually the product of two parents who lived in a marriage-like 
relationship. Table 2.6 shows the proportion of Australian ex-nuptial births by age 
of the mother in which paternity is acknowledged by the father (Choi and Ruzicka, 
1987:131). British data for 1987 found that exactly the same proportion - 68 per 
cent - of UK ex-nuptial births had the father’s name on the birth certificate and that 
in 70 per cent of these cases of joint registration the mother and father lived at the 
same address (CSO, 1989). It is therefore assumed in the model that 70 per cent 
of Australian fathers acknowledging paternity of ex-nuptial babies live with the 
mother in a ’marriage-like’ relationship, and these ex-nuptial babies are thus 
reassigned to the ’married parents’ category when calculating the probability of 
confinement by marital status in the model.
Table 2.6: Assumed Percentage of Ex-Nuptial Births With Parents in 
Marriage-Like Relationship in the Model, by Age of Mother
Age of 
mother
Percent of ex-nuptial 
births with paternity 
acknowledged in 1985 
(Choi et al, 1987)
Assumed percent of 
ex-nuptial births with 
parents in ’marriage­
like’ relationship in 
simulation *
15 to 19 59 41
20 to 24 70 49
25 to 29 74 52
30 to 34 75 53
35+ 74 52
All ages 68 48
* That is, second column is 70 per cent of first column.
A randomly generated number is assigned to every women every year between 
the ages of 15 and 44 inclusive. In the case of married women, when this 
number is less than or equal to the probability of confinement for a woman of her 
age, marital status and parity then she is selected for confinement. In the case of 
unmarried women, the probability of confinement is solely dependent on age and 
parity is thus not considered. As only around 10 per cent of all cohort babies are
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born to women who are not in ’marriage-like’ relationships, the extent of error 
introduced by failing to model ex-nuptial births by parity seems likely to be minor.
Once a woman has been selected for confinement the probability of a multiple 
birth is assigned. The probabilities are taken from the DYNASIM model, with 
98.12 per cent of all women selected for confinement giving birth to one child, 
1.85 per cent to two and 0.03 per cent to three children (Orcutt et al, 1976:64). 
Higher multiple births are not modelled as the probabilities are too low. Although 
a proportion of women who experience confinement do not achieve a live birth, and 
a significant proportion of babies die within the first year of life, to simplify the 
model these factors have not been taken account of, and no children are allowed 
to die. This might result in a fertility rate which is slightly too high given current 
trends.
However, when tested the model appeared to provide a reasonable representation 
of reality. The totai fertility rate for all cohort women was about 1.85, which 
compared well with the Australian total fertility rate of 1.87 children in 1986 (ABS, 
1988e:1). The cohort women thus give birth to somewhat less than two children, 
below the population replacement rate, and in accord with the latest fertility 
estimates by Australian demographers (Choi and Ruzicka, 1987:136).
As Table 2.7 shows, the parity progression rates also appear to be quite realistic. 
As expected, progression rates are much lower for unmarried mothers. It is 
difficult to compare the lifetime distribution of families by family size with 
cross-section distributions but, during the lifetime of cohort mothers, about 30 per 
cent produce one child, 33 per cent two children, 17 per cent three, and 8 per cent 
four or more children (Figure 2.12). The birth order of children as a proportion of 
all babies born to all cohort mothers is also very close to that recorded for married 
women only by the ABS in 1986: for example, about 32 per cent of all cohort 
babies were second children, while for married women in Australia in the same 
age range the relevant proportion was 35 per cent (1987e).
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Table 2.7: Parity Progression Rates in the Model and in Australia
1 to 2 
children
Estimated percent proceeding from 
2 to 3 3 to 4 4 to 5+ 
children children children
Australia
Married women 
only, aged 15-44(1)
87 49 32 42
Married women within 
10 yrs marriage 
duration(2)
80 39 22 ★
Model
Married women 76 44 32 42
Unmarried women 19 28 23 ★
All women 66 43 32 42
* Not available
Notes: (1) Calculated from ABS (1987e). (2) Choi and Ruzicka (1987:133)
Figure 2.12: Number of Children Born To Cohort Females
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Examples of Lifetime Family Records in the Model
To illustrate how the family formation, dissolution and fertility modules work in 
practice, Figure 2.13 illustrates some sample family histories of individuals in the 
simulation. For example, Female No 2064, at the left of the graph, became a sole 
parent at the age of 29, but subsequently married Male No 17 at the age of 34. 
They had no children together, and she was eventually widowed when he died at 
the age of 53. She then lived for another forty years by herself, finally dying at the 
age of 95.
Similarly, Female No 3372 and Male No 22 married in their late twenties, and 
almost immediately started a family, with their first child being born when she was 
aged 28 and the second and last being bom three years later. They then enjoyed 
a long marriage, until he died at the age of 78. In contrast, Male No 23 remained 
single for the whole of his life, finally dying at the age of 70.
2.8 CONCLUSION
Much of the data needed to simulate accurately the processes of demography, 
disability and education are not available in Australia, particularly data which deal 
with the probabilities of exiting and entering states, such as disability or full-time 
study. As a result, the relevant probabilities have to be inferred from cross-section 
data which show the percentage of a relevant group in a particular state, from 
overseas evidence, or from small and sometimes unpublished studies which 
happen to have examined the issue in question (such as the Victorian government 
data on secondary school student flows). Even the official demographic data 
available are inadequate for the purposes of dynamic microsimulation with, for 
example, no information about birth rates by parity for unmarried women, or about 
the probability of divorce by age, sex, education, previous marital status and 
duration of marriage.
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Figure 2.13: Lifetime Family Formation, Dissolution and Fertility Records of Fourteen Individuals in the Model.
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However, given the magnitude of these problems, the simulation appears to have 
worked remarkably well, when compared with external data sources. For example, 
the patterns of educational participation in the model by age closely match cross- 
section estimates of participation; while it is difficult to assess how realistic the 
long-term educational profiles are, the retention rates to Year 12 produced by the 
simulation, the proportion of students ever completing apprenticeships and the 
percentage ever attending university by their mid-20s all appear to match 
Australian data well.
Similarly, although they can no doubt be improved, the total marriage, divorce and 
fertility patterns of the simulated cohort appear to provide reasonable longitudinal 
profiles, with the total fertility rate and the incidence of divorce and marriage not 
appearing markedly at odds with the current projections of Australian 
demographers.
In the next chapter, given the demographic and educational profile which has been 
developed in the above modules, the simulation of the critical process of labour 
force participation is described.
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CHAPTER 3: LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND UNEMPLOYMENT
3.1 INTRODUCTION
As earned income is usually the major source of income during the lifetime the 
decision to participate in the labour force is an extremely important one. This 
decision is heavily dependent upon demographic characteristics, with Australian 
cross-section studies repeatedly showing, for example, that a woman’s decision 
to participate is greatly affected by her marital status and whether she has very 
young children (Brooks and Volker, 1985:45; Volker, 1984:51). Similarly, age and 
education have also emerged as key explanatory variables for both sexes (Miller 
and Volker, 1983:83; Bureau of Labour Market Research (BLMR), 1985a).
Additional challenges arise in modelling labour force participation or 
unemployment over time . Although measuring mobility over time is not always 
straightforward, as a number of studies have found, there are substantial flows into 
and out of the labour force each year (Abowd and Zellner, 1985; Hogue and Flaim, 
1986; Atkinson and Micklewright, 1990). For example, as Clark and Summers 
emphasise, even for prime age males in the US, whose labour force participation
a
rate averaged 92 per cent in the year of their study and who are not normally 
regarded as particularly mobile, over one-third of employment entrances came 
from those not in the labour force while 28 per cent of employment spells ended 
in labour force withdrawal (1979:283). Yet, notwithstanding this undoubted 
mobility , available studies of dynamic labour force participation also demonstrate 
that there is a great deal of consistency between an individual’s decisions in one 
year and the next (Nakamura and Nakamura, 1985; Picot, 1986; Joshi et al, 1981). 
As Nakamura and Nakamura observe, in constructing longitudinal microsimulation 
models it is not sufficient that the year-by-year distributions of earnings and
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employment "for various age-sex groups be correct. Rather, the observed 
continuity of the employment and earnings behaviour of individuals over time must 
be properly captured" (1985:9).
The inherent difficulties involved in modelling dynamic labour force supply are 
magnified in Australia by the lack of longitudinal data. There seem to be two 
possible publicly available sources for such modelling - the Australian Longitudinal 
Survey, which is a continuing annual study of two separate samples of people 
aged 15 to 24 in 1984, and the 1986 Income Distribution Survey micro-data tape, 
which contains very detailed information on individual and family characteristics 
and provides details of labour force status during two separate periods. These are 
previous labour force status during the financial year 1 July 1985 to 30 June 
1986 and current labour force status at a second point in time, which varied over 
the sample from September to December 1986.
While the ALS survey provides a rich longitudinal data source it only covers 
younger people and so, at least for the purposes of building the prototype of the 
HARDING model, the IDS data has been used, as it provides an entirely 
consistent data source for the whole lifecycle. However, this does mean that the 
possible modelling options are completely dependent upon the handful of labour 
force variables which are on the IDS tape and, as described below, this has 
affected the simulation in a number of important ways. In addition, while defining 
who is and is not in the labour force is not a straightforward exercise (for example, 
due to the phenomenon of ’hidden’ unemployment - BLMR,1985a, Chap 2), it also 
means that the definitions of employed, unemployed, in and not in the labour 
force used in the module are the same as those used in the IDS (see Appendix 1).
The structure of the labour force participation module is very complex, and an 
overview is provided in Section 3.2. The remaining sections describe the individual 
steps of the simulation in more detail, with Section 3.3 outlining the simulation of 
labour force re/entry or of continuing participation in the labour force, Section 3.4 
discussing the assignment of self-employment status, and Section 3.5 explaining
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the imputation of hours worked. Section 3.6 describes the simulation of 
unemployment and hours unemployed, while Section 3.7 details the separate 
procedures followed for modelling the labour force status of full-time students and 
invalids. Finally, Section 3.8 summarises key aspects of the dynamic labour force 
profiles generated by the model.
3.2 OVERVIEW OF THE MODULE
The modelling of labour force status is done through six discrete steps which are 
shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 and described more fully below for each sex. The 
two sexes are treated separately as their labour force participation patterns over 
the lifecycle are very different (BLMR, 1985a:46).
The general approach is similar to that developed by other researchers, in treating 
transitions between labour market states as a first-order Markovian process (eg. 
Clark and Summers, 1979:282) and, in particular, the labour market module is 
very similar in structure to that used in the DYNASIM microsimulation model 
(Orcutt et al, 1976). The first-order Markovian model means that it is assumed 
that each individual’s labour force behaviour can be represented by a matrix of 
transition probabilities, in this case applied every year, in which an individual’s 
transition decisions only depend upon their circumstances in the immediately 
preceding year, and thus do not depend upon how long they have been in a 
particular state. For example, all males of a given age and education level in the 
labour force are assumed to face a given probability of remaining in the labour 
force for a further year, and this probability is the same, irrespective of whether 
they have been in the labour force continuously for the preceding twenty years 
or for only two years.
The first step in the module is to assign whether the individual is in the labour 
force in the current year for an hour or more. For each year of life a randomly 
generated number is attached to an individual’s record. For those who were not in
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the labour force in the preceding year, when this number is less than the relevant 
probability of labour force entry, the individual is selected to enter the labour force. 
Similarly, for those who were in the labour force last year, if the random number 
is less than the probability of leaving the labour force, then the individual exits the 
labour force. If the randomly generated number is greater than the applicable 
probability then the person’s labour force status remains the same for a further 
year.
Both males and females can enter the labour force from the age of 15 onwards, 
with labour force participation ceasing completely at the age of 85. Those who 
are selected not to enter or to leave the workforce in any given year are coded as 
not being in the labour force, all the other labour force characteristic variables are 
set to missing, and the following five steps are skipped. For those selected to 
re/enter or remain in the labour force the following five procedures are followed.
The second step in the module is to assign self-employment status (as the self- 
employed and the non-self-employed have different labour force characteristics, 
especially during the later working years, and very different income patterns). 
Another random number is attached to each individual’s record for every year of 
life and, for those who were self-employed last year, if this number is less than the 
probability of remaining in self employment for a further year then the individual 
stays self-employed. Otherwise they are re-categorised as a wage and salary 
earner. Using the same random number procedure, some people who were non­
self-employed in the one year can enter self-employment the next year.
The third step is to determine the number of hours cohort members are in the 
labour force during the entire year. Because the 1986 IDS tape only provided 
labour force status at a single point in time during the 1986-87 financial year, 
rather than for the entire 1986-87 financial year, the calculation of hours worked 
per year is divided into two discrete stages. During the first stage, those cohort 
members selected to be in the labour force are divided into whether they are 
working full-time or part-time in the current year (based on the probabilities of being
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in each state recorded by respondents to the 1986 IDS at the single point in time 
in 1986 when they were interviewed). Secondly, the cohort are then assigned to 
one of up to eight ’hours in the labour force per year’ categories, which are based 
on the probabilities of working different numbers of hours during an entire year for 
those IDS respondents who said they worked full-time and part-time respectively 
in 1985-86. This stage is again based on a simple probability table, as hours 
worked in the IDS was divided into ranges and a continuous ’hours worked' 
variable was thus not available.
The fourth stage is to determine whether the individual experiences any 
unemployment at all in the current year. If so, the fifth and final step is to 
calculate for the entire year the percentage of time in the labour force which is 
spent unemployed. The above procedures effectively hold the labour force 
participation rate, the unemployment rate, the distribution of full and part-time 
work, and the distribution of hours worked and hours unemployed fixed at the 
1985-86 level for the entire lifetime of the pseudo-cohort. As in every other part 
of the model, such steady state assumptions provide a useful benchmark, but are 
obviously unlikely to replicate the actual fortunes of those born in 1986; for 
example, many would expect further substantial increases in female participation 
rates or a further shift towards part-time jobs during the coming decades (BLMR, 
1985a:40).
Amending the benchmark assumptions is not a trivial matter however. For 
example, it would be relatively easy to inflate the labour force participation rates 
of each sex by a uniform percentage or deflate the various unemployment rates 
by equal amounts, either for all years of the pseudo-cohort’s ’life’ or just in the 
later decades of life (on the basis that, for example, current demographic trends 
suggested that unemployment rates would decline in the future).
However, such simplistic procedures would seem unlikely to be very accurate. 
Research has shown that the participation decisions of women are more 
responsive to variations in labour market conditions than those of men (Eccles, 
1984:8), indicating that different adjustments to the rates for men and women
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Figure 3.1: Structure of the Labour Force Participation Model for Males
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Figure 3.2: Structure of the Labour Force Participation Model for Females
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would be necessary. Similarly, certain groups of men also seem more likely than 
others to be discouraged workers - in particular the over 55 year olds 
(BLMR.1983). This suggests that any attempt to change the benchmark 
assumptions of the 1985-86 status quo, in response to an assumed future 
improvement or deterioration in economic conditions, would require different 
adjustments to each of the dozens of separate probability cells upon which the 
labour market transitions are based.
Similar issues arise when attempting to model changes in labour supply due to 
changes in taxes or government transfers. The later assessment in this study of 
the distributional impact of taxes and transfers currently assumes no 
corresponding change in behaviour; nonetheless, it would clearly be desirable to 
incorporate behavioural change in the model in the future as, for example, studies 
have suggested that female labour supply is responsive to changes in transfer 
income (Killingsworth, 1983). However, as Hagenaars concluded after a survey 
of the available econometric evidence, "the variance of elasticities is currently too 
high to give one unanimous ’guesstimate’ useful for microsimulation"(1989:31).
Equally importantly, little is known about how improved economic conditions or 
changes in the level of taxes and transfers would affect lifetime participation 
decisions (Altonji, 1986; MaCurdy, 1981). For example, using panel data, 
Heckman and MaCurdy found evidence that labour force participation decisions 
are made with a very long time horizon in mind, and that the future values of 
variables determined current labour supply decisions (1980:67). It is therefore 
possible that improved economic conditions and higher wages might lead to 
increased labour supply during the early to mid-years of working life, but earlier 
retirement during the later years. In conclusion, while sensitivity analysis of the 
results will be very interesting to conduct, freezing the various labour force rates 
at the 1985-86 level and assuming no behavioural change appears an appropriate 
starting point.
A final issue is that this model of labour force participation, like those in the
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DYNASIM and SFB3 models, is based on a first-order Markov process - ie. the 
probability of being in or out of the labour force or of being self-erriployed simply 
depends upon status in the immediately preceding year (Orcutt et al, 1976). Such 
an approach will misrepresent lifetime labour force participation, hours and self- 
employment behaviour if behaviour during earlier years or decades significantly 
affects current decisions, and this effect is not adequately captured by reference 
to the immediately preceding year.
Some studies have found that the longer an individual is in the labour force the 
less likely he or she is to leave it. For example, using recall data from the 
Canadian Family History Survey, Picot found that "the probability of exiting the 
state after three years duration is only from one-third to one-half as large as after 
one year" (1986,14). Using data from the US National Longitudinal Survey of 
Labour Market Experience, Eckstein and Wolpin calculated that the predicted 
probability of working increased with the length of time spent in the labour force 
with, for example, the probability of working for married women aged 39 with no 
children in their household being 65 per cent if they had 10 years of labour force 
experience but increasing to 85 per cent if they had 20 years (1989:387).
Similarly, using data from the new German panel study, Merz found that the 
number of years of full and part-time work was positively correlated with the 
probability of being in the labour force (1987:19). Finally, an Australian study 
based on a 1980 survey of the work patterns of married women in Sydney found 
that each extra month of previous experience significantly raised the probability 
of participating in the labour force (Ross, 1986:331).
The above evidence thus suggests that models based only on the labour force 
state in the preceding year could overestimate the likelihood of transtions between 
the various labour market states - ie. as Picot points out, "the result is too many 
transitions between states and a model which produces an employment pattern 
which is too sporadic" (1986:1). Such a conclusion has, however, been disputed 
by Nakamura and Nakamura. Using longitudinal data from the Michigan Panel
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Study on Income Dynamics, they found that after controlling for work behaviour 
in the immediately preceding year, additionally taking account of work experience 
since the age of 18 only negligibly increased the accuracy of their predictions of 
current work behaviour (1985:291).
The Nakamuras’ included both hours of work and wages earned in the 
preceding year as explanatory variables affecting labour force participation in the 
current year; these two variables were not included in the regression equations 
in the other studies cited above, which instead used years of experience. It is 
thus not possible to check in these studies the possible importance of state 
duration over and above work behaviour in the preceding year.
It is therefore very difficult to judge how accurate the lifetime employment patterns 
produced by the model are. Any potential misrepresentation seems likely to be 
less significant for men, as almost all are in the labour force. However, if any 
new Australian data are collected which suggest that the employment profiles are 
insufficiently consistent, the relevant probabilities can be amended.
3.3 LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION
For those who had and had not been in the labour force at any time during the 
preceding year, the probabilities of being in the labour force at any time during the 
current year were calculated. Both males and females were first divided into three 
groups who seemed likely to have very different patterns of labour force 
participation - full-time students, invalids, and the remaining majority, who were 
not in either of the above two categories. (The procedures used for invalids and 
full-time students are discussed in Section 3.7.) For the remainder, either the 
probability of remaining in the workforce for a further year or of re/entering the 
workforce was estimated, using Markov cell-transition probabilities. While the 
DEMOGEN and SFB3 models used econometric techniques to simulate the
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decision to enter or leave the workforce, and this remains an alternative way of 
modelling such decisions, the HARDING model currently follows the DYNASIM 
model in using simple tables of probabilities of participation.
The significance of a number of possible factors affecting labour force 
participation was tested, and, in particular, analysis was carried out to determine 
which of the various 1985-86 labour force variables available on the 1986 IDS tape 
provided the best predictor of still being in the labour force the following financial 
year. Ultimately, whether the individual worked full-time for 52 weeks in the 
preceding year emerged as the best predictor of current labour force status.
Males
For males generally, the probability of being in the labour force during a given 
year for those who were in the labour force in the preceding year was made 
dependent upon age, whether the individual worked full-time for 52 weeks in the 
preceding financial year and education. For those who had not been in the labour 
force in the preceding year the probability of re/entry was based upon age and 
education. As expected, labour force participation rates by age formed an 
inverted U, with the percentage participating increasing sharply in the teens and 
twenties, peaking in the forties and declining from the late fifties onwards.
Previous Australian cross-section research has shown that the higher the level of 
education the greater the likelihood of labour force participation (Brooks and 
Volker, 1985:47). Education has also emerged as an important factor in 
longitudinal profiles, with Picot, for example, finding that after controlling for other 
explanatory variables, "the higher the level of education the less likely a man or 
woman is to leave employment and the more likely they are to re-enter it" 
(1986:20).
The three education categories used in the model were 12 years or less of 
secondary education but no tertiary qualifications; trade or other diplomas and 
certificates; and bachelor degrees or higher. More detailed education breakdowns
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were examined but, because almost all men were in the labour force every year, 
there were, for example, minimal differences between the pattern for those with 
12 years of secondary schooling and those with less than 12 years. Education 
made a slight difference to the labour force participation rates of prime age males; 
while about 95 per cent of males aged 25 to 49 with only secondary qualifications 
were in the labour force, the proportion rose to 98 per cent for those with some 
tertiary qualifications and 99 per cent for graduates.
For prime age males, about 99 per cent of those who worked full-time for 52 
weeks in the preceding year were in the labour force the following year, 
irrespective of education level. For those who did not work full-time full-year in the 
preceding year, education made a significant difference to the likelihood of being 
in the labour force in the current year, with the anticipated differences between the 
three education categories becoming most pronounced at ages 50 to 64, as those 
with less education dropped out of the labour force earlier.
The second set of variables on labour force status in the 1986 IDS, as mentioned 
earlier, measured current labour force status at a single point in time. As other 
researchers have noted, the proportion of males who are in the labour force during 
an entire year is higher than that during a single month (BLMR, 1985:52). 
Similarly, the IDS data found that an additional 1.5 per cent of men were in the 
labour force at some point during financial year 1985-86, compared to those who 
were in the labour force at the time of interview in late 1986. While the 
discrepancy is more pronounced for females, because they tend to move in and 
out of the labour force more frequently, there is a slight difference between the 
two measures for men, with the magnitude varying by age and education.
This means that, if the relevant probabilities of exiting and entering the labour force 
are estimated by simply using the proportion of men in the labour force during the 
12 months to June 1986 and the proportion of men in the labour force during a 
single month in late 1986, then too many men will be selected to leave the labour 
force each year. As a result, the explanatory variables discussed above were
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used to provide an indicator of the differences in risk faced by those of different 
age, education etc, and all the relevant probabilities were then inflated to produce 
the correct annual participation rates by age, sex and education level. The labour 
force participation rates of males by education status found in the 1986 IDS and 
simulated by the model are shown in Figure 3.3, and suggest that the model does 
a reasonable job of replicating differences in participation rates by age and 
education.
The impact of marital status upon the probability of remaining in the labour force 
for males was tested as a further explanatory variable, but it appeared insignificant 
once other variables had been controlled for as, during the prime working years, 
almost all males who were in the labour force one year remained in the labour 
force the next year.
It would have been desirable to have included a host of other explanatory 
variables in the model, including transfer income and non-earned income in the 
preceding year (negatively correlated with being in the labour force this year) and 
disability status (Orcutt et al, 1976). However, only some 8000 records for males 
were available on the 1986 IDS tape and, once more than the handful of 
explanatory variables described above were used, the size of the sample cells 
became unacceptably small with the results thus becoming correspondingly 
unreliable.
Females
Examination of the 1986 IDS data showed, as expected, that marital status, age 
of youngest child and education all significantly affected labour force participation 
rates. The results confirmed the findings of other Australian studies showing that 
the labour force participation rates of women increase with greater education 
(Miller and Volker, 1983:77); increase as the age of the youngest child increases 
(Volker, 1984:51) and are higher for non-married than married females 
(BLMR,1985a:55).
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Figure 3.3: Labour Force Participation Rates of Males By Age and Education 
in the 1986 IDS and in the Model*
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The probability for women of staying in the labour force for a further year was thus 
made dependent upon:
- age;
- education (secondary qualifications only, some tertiary studies, bachelors degree 
or better);
- whether the woman worked full-time for 52 weeks in the preceding year;
- marital status (only married and not married, as sample size did not allow split 
of non-married into never married and divorced/widowed/separated); and
- age of youngest child (aged less than 1 year, between 1 and 4 years, and other 
ie. youngest child aged 5+ or with no children).
The explanatory variables used in calculating the probability of re/entering the 
labour force were the same as for the probability of remaining, with the exception 
that women aged 25 to 49 who were not in the labour force in the preceding year 
and who changed marital status were given a different probability of re/entry. This 
was because the IDS data showed that such women had a probability of re/entry 
which was about twice that of women who did not change marital status during 
the year (presumably reflecting the entry of newly divorced or separated women 
into the labour force).
Tests were carried out to determine whether marital status change was a 
significant factor influencing either the continuation of labour force participation 
or entry to the labour force at other ages, but the effects were either insignificant 
once the impact of the other explanatory variables had been controlled for or the 
sample size was too small to allow any reliable conclusions to be drawn.
As with men, it was clear that the probabilities of remaining in or entering the 
labour force derived from usage of the IDS data were too low. While the 
measurement of labour force participation rates during the 1985-86 financial year 
showed rates during an entire year; the second observation of labour force status 
in the following year simply showed status at a single point in time. For example, 
while some 54 per cent of all women were In the labour force during the 1985-86
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financial year according to the IDS, only 51 per cent were in the labour force when 
they were actually surveyed for the IDS. Consequently, the probabilities of 
remaining in and entering the labour force again had to be inflated, so that the 
correct proportion of women by age and education level were in the labour force 
during the entire year.
The probabilities of labour force participation found in the 1986 IDS and those 
resulting from the simulation are shown in Figure 3.4. The profiles display the 
characteristic twin-humped pattern for female labour force participation rates, with 
the dip during the twenties and thirties caused by withdrawal from the labour force 
during the peak years of child bearing and raising. The twin peaks are much less 
pronounced for women graduates, due to their lesser likelihood of labour force exit 
upon marriage or the birth of children. As with men, the probability of participating 
in the labour force for an hour or more per year also rises with education.
Once again, it would have been desirable to have included other variables known 
to potentially affect women’s labour force status, such as husband’s employment 
status and income (Ross, 1986; Merz, 1987), investment income and wealth 
(Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980), and so on, but either the sample size did not 
permit further differentiation or the information was not available. In particular, it 
would have been useful to have included separate probabilities by disability status, 
but disability status was not included as a variable on the 1986 IDS micro data 
tape.
3-4 SELF EMPLOYMENT STATUS
Males
After a male had been selected to be in the labour force in a given year, he was 
assigned a self-employment status, with the probabilities of being self-employed 
in the current year usually being based upon whether or not he was self-employed 
in the immediately preceding year and age. For the 25 to 49 year old age group
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Figure 3.4: Labour Force Participation Rates of Females By Age and 
Education in the 1986 IDS and in the Model*
Percentage In Labour ForceTO
15 15-17 10-20 21-24 25-29 30-34 35-3B 40-4445-4950-5455-5960-6465-6970-74 75+
Secondary School 
Qualifcations Only
AGE
Some
Tertiary
Qualifications
Percentage In Labour ForceTO
15 16-17 10-20 21-2425-2930-3435-3940-4445-4950-5455-5980-6465-6970-74 75+
AGE
Percentage fn Labour Force
100-
Graduates
15 16-17 18-20 21-24 25-2930-3435-3940-4445-4950-5455-5880-8465-6970-74 75+
AGE
■IDS - "Model
* Note that labour force participation is defined as spending one or more hours in the labour force.
115
the sample size was large enough to allow additional differentiation by education, 
but the results showed no clear trend, with the probabilities for both entering and 
remaining in self-employment being highest for those with some tertiary 
qualifications but not university degrees (perhaps reflecting tradespeople setting 
up their own businesses). The probability of remaining self-employed once a 
business had been started reached about 85 per cent for the 25-49 year olds, 
rising to peak at 100 per cent for those aged 65 and over (ie. the over 65 year 
olds left self-employment to retire rather than to begin wage and salary 
employment). The probability of entering self-employment in a given year for 
those who were not self-employed in the preceding year was around 3 per cent for 
those aged less than 65.
The proportion of males in the labour force who are self-employed in both the 
simulation and in the real world increases steadily to about 25-30 per cent during 
the forties and fifties, subsequently increasing sharply to sixty per cent or more 
once the legal retirement age of 65 is reached. On average, some 20 per cent 
of all males in the labour force are self-employed. As Figure 3.5 illustrates, the 
model captures these cross-sectional patterns of self-employment well, although 
whether the longitudinal profiles of self-employment generated are accurate is not 
certain.
Females
For a woman in the labour force, the probability of being self-employed was based 
upon whether her husband was self-employed (if married), whether she was self- 
employed in the preceding year, and age. As one might expect, married women 
have very much higher probabilities of entering self-employment and significantly 
higher probabilities of remaining in self-employment if their husbands are self- 
employed. The proportion of women in the labour force who are self-employed 
increases during the twenties and thirties, remains at about 20 to 25 per cent of 
the female labour force during the forties and fifties, and then increases sharply 
from age 65 onwards. The proportion of all women in the labor force who are self- 
employed is around 13 per cent, substantially lower than for men.
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The proportions of females in the labour force who are self-employed found in the 
1986 IDS and in the simulation are shown in Figure 3.5. The model again seems 
to replicate cross-section patterns of self-employment adequately.
Figure 3.5: Proportion of Those in the Labour Force Who Are Self-Employed 
by Age and Sex, in the 1986 IDS and in the Model
Percentage of Labour Force Who Are Self-Employed
100-
5 16-17 18-20 21-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74
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MEN WOMEN
IDS ™ ° Model -— IDS --Model
3.5 FULL AND PART-TIME STATUS AND ANNUAL 
HOURS WORKED
It is difficult to model adequately changes in annual hours worked from one year 
to the next, when data about the number of annual hours worked are not available 
for two entire consecutive years. However, whether respondents worked full-time
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or part-time was a variable which was available for both of the time periods 
captured in the IDS. Consequently, the dynamic simulation of hours worked was 
divided into two steps. First, the probabilities of shifting from full to part-time work 
or vice versa for those already in the labour force, or of entering full or part-time 
work for those not in the labour force in the preceding year, were calculated. 
Second, annual hours worked were then assigned, based on the probability of 
working different numbers of hours during an entire year for those respondents 
working full or part-time respectively in the 1986 IDS in 1985-86.
Males
The probabilities of working full and part-time were estimated separately for the 
self-employed and non-self-employed where the sample size was large enough 
to permit valid results. The probability of working full-time in the current year for 
males who were in the labour force in the preceding year was made dependent 
upon whether the individual worked full-time in the preceding year, education, self- 
employment status and age. Males who worked full-time generally continued to 
work full-time from one year to the next, with the IDS data indicating that about 98 
to 100 per cent of prime aged males working full-time in one year continued to 
work full-time in the next year. Even during the later years of working life, the 
probability of continuing to work full-time for those who remain in the labour force 
is suprisingly high (although many drop out of the labour force); about 94 per cent 
of non-self-employed males aged 65 or more who worked full-time in the preceding 
year, and who were selected to remain in the labour force for another year, 
continued to work full-time.
Relatively few men were not in the labour force in the prime working years, so the 
probabilities of working full-time this year for those who were not in the labour 
force last year were simply based upon age, because the small sample size did 
not permit the use of additional explanatory variables. In the teens and early 
twenties, the probabilities of entering full-time work for those who had not worked 
in the preceding year hovered around 85 per cent, reflecting the transition from full­
time study to the world of work. During the peak working years, men who had
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dropped out of the labour force in the preceding year were quite likely to re-enter 
full-time employment; for example, from the ages of 25 to 49, some 56 per cent of 
males who were not in the labour force one year but were selected to re-enter the 
next year worked full-time. After the legal retirement age of 65, the probability of 
re-entering the labour force and working full-time dropped sharply.
Males who worked part-time in the preceding year were also very likely to switch 
to full-time work in the current year, although the probabilities varied markedly by 
education. For example, for non-self-employed males aged 25 to 49 who worked 
part-time in the preceding year, the probability of working full-time if in the labour 
force in the current year was 37 per cent for those with secondary qualifications 
but 75 per cent for graduates.
After it had been determined whether the individual was to be a full or part-time 
worker in the current year, the number of hours worked during the entire year was 
calculated, based upon the distribution of hours actually worked by full and part- 
time workers respectively in 1985-86 found in the 1986 IDS. During the peak 
working years, about 90 per cent of prime age males working full-time worked full­
time for 52 weeks, while even for the over-65 year olds, about 80 per cent of 
those still in the labour force and working full-time worked full-time full-year. 
Those with higher educational qualifications were more likely to work longer hours, 
while the self-employed were much more likely than the non-self-employed to work 
long hours. For part-time workers, the proportion of part-timers working fairly low 
numbers of hours increased as age increased.
Females
Tests upon the IDS data showed that having a baby aged less than one year 
dramatically affected the hours worked by women, so all women were divided into 
those with and without such babies. For those without very young babies, the 
probability of working full-time this year was based upon age, whether they 
worked full-time last year, education and marital status. Not suprisingly, for those 
women who remained in the labour force, between 90 and 100 per cent of those
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who worked full-time last year were working full-time this year, with those with 
higher educational qualifications being more likely to continue working full-time. 
For example, between the ages of 25 and 49, 90 per cent of women with 
secondary qualifications who remained in the labour force and worked full-time one 
year also worked full-time the next year, with the comparable figure for female 
graduates rising to 97 per cent.
While the above figures apply to those who worked full-time in the preceding year, 
many women also shifted from part-time work in one year to full-time work in the 
next year. At ages 15 to 24, almost three-quarters of women who worked part- 
time in the preceding year entered full-time work in the current year, reflecting the 
transition from part-time work while studying full-time at school or university to 
subsequent full labour force entry. From ages 25 to 49 just over one-third of those 
women who were working part-time in one year and who remained in the labour 
force switched to full-time work the following year. Interestingly, the proportion of 
women moving from part-time to full-time work increased over the 50 to 59 year 
age range to 64 per cent, presumably reflecting the return to full-time work as 
family responsibilities diminished.
For those women who were not in the labour force in the preceding year but had 
entered the labour force in the current year, the probablities of working full-time 
were much lower and, not suprisingly, showed great variation by marital status. 
For example, while 18 per cent of unmarried females aged 25 to 49 who were not 
in the labour force in one year but entered the labour force the next year moved 
into full-time work, the relevant probability for married females in the same age 
range was only about 7 per cent. Women who entered the labour force during this 
age range were thus much more likely to enter part-time rather than full-time work. 
Overall, women who were married were less likely to be working full-time than the 
unmarried, while unmarried prime age women with degrees had patterns similar 
to males, with about 97 to 100 per cent of those who worked full-time one year 
and who stayed in the labour force working full-time the next year.
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For those with very young babies, education and marital status made relatively 
little difference to the probabilities of working full or part-time, as the effect of a 
young child was quite overwhelming; only about 60 per cent of those who worked 
full-time in the preceding year and who stayed in the labour force after the birth of 
their child continued to work full-time in the current year (and only about 10 per 
cent of these worked full-time full-year in the current year).
After allocating women to full or part-time status the next question was the total 
number of hours worked during the entire year. The IDS data suggested that 
marital status and education were less important than age of youngest child in 
determining total hours worked. For example, for women aged 25 to 49 who said 
they were working full-time, 42 per cent of those with a child aged less than one 
were working full-time for 52 weeks, with the proportion rising to 65 per cent for 
those with pre-school aged children and 82 per cent for those with no or older 
children. After standardising for age of youngest child there was little difference 
in the distribution of hours worked in an entire year between married and non­
married women working part-time.
3.6 UNEMPLOYMENT STATUS AND HOURS 
UNEMPLOYED
Because there is a sizeable flow of people through unemployment, the proportion 
who experience some unemployment at any time during a year is usually about 
two to three times the number who are recorded as unemployed in any given 
month during that year. For example, while about 5 per cent of 25 to 49 year old 
males were unemployed during the month in which they were surveyed for the 
IDS in late 1986, some 10 per cent of such males experienced any unemployment 
during the 12 months to June 1986. The probabilities of experiencing 
unemployment used in the model may thus appear high at first glance, when 
compared to the standard estimates derived from cross-section surveys such as 
the Labour Force Survey. Examination of the 1986 IDS also showed that only an
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extremely small proportion of the self-employed experience unemployment during 
the course of an entire year, so in the model only the non-self-employed were 
allowed to be unemployed.
During construction of the model, the probability of experiencing any unemployment 
in any given year was initially simply made dependent upon whether the individual 
experienced any unemployment during the preceding year, education and age. 
However, this did not seem to result in consistent lifetime profiles, as almost all 
men were being randomly selected for a few years of unemployment during their 
working lives, whereas research suggested that dynamic unemployment was 
highly concentrated.
For example, Duncan et al found after analysis of 10 years of the PSID data that 
while about 10 per cent of their sample reported unemployment in any given year 
and almost 40 per cent experienced unemployment at least once in the decade 
between 1967 and 1976, only 5 per cent of the sample accounted for nearly half 
of the ten-year total unemployment (1984:96). This latter group of chronic 
unemployed averaged 96 weeks of unemployment during the 10 years and lost 
about 15 per cent of their expected 10 year earnings (1984:105). Such long-run 
unemployment was disproportionately concentrated among high school drop-outs, 
workers in blue collar occupations and those in the construction industry, with 60 
per cent of the chronically unemployed not having completed secondary school.
Similarly, examination of Canadian unemployment insurance administrative data 
for the eight years from 1975 to 1982 showed that 60 per cent of the sample 
experienced unemployment at least once during this period; of those experiencing 
unemployment, 69 per cent had multiple spells of unemployment over the eight 
years and this group (ie. about 40 per cent of the entire sample) accounted for 90 
per cent of total unemployment duration over the period. Approximately 35 per 
cent of those who experienced unemployment had four or more spells, while 7 per 
cent had more than eight spells of unemployment (OECD, 1985:106).
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Data from the West German unemployment register for the six years from 1976 
to 1982 showed that 48 per cent of those unemployed at any time during these 
six years experienced multiple spells of unemployment and accounted for 71 per 
cent of the total duration of unemployment. Fifteen percent of the unemployed 
had four or more spells of unemployment and this group suffered 37 per cent of 
the total weeks of unemployment (OECD,1985:106).
Finally, although there are not yet Australian longitudinal data spanning a large 
number of years, research using the Australian Longitudinal Survey has already 
suggested that unemployment is likely to be highly concentrated over time. 
Dunsmuir et al concluded that their results suggested that "a large proportion of 
the population is, post school, either solidly employed or solidly unemployed" 
(1988:21); Eyland and Johnson found that the slower the transition from school 
to work "the greater the likelihood of long-term unemployment at some later stage" 
(1987:18); and McRae found that the probability of transition out of unemployment 
from one year to the next was correlated with the duration of unemployment 
(1986:18). Using different data, Brooks and Volker also found that the probability 
of leaving unemployment in Australia decreased as the duration of unemployment 
increased (1986:296).
The evidence thus suggests that a significant proportion of the workforce will not 
experience any unemployment during their lifetimes, while for those that do, a 
minority will account for a substantial proportion of the total unemployment. Such 
concentrated unemployment over time appears to be due to a range of 
characteristics, with explanations ranging from those related to labour force 
disadvantage (such as low education level and working in industries where lay­
offs are common or employment is seasonal) to the "scarring" induced by 
unemployment, the loss of valuable work experience while unemployed or being 
marked as a ’loser’ by potential employers (Phelps, 1972), disability (Orcutt et al, 
1976:171) and a range of unobservable personal beliefs and characteristics.
To improve the accuracy of the model the cohort are therefore divided into three
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groups - those selected not to experience any unemployment at all during their 
lives, those selected to experience some unemployment and those selected to 
be chronically unemployed. The first step therefore involves working out what 
percentage of the population will be precluded from ever experiencing 
unemployment. The PSID’s finding of 60 per cent is clearly too low as it occurred 
during a period of low unemployment; the German finding that 40 per cent of the 
population did not experience unemployment seems more appropriate, but still 
seems likely to be an underestimate as the period covered by the survey only 
spanned eight years (and one would expect more people to experience 
unemployment as the time period was lengthened) while, in addition, the 
unemployment rate was higher in 1985-86 than from 1975 to 1982.
It was therefore decided to make 50 per cent of all graduates (with graduates 
comprising around 20 per cent of the entire cohort), 30 per cent of those with 
other tertiary qualifications (comprising about 70 per cent of the total cohort) and 
20 per cent of those with only secondary school qualifications (comprising only 
about 10 per cent of the well educated pseudo-cohort) experience no 
unemployment at all during their working lives. Given the education distribution 
of the cohort, this means that around one third are assumed never to experience 
any unemployment. This proportion can, of course, be amended to test other 
assumptions.
For the remaining two-thirds, the next issue was what proportion should be 
selected to be chronically unemployed. It was decided to make about 20 per cent 
of those experiencing unemployment accrue around 50 per cent of total lifetime 
unemployment. The probabilities of entering unemployment were thus scaled up 
for the 20 per cent of the cohort selected to be 'chronically unemployed' and down 
for the remaining 80 per cent of 'occasionally unemployed’, with the relevant 
probabilities being set so that the total unemployment rates by age and education 
remained the same as those found in 1985-86 in the 1986 IDS Survey. In 
addition, the chronically unemployed were given higher probabilities of spending 
more hours unemployed each year than the occasionally unemployed.
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Males
For those males who were not excluded from experiencing any unemployment in 
their whole lives, the probability of experiencing any unemployment in a particular 
year depended upon age, education, whether or not they belonged to the 
chronically unemployed group, and whether any unemployment was experienced 
in the preceding year. At younger ages the probability of unemployment was 
much higher; about 30 per cent of all males aged 15 to 24 in the labour force 
suffered some unemployment, with the proportion dropping to 10 per cent for 25 
to 49 year olds and around 7 per cent for 50 to 64 year olds (Figure 3.6).
Education made a significant difference, with the probability of experiencing 
unemployment this year for both those who did and did not have a spell of 
unemployment in the preceding year decreasing as education level increased. 
For example, amongst the non-self-employed aged 25 to 49 who belonged to the 
’occasionally unemployed’ group and who were not unemployed last year, the 
probability of a bout of unemployment this year was 8 per cent for those with 
secondary qualifications but only 4 per cent for those with degrees.
Whether unemployment was experienced in the preceding year emerged as the 
most important of the various explanatory variables, reflecting the highly 
concentrated nature of dynamic unemployment. For the 25-49 year old non-self- 
employed males mentioned above, the probability of experiencing some 
unemployment this year if they were unemployed in the preceding year was 65 
per cent, about eight times greater than the probability if they were not 
unemployed in the preceding year. The probability of being unemployed this year 
for those not in the labour force last year was very high, but small sample size 
again prevented the derivation of accurate estimates by education and age, so this 
group were combined with those who were in the labour force in the preceding 
year and experienced unemployment at some point during that year. While a 
small fraction of males aged 65 or more are unemployed in the real world, 
unemployment was not modelled for this group, as all such males should have an 
entitlement to age pension.
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Figure 3.6: Proportion of Non-Self-Employed Males in the Labour Force 
Experiencing Any Unemployment During Year by Age and Education in 1986 
IDS and in the Model
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After being selected to experience unemployment during a particular year, the next 
step was the allocation of time unemployed. Following the DYNASIM model, this 
was calculated as the fraction of time in the labour force spent unemployed. For 
most age ranges, small sample size meant that the relevant probabilities were 
simply based on age and the number of hours spent in the labour force. While 
a higher proportion of the young experienced unemployment in any given year, 
they were unemployed for shorter periods of time than the older unemployed, with 
only about one-fifth of 15 to 24 year olds being unemployed for 100 per cent of 
the time they were in the labour force. For the 25 to 49 year olds this figure rose
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to around one-third, while for the 50 to 64 year olds it increased further to more 
than one-half, reflecting the longer duration of bouts of unemployment for the 
older unemployed. For 25 to 49 year olds in the labour force full-year full-time, the 
larger sample size allowed an additional breakdown by education, with the better 
educated typically spending a lower fraction of time unemployed.
Females
Tests using the IDS data showed that women’s unemployment rates varied by age 
of children and marital status, with married women having lower recorded 
unemployment rates, probably due in part to their inability to claim for 
unemployment benefit due to the family income test. However, the dispersion in 
unemployment rates by education was higher than that for marital status, and as 
the sample size meant that only one of these variables could be included, 
education was selected. The probability of being unemployed in any given year 
for women was thus made dependent upon age, education, whether they were 
categorised as occasionally or chronically unemployed, and whether they 
experienced any unemployment in the preceding year.
The results were very similar to those for men, with the probability of being 
unemployed decreasing with age, decreasing with better education, and massively 
increasing if unemployment was experienced in the immediately preceding year. 
In the 1986 IDS the unemployment rates recorded for men and women were fairly 
similar, and this has thus been incorporated into the model’s parameters.
Figure 3.7 shows the proportion of non-self-employed females in the labour force 
who experienced an hour or more of unemployment in any year by education and 
age found in the 1986 IDS and simulated in the model. It should again be 
emphasised that these unemployment rates appear very high in comparison to the 
cross-section estimates of unemployment at a single point in time; as mentioned 
earlier, the number of people who experience unemployment at some point during 
an entire year is two to three times the number who will report that they are 
unemployed at a single point in time during that year. Once again, the results of
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the model closely match those found in the IDS.
The probability of spending different fractions of labour force time unemployed for 
women was dependent upon age and hours in the labour force, with the exception 
of 25 to 49 year olds who were in the labour force full-time full-year, where the 
probability was additionally dependent upon education. As with men, the fraction 
of labour force time spent unemployed increased with age and decreased with 
education.
Figure 3.7: Proportion of Non-Self-Employed Females in the Labour Force 
Experiencing Any Unemployment During Year by Age and Education in 1986 
IDS and in the Model
% Of Non-Self Employed Experiencing Any Unemployment in Year
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3.7 FULL-TIME STUDENTS AND INVALIDS
For both male and female full-time students the small sample size meant that the 
only explanatory variables used to determine the probabilities of remaining in the 
labour force were age and whether or not the student worked full-time full-year in 
the preceding year, with the age ranges being 15 to 24 and 25 to 49 years 
respectively. Students selected to be in the labour force were then assigned to 
one of five ’hours in the labour force categories’, in line with the distribution of 
hours by age and sex.
A more complete model of disability would incorporate the impact of disability 
upon labour force status, hours worked and income, as a comprehensive UK 
study showed that the disabled and non-disabled have different labour force 
participation and earnings profiles (Martin and White, 1988). However, there were 
no disability variables on the IDS tape, which meant that disability could not be 
adequately modelled at the micro level. While in the future it might be possible 
to match-merge a unit record tape from the recently conducted Australian Disabled 
Persons Survey with the IDS tape (ABS, 1989), as an interim measure the best 
that could be done was to isolate those disabled who were receiving invalid 
pension, who were separately identified on the IDS tape.
The labour force characteristics of those identified as invalid pensioners on the IDS 
tape were therefore used to set the various probabilities for those classified as 
invalid in the simulation. For such invalids, the probability of being in the labour 
force was simply dependent upon age and sex. No invalids were assumed to be 
working after the age of 65 for men and 60 for women. The allocation of hours 
in the labour force was based upon age and sex.
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3,8 LABOUR FORCE PROFILES OF THE COHORT
While estimates of the aggregate labour force participation rate or of the 
unemployment rate for the entire cohort will differ from those for the entire 1986 
Australian population (for example, because the age and marital status distributions 
of the pseudo-cohort are different from that of the 1986 population), the estimates 
within each age range should be similar. As discussed above, the model does 
appear to do a reasonable job of matching cross-section estimates of labour force 
participation, unemployment and self-employment rates in Australia by age. 
However, whether the dynamic profiles generated are realistic is a matter of 
conjecture, given the lack of Australian longitudinal data.
The results below show the labour force profiles generated for a sub-sample of the 
cohort. They include the records of only those 1816 females and 1540 males who 
lived until at least the legal retirement age (age 60 for females and age 65 for 
males), and show their labour force records only up until and including the year 
they became eligible for age pension. In other words, the results show labour 
force status for every year between the ages of 15 and 60 inclusive for females 
and 15 and 65 for males. After the commencement of age pension age, many 
retirees recommence part-time work or have sporadic labour force profiles, so that 
including such post-retirement activity could distort perceptions of labour force 
participation during the prime working years.
Those men who live until at least the age of 65, average 45 years of participation 
in the labour force for an hour or more per year, of which 41 years are spent in 
full-time work and the remaining four in part-time work (including, for example, part- 
time work undertaken whilst in full-time study). Only 6 years are spent out of the 
labour force on average by men between the ages of 15 and 65 inclusive (eg. in 
full-time study).
There is, however, great variation in the labour force profiles of men. About 0.5
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per cent of males spend only between 5 and 29 years in the labour force (eg. 
because they are invalid), while a further 10 per cent spend between 30 and 39 
years participating in the labour force (Figure 3.8). Almost 30 per cent spend 40 
to 44 years in the labour force, while half of all men spend 45 to 49 years 
participating in the labour force between the ages of 15 and 65.
Men are unlikely to spend these years working part-time, as Figure 3.8 also 
demonstrates. Almost 65 per cent of men spent less than five years working part- 
time between the ages of 15 and 65, while a further 24 per cent spent between five 
and ten years working part-time. Only about five per cent of men spent fifteen or 
more years working part-time. In contrast, sixty per cent of men spent forty or 
more years working full-time, although almost six per cent spent less than 30 years 
working full-time.
Men also do not spend many years out of the labour force during their prime 
working years. About 44 per cent spend less than five years out of the labour 
force (including those years spent in full-time study with no part-time work) and a 
further 40 per cent spend between five and nine years out of the labour force. 
Only 10 per cent spend 10 to 14 years being economically inactive.
Those women who live until at least the age of 60 average 33 years of participation 
in the labour force for an hour or more per year. Of these, 25 years are spent 
working full-time and the remaining eight years working part-time. The remaining 
13 years between the ages of 15 and 60 inclusive are spent out of the labour force 
in, for example, full-time study or family duties.
While this is the average picture for women, this average disguises major 
variations in labour force profiles, to a far greater extent than for men. Although 
many women spend fewer years in the labour force than men, as a comparison of 
the following two figures illustrates, nonetheless only about three per cent of 
women spend less than 15 years in the labour force, which emphasises the 
importance of labour force participation during the lifetimes of females outside the
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Figure 3.8: Labour Force Participation Profiles Produced by the Model During 
the Prime Working Years, by Sex
MALES
PER CENT50
40
30
20
10
0
0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-51
___________________________________ AGE_____________________________
 Yrs In Labour force •—s • Yrs working fult-tlme
■ ■ Yrs working part-time Yrs not In labour force
FEMALES
PER CENT
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-460-4 5-9 10-14
___________________________________ AGE_____________________________
 Yrs In labour force * Yrs working full~tlme
■ ■ Yrs working part-time - Yrs not In labour force
132
peak child-raising years. Half of all women spend 35 or more years participating 
in the labour force between the ages of 15 and 60.
Women are much less likely to work full-time than men, with about one-fifth of all 
women spending between 20 to 24 years working full-time, a further fifth spending 
25 to 29 years and another fifth spending 30 to 34 years working full-time. Only 
some five per cent of women work full-time for more than 40 years, while the 
majority of men fall into this category.
Similarly, the distribution of years of part-time work was also strikingly different for 
females than for males. While just under two-thirds of men spent less than five 
years working part-time, 17 per cent of all women did so, while half of all women 
spent 5 to 9 years working part-time during their peak working years. Women 
were also more likely to spend years out of the labour force than men, with one- 
quarter of all women remaining outside the labour force for five to nine years, and 
a further fifth spending 10 to 14 years out of the labour force.
Of the average 44 years spent participating in the labour force for an hour or more 
each year by males aged 15 to 65, unemployment was experienced during four of 
those years on average. Women also experienced an hour or more of 
unemployment during four of their prime working years. Just over one-third of all 
males and females experienced no unemployment during their peak working years 
and about 60 per cent experienced an hour or more of unemployment in less than 
five years (Figure 3.9). Only five per cent of both males and females experienced 
an hour or more of unemployment in 14 or more years.
As Figure 3.10 illustrates, men spent more years self-employed than women. One 
third of all women never entered self-employment of any sort, while about two- 
thirds spent less than five years being self-employed. About one-fifth of men never 
tried self-employment, while about two-fifths spent less than five years in their own 
businesses. About 15 per cent of all men spent 20 or more years in self- 
employment, in comparison to only three per cent of women.
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Figure 3.9: Frequency Distribution of Years Unemployed by Sex
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Figure 3.10: Frequency Distribution of Years of Self-Employment by Sex
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Finally, it is also possible to isolate the last year in which males and females 
participate in the labour force during their entire lives. This is not exactly the same 
as the year of formal retirement, as many of those who formally retire at 60 or 65, 
for example, subsequently do minor amounts of part-time work or set up small 
businesses and become self-employed. The sample below thus still only includes 
those cohort members who lived until at least the legal retirement age, but 
additionally takes account of any labour force participation after that age.
Women are more likely to exit the labour force at an earlier age than men, with 
about one per cent of women leaving the labour force never to return before the 
age of 35, and about another three per cent departing between the ages of 35 and 
45. As Figure 3.11 demonstrates, about 10 per cent of all women in the pseudo­
cohort leave the labour force for ever between the ages of 45 and 49, and a further 
11 per cent drop out for good at ages 50 to 55. Nonetheless, at the end of their 
59th year, more than half of all women have still not left the labour force for ever, 
although 40 per cent drop out in the five years after the legal retirement age of 60 
is reached.
Most men defer their final labour force exit until a later age, with only three per 
cent having left the labour force by age 55. However, the impact of early 
retirement begins to show up after age 55, with five per cent departing from the 
labour force between the ages of 55 and 59 and a further 40 per cent leaving at 
ages 60 to 64. Once the age pension age of 65 is reached, some 43 per cent of 
men drop out at age 65 or during the following four years and never re-enter paid 
employment.
3.9 CONCLUSION
Due to the lack of longitudinal data in Australia, attempting to simulate the labour 
force participation and unemployment patterns of individuals over time is a 
hazardous exercise. It must be emphasised that data deficiencies necessitated 
the making of a number of major compromises and assumptions in the module,
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Figure 3.11: Frequency Distribution of Age of Final Labour Force Exit, by Sex
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including the attempt to introduce a realistic dynamic component into the simulation 
of unemployment. While the proportions of individuals in the labour force or 
unemployed at different ages in the model all closely match the actual cross- 
section picture revealed on the 1986 Income Distribution Survey, this does not 
necessarily mean that the profiles of individuals over time are accurate. However, 
the lifetime profiles of years in the labour force, years unemployed, years of self- 
employment and ages of final labour force exit described above all appear 
believable. Nonetheless, while the dozens of assumptions made in the simulation 
appeared reasonable given existing knowledge, the extent to which the resulting 
simulation reflects actual dynamic labour force patterns in Australia remains 
unknown.
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CHAPTER 4: EARNED AND UNEARNED INCOME
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the simulation of earnings, investment income, 
superannuation income and maintenance income in the model. The simulation of 
earnings is dealt with in Section 4.2. The first part of this section describes the 
procedures used to simulate hourly wage rates, principally through the use of 
multiple regression. A multiple regression model can be used to calculate the 
expected hourly wage rate of a person with particular characteristics, eg. to predict 
what the expected wage rate of a forty-year old married male graduate will be. 
However, in the real world, there is enormous variation in the wage rates of such 
male graduates, and this variation has to be recreated in the model, or the 
simulated world will appear too equal.
To do this, a stochastic term has to be added to the equations predicting wage 
rates. The treatment of this error term depends upon how the difference between 
the predicted expected wage rates and actual wage rates in the real world is 
interpreted. There are many factors which underlie the presence of these 
residuals. The most important of these is often the exclusion from the regression 
equations of factors which are likely to affect wage rates but which are not easily 
measurable or about which data are not available (such as personal attitudes or 
parental social class). The discrepancy may also be due to such factors as sample 
bias, measurement error in the sample surveys upon which the econometric 
estimates are based, and so on (Atkinson et al, 1989:9).
When simulating the earnings of individuals overtime, a critical question is whether 
these error terms are correlated from year to year. In other words, if one individual
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has a wage rate in one year which is very much higher than the average wage rate 
for someone of their age, sex and education, how likely are they to still have a 
much higher than average wage rate the next year and the year after that? If panel 
data for Australia were available, the importance of this fixed effect could be 
directly estimated from the data. Because such data are not available, the 
significance of such permanent effects in Australia has to be guessed at. 
Consequently, the second part of Section 4.2 discusses available overseas 
evidence on earnings dynamics.
The third part of Section 4.2 then explains the assumptions made in the model 
about error terms, given this overseas evidence. The procedures used to try to 
recreate plausible patterns of earnings dynamics are explained in detail. The final 
part of Section 4.2 summarises some of the results of the simulation of wage rates 
and tries to assess whether the dynamic patterns created in the model appear 
realistic.
Section 4.3 details the enormous problems encountered when trying to simulate 
the receipt of investment income, while Section 4.4 describes the simulation of 
superannuation income. Finally, Section 4.5 explains the procedures used to 
model the receipt of maintenance income by women.
4.2 EARNINGS
There are no longitudinal data on earnings for a representative sample of the 
population in Australia, which creates enormous difficulties when attempting to 
simulate lifetime earnings profiles for the pseudo-cohort. In modelling earnings and 
other income, the standard assumption used for the entire model - that the cohort 
live in a world which is the same as that existing in 1986 - has been followed. This 
effectively means it has been assumed that the earnings and income received by 
the many different age cohorts captured in the 1986 Income Distribution Survey
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(IDS) can be linked together to provide a picture of the lifetime income of the 
pseudo-cohort. Given that earnings tend to increase over time at about the rate 
of economic growth (Moss, 1978:124), it is possible to modify the wage rates etc 
derived from the IDS, to allow for assumed future productivity growth. It is also 
possible to select a discount rate, to allow for income received late in life being of 
less value than that received early in life. For reasons explained in detail in 
Chapter 5, the rate of economic growth and the discount rate have been assumed 
in this first version of the model to be the same, so that the two effectively cancel 
each other out. (The same assumption is also made in the West German and 
Canadian dynamic cohort models - Wolfson, 1988:233; Hain and Helberger, 
1986:63.)
To calculate log hourly wage rates, multiple regression equations using ordinary 
least squares were estimated separately for men and women and for the different 
education categories within each sex for each of the following groups;
- the non-self-employed working full-time;
- the non-self-employed working part-time; and
- the self-employed.
There was much greater variance of part-time earnings, which is why part-time 
workers were treated separately.
Non-Self-Employed Males and Females
For non-self-employed males, who were aged less than 65, were not invalid and 
were not at school, the log of the hourly wage rate was made dependent upon 
education, full or part-time status, age, whether the individual worked full-year full­
time in the preceding year, whether they were married or divorced and the number 
of hours worked per week (Table 4.1). The independent variables used for women 
were the same, with the sole addition of a dummy variable testing for the presence 
of dependent children (Table 4.2).
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The use of hours of work as an independent variable explaining wage rates is 
unusual, as labour supply theorists usually approach the problem from the other 
direction and use wage rates as an independent variable which helps to predict 
labour supply (Brown, 1983; Killingsworth, 1983). However, the direction of 
causality is not certain. The expected wage rate could not be used as an 
explanatory variable in the simulation of hours worked (described in the preceding 
chapter), because hours worked was not a continuous variable, and the use of 
simple probability tables made usage of the wage rate as an independent variable 
problematic. However, as in the 1986 IDS data, hours worked emerged as an 
important predictor of wage rates (being significant at the one per cent level in all 
cases), it was decided to retain it as an explanatory variable in the simulation.
Self-Employed Males
The independent variables used for the self-employed were similar to those for the 
non-self-employed, with the exception that they were not divided into those working 
full-time and part-time. In addition, data on total hours worked and total earnings 
during the financial year 1985-86 (rather than at a single point in time in late 1986) 
were used to estimate the hourly wage rate. (This was because the weekly 
earnings of the self-employed seemed likely to suffer major fluctuations, making 
the data available at a single point in time in late 1986 unreliable.) This meant that 
no information was available about earnings in the preceding year, and that the 
self-employed’s wage rate was affected by the total number of hours worked in 
1985-86, rather than by weekly hours as for the non-self-employed.
Major difficulties were presented by the 15 per cent of self-employed males 
declaring zero income for the entire financial year (with the percentage reporting 
zero income showing almost no variation by education level). It seemed probable 
that those who had only recently set up their own businesses would be more likely 
to report zero income than those who had been self-employed for a number of 
years. However, the IDS data showed that the hourly wage rate declared by the 
self-employed during the single week of the IDS survey in late 1986 was lower for 
those who had been self-employed during the preceding financial year than for
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those who had only recently become self-employed. This indicated that imputing 
lower earnings for the first few years of self-employment might not be the most 
appropriate course. It was finally decided to simply randomly select the correct 
proportion of self-employed men each year to have zero income, and to use 
multiple regression to impute earnings to the remainder.
Self-Employed Females
Women who were self-employed were divided into three groups;
- those with a self-employed husband whose husband reported zero income;
- those with a self-employed husband whose husband had positive earnings; and
- those without a self-employed husband (including single women).
The probability of women in each of these three categories themselves reporting 
zero income was then calculated, and the relevant proportion were randomly 
selected each year to receive zero income. This probability was made dependent 
upon education, as the IDS data showed that women of higher education levels 
were less likely to report zero income than women of lower education levels. For 
the remainder with positive earnings, the hourly wage rate was calculated, and 
made dependent upon the husband’s income where both partners were self- 
employed, because of the likelihood of income splitting.
Fitted Log Hourly Wage Rates
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the fitted log hourly wage rates, for non-self-employed 
males and females working full-time, produced in the model using the above 
regression co-efficients. Earnings for males peaked at about age 45, and peaked 
at a later age for those with higher educational qualifications. For those with only 
secondary school qualifications, the age-earnings profile was almost flat, while the 
better educated experienced significant increases in their hourly earnings rate 
between labour force entry and their late 40s. Hourly earnings for females showed 
a similar pattern.
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Table 4.1: Regression Coefficients Used for Estimating Log of the Hourly 
Wage Rate for Males(1).
COEFFICIENT
a  Age Age2 Work FT
f y m-
Married Divorced Hours
p.w.*
Variance 
of residual
1. NON SELF-EMPLOYED WORKING FULL-TIME
- s e c o n d a r y  s c h o o l  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o n ly  
0.85 0.077 -0.0009 0.1096 
(0.003) (0.0002) (0.02E-4) (0.0007)
0.0638
(0.0008)
0.0263
(0.001)
-0.00614
(0.00005)
0.116
- t r a d e  q u a l i f ic a t io n s
2.12 0.0189 -0.0002
(0.004) (0.0002) (0.02E-4)
0.0502
(0.0009)
0.0358
(0.0009)
-0.029
(0.002)
-0.007
(0.0006)
0.080
- o t h e r  t e r t ia r y  q u a l i f ic a t io n s ,  n o t  d e g r e e s  
1.58 0.056 -0.0006 0.110 
(0.009) (0.0004) (0.05E-4) (0.002)
0.119 
(0.0018)
0.130
(0.003)
-0.012
(0.0009)
0.131
- d e g r e e s
1.62 0.057 -0.0006 
(0.009) (0.0005) (0.06E-4)
0.264
(0.002)
0.112
(0.001)
0.088
(0.004)
-0.012
(0.00009)
0.098
2. NON SELF-EMPLOYED WORKING PART-TIME
- s e c o n d a r y  s c h o o l  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o n ly  
1.23 0.065 -0.0009 -0.140 
(0.014) (0.0009) (0.01 E-3) (0.006)
0.273
(0.006)
-0.034
(0.011)
-0.013
(0.0002)
0.279
- t r a d e  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  
1.73 0.051 -0.0008 
(0.049) (0.003) (0.04E-3)
0.279
(0.013)
0.052**
(0.021)
0.913
(0.913)
-0.015
(0.0005)
0.472
- o t h e r  t e r t ia r y  q u a l i f ic a t io n s ,  n o t  d e g r e e s  
1.79 0.033 -0.0005 0.354 
(0.035) (0.002) (0.02E-3) (0.011)
0.378
(0.009)
0.793
(0.018)
-0.001
(0.0004)
0.219
- d e g r e e s
-2.68 0.290 -0.0033 
(0.076) (0.004) (0.05E-3)
0.034*
(0.019)
-0.179
(0.013)
-1.093
(0.029)
-0.016
(0.0005)
0.315
All coefficients significant at the 1 per cent level except for those marked with **, which indicates 
significant at the 5 per cent level, or #, which indicates not significant at 5 per cent level. Standard 
errors in brackets.
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Table 4.1 cont
COEFFICIENT
p > CQ CD > CQ CD I
O Work FT 
FY *' 1 m
Married Divorced Hours
p.w.*
Variance 
of residual
3. SELF-EMPLOYED
- s e c o n d a r y  s c h o o l  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o n ly  
1.93 0.009 -0.0002 0.182 
(0.021) (0.001) (0.01 E-3) (0.005)
0.141
(0.006)
0.539
(0.008)
-0.0003
(0.03E-4)
0.879
- t r a d e  q u a l i f ic a t io n s
1.57 0.042 -0.0005
(0.018) (0.0009) (0.0001)
0.191
(0.005)
-0.207
(0.005)
0.074
(0.007)
-0.00027
(0.03E-4)
0.476
- o t h e r  t e r t ia r y  q u a l i f ic a t io n s ,  n o t  
0.99 0.012 -0.0002 
(0.044) (0.002) (0.03E-3)
d e g r e e s
0.411
(0.012)
0.871
(0.013)
1.250
(0.018)
-0.0002
(0.07E-4)
0.885
- d e g r e e s
1.54 -0.037 0.0008 
(0.075) (0.004) (0.04E-3)
-0.022#
(0.014)
0.029**
(0.013)
1.455
(0.032)
0.0002
(0.07E-3)
1.469
All coefficients significant at the 1 per cent level except for those marked with **, which indicates 
significant at the 5 per cent level, or #, which indicates not significant at 5 per cent level. Standard 
errors In brackets.
* For the self-employed the Work FT FY variable is whether worked full-time full-year in the current 
year, rather than in the immediately preceding year and the Hours variable is total annual hours rather 
than hours worked per week.
(1) The above coefficients are for males who are not school students, not invalid pension recipients and 
are aged less than 65 years. The small sample size of students, invalids and over 65 year olds meant 
that their imputed hourly wage rate was simply a function of the average rate received by each group, 
with the addition of the permanent error term (multiplied by the variance of the residuals applicable to 
each of these groups) plus a stochastic error term. School students who worked part-time were divided 
into three age groups -15 ,16 -17  and 18-20 years - as average wages increased with age. Those aged 
65 and over who were still in the labour force were divided into the self-employed and the non-self- 
employed.
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Table 4.2: Regression Coefficients Used for Estimating Log of the Hourly 
Wage Rate for Females (1)
COEFFICIENT
a  Age Age2 Work FT
FY *r  1 t-i
Married Divorced Children Hours
p.w.*
Variance 
of residual
1. NON SELF-EMPLOYED WORKING FULL-TIME
- s e c o n d a r y  s c h o o l  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o n ly  
1.60 0.058 -0.0007 0.137 
(0.005) (0.0002) (0.03E-4) (0.0008)
0.072
(0.001)
0.132
(0.002)
-0.061
(0.001)
-0.0189
(0.09E-3)
0.112
- o t h e r  t e r t ia r y  q u a l i f ic a t io n s ,  n o t  d e g r e e s  
1.29 0.066 -0.0008 0.098 
(0.006) (0.0003) (0.04E-4) (0.0009)
-0.023
(0.001)
0.012
(0.012)
-0.0332
(0.001)
-0.0098
(0.09E-3)
0.077
- d e g r e e s
1.76 0.039 -0.0004 0.071 
(0.011) (0.0006) (0.08E-4) (0.002)
0.062
(0.002)
0.085
(0.003)
-0.0279
(0.002)
-0.0053 
(0.11 E-3)
0.068
2. NON SELF-EMPLOYED WORKING PART-TIME
- s e c o n d a r y  s c h o o l  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o n ly  
1.87 0.016 -0.0002 0.189 
(0.007) (0.0005) (0.06E-4) (0.003)
0.136
(0.003)
0.042
(0.004)
0.009
(0.002)
-0.0135
(0.08E-3)
0.174
- o t h e r  t e r t ia r y  q u a l i f ic a t io n s ,  n o t  d e g r e e s  
1.88 0.039 -0.0006 -0.174 
(0.013) (0.0008) (0.01 E-3) (0.005)
0.131
(0.004)
0.049
(0.006)
-0.213
(0.003)
-0.0142
(0.0001)
0.229
- d e g r e e s
3.89 -0.100 0.0012 -0.125 
(0.062) (0.004) (0.05E-3) (0.019)
0.804
(0.014)
1.219
(0.023)
0.065
(0.011)
-0.0152
(0.0005)
0.414
All coefficients significant at the 1 per cent level except for those marked with **, which indicates 
significant at the 5 per cent level. Standard errors in brackets.
* For the self-employed the Work FT FY variable is whether worked full-time full-year in the current
year, rather than in the immediately preceding year and the Hours variable is total annual hours rather 
than hours worked per week.
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Table 4.2 cont
3. SELF-EMPLOYED WOMAN WITH SELF-EMPLOYED HUSBAND,BOTH HAVE EARNINGS
COEFFICIENT
a  Age Age2 Work FT Husband’s
FY Hrly Rate
Children Hours
p.yr.
Variance 
of residual
- s e c o n d a r y  s c h o o l  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o n ly
2.33 -0.026 0.0003 0.263 0.763
(0.03) (0.002) (0.02E-3) (0.007) (0.002)
0.089
(0.005)
-0.0008
(0.04E-4)
0.688
- o t h e r  t e r t i a r y  q u a l i f ic a t io n s ,  n o t  d e g r e e s
2.31 -0.024 0.0002 -0.029 0.597
(0.052) (0.0028) (0.04E-3) (0.008) (0.003)
-0.266
(0.008)
-0.0004
(0.04E-4)
0.399
- d e g r e e s
-9.02 0.525 -0.0077 0.200** 1.458 
(0.266) (0.012) (0.0002) (0.096) (0.027)
-0.074**
(0.034)
-0.0002
(0.35E-4)
0.299
4. SELF-EMPLOYED WOMAN WITH NO SELF-EMPLOYED HUSBAND
COEFFICIENT
a  Age Age2 Work FT Married Divorced Children
FY
Hours
p.yr.
Variance 
of residual
- s e c o n d a r y  s c h o o l  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o n ly
2.29 -0.045 0.0006 0.634 -0.401 0.346
(0.068) (0.003) (0.04E-3) (0.015) (0.020) (0.023)
0.631
(0.013)
-0.0001
(0.07E-4)
1.271
- o t h e r  t e r t ia r y  q u a l i f ic a t io n s ,  n o t  d e g r e e s
-4.24 0.367 -0.0042 1.259 -1.133 0.332
(0.10) (0.006) (0.07E-3) (0.033) (0.027) (0.035)
0.534
(0.018)
-0.0010
(0.02E-3)
1.136
- d e g r e e s
-7.13 0.392 -0.0045 -0.116 - -0.074 
(0.117) (0.005) (0.05E-3) (0.005) - (0.008)
0.349
(0.008)
0.0005
(0.06E-4)
0.035
All coefficients significant at the 1 per cent level except for those marked with **, which indicates 
significant at the 5 per cent level. Standard errors in brackets.
(1). The above coefficients are for females who are not school students, not invalid pension recipients 
and are aged less than 65 years. See note under Table 1 re imputation of wages of students, invalids 
and over 65 year olds. In addition, the number of married self-employed women who had positive 
earnings themselves when their self-employed husband had zero earnings was so small that only the 
average hourly wage rate for these women was imputed (with the appropriate variance reinserted).
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Figure 4.1: Fitted Log Hourly Wage Rates For Non-Self-Employed Males 
Working Full-Time by Education and Age
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Figure 4.2: Fitted Log Hourly Wage Rates For Non-Self-Employed Females 
Working Full-Time by Education and Age.
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As mentioned earlier, one drawback with simply using the coefficients produced by 
multiple regression to calculate the hourly wage rates used in dynamic 
microsimulation models is that this eliminates much of the dispersion in wage rates 
present in the real world. That is, the technique of multiple regression shows the 
average wage rate received by, for example, married male graduates aged 35 
working 40 hours a week. In the real world, some of these male graduates would 
be earning three or fo.ur times this average wage rate, while others might be 
earning half of the average rate. Some of this apparent variance in earnings may 
be due to measurement error in the samples upon which the surveys were based 
eg. due to respondants incorrectly reporting their hours worked or their wages 
(Atkinson et al, 1990:92).
The problem is also due to actual wage rates being based upon a wide range of 
personal and other characteristics about which there is no information in the IDS 
and which are therefore excluded from the regression equation (eg. upon ability, 
motivation, background etc). Yet it is important to try to recreate the major 
differences in earnings apparent in the real world, otherwise there will be 
insufficient inequality in the model.
There are a number of ways in which the variance apparent in the real world can 
be reinserted into the simulated earnings distribution in the model. As noted 
above, the application of the relevant regression coefficients for each group results 
in the simulation of the average hourly earnings of those of a particular education 
level, hours worked, self-employment and marital status etc (called the fitted wage 
rate). To recreate the dispersion of hourly wage rates apparent in the real world, 
an error term has to be added to this fitted wage rate for each individual each year. 
The magnitude and dispersion of the error term is estimated from the 1986 IDS, 
and is calculated by subtracting the fitted hourly earnings produced using the 
regression equation from the actual hourly earnings recorded by individuals in the 
survey.
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For example, when the fitted log hourly wage rate for non-self-employed tradesmen 
working full-time is calculated, using the multiple regression coefficients estimated 
from the 1986 IDS, this fitted wage rate is, on average, 28 cents above or below 
the actual wage rate of such tradesmen in the sample. In around 5 per cent of 
cases the fitted wage rate is likely to be more than 56 cents above or below the 
actual wage rate. Adding an error term which has a mean of zero and a variance 
of 0.08 (ie. 28 cents squared) to the fitted wage estimated in the model then 
results in the variance of the simulated wages in the model matching that in the 
real world - that is, in both the 1986 IDS and the model the mean hourly log wage 
for this group of tradesmen is $2.30 an hour and the variance of this hourly wage 
rate is 0.09.
It is not, however, sufficient just to assign randomly these error terms to each 
simulated individual in the model every year; the factors which cause one individual 
to have a wage rate three times the average for comparable individuals in one year 
are likely to be still present the next year, so that in the next year the individual is 
still likely to be earning well above the average for his or her cohort.
For example, if a person is earning higher than average wages in one year 
because they are particularly clever or their father owns a merchant bank, these 
factors are likely to still be affecting their wages the following year. A way 
therefore has to be found in the model to capture the relative permanence of the 
error term over time, whilst also allowing for the random shocks and fluctuations 
in earnings which panel data demonstrate exist.
If Australia had a panel survey, the importance of the permanent error term and 
of the stochastic error term could be directly estimated from the data. However, 
when all that exist are cross-section data, a guess has to be made at the relative 
importance of the two effects.
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Evidence On The Dynamics Of Earnings
A critical consideration when simulating lifetime income is the degree of relative 
earnings mobility. Previous research has suggested that the size distributions of 
income and earnings in developed economies are fairly fixed, showing relatively 
little change over time (Schiller, 1977:926; Thatcher, 1971:374). Yet a critical issue 
when assessing long term inequality and poverty is how mobile individuals are 
within this relatively rigid size distribution. Do individuals remain in the same 
position relative to others in their birth cohort or is there substantial relative 
earnings mobility over time ? Or, put another way, what percentage of those in the 
bottom decile of earnings for 20-30 year olds in one year are still within the bottom 
decile of earnings for 30-40 year olds ten years later?
As Hart points out, "How long the average person stays in a particular income size 
class is just as important a characteristic of a society as is the degree of inequality 
of incomes at any point of time... the degree of ’income mobility’ or movement 
between income size classes may be more important than the static measures of 
inequality at one point of time in determining incentives to work, social justice and 
other qualities of life" (1976a:108).
Available evidence suggests that there is earnings mobility within industrialised 
countries. Using the US Longitudinal Employer Employee Data file, Moss 
compared the relative earnings positions in 1959 and 1969 of US workers born 
between 1925 and 1929, and found that about two-thirds were in a different 
earnings decile in 1969 (1978). Schiller used the same LEED data file, but 
included only those males who were aged between 16 and 49 in 1957 (the first 
year of the observation period), who had at least $1000 of earnings in 1957 and 
had positive earnings in 1971. He assigned each male within a five year age 
cohort to a ventile of earnings (5 % bands) in 1957 and in 1971, and then 
compared the two to find out whether individuals of approximately the same age 
and experience exchanged relative earnings positions over time. He found that 
about 30 per cent of workers stayed in the same ventile and that they tended to
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be at either the top or bottom of the earnings distribution (not suprisingly, because 
those at the top and bottom find it hard to move up and down respectively), while 
the remaining 70 per cent changed ventiles, with the average move spanning four 
ventiles (ie about one-fifth of the earnings distribution) (1977).
In the UK, Thatcher compared Department of Health and Social Security data on 
the earnings of employees who paid national insurance contributions in at least 48 
weeks in both 1963-4 and 1964-5 and, after dividing them into age cohorts, again 
found movements in relative earnings positions between the two years (1971). 
Similarly, also using DHSS data, Hart found major changes in the relative position 
of males born in 1933 between 1963 and 1970 - for example, only 16 per cent of 
those males in the fifth earnings decile in 1963 were still in the fifth decile in 1970, 
with the original sample having moved as far as the top decile and as low as the 
bottom decile of earnings in 1970 (1976a:123).
Using a shorter time frame, the UK Department of Employment, using a constant 
sample of the earnings of individuals in one week in 1970, 1971 and 1972, found 
that only 4.6 per cent of the sample were in the lowest decile of earnings in each 
of the three years, suggesting that spells in the bottom decile were a transitory 
experience for many (1973).
Numerous other studies have examined the extent to which earnings in one year 
are correlated with earnings in the next, and have found that there is greater 
mobility while workers are younger. After an exhaustive survey of the literature, 
Atkinson et al concluded that "the results in general support the view that 
correlation rises over the life-cycle, from values around 0.75 in the mid-20s to 
around 0.90 to 0.95 in the 50s" (1990:101).
Such mobility in relative total earnings is perhaps not unexpected, given the PSID 
finding that the work hours of even prime age males fluctuate markedly from year 
to year, due to changes in the length of the standard week, in overtime hours and 
second jobs, short spells of unemployment and illness, etc. Duncan and Hoffman
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found that "the average difference in hours worked from one year to the next 
amounted to more than six 40-hour weeks for women and, suprisingly, even more 
for men" (1984:122). Under these circumstances, one would expect total annual 
earnings to fluctuate markedly and thus produce major changes in relative earnings 
positions from year to year.
However, the PSID data also revealed that the hourly wage rate also fluctuated 
greatly from one year to the next, by an average of 25 per cent for prime-age men 
(Duncan and Hoffman, 1984:122). Comparing the hourly wage rates of white male 
household heads (who were aged 25 to 50 in 1969) showed that 56 per cent of 
these males were in a different wage quintile in 1978 than that they had occupied 
in 1969 - and that one person in five had changed position by two quintiles or more 
(1984:116). (These transition rates are not, however, cohort specific, and, given 
the strong relationship between age and hourly wages, one would expect major 
shifts in quintile position).
Reflecting the "remarkable volatility" in hours worked and hourly wage rates, 
Duncan and Hoffman found that there "is a tremendous amount of year-to-year 
fluctuation in earnings both upward and downward. No identifiable group - not the 
more educated, not union members, not even higher-income persons - seems to 
be immune from these changes in year to year income" (1984:119). While part of 
this apparent mobility may be due to measurement error (Bound et al, 1989), if 
such error is correlated over time the magnitude of the problem may be reduced. 
It should also be recognised that much apparent mobility reflects systematic factors 
rather than random forces, such as increasing age, movement in and out of full­
time jobs and of the labour force, and so on.
Is Mobility Transitory ?
A second important issue in simulating lifetime earnings, given this apparent 
mobility, is whether upward mobility in one period is reversed in the next period, 
thus rendering mobility a transitory phenomenon. For example, one could imagine 
a society where there were major changes in relative earnings position in one year
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which were fully reversed in the next year. In such a society, if relative earnings 
positions in one year were compared with those in the immediately preceding year 
then an impression of substantial mobility would be created - yet if the relative 
earnings positions were compared to those of two years earlier then there would 
appear to be no mobility. Whether or to what extent mobility is permanent or 
transitory makes an enormous difference to how lifetime earnings should be 
simulated.
Shorrocks argues that "since those who have recently received a significant 
income increment due to promotion are unlikely to be considered for further 
promotion in the near future, they will tend to experience lower income changes 
than the average of their contemporaries, some of whom are being promoted" 
(1976:571). In other words, individuals who move ahead of their cohort in one year 
through promotion, shifting jobs etc, are likely to find that in the next year or two 
many of their contemporaries catch up, even though the high fliers might then 
move ahead again with their next promotion.
Shorrocks found that the process governing income mobility was not first-order 
Markov, because the "probability of a positive [earnings] class change in one 
period is inversely related to the past transition and vice versa" (1976:576). 
Similarly, Hart found that "higher than average increases in income in one period 
are followed by lower than average increases in income in the following period, and 
vice versa" (1976b:560).
However, Schiller argued that while improvements in relative position in one period 
were often offset in the next, nonetheless most of the mobility observed was 
’permanent’ (1977:934). Support for this view is provided by studies which have 
tracked cohorts for long periods and have found that earnings mobility increases 
with the length of the measurement period. Both Bourguignon and Morrisson 
(1983) and Soltow (1965) found that the correlation between earnings 30 years 
apart was below 0.40 per cent - so that, as Atkinson et al explained, this "means
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that, well after entry in active life, intial earnings explain only 16 per cent of the 
variance of earnings 30 years later" (1988:625).
Permanence in Earnings Relativities
Nonetheless, despite this undoubted mobility, available evidence also suggests that 
there is also marked permanence in the relative earnings positions of individuals. 
Kennedy analysed the earnings of 262 males born in 1930 who had positive 
earnings every year from 1966 to 1983 and contributed for each of these years to 
the Canada Pension Plan. He found that "following an unstable period of earnings 
’adolescence’, few mature individuals make large long-term gains or losses in 
earnings relative to those of their cohort. Permanent differences between 
individual levels of earnings, rather than transitory fluctuations, account for the bulk 
of the earnings differences evident in cross-sectional data" (1989:385). He found 
that 68 per cent of the variation in relative earnings observable across these 
individuals at a given point in time was explained by permanent differences 
between their level of earnings.
After an extensive survey of the literature, Atkinson et al also concluded that "all 
of these results point to strong permanent forces - ie. associated with constant 
individual observed or non-observed attributes - for earnings mobility, which may 
dominate purely transitory phenomena" (1990:143).
On balance, it appears that permanent differences between individuals account for 
the majority of earnings variance; that there are nonetheless substantial 
fluctuations from year to year around an individual’s long term relative position; 
that such transitory fluctuations contribute greatly to the apparent shifts in relative 
earnings positions revealed in surveys of earnings at two or more points in time, 
but that some component of the relative earnings mobility revealed by such 
surveys is caused by permanent changes in the position of some individuals vis a 
vis their cohort. However, given the marked variation in the findings of the various 
studies, as Atkinson et al observe, "it is not possible to draw definite conclusions 
about the extent of earnings mobility" (1990:151).
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Modelling Earnings Dynamics For Australia
Given the dearth of Australian panel data and the lack of definitive overseas 
evidence (including the absence of many results on the dynamic profiles of 
women), the extent of mobility in earnings in Australia over time remains uncertain. 
It is therefore not clear to what extent the following procedures used to generate 
the permanent and stochastic variance in hourly earnings apparent in the real 
world are accurate.
The Permanent Error Term
Given the permanence of much of the earnings differentials found by Kennedy and 
others, all of the variables available in the model were examined to see which 
might help in generating the degree of institutionalised inequality in earnings 
apparent in society. First, all cohort members were given a ’socio-economic score’ 
which was based upon a range of personal and socio-economic characteristics 
which could be expected to influence whether they earned more or less than 
similar members of their cohort.
They were thus first assigned four points if their parents belonged to the top SES 
quartile, three and two points respectively for the middle quartiles and one point 
if their parents were in the lowest SES quartile, on the assumption that family 
background might have some influence on future relative earnings rates (Duncan 
and Hoffman, 1984:110). Those who went to a private school for their final years 
of secondary schooling were assigned another 4 points, those at Catholic schools 
3 points, those at government schools 2 points and those who left school before 
the final two years of secondary schooling only one point, on the assumption that 
extra years of schooling in good schools might help to create the confidence, 
contacts, etc which might later be associated with higher earnings. Finally, those 
selected never to experience any unemployment in their whole lives were awarded 
another four points, those selected to be occasionally unemployed 2.5 points and 
the chronically unemployed one point, on the assumption that such unemployment 
might be associated with personal characteristics, ’scarring’ or intermittent work
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patterns which could affect relative earnings position. The maximum score on the 
socio-economic variable was thus 12.
While environmental influences are thus assumed to affect the relative earnings 
positions of individuals in the pseudo-cohort, it also seemed likely, that personal 
qualities would also make a difference to relative positions. To capture this, a 
second uniformly and randomly distributed ’ability’ variable was created, designed 
to capture such unmeasurable personal characteristics as intelligence, ability, 
motivation, efficacy, and willingness to work very long hours, all of which might be 
expected to affect relative earnings. The pseudo-cohort were then divided into 
eight ’ability’ groups of equal size, with the top group being awarded 16 points and 
the bottom group two points.
The ability and total socio-economic scores were then added together to derive the 
'relative earnings advantage’ score, producing a maximum score of 28 for those 
who were endowed with the personal characteristics and social and environmental 
advantages likely to ensure that they earned a higher wage rate than other 
comparable members of their cohort.
After being divided at age 45 into the groups for whom separate regression 
equations were estimated, the individuals within each group were ranked by their 
’relative earnings advantage’ score and were then each assigned a number from 
a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of one, with the highest 
ranking members within each of the groups being given the top positive numbers 
from this distribution and the lowest ranking members being given the bottom 
negative numbers.
This procedure ensured that a normally distributed ’permanent’ error term was 
attached to each simulated individual in each of the groups for whom regression 
equations were used to impute hourly wage rates. The variance of the residuals 
(ie. the difference between the actual log hourly wage rates received by the real 
individuals recorded in the 1986 IDS and the fitted hourly wage rates imputed to
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them using the appropriate regression equation) was then calculated. To recreate 
the correct degree of variance in wage rates in the pseudo-cohort, all that was then 
required was to multiply the ’relative earnings advantage’ score of each individual 
by the square root of the appropriate variance of the residuals. An individual with 
a high lifetime ’relative earnings advantage’ score, for example, might have a wage 
rate which was consistently 50 per cent higher than the average wage rate of other 
comparable individuals in the simulation.
The Stochastic Error Term
In addition, in order to produce the random shocks to wage rates which the PSID 
and other data suggest exist, a further 'transitory' error term was added to the 
wage rate of each simulated individual each year. This error term was drawn from 
a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 0.0025, and was changed every 
year for every individual. This meant that, on average, the actual wage rate in any 
given year was five per cent higher or lower than the ’permanent’ wage rate, and 
that every year about five per cent of the pseudo-cohort received an hourly log 
wage rate which was about 10 per cent higher or lower than their permanent wage 
rate.
While this second error term might appear too low, given the average 25 per cent 
fluctuation in hourly wage rates from one year to the next found by the PSID, it 
should be noted that there is significant change in wage rates from year to year for 
simulated individuals. Hourly wage rates change greatly, not only due to the 
stochastic error term, but also due to increasing age, changes in marital status 
and hours worked (both currently and in the preceding year), switches from full­
time to part-time work and vice versa, entries or exits to self-employment, the 
attainment of additional educational qualifications and so on.
In a small number of cases, when the applicable hourly wage rate for self- 
employed individuals was multiplied by the number of hours worked in the year, the 
resultant total annual earnings far exceeded the highest annual earnings for the 
self-employed revealed in the IDS. It is entirely conceivable that some self­
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employed do occasionally earn extraordinarily high earnings, and that their 
absence from the IDS is simply due to this relatively rare event not occurring to 
any of the IDS sample.
During development of the model these very high self-employed incomes were 
therefore originally left untouched, but this was later found to cause major problems 
when simulating investment incomes. Because earned income was originally used 
as one of the independent variables affecting investment income receipt, those with 
extraordinarily high earned income were subsequently assigned extraordinarily high 
investment income in some of the techniques tested for simulating investment 
income. Eventually, a decision was taken to truncate the extremely high self- 
employed earned incomes, so that those self-employed with an earned income of 
greater than $150,000 a year were simply given an earned income of $150,000 a 
year ( the maximum earned income for self-employed found in the IDS was 
$120,000 for women and $130,000 for men). This modification only affected some 
0.001 per cent of the observations of males and 0.0005 per cent of observations 
of females. It is possible to change the assumption to retain the original simulated 
earnings.
Evaluation of the Earnings Simulation
Mean and Variance of Earnings for Different Groups
There are two reasons to expect divergence between the mean log hourly wage 
rates recorded in the 1986 IDS and those simulated in the model. First, while one 
would expect the distribution of hours worked to be the same in the model as in 
the IDS (because the labour force module was based upon the IDS data) in other 
respects the pseudo-cohort do not look exactly like the population captured in the 
IDS. For example, wage rates are affected by marital status and the presence of 
children, and in the model a different proportion of the population are married or 
have children compared to the IDS population. This is because the marital and 
child status of the real individuals recorded in the IDS are a result of the marriage
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and fertility rates applying during the last 100 years, while the marital and child 
status of the simulated individuals result from the use of the marriage, divorce and 
fertility rates applying in 1986.
Apart from the simulated population not exactly replicating the demographic 
characteristics of the IDS population, a second reason to expect divergence 
between the simulated wage rates and the real wage rates recorded in the IDS is 
the random nature of the permanent error term used in the model. In a model of 
100,000 simulated individuals, the normal distribution of error terms generated 
within SAS (the computer language in which the model was written) for each of the 
24 groups for whom multiple regression equations are estimated would probably 
have a mean of exactly zero and a variance of exactly one for each group.
However, in a model of only 4000 simulated individuals, it would be exceptionally 
good luck if, for example, the small number of people selected to be self-employed 
each year had attached to each of them a permanent error term which 
coincidentally resulted in a normal distribution of error terms with a mean of zero 
and a variance of one for this small sub-group as a whole. Yet, when this 
condition is not met, the variance apparent in the real world cannot be accurately 
reinserted into the model. This appears to be one of the reasons why the results 
are less satisfactory for smaller groups, such as the self-employed and non-self- 
employed males working part-time. The much greater dispersion of wages for 
these groups, particularly for the self-employed, also makes it more difficult to fit 
a satisfactory regression line and to accurately reproduce their earnings rates.
Nonetheless, despite these potential problems, on the whole the earnings module 
appears to perform very well in reproducing a realistic distribution of wage rates. 
Table 4.3 shows the mean and variance of log hourly earnings rates for various 
groups found in the 1986 IDS and compares them with the results produced by the 
model. In most cases, the mean and variance produced by the simulation appear 
very close to the IDS estimates.
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Table 4.3: Mean and Variance of Log Hourly Earnings Rates for Various 
Groups Found in 1986 IDS and in the Model
Category
IDS SURVEY 
Mean Variance
SIMULATION MODEL 
Mean Variance
NON SELF-EMPLOYED, AGED LESS THAN 65 YEARS  
- working full-time
M a l e s
• secondary sch only 2.15 0.17 2.05 0.18
- trade quals 2.30 0.09 2.30 0.09
- other tertiary 2.45 0.16 2.45 0.16
- degree 2.60 0.14 2.65 0.13
F e m a l e s
- secondary sch only 1.95 0.15 1.90 0.16
- some tertiary 2.15 0.10 2.20 0.10
- degree 2.40 0.08 2.40 0.07
- working part-time
M a l e s
- secondary sch only 2.10 0.32 2.10 0.33
- trade quals 2.25 0.65 2.20 0.58
- other tertiary 2.60 0.31 2.55 0.30
- degree 2.35 0.44 2.35 0.64
F e m a l e s
- secondary sch only 2.10 0.18 2.05 0.19
- some tertiary 2.20 0.25 2.25 0.19
- degree 2.50 0.41 2.40 0.55
SELF-EMPLOYED, AGED LESS THAN 65 YEARS
M a le s
- secondary sch only 1.50 0.88 1.40 0.79
- trade quals 1.75 0.48 1.75 0.54
- other tertiary 1.70 0.88 1.58 1.00
- degree 2.05 1.47 2.25 1.94
M a r r i e d  F e m a l e s  w ith  S e l f - e m p lo y e d  H u s b a n d ,  B o t h  H a v e  E a r n in g s
- secondary sch only 2.00 1.29 2.15 1.39
- some tertiary 2.00 0.83 1.95 0.76
- degree 2.70 0.89 2.65 0.59
F e m a l e s  W i t h o u t  S e l f - e m p lo y e d  H u s b a n d s
- secondary sch only 1.60 1.21 1.75 1.44
- some tertiary 1.40 1.28 1.60 1.96
- degree 2.00 0.56 1.95 0.34
Table 4.3 cont
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IDS SURVEY SIMULATION MODEL
Category Mean Variance Mean Variance
AGED OVER 65 YEARS
Self-employed men 1.40 2.77 1.85 1.35
Self-employed women 1.45 2.78 1.60 2.61
Non-selfemployed men 2.05 0.38 2.00 0.41
Non-selfemployed women 1.95 0.33 1.90 0.36
SCHOOL STUDENTS
Male 1.55 0.31 1.50 0.29
Female 1.60 0.40 1.60 0.36
Year to Year Fluctuation in Hourly Wage Rates
The model also appears to capture well the fluctuation in hourly wage rates from 
year to year, which was found in the PSID data. Table 4.4 shows the average 
absolute change in hourly earnings at ages 35, 45 and 55 of the pseudo-cohort 
males and females compared to those earned in the preceding year. For example, 
it shows that for males, the hourly wage received at age 35 was, on average, 19 
per cent higher or lower than that received at age 34. The hourly earnings of 
women show greater variation than those of men, but this is to be expected, given 
the greater volatility in their labour force behaviour.
Relative Earnings Mobility
The annual earnings of the simulated individuals in the model also vary greatly 
from year to year. As they are calculated by simply multiplying the hourly wage 
rate by the number of hours in the labour force in a given year, they not only 
reflect fluctuations in wage rates but also the impact of changes in working hours 
due to unemployment, illness, pregnancy and birth, of changes in marital status 
and the presence of young children, extended leave or absences from the labour 
force etc. One partial test of the model is to examine whether it appears to 
simulate a realistic degree of mobility and immobility in total earnings.
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Table 4.4: Average Absolute Change in Hourly Wage Rates Produced by the 
Model and Found in PSID Data.
Age
Absolute Percentage Change in Hourly 
Wage Rates Compared to Those Earned 
in the Preceding Year
1. PSID (1)
- white male household heads
aged 25-50 0.25
2. MODEL
Males
- 35 years 0.19
- 45 years 0.23
- 55 years 0.19
Females
- 35 years 0.32
- 45 years 0.28
- 55 years 0.20
Note: The table shows the absolute percentage increase or decrease in hourly wage rates at the given 
age, compared to those earned one year earlier. Only those with positive earnings in both years are 
included.
(1). Source: Duncan and Hoffman (1984:122).
A number of longitudinal studies have sampled the same groups of males at two 
different points in time. Such studies have composed transition matrices, by 
allocating the males to an earnings decile in the base year of the sample (eg. in 
1960), and then reallocating the same males to an earnings decile some years 
later, based on their earnings in the latter year (eg. in 1970). It is then easy to 
see how many of the males have shifted from one decile to another or, conversely, 
have remained in the same decile, thereby providing a clue of the degree of 
earnings mobility in the society.
In Table 4.5, the proportion of males remaining in the same aggregate earnings 
decile or quintile at two different points in time found in a number of longitudinal 
studies is shown, and compared with the results produced by the model. For 
example, when pseudo-cohort males in the labour force at both age 35 and age
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45 are allocated to earnings quintiles in each of those years, about 45 per cent are 
in the same earnings quintile in both years. Conversely, some 55 per cent either 
move up or down the relative earnings distribution. As expected, the relative 
earnings mobility of pseudo-cohort females is greater, with only 39 per cent 
remaining in the same earnings deciles at ages 35 and 45. These results appear 
to compare well with the findings of longitudinal studies, and suggest that the 
model generates an appropriate degree of mobility.
Table 4.5. Proportion of Those in Labour Force Remaining in Same Total 
Earnings Decile or Quintile in Other Data Sources and in the Model
Country, 
Study 
and Year
Time Period, Group 
Covered, and Age 
of Sample in
Percent of Sample Remaining 
in the Same Total Earnings
Base Year Quintile Decile
1. Studies
- UK - Hart 
(1976)
7 years, adult 
males aged 30
44 28
- US - Schiller 
(1977)
14 years, males 
aged 16-49 
earning $1000+
2 9*
- US - Moss 
(1978)
10 years, white 
males aged 30-34
33**
- US - Duncan 
et al (1984)
9 years, white 
males aged 25-50
44
2. Model #
Males -10 years, males 
aged 35
-10 years, males 
aged 45
-20 years, males 
aged 35
47 28 
45 26 
40 23
Females -10 years, females 
aged 35
-10 years, females 
aged 45
-20 years, females 
aged 35
36 21 
39 21 
32 18
* P e r c e n t  o f  m a l e s  r e m a in in g  in  t h e  s a m e  v e n t i le  ( ie .  5  p e r  c e n t  b a n d )  r a t h e r  t h a n  d e c i le .
* *  P e r  c e n t  o f  w h it e  m a le s  r e m a in in g  in  t h e  s a m e  d e c i le  o f  e a r n in g s  f o r  a l l  m a l e s  ( b o t h  w h it e  a n d  b la c k ) ,  
ie .  3 3  p e r  c e n t  o f  w h ite  m a le s  r e m a in e d  w ith in  t h e  s a m e  a g g r e g a t e  e a r n in g s  d e c i le .
#  S a m p le  is  t h o s e  in  t h e  la b o u r  f o r c e  a t  a g e s  3 5 ,  4 5  a n d  5 5  ( ie .  t h o s e  n o t  in  t h e  l a b o u r  f o r c e  in  o n e  
o r  m o r e  o f  t h e s e  y e a r s  a r e  n o t  In c lu d e d ) .
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4.3. INVESTMENT INCOME
The 1986 IDS contained information about personal investment income, comprising 
income from interest (on bank accounts, government bonds, loans, debentures 
etc), dividends, net rent, taxable profit from sale of property, and interest from 
property, cash management and unit trusts. In addition, a small number of 
individuals on the tape were designated as receiving income from ’own non-limited 
liability business/trust’, were recorded as working for 52 weeks in their own ’non­
limited liability business or trust in 1985-86’, yet said that they worked zero hours 
per week in this non-limited liability business/trust. Most also appeared to be 
working 52 weeks for wages and salaries, and so it was decided to treat this kind 
of income as unearned income rather than earned income. Hence it was 
reallocated to investment income and is included here.
The accurate simulation of investment income is extremely difficult, as some 45 per 
cent of Australians receive no investment income, a large proportion of those who 
do receive investment income receive fairly small amounts of only a few hundred 
dollars a year, while a further very small proportion receive very high investment 
incomes of over $100,000 a year. These characteristics make it more difficult to 
use econometric techniques to satisfactorily simulate investment income and a 
number of different approaches were tried.
In the first approach tried, a tobit model was estimated to impute annual 
investment income (a tobit model is a technique which allows one to deal with 
situations where the dependent variable - in this case investment income - is zero 
for a significant proportion of the sample). The first attempt was estimated by a 
maximum likelihood tobit model (Maddala, 1983:151-162). The explanatory 
variables used in the tobit equation were age (investment income increased with 
age), self-employment status (the self-employed had significantly higher investment 
income than the non-self-employed), education (investment income increased with 
additional education), the presence of any children aged less than 15 (associated 
with lower investment income), whether divorced (lowered income), and the
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amount of earned income (higher earned income was correlated with higher 
investment income).
However, when the relevant tobit parameters were used in the model to simulate 
investment income it became clear that either the parameters were biased or the 
data was not normally distributed, as the mean investment incomes for discrete 
groups in the simulated population were two to three times higher than the real 
mean investment incomes for comparable groups in the 1986 IDS. Truncating 
simulated investment incomes which were very high had little effect upon this 
problem.
A second attempt utilised an alternative two-step tobit procedure used by Heckman 
(1976). Because at the second stage this procedure used ordinary least squares 
it was hoped that it would be less sensitive to distributional misspecifications 
(caused by the few very high observations for investment income in the IDS). 
However, the predictive power of the resulting estimates was also poor; in 
attempting to capture the long investment income tail the mean was biased 
upwards, again leading to unusable predictions. It was decided that the results 
produced using a tobit model were too inaccurate to use as, for example, 
investment income levels which were double or triple the real levels would make 
large numbers of retirees in the model ineligible for means-tested age pensions.
Finally, the best that could be done was to simply divide the population into major 
sub-groups and then select the correct proportion within each sub-group to have 
zero investment income and impute the relevant mean and variance of the log of 
investment income for the remainder. Figure 4.3 summarises the procedures 
followed in assigning investment income, which are described more fully below.
The first step was therefore to devise a method of determining which cohort 
members would receive zero investment income in a given year. For both sexes, 
the probability of having zero investment income was calculated from the 1986 IDS 
and was based upon age, education, self-employment status and marital status.
164
A lifetime propensity to save was then imputed to each simulated individual at 
birth. The value of this variable ranged between zero and one, and was made 75 
per cent dependent upon parental SES (with those with higher SES parents being 
more likely to receive investment income) and 25 per cent dependent upon chance 
(ie. thereby imputing personal preferences for saving or spending). This ratio can 
be changed. When the value of the lifetime propensity to save was less than the 
probability of receiving zero investment income in any year, then the individual was 
assigned zero investment income.
The remaining cohort members were thus selected to have positive investment 
income in that year. The second step was therefore to work out how much 
investment income these individuals would receive in that year. Cohort males were 
assigned investment income in accord with their age, self-employment status, and 
education. Females were stratified by their age, marital status, education and, 
where sample size on the IDS tape provided valid results, by their self-employment 
status. No doubt reflecting the highly skewed distribution of investment income in 
the IDS which made the econometric techniques unsatisfactory, even just imputing 
the mean and variance of investment income found in the IDS resulted in 
investment income levels in the simulation which were too high for some sub­
groups.
In such cases the maximum log investment income allowed was truncated, usually 
to the maximum observation found on the IDS for that sub-group, but sometimes 
to somewhat lower levels. In other words, when the choice was between imputing 
the correct variance and then facing a mean which was too high, or imputing a 
variance which was lower than that found in the real world but resulted in the 
correct mean, the latter course was followed. This approach was taken to ensure 
that artificially high numbers of the pseudo-cohort would not be precluded from 
receipt of social security cash transfers. However, alternative approaches could 
easily be modelled.
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As with earned income, an error term was added in order to recreate the 
dispersion of investment income apparent in the real world. Randomly reassigning 
this error term for every individual every year would have caused wild fluctuations 
in investment income. While it seems likely that there are major fluctuations in 
investment income over time, it also seems probable that some individuals save 
persistently more or less than individuals with apparently similar characteristics in 
their cohort.
For example, individuals who have high investment incomes in one year due to rich 
parents giving them assets or trust income are likely to still be benefiting from 
these factors the following year. Similarly, it seems likely that some individuals 
have a lifetime tendency to save more, while others in their cohort prefer to spend 
all of their income, and thus accrue less assets and subsequently investment 
income.
If one had genuine longitudinal data on investment income, the importance of the 
permanent and stochastic error terms could be directly estimated from the 
longitudinal data. However, when all that is available is cross-section data, like 
that in the IDS, the relative magnitude of the permanent error term (capturing long- 
run individual tendencies to save more and receive more investment income than 
others with similar characteristics) and the stochastic error term (capturing 
fluctuations in investment income from year to year, due to changes in interest 
rates, stock market crashes, sale of assets etc) have to be imputed.
Given these factors, the error terms were created in the following way. Two error 
terms were added to the relevant means. The first, which amounted to one-third 
of the observed variance of investment income within each sub-group, was 
allocated stochastically and varied from year to year, thus producing random 
fluctuations in investment income. The second, amounting to two-thirds of the 
observed variance in investment income, was a permanent error term, which 
determined whether the individual normally received more or less investment 
income than apparently comparable invididuals.
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Figure 4.3: Structure of the Investment Income Module
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This permanent error term could have simply been randomly allocated at birth. 
However, as both the tobit and multiple regression results had shown that higher 
investment income was positively correlated with higher earned income, such a 
procedure would have created an income distribution which was artificially equal. 
Instead, a more complex procedure was followed, which created a link between 
earned income and investment income and effectively involved re-using the 
’relative earnings advantage score’ error term (which, as discussed earlier, was a 
major factor determining whether each simulated individual earned more or less 
than their cohort). Tests showed that the procedure had introduced a positive 
correlation between simulated earnings and simulated investment income.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the mean investment incomes by age, education and, 
for females, marital status, found in the IDS and produced by the model. About 
40 per cent of all cohort males and females receive investment income. This is 
somewhat higher than the proportion found in the IDS, because the pseudo-cohort 
have higher educational qualifications than the IDS population and the proportion 
receiving investment income increases as education level increases.
4.4 SUPERANNUATION INCOME
The 1986 IDS contained information about regular income from superannuation 
pensions, any amount of superannuation lump sum received, and whether such a 
lump sum was rolled over or transferred. No attempt was made to explicitly 
simulate the receipt of lump sums in the model, although the interest income etc 
from invested lump sums is implicitly captured in the investment income module, 
while the income from lump sums rolled over to deferred annuities is captured as 
superannuation income.
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Figure 4.4: Mean Yearly Investment Income by Age and Education for Males 
in the 1986 IDS and in the Model
0000
6000
4000
2000
YEARLY INVESTMENT INCOME $
15 TO 24
Secondary School 
Qualifications Only
25 TO 49 50 TO 64
AGE GROUP
 YEARLY INVESTMENT INCOME $
0000-1------------------------------------------------
6000
Some
Tertiary
Qualifications
4000-
2000
15 TO 24 25 TO 49 50 TO 04
AGE GROUP
YEARLY INVESTMENT INCOME $
Graduates
AGE GROUP
■  IDS 0  MODEL
169
Figure 4.5: Mean Yearly Investment Income by Age, Education and Marital 
Status For Females in the 1986 IDS and in the Model
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Males
The 1986 IDS showed that the receipt of superannuation income by males became 
significant after the age of 50. About five per cent of all 50-54 year old males in 
the IDS said they received superannuation, with the proportion increasing sharply 
after age 60 to about 12 per cent of the total. Tests on the IDS showed that 
receipt of superannuation was not limited to males out of the labour force, 
suggesting that some males received their superannuation entitlements and 
subsequently re-entered or remained in the labour force in a different job.
A tobit model was used to simulate receipt of the first year of superannuation 
income for males (Table 4.6). Superannuation reciept was made dependent upon 
age, education level and whether the individual was divorced. Other possible 
explanatory variables, such as whether the individual was single or married, were 
tested but were found not to be significant.
Table 4.6: Tobit Parameters Used to Estimate Male Superannuation Income
Coefficient
Sigma
Constant Age Age2 Some
Tertiary
Degree Divorce
-5650 141 -0.967 280 397 -96.3 427
(1010) (30.1) (0.224) (43.6) (57.7) (52.5)
Note: Standard errors in brackets.
For the first year of retirement after the age of 49, the tobit model was used to 
simultaneously select the correct proportion of males to receive superannuation 
income and to set the amount of superannuation income received. Once cohort 
males were selected to receive a certain amount of pension income, this amount 
was then assumed to be received every year until death. In the IDS data, due to
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cohort/period effects, the amount of occupational pension received actually 
declined sharply for males aged 75 or more. However, given the prevalence of 
index-linked pensions by 1986, it seemed unlikely that in the real world real 
pensions would decrease as an individual became older. Consequently, in the 
simulation the assumption was made that after the first year of pension was 
received it would remain at that level for the rest of life. This is thus the single 
area of the model where an attempt has not been made to replicate exactly the 
situation actually existing in 1986.
This provision also meant that private pension income did not cease with re-entry 
to the workforce so that, as in the real world, a small proportion of simulated males 
in the workforce receive occupational pension income.
As before, an error term was used to ensure that rather than all males receiving 
the mean pension income for someone with their characteristics, pension income 
varied in line with the dispersion apparent in the real world. With real longitudinal 
data, the likelihood of receiving a pension by such characteristics as occupation 
and industry (Altmann, 1981), level of earned income received during working life 
and duration in different types of jobs could be estimated. Unfortunately, the IDS 
simply records pension income received in late 1986 and does not contain any 
data about current retirees during their earlier working years.
Although superannuation receipt varies by industry and occupation, these variables 
are not included in the model. However, superannuation income is also highly 
correlated with previous earned income, as most pensions are multiples of final 
average salary. Rather than making the error term used in imputing 
superannuation income directly dependent upon final average salary, which would 
have involved very complex programming, the error terms finally used in the 
simulation were the same as those used for imputing the permanent part of the 
variance of earnings, thereby introducing a linkage between earnings and 
superannuation receipt via another means.
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In effect this means that simulated males who had a high ’relative earnings 
advantage score’ also had a greater likelihood of both receiving superannuation 
and receiving higher amounts of private pension income than those with a low 
’relative earnings advantage score’. Because this relative earnings advantage 
score is not perfectly correlated with earnings (which also depend upon other 
characteristics and upon chance) a ’chance’ or ’luck’ element is introduced into the 
simulation of superannuation income, designed to capture the effect of unknown 
factors such as industry of employment.
Females
Modelling the receipt of superannuation income for women was extremely difficult, 
because so few women received superannuation in 1986. There were insufficient 
observations on the IDS tape to estimate a tobit model. The small number of 
observations did not even allow subdivision by more than one explanatory variable, 
so after tests to compare the importance of factors such as marital status and 
education, eventually education was selected as the most important factor. 
According to the 1986 IDS, only 4 per cent of women with secondary school 
qualifications aged 60 and over were receiving superannuation income; this rose 
to 11 per cent for those with some tertiary qualifications and to 23 per cent for 
those with degrees.
In the simulation, the correct proportion of women by education level were 
randomly selected in the first year of retirement to receive superannuation income. 
The amount of pension imputed consisted of the average amount for women of 
each education level plus an error term. As with men, the permanent earnings 
error term was simply multiplied by the degree of variance in superannuation 
income apparent in the IDS data, so that those women with high ’relative earnings 
advantage scores’ who were selected to receive superannuation also received 
higher superannuation pensions.
When a married cohort member who was receiving superannuation died, the 
surviving spouse was given 0.67 per cent of the superannuation entitlements of
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the deceased spouse. This figure was based upon Department of Social Security 
estimates and can be varied if desired.
The proportion of men and women receiving superannuation in the IDS and in the 
model is shown in Table 4.7. Substantially more individuals receive pension 
income in the model than in the IDS. This is in large part due to the higher 
education levels of the pseudo-cohort, as for both men and women education level 
directly affects the probability of receipt. In addition, these higher receipt levels 
also increase the number of surviving spouses who begin to receive 
superannuation income after the death of their partner, thereby further increasing 
the proportion receiving superannuation. For men, average superannuation 
payments received decline after taking account of the income they receive from the 
pensions of their deceased wives, because women receive lower occupational 
pensions on average than men. Conversely, for women, average occupational 
pensions increase after taking account of the higher payments they receive from 
the entitlements of their deceased husbands.
Table 4.7: Proportion of Males and Females After Retirement Age Receiving 
Superannuation Income and Average Income Received by Education
MODEL
Group
IDS Before Including 
Spouse’s Pension*
After Including 
Spouse’s Pension*
% $ p.w. % $ p.w. % $ p.w.
Males
- sec sch only 7 200 4 180 6 160
- some tertiary 10 210 12 240 13 230
- degree 24 270 24 285 25 275
Females
- sec sch only 4 100 4 85 9 135
- some tertiary 11 120 9 120 12 140
- degree 23 170 27 150 31 160
*That is, before and after including any pension received by a person due to the death of a spouse who 
was receiving an occupational pension.
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4.5 MAINTENANCE INCOME
To simulate maintenance income the passage of the children of the pseudo-cohort 
through secondary education and the process of leaving home had to be 
simulated. The probabilities of children remaining in full-time education and/or 
living at home were estimated from the IDS data on the characteristics of 15 to 24 
year olds. It was assumed that the children for whom a mother could potentially 
receive maintenance comprised children still living at home aged less than 18 and 
full-time students living at home aged 18 to 24.
The IDS data were used to isolate important factors affecting the probability of 
receiving maintenance and the amount of maintenance received, such as the age 
of the youngest child and the number of dependent children. However, many of 
the factors which seemed likely to have a major impact on maintenance receipt, 
such as the length of time since the family split up, were not recorded in the IDS 
and could therefore not be included in the model. Accurate simulation was also 
hindered by the relatively small number of people receiving maintenance recorded 
in the IDS, which restricted the number of explanatory variables which could be 
used.
In the model, the year of family break up was identified and a proportion of the new 
sole parent mothers were selected to receive maintenance (no fathers were paid 
maintenance, as upon family dissolution all children were assumed to remain with 
the mother). These proportions were set so that the percentage receiving 
maintenance in the simulation was about the same as that in the 1986 IDS. The 
amount of maintenance imputed was the mean received by sole parents in the IDS 
with the same number of children and same age of youngest child, with an error 
term which was related to the earnings of the former husband. This meant that 
high income ex-husbands paid more maintenance than low income ex-husbands.
After the amount of maintenance paid in the first year of family breakup was 
imputed, it was retained at the same level for the next five years (unless all 
children eligible for maintenance left the family home during that period in which 
case it was reset to zero in the year the last child left). One third of all the sole 
parents selected to receive maintenance in the model were arbitrarily selected to 
receive it for a maximum of five years, a further one-third received it for a 
maximum of ten years and the final third received it for up to 15 years. Again, 
maintenance was terminated if all eligible children left home.
In the absence of an Australian panel study with longitudinal data on maintenance 
it is difficult to know how accurate the above simulation is. All that can be said is 
that the proportion of sole parents receiving maintenance in the simulation and the 
average amount of maintenance received are very similar to that recorded in the 
1986 IDS (Table 4.8).
Table 4.8: Percentage of Sole Parents Receiving Maintenance by Age of 
Youngest Child and Average Maintenance Received in the 1986 IDS and in 
the Model
1986 IDS Model
Per cent of sole parents receiving maintenance, youngest child aged
- Oto 4 14 14
- 5 to 9 28 28
- 10 to 14 31 32
- 15 to 20 36 33
Average amount
received - $ pw 42 41
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4.6 CONCLUSION
The data available in Australia to estimate dynamic income profiles are woefully 
inadequate. The attempts made in the simulation to impose realistic linkages 
between various types of income over time only represent reasonable guesses at 
the importance of permanent and transitory effects, and different assumptions 
would produce quite different results. In the future, other assumptions can be 
tested and, if a panel study is ever conducted, the resulting data can be 
incorporated in the model and used to estimate dynamic profiles.
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CHAPTER 5: GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND 
TAXES
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the simulation of various federal government expenditures and 
taxes in the model. Ultimately, it would be desirable to include all federal government 
taxes and expenditures, to derive a comprehensive picture of the impact of 
government upon lifetime income distribution and redistribution. The major social 
security cash transfers, federal education cash transfers and other education outlays, 
and income tax are currently included in the model. Other major areas of government 
expenditure, such as housing and health outlays, and indirect taxes, will be added in 
the future.
Figure 5.1 shows total federal government outlays by function in 1985-86. Outlays on 
social security and welfare were about $19 billion, and comprised about 27 per cent 
of the total outlays of $69.9 billion. However, such outlays included expenditure on 
a range of social services, such as aged person’s homes and hostels and the home 
and community care program, and all such services are currently excluded from the 
scope of the model. Assistance to veterans is also not included as, unless there is 
another war, a cohort born in 1986 will not include any veterans. In total, almost 77 
per cent of total social security and welfare outlays are ’allocated’ in the model 
(although, as the cohort only consists of 4000 individuals, expenditure totals obviously 
do not equal those for the entire Australian population).
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Figure 5.1:1985-86 Australian Federal Government Budget Outlays by Function
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Outlays on education totalled some seven per cent of all outlays. Of these, about 95 
per cent are allocated in the model, with the excluded expenditures including those 
on special groups, such as aboriginals, migrants and veterans’ children. In all, about 
one-third of budget outlays are currently included in the simulation.
Federal government receipts in Australia in 1985-86 reached about $64 billion, with 
income taxes from individuals comprising just over $32 billion (Figure 5.2). As 
income tax is the only tax currently included in the model, about half of all government 
revenues are taken account of in the simulation.
179
Figure 5.2: 1985-86 Australian Federal Government Receipts by Source
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Section 5.2 describes in detail the social security cash transfers included in the model, 
and explains the assumptions made in modelling transfers with lower take-up rates, 
such as Family Income Supplement. Section 5.3 outlines the simulation of education 
services and cash transfers, while Section 5.4 examines the imputation of income tax. 
Section 5.5 describes the various income and tax measures used in the model. 
Because lifetime incomes can only be calculated on an individual basis, but family 
status has to be taken account of in any assessment of lifetime standard of living, 
some of the measures are quite different to those normally used in the analysis of 
income distributions. The difficult question of discounting and of the treatment of 
economic growth in the model is also tackled in this section.
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5.2 SOCIAL SECURITY OUTLAYS
The social security system existing at June 1986 was simulated in the model. Many 
changes have been made to the social security system since that date, following a 
major review of the system by the government. Some of the most important changes 
have been identified below, but these amendments have not been incorporated in the 
social security parameters in the model, although modelling the changes and then 
estimating the impact upon lifetime income remains a high priority for the future.
In the simulation, the recipients of cash transfers are assumed to derive all of the 
benefits from these cash transfers - in other words, the benefits of the transfers are 
assumed not to be shifted to third parties, with the transfers thus being 100 per cent 
incident upon their initial recipients. One could, however, envisage circumstances 
where part of the actual benefit was shifted to third parties. For example, the benefit 
of increases in rent assistance to social security recipients may be partly shifted to 
private landlords, who increase rents to what the new market will bear (Groenewegen, 
1979:51). Similarly, cash transfers to the elderly might reduce the support offered by 
children to their elderly parents, with the benefits of such transfers thus being at least 
partially incident upon the children rather than the nominal recipients. However, in the 
case of cash transfers, the no-shifting assumption is usually considered reasonable, 
and has been employed in the major incidence studies (eg. CSO, 1990; Reynolds 
and Smolensky, 1977:39).
Social Security Transfers Simulated
The following transfers were simulated in the model;
- age pension, available to women aged 60 or more and men aged 65 or more, 
subject to residence requirements and a test on current income and assets 
(unlike the European social insurance systems, the receipt of age pension and 
all the other pensions and benefits does not depend upon previous labour force
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status and earnings, but only upon current economic status). In 1986 age 
pensioners aged 70 and over could elect to be income tested under a more 
generous income test but with a lower maximum payment rate if this provided 
them with higher pension than the standard income test; however, by 1990 this 
provision had been abolished;
- invalid pension, available to people aged 16 and over who are permanently blind (on
a non-income/assets tested basis) or permanently incapacitated for work to the 
extent of not less than 85 per cent (on an income/assets tested basis);
- wife's pension, payable to the wife (not husband) of an age or invalid pensioner who
is not eligible for a pension in her own right;
- carer's pension, payable to a person who is not entitled to another pension but is
providing long term care to a severely handicapped relative receiving age or 
invalid pension (in the model imputation of this pension was restricted to the 
husbands of female invalid pensioners);
- Class A and B widow’s pension and supporting parent’s benefit, payable to sole
parents with dependent children (these payments were replaced by a single 
sole parents pension in March 1989). A Class B widow’s pension was payable 
in 1986 to older widows who did not have dependent children but who were not 
expected to participate in the labour force; by 1990 this pension was being 
phased out. Class C widow’s pension (of whom there were only 102 recipients 
in June 1986), payable to low income women without children in the 26 weeks 
following death of a husband, was not modelled.
- unemployment benefit, payable to women aged 16 to 59 and men aged 16 to 64
who are unemployed (in January 1988, unemployment benefit for 16 and 17 
year olds was replaced by Job Search Allowance);
- sickness benefit, payable to people in the same age ranges as unemployment
benefit who are temporarily incapacitated for work because of sickness or 
accident and have suffered a loss of income as a result of the incapacity;
- special benefit, designed to meet cases of special need and payable to people who
are not eligible for a pension or unemployment or sickness benefit but who are 
unable to earn a sufficient livelihood for themselves and their dependents and 
are in hardship;
- family income supplement (FIS), payable to low income families with dependent
children not receiving any other form of Commonwealth income support (the 
payment was revamped in 1987 and renamed family allowance supplement- 
FASj;
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- family allowance, payable monthly to people with dependent children aged less than
16, full-time dependent students aged 16 and 17 not receiving education 
transfers, or similar students aged 18 to 24 in low income families. In 1986 the 
allowance was not income-tested, but by 1990 it was income-tested on the 
taxable income of parents, although the income test was much more generous 
than that for FAS; and
- multiple birth payments, a non-income-tested payment payable to parents of triplets
or quads aged under 6.
In addition to basic rates, pensioners and beneficiaries could receive a number of 
additional allowances, of which additional pension and benefit paid for dependent 
children and mother's/guardian’s allowance paid to sole parent pensioners were 
included in the model. (By 1990 the definition of dependent children which qualified 
parents for these additional allowance - and for sole parents pension - had changed). 
Rent assistance, which could be paid to pensioners and beneficiaries who were 
private renters, was not included in the model; the suppression of housing data by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics on the 1986 IDS tape made the imputation of housing 
status problematic. Eligibility for fringe benefits was also calculated, although no 
value has currently been imputed for these benefits.
It should be noted that, in married couples, all benefits and supplements are paid to 
the husband, while pensions are split equally between partners but any additional 
payments for the children of pensioners are paid to the wife. Family allowance, 
multiple births and FIS are all expressly paid to the mother in married couples. These 
provisions have been fully incorporated in the model.
The Assets Test
In 1986, all of the pensions listed above and supporting parent’s benefit were both 
income and assets-tested, while the remaining benefits were simply subject to an 
income test. By 1990 all pensions and benefits and FAS were both income and
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assets-tested. It has not, however, been possible to model the assets test adequately 
- a problem which is also shared by those constructing Australian static 
microsimulation models. To do so requires simulation of the distribution of assets, and 
no recent and adequate data on wealth in Australia exist. One could simulate a 
distribution of assets based upon the amount of investment income received by 
families (which is captured in the model), and this approach was followed by Dilnot, 
based upon data in the 1986 IDS (1990). However, while such an approach is useful 
for providing aggregate estimates of wealth in Australia, it seems less likely to be 
useful for microsimulation purposes, as one of the major functions of assets tests is 
to exclude those who have substantial assets but low investment income - who, in 
other words, have investment incomes which are not commensurate with their asset 
holdings.
Despite these difficulties, the assets test upon age pension could not be ignored. 
When only the income test was applied to those of age pension age in the model the 
proportion eligible to receive age pension was higher than would be expected in the 
real world. A method of reducing take-up therefore had to be developed. Ultimately, 
the amount of investment income received by each cohort member during their entire 
lifetime was calculated, and all were then ranked by the amount of lifetime investment 
income received. About the top 15 per cent were then excluded from receipt of age 
pension, with the 15 per cent figure being selected to ensure that around 70 per cent 
of both males and females of age pension age actually received age pension (many 
of the top 15 per cent were in any event excluded by the income test).
It is difficult to judge whether this is an appropriate degree of take-up. In 1986 an 
estimated 79 per cent of the population of age pension age were actually receiving 
age pension or service pension (age pension paid to ex-servicemen). By 1989, 
according to internal DSS estimates, this had fallen to an estimated 77 per cent. In 
the absence of policy change, one would expect the proportion to fall steadily in the 
future as, given superannuation initiatives in the 1980s, a growing proportion of the
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retired population will receive occupational pensions. Certainly, the receipt of 
occupational pensions among the pseudo-cohort is higher than in Australia in 1986. 
However, if the imputed 70 per cent take-up rate is considered too high or too low, the 
parameters can be easily amended.
With the above exception, no attempt was made to impute the assets test, and 
eligibility for the above payments was simply calculated by isolating all of those with 
the relevant family and other characteristics and then applying the appropriate income 
test to determine the amount of any payment received. Two further exceptions were 
made to this general procedure.
Sickness and Special Benefit Take-up
First, the incidence of sickness was not explicitly modelled. In determining eligibility 
for sickness and special benefit a two step procedure was followed. Those who had 
more than four weeks not in employment in any given year, who had been in the 
labour force earlier in the year or in the preceding year, and who were not in states 
which would obviously preclude them from receiving these two benefits (eg. they 
were not unemployed, full-time students, receiving a pension etc) were first isolated. 
This pool of potential recipients was obviously much larger than the number actually 
receiving sickness and special benefits, as at any point in time a significant proportion 
of those of labour force age are not employed but are also not sick or eligible for 
special benefit. A proportion of the potentially eligible were therefore then randomly 
selected to be in states which did not qualify them for sickness or special benefit.
This proportion was set so that the total expenditure on sickness and special benefits 
for the lifetime of the entire cohort was about 16 per cent of the total expenditure on 
unemployment benefits for the cohort. In 1986 aggregate expenditure on sickness 
and special benefit amounted to 16 per cent of aggregate expenditure on
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unemployment benefit (DSS,1986c:32-34). While the synthetic cross-section 
distribution which is created by using the pseudo-cohort’s records does not exactly 
match the 1986 actual cross-section population in Australia (eg. there are more 
elderly people in the synthetic distribution), this seemed a reasonable method of 
approximating what take-up and expenditure on sickness and special benefits should 
be for the pseudo-cohort.
FIS Take-up
The second exception made in simulating the various social security income test was 
for family income supplement FIS was only introduced in May 1983, and in 1986 
provided a relatively low rate of payment in exchange for a rigorous income test. 
While most pensions and benefits and family allowance are believed to have 
extremely high take-up rates among eligible groups, FIS take-up was believed by the 
Department of Social Security to be quite low (Cass, 1986:74). Although estimates of 
the eligible population are not precise, Pech estimated that take-up might be as low 
as one-third of eligible families (1986:3).
Following the replacement of FIS with FAS in 1987, and in an attempt to address the 
take-up problem, the test on income during the four weeks preceding the application 
for FIS was replaced with an income test on taxable income during the preceding tax 
year. Subsequent estimates suggested that FAS take-up was higher (perhaps some 
58 per cent of total expenditure) (Whiteford and Doyle, 1989). As might be expected, 
take-up is believed to be higher among those entitled to full rather than part payment 
of FAS (Bradbury et al, 1990:65).
In addition, larger families are more likely to apply for FIS than smaller families, with 
the mean number of children in FIS families in April 1985 being 2.8 (Pech, 1986:46), 
compared to an average family size in Australia of less than 2 children. Finally,
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although some 30 per cent of families receiving FIS derive all or part of their income 
from self-employment (Pech,1986:13), the larger number of self-employed families 
with very low incomes means that take-up rates among the self-employed are actually 
lower than among wage and salary earners.
Available evidence therefore suggests that in modelling FIS:
- take-up rates should be higher for the non-self-employed than for the self-employed;
- take-up rates should be higher for those with larger families; and
- take-up rates should be higher for those entitled to full FIS.
Selecting appropriate take-up rates is problematic, given the lack of reliable data about 
potential recipients with the above characteristics - a problem which is again shared 
by those constructing Australian static microsimulation models. In addition, it is not 
clear to what extent relevant characteristics of the pseudo-cohort vary from those of 
the 1986 Australian population (for example, the receipt of workers and accident 
compensation is not simulated in the model, thereby creating a larger low income pool 
potentially eligible for FIS than in the real world).
In June 1986, about 1.6 per cent of all married couple families received FIS 
(DSS,1986c:37-38). However, because many families received FIS for less than one 
year, the number who received FIS during the course of an entire year was higher 
than the number who received it at any single point in time. Examination of the 1986 
IDS data on the number of weeks that FIS recipients received FIS in 1985-86 
suggested that about two to three per cent of all married couple families could be 
expected to receive FIS during any given year. The FIS take-up parameters were 
therefore set to ensure that just under three per cent of all such families in the 
pseudo-cohort received FIS.
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Whether the take-up rates approximate the true situation cannot be determined, but 
all parameters can be changed if desired. For 1986 the parameters in the simulation 
result in:
- about three per cent of all married couple families receiving FIS;
- an increase in take-up by family size, with about 1.7 per cent of all married couples
with one child receiving FIS, rising to about 5 per cent for those with four or 
more children;
- variation in receipt by self-employment status, with some 3.85 per cent of all married
couple families where at least one spouse was self-employed receiving FIS, 
compared to some 2.3 per cent of all wage earner couples with children. 
Because the number of self-employed families on low incomes is much higher 
than the number of wage and salary earners, these proportions imply a much 
lower take-up rate by the self-employed. The ratio between the number of self- 
employed and wage earner recipients produced by the model is almost the 
same as that found by Pech (1986).
- an average number of children per recipient family of 1.9, compared to 2.8 in the
real world (presumably reflecting lower birth rates and smaller family size in the 
model);
- an average period of FIS receipt of 28 weeks, compared with 40 weeks in the 1986
IDS. (This shorter time period might reflect more accurate policing of income 
in the model than exists in the real world, in the sense that income increases 
were immediately reflected in either lower FIS payments or the termination of 
FIS, whereas in the real world recipients might not always report such 
increases promptly or at all.)
- an average annual payout per recipient family of about $800 in the model, compared
to about $1690 per family in 1986 (reflecting smaller family size and a shorter 
average period of receipt, as well as unknown factors).
Excluded Cash Transfers
The payments included in the model and categorised above accounted for around 98 
per cent of the total outlay of $15 billion on income maintenance cash benefits made 
by the Department of Social Security in 1986. A number of other social security
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payments or programs existing in 1986 were not modelled, either because of the low 
number of recipients, because the expenditure involved was not large, or because it 
was difficult to simulate the programs adequately. These payments comprised Class 
C widows pension, rent assistance, special temporary allowance, funeral benefit, 
orphans pension, handicapped child’s allowance, remote area allowance and mobility 
allowance.
Figure 5.3 shows the division of social security cash transfers in 1985-86. Of these, 
about 97 per cent of the outlays on pensions are included in the simulation, 99 per 
cent of outlays on benefits, and 98 per cent of outlays on child transfers (family 
allowance, FIS, and multiple birth payments). Table 5.1 outlines the rates of payment 
made in June 1986 and included in the simulation.
Figure 5.3: Outlays on Income Maintenance Cash Benefits by the Department 
of Social Security, 1985-86.
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Table 5.1: Rates of Payment of Social Security Cash Transfers Included in Model
Payment Weekly rate at June 1986 
$
Pensions
- single pensioner 102.10
- married pensioners (combined rate) 170.30
- mothers/guardians allowance for sole parents 12.00
- additional pension per child 16.00
Benefits
- single beneficiary, aged under 18 without dependents 50.00
- single unemployed, 18-20 yrs, no dependents 88.20
- single unemployed, 21 + yrs, no dependents 95.40
- single sickness beneficiary, 18+ yrs, no dependents 102.10
- married beneficiary with dependent spouse 170.30
- additional benefit per child 16.00
Child Transfers
- family allowance - first child 5.26
- second child 7.50
- third or fourth child 9.00
- fifth and subsequent 10.51
- supplement for triplets aged less than 6 34.62
- family income supplement - per child 16.00
5.3 EDUCATION OUTLAYS
Education outlays in Australia amounted to $4.9 billion, of which about half were 
devoted to the provision of tertiary education services, almost 40 per cent to school 
services, and eight per cent to the provision of cash transfers to students or their 
parents (Figure 5.4). All of the above are allocated in the model, so that some 96 per 
cent of all Federal education outlays are distributed.
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Figure 5.4: Outlays on Education by the Commonwealth by Function, 1985-86
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Source: Treasurer (1986:93)
Education Cash Transfers
In 1986 the Department of Education provided a number of cash transfers to students, 
of which the following are included in the model:
- Secondary Allowances Scheme, which assisted lower income families with children 
in the final two years of secondary education. With the exception of self- 
supporting students, the allowance was paid direct to parents. It was income- 
tested on joint parental taxable income in the tax year preceding the year of 
study, with special provisions for families whose taxable income in the year of 
study had fallen substantially.
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- Tertiary Education Assistance Scheme, which assisted full-time students at
universities, colleges of advanced education, colleges of technical and further 
education and other tertiary institutions. TEAS was income-tested upon both 
parental income in the preceding tax year (with special provisions for those 
whose parents had experienced a significant drop in income), and upon the 
income of the student. A lower rate was payable to students still living with 
their parents, while married students were income-tested upon the income of 
their spouse rather than their parents.
- Postgraduate Awards Scheme, which assisted full-time Master’s and Phd students.
The awards were not income-tested upon parental income (although there were 
limits to the amount of paid work awardees could undertake), but were 
competitive.
The above three schemes accounted for about 85 per cent of education cash 
transfers made in 1985-86 (DEET, 1987c:30). The other major schemes, which were 
not modelled, were those for special groups such as aboriginals and isolated children 
(neither of which could be imputed as racial origin and geographic location were not 
simulated in the model).
In January 1987, SAS and TEAS were replaced by AUSTUDY, which provided age- 
related assistance to secondary and tertiary students aged 16 and over. The new 
scheme was intended to improve incentives to undertake further education and to 
lessen the gap between unemployment benefit and education allowances for 
teenagers. While the government originally intended to pay any AUSTUDY 
entitlement to school students direct to the student (rather than to their parents, as 
under SAS), community concern resulted in the parents of secondary students under 
the age of 18 having the right to receive the allowance if they wished (although the 
allowance would still be treated as if it were the income of the student for taxation 
purposes).
The simulation of the education transfers was complex, not only because of the 
various income tests applicable to parental, spouse and student income and the
/
192
additional income tests for allowances for dependent spouses and children, but also 
because receipt had to be simulated for two generations - ie. for both the pseudo­
cohort and their children.
As with social security cash transfers, there is an issue about who the benefits of cash 
transfers should be assumed to be incident upon. For example, while SAS is paid to 
parents, the benefits are presumably, at least in part, passed onto the teenage 
students whom they are designed to help keep in school. There is also some 
question about the incidence of transfers between generations, with economists such 
as Barro arguing that attempts by the state to increase benefits to students (eg. via 
increases in TEAS) are subsequently negated by their parents then reducing their 
transfers to their children, either in the short term or in the longer term via reduced 
inheritances (1974).
Despite these issues, the benefits of education cash transfers were assumed in the 
model to be incident upon those actually receiving the cash transfers. Thus, in the 
model, SAS was assumed to be incident upon the pseudo-cohort when they were the 
parents of children in the final years of secondary school. In the case of married 
couples, SAS payments were divided equally between the two parents, with each 
parent thus being assumed to receive half. In contrast, TEAS was imputed to the 
pseudo-cohort when they were tertiary students themselves. However, the receipt of 
TEAS by their children a generation later was also simulated. In this case, while any 
TEAS income received by their children was not added to income unit income, the fact 
that the child was receiving TEAS was flagged, as it affected eligibility for family 
allowance.
Table 5.2 shows the value of the education allowances imputed to the cohort when 
they are students or the parents of students, while Table 5.3 shows the proportion of 
students in the simulation and in the real world receiving the various allowances.
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Table 5.2: Weekly Education Allowance Rates Imputed in the Model*
Category Weekly Rate 1986
SAS TEAS PGA
- at home 35.00 47.50 156.27
- away from home or independent n.a. 73.28 156.27
* There are also supplements for dependent spouses and dependent children. 
Source: Department of Education (1986:44); DEET (1987c:34)
Table 5.3: Proportion of Potentially Eligible Groups Receiving Various Education 
Transfers in the Model and in Australia in 1986
Estimated Percentage of Eligible Families or Students Receiving Transfers
Model Australia 1986*
-SAS 25 25
-TEAS 36 38
- PGA 4 5
* Source: Department of Education (1986:40 ; 1987); Wran et al (1988:9).
Other Education Outlays
The only benefits from government outlays on goods and services currently imputed 
to the pseudo-cohort are education outlays. Both determining the beneficiaries and 
ascribing a monetary value to the services received by individuals is, however, much 
more contentious than in the case of cash transfers. The analysis of expenditure 
incidence can be divided into two discrete steps - first, the determination of who 
actually receives the benefits of government expenditures and, second, the calculation 
of the monetary value of those benefits. The allocation and valuation of the benefits 
of pure public goods (such as defence and environmental protection), which
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supposedly provide an indivisible collective benefit to all members of society, is a 
much disputed area, and many incidence studies have deliberately excluded such 
services from their balance sheet (eg. CSO, 1990; ABS, 1987b).
Identification of the beneficiaries of expenditures on impure or divisible public goods 
and services, such as education and health, is almost as contentious. Incidence 
studies have typically assumed that the benefits of such goods and services are only 
received by those actually using the services (Economic Planning Advisory Council 
(EPAC), 1987:23). They thereby make the questionable assumptions that there are 
no externalities from the services which bestow benefits upon non-users (such as the 
advantages to society or to employers from a highly educated or healthy workforce) 
and that all benefits should be allocated to the consumers of a service (eg. patients) 
rather than to the producers (such as doctors).
Further, after making such assumptions about who the beneficiaries of public services 
are, incidence studies typically value the benefits of those services at the cost of 
provision. For example, rather than attempting to determine the real value or utility 
of a service such as a year of tertiary education to the recipient, the average cost to 
government of providing a year of tertiary education is simply added to the income of 
a full-time tertiary student. Such an approach suffers from a number of deficiencies 
(Brown and Jackson, 1990:184). Cost is unlikely to approximate the real worth of the 
services, is not based on market prices, and takes no account of the quality or 
efficiency of the goods and services delivered. For example, as McGranahan 
observes, "for the same level of service delivery, the income of the beneficiaries will 
be given a higher monetary imputation, the more inefficient or corrupt the service" 
(1979:40).
Further, such imputation procedures implicitly assume that the marginal utility of 
income is the same for all individuals (ie. that a dollar given to a rich person is worth 
the same as a dollar given to a poor person). Aaron and McGuire, in a controversial
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new approach, developed an explicit form of the utility function and concluded that 
under certain assumptions government expenditures caused no noticeable 
redistribution of income from high to low income groups (1970).
In conclusion, economists have not yet reached a firm consensus either about how 
to identify the beneficiaries of public services such as health and education or about 
how to value the worth of those services. For the current study, therefore, the 
benefits of education spending are assumed to be incident upon those actually using 
education services, and the imputed benefit is simply the average cost to government 
of providing the service, following the methodology used in Harding (1984), EPAC 
(1987), and in the ABS fiscal incidence study (1987b). (However, it will be possible 
in the future to experiment with other assumptions - eg. to assume that some 
proportion of education outlays are incident on non-users or to try different utility 
functions.)
The ABS kindly provided details of government expenditure upon each type of tertiary 
education and upon pre-schools in 1985-86 and this was divided equally among all 
users of the relevant service. All part-time students were assumed to equal half of a 
full-time student when calculating the total number of students among whom total 
expenditure was to be divided, and were also then subsequently imputed half of the 
benefit allocated to full-time students. Tertiary education outlays not elsewhere 
classified were divided equally among all tertiary students. As no distinction was 
drawn in the model between university and college of advanced education students, 
the total expenditure on these two sectors was pooled and then allocated. Technical 
and Further Education (TAFE) students were treated separately.
For school students, figures from the Department of Employment, Education and 
Training were used to calculate average government expenditure per student in 1986 
for different types of students (1987a). Table 5.4 shows the annual amounts imputed.
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Table 5.4: Annual Estimated Cost to Government of a Year of Education 
Provided to Various Types of Students
Sector Annual Cost Per Student 
1986$
- pre-school 1043
- primary school
- government 2313
- Catholic 1428
- other non-government 1288
- secondary school
- government 3530
- Catholic 2211
- other non-government 1818
- university/CAE
- full-time 7633
- part-time 3827
-TA FE
- full-time 2711
- part-time 1366
5.4 Income Tax
As with the incidence of government expenditures, the incidence of taxes is an area 
of extensive debate among economists. To determine the incidence of taxes it is 
necessary to know who actually pays the taxes. Because individuals and firms have 
statutory obligations to pay taxes, it initially appears a simple matter to calculate the 
distribution of tax burdens. However, this legal incidence may differ greatly from 
economic incidence, as those legally liable to pay taxes may be able to shift the 
burden to others through changes in prices, wages or profits. The incidence of 
indirect taxes and company taxes is still a hotly debated matter (eg. see Musgrave 
and Musgrave, 1984; Browning and Johnson, 1979; Prest, 1955; Mathews, 1980) but,
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as no attempt is made to allocate these taxes in the current study, the area can be 
ignored for the present.
The economic incidence of income tax is generally less controversial and is assumed 
to be similar to its legal incidence although, for example, it is recognised that business 
executives, lawyers, doctors and others working in oligopolistic markets may be able 
to shift part or all of any income tax increases forward to their clients or to consumers 
(Break, 1974:179). However, in the simulation, income taxes are assumed to be fully 
incident upon those legally liable to pay them. Equally importantly, those with legal 
liabilities to pay tax are assumed to meet them and no account is taken of the 
underground economy or possible tax evasion. In addition, in this initial version of the 
model the burden of income tax is assumed to equal the amount of tax collected, 
even though income taxes may distort consumer choice and generate excess burdens 
(also known as deadweight loss) (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984:307; Ballard et al, 
1985; Bascand and Porter, 1986:364).
The income tax schedules applying in 1985-86 were used in simulating the income tax 
system, and are summarised in Table 5.5. First, total assessable income was 
calculated, by adding together all of the potentially taxable income received by an 
individual each year (see Table 5.6). Although in Australia expenditure necessarily 
incurred in earning assessable income and various other special deductions can be 
subtracted from assessable income, thereby leaving taxable income, no attempt was 
made in the model to simulate such deductions.
While these deductions can be significant for some groups, such as wage and salary 
earners with very high incomes and for the self-employed, such deductions are of 
minor importance to most taxpayers, amounting on average to some 2 to 3 per cent 
of assessable income. However, more importantly, on the 1986 IDS tape, which was 
used to simulate investment and business income, many of the income items reported 
were net of expenses incurred in earning that income, and therefore such expenses
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Table 5.5: 1985-86 Income Tax Schedules
Taxable Income Tax Due on Total Taxable Income
$ 0- 4595 Nil
$ 4596-12500 Nil + 25c for each $1 over $4595
$12501 -19500 $ 1976.25 + 30c for each $1 over $12500
$19501 -28000 $ 4076.25 + 46c for each $1 over $19500
$28001 -35000 $ 7986.25 + 48c for each $1 over $28000
$35001 and over $11346.25 + 60c for each $1 over $35000
Table 5.6: 1986 Tax Status of Income Components Included in the Model
Income Source Tax Status
- wages and salaries taxable
- investment income taxable
- private occupational pension
- age pension, wife's pension and carer’s pension (if wife or husband of age 
pension age), widow’s pension, supporting parent’s benefit, unemployment
taxable
benefit, sickness benefit, special benefit taxable
- TEAS (later AUSTUDY for tertiary students) taxable
- Postgraduate Study Award taxable*
- SAS (later AUSTUDY for school students) not taxable**
- invalid pension not taxable
- family allowance, multiple birth payment
- additional pension/benefit, FIS (later FAS),
not taxable
mother’s/guardian’s allowance 
- dependent child supplements for TEAS and PGA
not taxable
recipients not taxable
- maintenance not taxable
* Not taxable in 1990
** Not taxable in hands of parents in 1986. Taxable income to school students in 1990.
should presumably not be subtracted again. Thus, for example, any tax avoidance 
by higher income groups achieved by investing in negatively geared housing or other 
assets should already have been captured earlier in the model, via lower net 
investment incomes being imputed to this group, rather than being captured at this 
stage in the form of substantial income tax deducations. Pending development of a
199
sophisticated method of imputing deductible expenditures which avoids any double 
counting, taxable income has been assumed to equal assessable income.
The next step in imputing income tax was to apply the income tax schedule to taxable 
income, thereby calculating gross tax payable. Fourth, any rebates to which the 
taxpayer was entitled based upon their family and other characteristics were 
subtracted from gross tax. The rebates included in the model comprised:
- the dependent spouse rebate for those with and without a dependent child or
student, designed to recognise the additional costs incurred by those supporting 
a dependent spouse;
- the sole parent rebate, designed to recognise the additional costs faced by sole
parent taxpayers;
- the pensioner rebate, for taxpayers receiving a social security pension, and designed
to protect full-year pensioners with little private income from income tax 
liabilities; and
- the beneficiary rebate, for taxpayers receiving unemployment, sickness and special
benefit, and designed to protect full-year beneficiaries with little private income 
from income tax liabilities.
The daughter-housekeeper, housekeeper, invalid relative, parent, zone and overseas 
forces, home loan interest, averaging, termination payment, life assurance and 
medical expenditure rebates were not simulated. The rebates which were included 
in the model accounted for around 65 per cent of total rebates in 1985-86 (Australian 
Taxation Office, 1988:49).
The Medicare levy, which amounted to one per cent of taxable income, with special 
exemptions for low income individuals and families and certain social security 
recipients, was also modelled. Net tax payable was then calculated, equalling gross 
tax, minus any rebates, plus any Medicare levy.
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5.5 INCOME AND TAX MEASURES USED IN THE 
MODEL
A number of different measures of income and welfare are used in the following 
chapters, and these are summarised in Table 5.7.
Annual Income Measures
Original income is income received from private sources, comprising wages, salaries 
and income from own business, income from superannuation and annuities, 
investment income and other non-government income such as maintenance. Much 
of the analysis in the following chapters compares the distribution of income before 
specified government actions with the distribution after such actions, and this 
immediately raises the issue of what the most appropriate ’before’ benchmark (or 
counterfactual) is. For the moment, it has been assumed that the original distribution 
of pre-tax and pre-transfer income is an appropriate distribution against which to 
measure the redistributive effect of government taxes and expenditures. However, it 
should be appreciated that the implicit assumption that the original distribution of 
income would remain the same if no public sector existed is clearly invalid (although, 
particularly in the context of lifetime incidence models, it is not at all clear how the 
original income distribution should be adjusted to provide a better counterfactual).
Gross income comprises original income plus government social security and 
education cash transfers. Taxable income equals gross income minus non-taxable 
private income and non-taxable government cash transfers. Disposable income 
measures the amount of income individuals have left to spend each year, after taking 
account of income received from all sources, minus net income tax paid.
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Table 5.7: Income and Tax Measures Used in the Model
Measure Description
1. ANNUAL INCOME MEASURES
Original Income 
Gross Income
Taxable Income
Gross Tax 
Net Tax
Disposable Income 
Family Disposable income
Shared Family 
Disposable Income
Equivalent Family Income
Education Services 
Income
Final Income
DSS Transfers
Education Transfers
Earnings + investment income + superannuation income + maintenance 
income
Original income + taxable social security transfers + non-taxable social 
security transfers + taxable education transfers + non-taxable education 
transfers
Earnings + investment income + superannuation income + taxable social 
security transfers + taxable education transfers
Tax payable when tax schedules applied to taxable income
Gross tax - any tax rebates + Medicare levy
Taxable income - net tax + non-taxable social security transfers + non- 
taxable education transfers + maintenance
Disposable income of family unit (disposable income of wife + disposable 
income of husband in married couples); else just disposable income of 
single individuals
Disposable income of wife + disposable income of husband, divided by 
two with each half then allocated to each partner in married couples; else 
just disposable income of individuals
Family disposable income divided by selected equivalence scale.
Imputed values of preschool income + primary school income + secondary 
school income + tertiary income (based on cost to govt of provision)
Equivalent family income + education services income
Age pension + invalid pension + sole parent’s pension + unemployment 
benefit + sickness and special benefit + FIS + family allowance + multiple 
births payments + additional pension/benefit + mothers/guardians 
allowance
TEAS + SAS + PGA + any allowances for dependents
2. LIFETIME INCOME MEASURES
Total
Annualised ...
Available for each of above measures and equal to the lifetime sum 
received
Again available for each of above measures, and equal to the lifetime sum 
received divided by years of life - 15.
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All of the measures mentioned above use the individual as the income unit. Thus, for 
example, disposable income merely shows the personal amount of income remaining 
for an individual to spend after payment of any income taxes. While such individual 
income measures are of great interest and are used extensively in the following 
chapters, they take no account of the income sharing likely to take place between 
married couples. For example, an unmarried female with no original income is likely 
to have a very different standard of living to a married female who also has no original 
income but is married to a high income spouse. The following income measures 
attempt to take account of such sharing.
In the measures outlined below, no account is taken of any income received by the 
children of the pseudo-cohort in calculating family income. All such children who 
receive education transfers are assumed to be no longer dependent upon their 
parents and effectively form a separate income unit and exit the model. Similarly, 
children aged 16 and over who still live at home but are not dependent full-time 
students (and who are therefore mainly in employment, receiving unemployment 
benefit etc) are also assumed to be separate income units and thereby outside the 
scope of the model. Such children are thus ignored when calculating the family’s 
income or standard of living.
Family disposable income shows the amount of disposable income received by each 
family, with a family defined as a single individual with or without dependent children 
or a married couple with or without dependent children. (There are no families of 
unrelated individuals in the model and currently no extended families.) Its main use 
is for the later derivation of equivalent family income; in a lifetime context it is less 
useful than the two measures described below, as family disposable income provides 
an inadequate guide to the living standards of the individuals within that family and 
cannot be usefully summed over time.
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Shared family disposable income shows the amount of disposable income available 
to individuals to spend, assuming completely equal sharing within the family unit. In 
the case of married couples, the shared disposable income of each partner equals the 
sum of the disposable income of husband and wife, divided by two. In the case of 
single individuals, it is the same as disposable income.
Equivalent family income is the third measure which takes account of family 
circumstances, and it attempts to place families of different size and composition on 
an equal footing, so that their relative standards of living can be more easily 
compared. For example, in any given year, an individual with a disposable income 
of $20,000 enjoys a higher standard of living than a married couple family with six 
children whose total disposable income is also $20,000. But how much higher is the 
standard of living of the single person ? Equivalence scales attempt to summarise the 
differences in income required by various types of families to achieve comparable 
standards of living.
There are a number of methods of constructing equivalence scales including, for 
example, examining how much families of different size and composition spend upon 
food, clothing, housing etc, and then calculating the amount of income required by 
each family type to achieve the same standard of living as, say, a married couple 
without children. Comparison of these dollar amounts might then show, for example, 
that a single person required only 60 per cent of the combined income of a couple 
without children to achieve the same standard of living.
After using such techniques to construct an equivalence scale, if an equivalence scale, 
which employed a married couple without children as the base and gave them a 
value of 1, were applied to the single person and the family mentioned above, then 
the equivalent income of the single individual would be higher than their disposable 
income, while the equivalent income of the couple with six children would be lower 
than their disposable income. It would thus become clear that the couple with six
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children had a lower standard of living than the single individual (because they were 
supporting more people on the same disposable income), and the extent of their 
relative disadvantage would become clearer.
Most Australian work using equivalence scales has tended to use the equivalence 
scales implicit in the Henderson poverty lines developed in the 1970s and updated 
regularly since. However, the Federal Government has now explicitly endorsed new 
equivalence scales, which set the amount of extra income required by a family with 
a child aged under 13 at 15 per cent of the married rate of pension and with a child 
aged 13 to 15 at 20 per cent of the married rate of pension (Howe, 1989:3). A single 
person is assumed to require 60 per cent of the income of a married couple to reach 
the same standard of living. These benchmarks were achieved by the January 1990 
social security cash transfer rates, and these rates have therefore been adopted as 
the equivalence scale used in the model when estimating equivalent income (Table 
5.9). The equivalence scale can, of course, be varied if desired.
It should be appreciated that, although the need to use equivalence scales to compare 
differing types of families is now widely accepted, there is still major debate about the 
validity of the various scales in use, about how to construct equivalence scales, about 
exactly which factors affecting need can be realistically included in the scales, and 
about whether a single set of scales is equally applicable to both high and low income 
families (Whiteford, 1985; Social Welfare Policy Secretariat, 1981). The Australian 
scale does not, however, seem out of step with international practice. For example, 
the British Central Statistical Office now rank all households by equivalent income in 
their yearly analyses of fiscal incidence, and use the McClements scale, which is quite 
similar to the Australian scale described in Table 5 .8 .(1)
(1) For example, this scale gives a single adult with no children a value of 0.61; children aged 13 to 15 a 
value of 0.27, those aged 10 to 12 a value of 0.25, 8 to 10 year olds a value of 0.23, 5 to 7 year olds 0.21, 
2 to 4 year olds 0.18, and under two year olds a value of 0.09 (CSO, 1990:111).
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Table 5.8: Equivalence Scale Implicit in the Australian Social Security System 
for Selected Family Types, January 1990*
Category Equivalence Scale Value
Single Adult
- with no dependent children 0.60
- with one dependent child, aged less than 13 0.80
- with one dependent child, aged 13 to 15 0.86
- with two dependent children, aged less than 13 0.96
- with two dependent children, aged 13 to 15 1.06
- with three dependent children, aged less than 13 1.11
- with three dependent children, aged 13 to 15 1.26
- with four dependent children, aged less than 13 1.27
- with four dependent children, aged 13 to 15 1.47
- additional children, aged less than 13 0.16
- additional children, aged 13 to 15 0.21
Married Couple
- with no dependent children 1.00
- with one dependent child, aged less than 13 1:15
- with one dependent child, aged 13 to 15 1.20
* with two dependent children, aged less than 13 1.30
- with two dependent children, aged 13 to 15 1.40
- with three dependent children, aged less than 13 1.45
- with three dependent children, aged 13 to 15 1.60
- with four dependent children, aged less than 13 1.61
- with four dependent children, aged 13 to 15 1.81
- additional children, aged less than 13 0.16
• additional children, aged 13 to 15 0.21
* Married couple with no dependent children used as the base.
After application of an equivalence scale to the total disposable income of the family 
unit in the model, the resulting value for equivalent income is imputed to both husband 
and wife in the case of married couples. Although this intially appears confusing, as 
Danziger and Taussig point out, "the adjustment of the income concept for differences
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in unit size and composition is independent of the issue of how to weight the units" 
(1979:368). In a strict accounting sense this procedure appears strange, as it 
apparently ’multiplies’ the amount of income in the economy, but it simply provides 
a way of attributing to each individual the standard of living of the family in which they 
reside.
An additional issue is that the standard assumption made by economists that income 
is equally shared within the family unit has been challenged by recent empirical work, 
which has shown that income is not always equally shared and that spouses do not 
always enjoy the same standard of living (Edwards, 1981; Pahl,1989,1990; 
Vogler,1989). Consequently, the model was written so that this benchmark 50/50 
assumption can be changed to assume, for example, a 60/40 income split in the 
husband’s favour within married couples. Although this is obviously a rather arbitrary 
method (eg. one would imagine that actual income sharing might vary with the 
relative share of family income contributed by the wife), nonetheless some results are 
presented in the following chapters which show the equivalent incomes of individuals 
assuming unequal sharing within the family unit.
Education services income is the amount of benefit imputed to the individual if they 
are using education or pre-school services in a given year. Final income is 
equivalent income plus education services income. Ultimately, it would be desirable 
to broaden the scope of the final income measure to include the imputed benefits of 
other services, such as health and housing, and to incorporate indirect taxes paid in 
the year. Finally, education and social security transfers are already fully incoporated 
in the various income measures, but the specific items they comprise are listed in 
Table 5.7 to avoid any confusion.
In Table 5.9 an example of a hypothetical family is used to illustrate all of the income 
concepts outlined above.
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Table 5.9: Hypothetical Example of Income and Tax Measures Used in Model
Example for married couple with two children aged less than 13, husband employed full-time full-year 
earning $20,000, wife not employed and studying full-time at a university, zero investment or other private 
income.
HUSBAND’S
INCOME
WIFE’S
INCOME
Original income 20,000 0
Gross income
- original income plus family allowance 20,000 967.20
Taxable income 20,000 0
Gross tax 4,306 0
Net tax
- gross tax + $200 Medicare levy, minus 
$1030 dependent spouse rebate 3,478 0
Disposable income 16,524 967.20
Family disposable income 17,491.20 17,491.20
Shared family disposable income 8,745.60 8,745.60
Equivalent family income 
- family disposable income divided by 1.3 13,454.77 13,454.77
Education services income 0 7,633
Final income 13,454.77 21,187.77
Lifetime Income Measures
While ail of the income and tax measures outlined above are available for annual 
income, they can also be summed across the lifetime of individuals to produce 
lifetime measures of total original income, total disposable income, total equivalent 
income etc. In addition, each of the components of income included in the model can
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be summed to derive, for example, the total amount of family allowance or age 
pension received during an individual’s lifetime. It should be emphasised that no 
discount rate is currently employed when calculating lifetime income measures, but 
that annual incomes are simply summed. This means that a dollar of income received 
late in life is given the same value as a dollar of income received early in life, contrary 
to the practice of many lifetime income studies which give a higher weighting to 
income received early in the lifecyle via use of a discount rate (Lillard, 1977; Fase, 
1971; Hancock and Richardson, 1981). The discount rate is used to reflect not only 
individual preferences for receiving money now rather than in the future, but also to 
capture the economic advantage bestowed by money received early in the lifecycle 
due to the interest which can be earned on it if invested.
However, use of a discount rate in a study such as this which also abstracts from 
economic growth is problematic. Because cross-section data were used to set the 
various earnings and income parameters, the yearly increases in real incomes which 
could be expected to occur in the real world with economic growth were abstracted 
from. While it would have been easy to model increases in wage rates etc due to 
economic growth, it was not clear how the various other parameters in the model 
would then have to be changed.
For example, if real increases in wages and other income were modelled then the 
various social security income tests would presumably require amendment every year, 
otherwise an ever-declining proportion of the pseudo-cohort would be eligible for 
income-tested cash transfers. The tax scales would presumably also require 
amendment, otherwise the proportion of income paid in tax would increase markedly 
over the lifetime.
Similarly, if real wages were rising then presumably there would also be increasing 
wages for university staff and teachers, and the imputed cost of a year of each type 
of education would also have to be ratcheted up for every year of the model. The
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imputation of economic growth is thus very complex, and a steady state world seemed 
easier to simulate and more clearly understandable, at least for the first round of the 
model. This is also the practice of the Canadian and West German dynamic cohort 
models, both of which assume that the rates of economic growth and of discounting 
cancel each other out (Wolfson, 1988:233; Hain and Helberger, 1986:63).
If economic growth is abstracted from, is there still a case for discounting? As 
mentioned above, in the real world earnings after adjusting for inflation tend to 
increase at about the rate of economic growth - about three per cent a year during the 
60s and 70s (Moss, 1978:124). It is therefore only an advantage in an economic 
sense to receive income early in the lifecycle if the real interest rate is higher than the 
real growth in income. In a model which abstracts from economic growth, the 
discount rate which should be applied is only any difference between the real discount 
rate and the rate of real income growth, and it is not certain that the former exceeds 
the latter. Thus, for the present, the real discount rate has been implicitly assumed 
to equal the rate of real income growth, so that the two cancel each other out. 
However, analysing the difference that other assumptions about discount rates would 
make to the results is an interesting area for future development of the model.
A separate issue is that while the total lifetime income of individuals is of great 
interest, it can distort perceptions of inequality and income distribution. Some of the 
cohort have low lifetime incomes simply because they died at an early age, rather 
than because they received low earnings. Further, despite their apparently low 
lifetime incomes, this group would also appear to have received minimal social 
security transfers, having died long before age pension age, thereby creating a 
misleading impression of the lifetime progressivity of cash transfers.
Some other lifetime microsimulation models have dodged this problem, by making all 
individuals in the model die at the same age. For example, in the Davies model each 
household consists of a husband and wife who start economic life together at age 20
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and die together at age 75 (Davies et al, 1984:636). Similarly, all individuals in the 
Blinder model start economic life at age 18 and die 54.7 years later at about age 73 
(1974). While the West German SFB3 dynamic cohort model contains the option of 
using age-sex-family status specific death rates or of terminating all cohort records at 
the same age, published work comparing the lifetime incomes of individuals has fixed 
a uniform age of death, thereby avoiding the issue (Hain and Helberger, 1986:63).
However, as the aim of this study was to directly compare lifetime incomes, a further 
set of annualised lifetime measures were developed. First, all of those who died 
before the age of 20 were excluded, as many of this group would not have entered 
the workforce, and would thus have zero annualised income. Second, for those 
remaining, total lifetime income was then divided by their number of years of life minus 
15. (It is equally easy to divide lifetime income by total years of life, but because the 
cohort typically enter the labour force between the ages of 15 and 20, such a 
procedure results in annualised lifetime incomes which appear quite low at first 
glance.) Dividing by years of life minus 15 thus gave a more accurate ’eyeball’ 
impression of living standards.
This second set of annualised measures is available for all of the summary income 
and tax measures listed in Table 5.9, and for any of the individual components of 
income included in the model.
5.6 CONCLUSION
All of the major social security and education cash transfers, income tax and the major 
income tax rebates, and outlays on education services are currently included in the 
model, capturing about one-third of total budget outlays and one-half of total receipts 
by the Australian government. The imputation of the benefits of these outlays, 
particularly in the case of education services, and of the burden of income taxes, is
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not an uncontested area within economics, and a number of important assumptions 
have been made. For example, cash transfers have been assumed to be incident 
upon those receiving them and their value has been assumed to equal their cash 
value. Similarly, the benefits of education services have been assumed to be wholly 
incident upon those using such services, and their value has been assumed to equal 
their cost of provision. The burden of income tax has been assumed to be incident 
upon those with the legal liability to pay such taxes, the value of that burden has been 
assumed to be equal to the amount of tax collected, and it has been assumed that 
there is no tax evasion.
In calculating lifetime income received or taxes paid, the rate of economic growth and 
the discount rate have been assumed to be equal so that, for example, total lifetime 
earnings simply equals the sum of earnings received during every year of life. While 
income and tax measures are available for every individual, the measures of shared 
family disposable income and of equivalent family income attempt to take account of 
the difference made by family circumstances to the welfare of an individual, in the 
former case by splitting the total income of married couples equally between the two 
partners and, in the latter case, by applying an equivalence scale to the income of the 
family unit. Finally, in an attempt to standardise for differential length of life, a set of 
annualised measures have been developed, consisting of the total lifetime measures 
divided by years of life minus 15.
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CHAPTER 6: LIFETIME INCOME BY EDUCATION, 
FAMILY AND UNEMPLOYMENT STATUS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter begins the second part of the thesis, which describes some of the 
results of the simulation. The model has the potential to be used for a wide range 
of purposes. For example, the Australian government has introduced major social 
security, education and income tax reforms since 1986, and one possible use of 
the model is to assess the changes made to these systems since that date, to 
determine whether they have made the distribution of lifetime income more equal, 
and have directed resources to those stages of the lifecycle where individuals 
typically experience lower standards of living. Similarly, the model can be used to 
assess the lifetime impact of possible policy changes, such as increases in pension 
rates or changes to the Higher Education Contribution Scheme. In addition, it 
would also be interesting to change other parameters in the model, such as the 
differential mortality rates or the labour force participation rates, to assess the 
impact that such changes would make to the distribution and redistribution of 
lifetime income, and to assess the sensitivity of the results of the model to the 
hundreds of parameters embodied within it. Unfortunately, both time and length 
considerations prevented such analysis from being conducted and included within 
this study.
Chapters 7 to 9 present the results for the questions that the model was originally 
constructed to answer, about the distribution and redistribution of lifetime and 
annual income. This chapter provides an introduction to the output of the model, 
and analyses the results for lifetime income by various lifetime characteristics.
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The impact upon lifetime income of differing educational achievements is analysed 
in Section 6.2. The first part of this section examines the sources and amount of
income received by males by educational status, and then assesses the impact
*
made by cash transfers and income tax upon the inequalities apparent in original 
income. The second part describes the personal incomes received by females by 
education level and then discusses the effect of the tax-transfer system. The third 
part of this section examines whether differential length of life makes any 
significant difference to the conclusions reached about the relative inequalities of 
income apparent by educational status, as the higher incomes of the better 
educated have to be spread over a longer lifespan.
The fourth part of Section 6.2 identifies the major differences in labour force 
participation patterns apparent by educational status, and points out that the better 
educated earn higher incomes in part because they work more hours than the less 
well educated. An attempt is made to take such differences in patterns of labour 
force participation and in unemployment into account, in the assessment of the 
relative lifetime advantage enjoyed by the better educated.
Finally, while the above analysis has dealt with the incomes received by 
individuals, any assessment of lifetime welfare requires that the impact of family 
circumstances upon standards of living also be taken into consideration. The final 
part of this section therefore examines the relative lifetime standards of living, 
measured through the use of equivalent income/enjoyed by those with different 
educational achievements.
The significant effect upon lifetime income and welfare of marriage and of having 
children is considered in Section 6.3. The impact upon the individual incomes of 
first women and then men of marriage and of children is analysed, while the third 
part of Section 6.3 broadens the analysis to take account of income sharing within 
the family. Finally, Section 6.4 briefly examines the effect upon lifetime income of 
repeated spells of unemployment during individuals’ lifetimes.
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6.2 LIFETIME INCOME BY EDUCATION STATUS
A question of enduring interest in economics and social policy has been the 
differing lifetime experiences of those with different educational achievements. 
How much higher is the lifetime income of those who undertake further education 
and to what extent do higher future earnings outweigh the earnings lost during 
years of full-time study ? In Australia, such questions assumed major policy 
significance during the heated debate surrounding the introduction of the Higher 
Education Contribution Charge in 1989 (Wran et al, 1988).
Total Lifetime Income of Males
After taking account of all private income and cash transfers from the state, men 
with degrees received total gross lifetime incomes of about $1.4 million per person, 
almost double the total income received by those with only secondary school 
qualifications and about 30 per cent more than the $1 million received on average 
by those with some tertiary qualifications (Table 6.1 )(1). There was, however, great 
variation in gross income, as shown in Figure 6.1, with the maximum gross lifetime 
income in the model of almost $5.4 million being achieved by a male graduate. 
Over half of all males with secondary qualifactions only received total lifetime 
incomes of between $0.4 and $0.8 million, and very few received lifetime incomes 
in excess of $2 million. In contrast, almost one-third of male graduates received 
total lifetime incomes ranging between $0.8 and $1.2 million, and about 10 per cent 
received gross incomes in excess of $2.8 million. (It should be noted that many 
of those with low incomes would have died prematurely.) What were the sources 
of these marked differences in income ?
The relative contribution to lifetime income made by earnings showed little 
differentiation by educational status, amounting to about 85 per cent for all three
(1) All of the following results only include the records of men and women who lived until at least age 
21.
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Table 6.1: Average Lifetime Income and Tax Measures for Males by
Education
EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
Measure Secondary 
School Only
Some
Tertiary
Degree
1. TOTAL LIFETIME MEASURES
Earnings 666,080 880,520 1,221,365
Investment Income 57,810 84,280 125,955
Superannuation 7,490 25,280 61,065
TOTAL ORIGINAL INCOME 731,380 990,080 1,408,385
Cash Transfers 55,030 41,840 37,575
GROSS INCOME 786,410 1,031,920 1,445,960
Income Tax Paid 184,640 285,085 493,470
DISPOSABLE INCOME 601,770 746,835 952,490
SHARED DISP INCOME (family unit) 547,195 657,800 787,400
EQUIVALENT DISP INCOME (family unit) 931,355 1,125,925 1,349,360
Education Services Income 33,990 37,025 61,575
Lifetime hrs in labour force 79,140 90,435 86,245
Lifetime hours employed 74,375 87,615 84,495
Lifetime hours unemployed 4,765 2,820 1,750
2 . ANNUALISED LIFETIME MEASURES
Earnings 11,765 15,465 20,665
Investment income 985 1,430 1,995
Superannuation 115 380 880
TOTAL ORIGINAL INCOME 12,865 17,275 23,535
Cash Transfers 860 650 575
GROSS INCOME 13,725 17,925 24,110
Income tax paid 3,245 4,975 8,225
DISPOSABLE INCOME 10,480 12,945 15,885
SHARED DISPOSABLE INCOME (family unit) 9,520 11,375 13,085
EQUIVALENT DISP INCOME (family unit) 16,165 19,410 22,375
3. AVERAGE MEASURES
Av length of life 73.0 73.4 75.1
Av yrs in labour force (gt 1 ht per yr) 40.4 44.1 44.0
Av yrs any unemployment experienced 6.9 4.2 2.8
Av hours in L F . during yrs in L.F. 1,945 2,045 1,965
Av hrs employed during yrs employed 1,830 1,980 1,925
Av lifetime hourly wage rate 8.95 10.10 14.35
Av yrs of education 12.6 13.5 16.6
Note: All income figures rounded to nearest $5. Totals may not sum due to rounding.
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Figure 6.1: Frequency Distribution of Total Gross Lifetime Income By 
Education for Males
Percentage
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groups (Figure 6.2). However, the absolute values received were very different, 
ranging from under $700,000 for males with secondary qualifications only and 
rising to $1.2 million for graduates. Investment income showed greater variation, 
amounting to under $60,000 on average for males with secondary qualifications - 
or some 7.4 per cent of total gross lifetime income - and shooting up to $126,000 
for graduates, comprising almost 9 per cent of total income received by this group. 
Although this shows the average value of investment income received, there was 
great dispersion within the three educational groups, with investment income for 
graduates, for example, ranging from a low of zero to a maximum value of $1.5 
million during their lifetimes.
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Figure 6.2: Sources of Total Gross Lifetime Income by Education for Males
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Superannuation income was the most unequally distributed source of original 
lifetime income, with those with degrees receiving on average about eight times as 
much superannuation income as those with secondary qualifications and about two 
and a half times as much as those with some tertiary qualifications. 
Superannuation income was a negligible source of lifetime income for those with 
secondary school qualifications, not even reaching one per cent of gross lifetime 
income, but contributing just over 4 per cent of the gross lifetime income of 
graduates.
What contribution did government programs make to equalising the distribution of 
original income ? Social security and education cash transfers were a relatively 
minor source of lifetime income for males, although the average $55,000 received 
by those with secondary schooling accounted for 7 per cent of their total gross 
lifetime income. Almost 70 per cent of this was accounted for by age pension 
receipts, with unemployment benefit being the other major source, amounting to 
22 per cent of all cash transfers received. Education cash transfers for this group 
were insignificant, amounting to around 2 per cent of all cash transfers received. 
This average picture disguises major differences in lifetime patterns of receipt, with 
some 6.7 per cent of the secondary group receiving no cash transfers during their 
entire lifetimes, while the maximum value received was $207,000.
In contrast, those with degrees received only $38,000 in total cash transfers on 
average during their lifetimes, less than three per cent of their total gross income. 
Again, age pension received in retirement amounted to 74 per cent of all cash 
transfers received, but education transfers accounted for 10 per cent of all such 
transfers, reflecting the assistance provided to many graduates during their years 
at university. Once again, there was enormous variation in receipt patterns. While 
7.3 per cent of graduates received no cash transfers during their entire lifetimes, 
the maximum value received of $182,000 was not much less than the highest 
amount received by those with secondary qualifications.
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The impact made by income tax was more far-reaching. Figure 6.3 shows the 
average amounts of income received by males by education, using different 
definitions of income. The difference between original and gross income shows the 
contribution made by cash transfers. For males, who are represented by the 
unbroken lines in Figure 6.3, the addition of cash transfers makes little difference 
to the dispersion of incomes still apparent at the gross income stage. As an 
experiment, the figure next shows the total amount of income received if imputed 
education services income is added to gross income. Because those with degrees
Figure 6.3: Average Amounts of Total Lifetime Income Received by Sex and 
Education, Using Different Income Concepts
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utilise education services to a greater extent, the degree of income inequality 
becomes greater at this stage, as shown by the slight widening of the gap between 
those with degrees and others, when the income measure is changed from gross 
income to gross income plus education services income.
However, income taxes markedly reduce the degree of income inequality, as 
shown by the narrowing of the gap in Figure 6.3 between graduates and non­
graduates as the income base is changed from gross income (with or without 
education services imputed) to disposable income. Male graduates pay just under 
half a million dollars of income tax during their lifetimes, in comparison to the 
$185,000 contributed by those with secondary qualifications and the $285,000 paid 
by those with some tertiary qualifications (Table 6.1). As a result, while the total 
original lifetime income of graduates is 1.9 times higher than that of secondary 
schoolers, the total disposable income of graduates, after the intervention of the 
tax-transfer system, is only 1.6 times greater.
Total Lifetime Income of Females
How do these results compare with those for females? As Figure 6.3 demonstrates 
clearly, the average lifetime incomes of females are much lower than those of 
males, with even the incomes of the top-ranking education group of female 
graduates only exceeding the incomes of the bottom-ranking males with secondary 
qualifications. The total gross lifetime income of female graduates of almost 
$970,000 (Table 6.2) amounts to only two-thirds of the gross income of male 
graduates, and is about 94 per cent of the gross income of males with some 
tertiary qualifications. However, female graduates fare very much better than other 
females, receiving twice as much income during their lifetimes as women with only 
secondary school qualifications and about 27 per cent more income than women 
with some tertiary qualifications.
The gross incomes of women also show great dispersion, with the top ranking 
female with secondary qualifications reaching a lifetime gross income of about $2 
million, compared to the highest value for a female graduate of $3.7 million. Again,
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Table 6.2: Average Lifetime Income and Tax Measures by Education for 
Females
Measure
EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
Secondary 
School Only
Some
Tertiary
Degree
1. TOTAL LIFETIME MEASURES
Earnings 296,660 489,930 693,640
Investment Income 54,335 125,285 139,060
Superannuation 10,100 15,445 48,780
TOTAL ORIGINAL INCOME* 363,235 633,380 884,480
Cash Transfers 101,865 87,680 83,570
GROSS INCOME 465,100 721,060 968,050
Income Tax Paid 78,430 153,930 239,530
DISPOSABLE INCOME 386,675 567,125 728,520
SHARED DISP INCOME (family unit) 550,290 670,830 770,615
EQUIVALENT DISP INCOME (family unit) 920,775 1,119,140 1,291,240
Education services income 34,525 36,630 59,985
Lifetime hrs in labour force 41,600 57,760 65,800
Lifetime hours employed 38,540 55,005 64,735
Lifetime hours unemployed 3,060 2,755 1,065
2. ANNUALISED LIFETIME MEASURES
Earnings 4,960 7,980 10,825
Investment income 860 1,900 2,030
Superannuation 145 215 675
TOTAL ORIGINAL INCOME* 5,995 10,140 13,580
Cash Transfers 1,545 1,320 1,230
GROSS INCOME 7,540 11,460 14,815
Income tax paid 1,305 2,465 3,660
DISPOSABLE INCOME 6,235 8,995 11,150
SHARED DISPOSABLE INCOME (family unit) 8,845 10,700 11,780
EQUIVALENT DISP INCOME (family unit) 14,735 17,800 19,700
3. AVERAGE MEASURES
Av length of life 77.8 78.5 80.6
Av yrs in labour force 26.3 34.3 39.1
Av yrs any unemployment experienced 4.8 4.5 2.0
Av hours in L.F. during yrs in L.F. 1,535 1,655 1,665
Av hrs employed during yrs employed 1,405 1,570 1,640
Av lifetime hourly wage rate 7.65 8.85 10.70
Av yrs of education 12.8 13.4 16.4
* Totals also include maintenance income.
2 2 2
there is substantial variation in the total lifetime incomes of women within each 
educational grouping. About 90 per cent of women with secondary qualifications 
receive total gross lifetime incomes of less than $0.8 million, compared to only 60 
per cent of those with some tertiary qualifications and less than 50 per cent of 
female graduates (Figure 6.4). (Again, some of the low gross lifetime incomes 
would reflect those who died at an early age, as well as women who spent many 
years out of the labour force.)
Figure 6.4: Frequency Distribution of Total Lifetime Gross Income by 
Education for Females
Percentage
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The sources of total lifetime gross income are also very different for women. 
While earnings contributed around 85 per cent of all lifetime income for men, the 
comparable figure for females with secondary qualifications is only 64 per cent,
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rising to 72 per cent for female graduates (Figure 6.5). The absolute amounts of 
lifetime earnings received are also much lower, with the $296,000 earned by 
females with secondary qualifications and the $694,000 earned by female 
graduates amounting to only 45 and 57 per cent respectively of the earnings of 
males with comparable education. The dispersion in average earnings among 
women is, however, greater, with female graduates earning 2.3 times more on 
average than women with secondary qualifications during their lifetimes.
Somewhat suprisingly, women with some tertiary qualifications or degrees received 
higher lifetime investment incomes than men. This is in part accounted for by 
women living for about five years longer than men on average, with substantial 
amounts of investment income being received during these last years of life while 
in retirement. After accounting for differential length of life (discussed further 
below), women with some tertiary qualifications still received more investment 
income than comparable men (although the investment income received by male 
and female graduates becomes almost the same). However, this simply reflects 
the imputation of investment income in the simulation using the data available in 
the 1986 IDS, which does find that women with some tertiary qualifications receive 
more investment income after age 50 than comparable men (see Figures 4.4 and 
4.5 in Chapter 4). Whether this is due to sampling error is unclear.
However, due both to the higher absolute amounts of investment income received 
during the lifecycle and to the lower absolute amounts of other income sources, 
investment income remains a more significant source of income for women than 
for men, amounting to about 12 per cent of total gross lifetime income for those 
with secondary qualifications and reaching a peak of 17 per cent for those with 
some tertiary qualifications (Figure 6.5). Superannuation income was again the 
most unequally distributed component of original income, with the average $49,000 
received by female graduates being almost five times that received by women with 
secondary qualifications.
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Figure 6.5: Sources of Total Gross Lifetime Income by Education for Females
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Some Tertiary Qualifications
Earnings
Superannuation
Investment 
Cash transfers
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The tax-transfer system again ameliorates these inequalities in original income. Cash 
transfers are a vastly more important source of lifetime income for women than for 
men, reflecting both the provision of child transfers to women, their greater likelihood 
of experiencing sole parenthood and their longer lives and commensurately lengthier 
receipt of age pension. Women received about twice as much in cash transfers 
during their lifetimes as men and this, allied with their lower original incomes, made 
cash transfers a very significant component of lifetime income. For women with 
secondary qualifications, cash transfers amounted to just over one-fifth of all income 
received during their lives, although the importance of such transfers declined with 
increasing education, reaching less than 9 per cent of the total gross lifetime income 
of women with degrees (Figure 6.5).
The composition of lifetime cash transfers is also very different for women than for 
men. A breakdown of lifetime transfers for women with secondary qualifications only 
is shown in Figure 6.6. Pension payments account for 67 per cent of all cash 
transfers (of which age pension comprises some 98 per cent and invalid pension the 
remainder). The second largest contender is sole parents pension, amounting to one- 
fifth of all transfers received, followed by family allowances and FIS which comprise 
just over one-tenth of all transfers. Education transfers are negligible at around 2 per 
cent; of the average $1575 received in lifetime education transfers, just under half are 
transfers received by these women when they are students themselves and the 
remaining majority are transfers paid to them in middle age in respect of their student 
children.
The compositional pattern for other women is fairly similar although, for women with 
degrees, education cash transfers not suprisingly are more significant, amounting to 
some $4,200, or 5 per cent of total transfers received by this group. Of these 
education transfers, over 84 per cent are TEAS and PGA payments made to these 
graduates when they are students.
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There is again great variation in the amount of cash transfers received by those with 
the same educational status, although the maximum values for each education 
grouping are again reasonably close, amounting to $285,000 for women with 
secondary qualifications and almost $280,000 for women with degrees.
Figure 6.6: Components of Total Lifetime Cash Transfers Received by Women 
with Secondary Qualifications Only
Pension
Education transfers
Child transfers 
Sole parents pensions
Income taxes markedly reduce the inequalities apparent in the distribution of original 
and disposable income, as shown by the closing of the gap between the dashed lines 
for women with different educational achievements in Figure 6.3, as the income 
measure is changed from gross to disposable income. Reflecting their lower incomes,
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the amount of income tax paid by women is much less than that by men, with female 
graduates contributing some $240,000 in income tax on average during their lifetimes. 
Women with secondary qualifications pay less than $80,000 in income tax during their 
lives.
Taking Account of Differential Length of Life
While the above figures suggest that those with higher education enjoy much higher 
lifetime incomes, it is conceivable that this advantage might be partially or even fully 
offset by the longer lifespans of those with higher education. As discussed in Chapter 
2, differences in mortality after the age of 45 were simulated in the model, although 
there is no way of knowing, given the lack of Australian data, whether the simulated 
differences were sufficiently large. Because men die at an earlier age on average 
than women, the differences in mortality by education are not as apparent. Men with 
degrees live two years longer on average than those with secondary qualifications 
only, but women with degrees live almost three years longer on average than women 
without any tertiary qualifications (Tables 6.1 and 6.2). The higher incomes of the 
better educated thus have to be spread over a somewhat longer lifespan.
To take account of this phenomenon, annualised lifetime measures were developed 
(see Chapter 5), which simply attempted to put all those in the simulation on a more 
equal footing, by dividing the various lifetime totals by years of life minus 15 (the 
assumed age of potential labour force entry). While the various annualised income 
measures are listed in Table 6.1 for men, Figure 6.7 attempts to summarise the 
conclusions which can be drawn. The figure shows the total lifetime original, gross 
and disposable income received by males with degrees and by males with some 
tertiary qualifications as a percentage of the comparable incomes received by men 
with secondary qualifications only, and then shows the difference which is made by 
using annualised lifetime income rather than total lifetime income measures.
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Figure 6.7: Total and Annualised Lifetime Original, Gross and Disposable 
Incomes of Males with Degrees or with Some Tertiary Qualifications as 
Proportion of Comparable Incomes of Males with Secondary Qualifications
Income as Proportion of Income of Male With Secondary Qualifications
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Figure 6.8: Total and Annualised Lifetime Original, Gross and Disposable 
Income of Females with Degrees or with Some Tertiary Qualifications as 
Proportion of Comparable Incomes of Females with Secondary Qualifications
Income as Proportion of Income of Female With Secondary Qualifications
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For males with some tertiary qualifications there is almost no difference between the 
two concepts, as such males on average live for only five months longer than males 
without any tertiary qualifications. For males with degrees, however, the extra length 
of life does make some difference. For example, while the original (pre-tax, pre­
transfer) total lifetime income of men with degrees is more than 1.9 times higher than 
the total original lifetime income of men without tertiary qualifications, their annualised 
original lifetime income is only slightly more than 1.8 times higher. The magnitude of 
the difference made by accounting for differential length of life appears to stay fairly 
constant, whether original, gross or disposable income is used as the basis of 
comparison. In conclusion, while the extra few years of life do reduce the relative 
advantage enjoyed by males with degrees, the difference appears fairly insubstantial, 
indicating that such males do still enjoy much higher lifetime incomes than their less 
well educated peers.
For women, however, the difference made by moving from total lifetime to annualised 
lifetime income measures is more pronounced. As Figure 6.8 demonstrates, while the 
total original lifetime income of women with degrees is about 2.43 times higher than 
that of women with no tertiary qualifications, their annualised original lifetime income 
is only about 2.27 times greater - a cut of about 7 per cent. Similarly, the relative 
lifetime incomes of women with some tertiary qualifications are also somewhat lower 
once account is taken of their longer lifespans. (Comparison of Figures 6.7 and 6.8 
also shows that the gap between the average incomes of better and less well- 
educated men is less wide than it is for women.)
In conclusion, although the differences are not vast, the longer lives enjoyed by the 
better educated do reduce the relative income advantage apparent when only the total 
lifetime results are examined.
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Taking Account of Varying Labour Force Participation Patterns
Even more importantly, the various annualised measures could be regarded as 
overstating the real advantage enjoyed by those with higher educational qualifications. 
Further examination of the data showed that the higher lifetime incomes of those with 
tertiary qualifications were due to a greater number of hours worked during the 
lifetime, as well as to a higher average hourly wage rate.
For example, men with secondary qualifications spent an average 40.4 years in the 
labour force compared with 44 years for more highly educated men and, once in the 
labour force, spent 20 hours less per year in the labour force. As a result of these 
factors, those with degrees averaged an additional 8000 hours in the labour force 
during their lifetimes compared to those without any tertiary qualifications - or the 
equivalent of 200 forty-hour weeks. Interestingly, those males with some tertiary 
qualifications (which included many self-employed tradespeople) worked longer hours 
than either of the other two groups.
The differences were even more marked for women. On average, women with 
secondary qualifications only participated in the labour force (for an hour or more per 
year) during 26 years of their life. This rose to 34 years for those with some tertiary 
qualifications and to 39 years for those with degrees. In addition, when actually in the 
labour force, the better educated worked more hours per year. Thus, female 
graduates and those with some tertiary qualifications averaged about 1660 hours in 
the labour force during the years they were in the labour force, while those with 
secondary qualifications averaged only 1535 hours. In summary, less well educated 
women were more likely to drop out of the labour force upon marriage and childbirth 
than their better educated counterparts and, when they did enter the labour force, 
were more likely to work part-time.
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These trends resulted In enormous differences in total lifetime hours in the labour 
force, with those women with some tertiary qualifications spending an extra 16,000 
hours in the labour force and those with degrees spending an additional 24,000 
hours in the labour force during their lifetimes in comparison to women with secondary 
qualifications only - a difference of 404 and 605 working weeks respectively.
In addition to these participation differences, there was also a substantial difference 
in the average lifetime wage rate (calculated as total lifetime wages divided by lifetime 
hours of employment). For women with secondary school qualifications only, the 
average lifetime wage rate was $7.65 an hour, compared with $8.85 for those with 
some tertiary qualifications and $10.70 for those with degrees (Table 6.2). Men’s 
hourly wage rates were higher than women’s, at $12.60, $13.50 and $16.60
respectively (Table 6.1).
While there were thus significant differences in the lifetime hourly wage rate received 
by the better educated, the wide variation in labour force participation rates raised 
the question of whether an attempt could be made to control for this variation, so that 
the relative monetary advantage enjoyed by the better educated could be more 
accurately assessed. It is difficult to determine the extent to which differences in 
lifetime hours worked should be treated as an involuntary choice forced upon workers 
(eg. in the case of the greater likelihood of forced early retirement for those with less 
education) or as a voluntary choice between labour and leisure, which would imply 
that leisure could be valued at the wage rate (Scitovsky, 1973).
However, if differences in hours worked reflect relative preferences for leisure over 
labour, and if such differences are significant between those with different educational 
qualifications, then those numerous studies of the relative rates of return to education 
which simply calculate such rates by examining the total yearly incomes by age 
received by those with different educational qualifications seem fundamentally flawed,
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by not taking into account the different periods of time spent earning such incomes 
(Clark and Tarsh, 1987; Psacharopoulos, 1973; Chapman and Chia, 1989; Chapman, 
1988).
Standardising Lifetime Hours Worked
Without seeking to enter the debate about whether hours worked reflect voluntary or 
involuntary choices, an attempt is made below to standardise lifetime hours in the 
labour force, so that at least the magnitude of the potential difference may be 
assessed. A further issue is that, even if the labour force participation patterns of 
individuals did not vary by education, because those with less education are more 
likely to spend some of their labour force hours unemployed this presumably should 
also be taken into account when assessing lifetime rates of return (Miller, 1981). 
Finally, the impact of progressive tax systems in reducing the return to education is 
widely recognised (Miller, 1981; Richardson and Hancock, 1981; Chapman, 1988), so 
that earnings net of income tax seem the approriate measure to use in assessing 
private returns to education.
The attempt to distinguish between the separate effects of education and hours 
worked on lifetime earnings outlined below can, however, only be regarded as very 
approximate. The average age of labour force entry, after taking account of years of 
full-time study, is only an approximation as, for example, some graduates might have 
studied part-time to attain their degrees. All individuals are assumed to leave the 
workforce at the legal age pension age and, following Eckaus, all are assumed to 
work a standard 2000 hour year (quoted in Miller, 1981).
The proportion of time spent unemployed during each year is simply calculated by 
taking lifetime hours unemployed as a percentage of lifetime hours in the labour force 
(Tables 6.1 and 6.2), and the assumption that the same proportion of time would be
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spent unemployed if labour force participation rates were increased might not be valid. 
Equally, the resultant hours in the labour force per year have simply been multiplied 
by the average hourly lifetime wage rate to derive annual earnings, and this abstracts 
from such issues as whether those within each educational group who have lower 
than average participation rates would also have lower than average wage rates.
It should also be noted that no attempt has been made to impute the unemployment 
benefits which might be payable to individuals while they were unemployed (thereby 
overestimating the gains made by the better educated). Similarly, the costs of full­
time study, calculated by the Department of Employment, Education and Training as 
$595 in 1984 (1987d), and possible part-time earnings by graduates while they are 
studying (calculated by DEET as $1,483 per year for those not receiving student 
assistance and $865 for those receiving such assistance), have also been abstracted 
from, as has any student assistance paid to graduates, thereby underestimating the 
relative gains made by the better educated. Finally, possible differences in family 
circumstances have been ignored when calculating income tax payments, so that the 
tax rates applied are simply those applicable to single taxpayers without dependents 
in 1985-86.
Table 6.3 shows the figures which are the basis of the calculation, while the results 
are presented in Figure 6.9. While the total lifetime earnings of males with some 
tertiary qualifications in the simulation are 1.3 times greater than those of males with 
only secondary qualifications, their earnings after standardisation for different labour 
force participation patterns are only 1.15 times greater. Similarly, while the total 
lifetime earnings of male graduates in the simulation are more than 1.9 times higher 
than those of males with secondary qualifications, their imputed earnings after 
imposing comparable lifetime hours in the labour force are only 1.55 times greater.
The relative advantage enjoyed by the better educated is further lessened by income 
tax. While the imputed earnings after-tax cannot be precisely compared with any of
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Table 6.3: Estimates of Lifetime Earnings After Standardising for Differential 
Labour Force Participation Patterns
Secondary 
School Only
Some
Tertiary
Degree
MALES
Av age of labour force entry 16.5 17.5 20.5
Assumed age of l.f. exit 65 65 65
Years in labour force - (A) 48.5 47.5 44.5
% of yearly hours in l.f spent unemployed 6.02 3.12 2.03
Av hours per yr spent in employment 1880 1938 1959
Av annual gross (pre-tax) earnings (1) - (B) 16,826 19,574 28,112
Av annual after-tax earnings® -(C) 13,552 15,464 20,072
Lifetime gross (pre-tax) earnings - (A x B) 816,061 929,765 1,250,984
Lifetime after-tax earnings (A x C) 657,272 734,540 893,204
FEMALES
Av age of labour force entry 16.5 17.5 20.5
Assumed age of l.f. exit 60 60 60
Years in labour force - (A) 43.5 42.5 39.5
% of yearly hours in l.f spent unemployed 7.36 4.77 1.62
Av hours per yr in employment 1853 1905 1968
Av annual gross (pre-tax) earnings (1) - (B) 14,175 16,860 21,058
Av annual after-tax earnings® - (C) 11,696 13,575 16,265
Lifetime gross (pre-tax) earnings - (A x B) 616,613 716,550 831,791
Lifetime after-tax earnings (A x C) 508,776 576,969 642,470
(1) Average hours of employment per year multiplied by average lifetime hourly wage rate.
(2) Applying 1985-86 income tax schedules, and assuming no rebates, deductions etc.
the results presented earlier, comparison of Figure 6.9 with Figure 6.7 shows that the 
disposable imputed earnings of graduates are about 1.35 times greater than those of 
males with secondary qualifications, while their total lifetime disposable incomes 
(which include other sources of income and are thus not directly comparable) are 
almost 1.6 times greater.
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Figure 6.9: Actual and Imputed Lifetime Earnings of Males and Females with 
Tertiary Qualifications as a Proportion of the Lifetime Earnings of Those with 
Only Secondary Qualifications
MALES
Earnings as Proportion of Earnings of Males With Secondary Quals
Some Tertiary Degree
Lifetime Education Status
Earnings
Imputed post“tax earnings
Imputed pre-tax earnings
FEMALES
Earnings as Proportion of Earnings of Females With Secondary Quals
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Standardisation for hours worked has an even more dramatic effect for females, 
because of the much greater variation in their labour force participation patterns by 
education. While the earnings originally simulated for females with degrees in the 
model were about 2.3 times higher than those of women with secondary qualifications, 
their imputed earnings after assuming similar labour force profiles were only about 
1.35 times greater. A marked decline in the relative earnings advantage enjoyed by 
women
with some tertiary qualifications is also apparent. There was less change in relative 
advantage for women than for men after taking into account income tax payments, 
because the lower earned incomes of women meant that the progressive nature of the 
tax system had less impact.
While the above calculations can only be regarded as a very rough attempt to isolate 
the contribution made by differential labour force participation patterns to the earning 
inequalities apparent amongst those with different educational qualifications, the 
results suggest that such differences in lifetime hours worked do make a significant 
contribution to such inequalities, particularly for women.
The extent to which such differences reflect voluntary or involuntary choice is 
important when attempting to make a value judgement about the implications of these 
results for the analysis of income inequality. However, as the labour force 
participation rates of women seem more likely to reflect the result of a deliberate 
choice between paid work in the labour force and unpaid work in the home, to a much 
greater extent than for men, the sharp drop in the relative advantage enjoyed by 
female graduates, once variations in participation rates are standardised for, suggests 
that any analysis for females which does not take differences in work effort into 
account may be highly misleading.
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Taking Account of Family Circumstances
While the personal incomes received and taxes paid by individuals are of great 
interest, they take no account of income sharing within the family unit, which helps to 
attenuate the marked disparities between the incomes of men and women described 
above. For example, the very low earned incomes of many women without tertiary 
qualifications might not provide an accurate guide to the lifetime standard of living they 
achieve, because they might be married to high income spouses who share income 
with them. However, only the incomes of individuals can be tracked In any meaningful 
way over time, as families are constantly dissolving and reforming from year to year, 
with marriage, divorce, children leaving home, and so on (Elder, 1985:28).
Consequently, as described in Chapter 5, two additional income measures were 
developed for use in the simulation which took varying degrees of account of family 
circumstances. The first, shared disposable income, assumes completely equal 
sharing of income between adults, so that in married couples all income received is 
divided equally between each partner, irrespective of the relative contribution of each 
partner to that combined income. While such equal sharing could be applied to any 
of the income and tax measures used, disposable income has been selected, as it 
captures the amount of money available to individuals and couples to spend after the 
intervention of the tax-transfer system. Implicitly, therefore, the measure splits the 
income taxes paid and cash transfers received by a couple equally between them, 
irrespective of who actually received the income or paid the taxes. During those years 
when individuals are single, their shared disposable income is simply the same as 
their personal disposable income.
The second family-based measure was equivalent disposable income, where an 
equivalence scale was applied to the total disposable income of a family, and the
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resulting values for equivalent income were attributed to both partners in the case of 
married couples.(1) This measure thus goes further than the shared income measure 
in also taking into account the financial demands imposed by any children, as well as 
the possible economies of scale enjoyed by a couple living together and sharing 
accommodation etc, relative to a single person.
As Table 6.4 demonstrates, the inequality apparent between men and women, when 
only their personal incomes are considered, largely disappears when account is taken 
of family circumstances. For example, women with only secondary qualifications 
have personal annualised lifetime disposable incomes of only $6235 a year on 
average. However, once they are assumed to benefit equally in the incomes of their 
husbands their annualised lifetime shared disposable incomes rise to $8,845 a year. 
Because of the higher incomes of female graduates, allied with the fact that about 
one-quarter are married to males who do not have degrees, the increase in their 
income when the base is changed from personal disposable income to shared 
disposable income is not as great, but still amounts to about $600 a year on average.
Not suprisingly, the incomes of men fall when they are assumed to split income 
equally with their wives, with the shared disposable income of men with secondary 
qualifications being almost $1,000 lower per year than their personal annualised 
lifetime disposable incomes. The drop is more pronounced for male graduates; once 
they are assumed to split income equally with their wives during the years they are 
married, their shared disposable income during each year of adult life is almost $3,000 
lower than their personal annualised lifetime disposable income.
(1) A family is defined as a single person with or without children and married couples with and without 
children. As in comparable dynamic cohort microsimulation models, there are currently no extended 
families or families’ of unrelated individuals in the simulation.
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Table 6.4: Lifetime Disposable, Shared and Equivalent Incomes by Educational 
Status and Sex
MEASURE
EDUCATIONAL STATUS
Secondary Some Degree 
School Only Tertiary
MALES
Annualised disposble income 10,480 12,945 15,885
Annualised shared income (family unit) 9,520 11,375 13,085
Annualised equivalent income (family unit) 16,165 19,410 22,375
Annualised equivalent income (60:40 split within couples) 18,010 21,615 25,105
Total lifetime disposable Income 601,770 746,835 952,490
Total lifetime shared income (family unit) 547,195 657,800 787,400
Total lifetime equivalent income (family unit) 931,355 1,125,925 1,349,360
Total lifetime equivalent income (60:40 split) 1,040,915 1,255,670 1,513,015
FEMALES
Annualised disposble income 6,235 8,995 11,150
Annualised shared income (family unit) 8,845 10,700 11,780
Annualised equivalent income (family unit) 14,735 17,800 19,700
Annualised equivalent income (60:40 split within couples) 12,765 15,690 17,410
Total lifetime disposable income 386,675 567,125 728,520
Total lifetime shared income (family unit) 550,290 670,830 770,615
Total lifetime equivalent income (family unit) 920,775 1,119,140 1,291,240
Total lifetime equivalent income (60:40 split) 797,850 988,050 1,139,985
The figures also provide an interesting illustration of the importance of adjusting for 
differential length of life. For example, the total lifetime shared disposable incomes 
of women with secondary qualifications are higher than those of men with comparable 
qualifications; however, as such women live on average for an additional five years, 
this total income is spread over a longer lifespan, and their annualised shared 
disposable incomes are actually lower than those of men with similar qualifications. 
Even with assumed full income sharing, men have higher annualised shared incomes
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than women, because they receive higher incomes than women during the years they 
are single.
Once the income measure is broadened to take account of the number of children 
also dependent upon it, the discrepancy between men and women widens slightly, 
possibly reflecting the greater number of years women spend as sole parents and as 
single retired individuals relative to men. For example, while the annualised shared 
disposable income of women with some tertiary qualifications amounts to 94 per cent 
of that of men with some tertiary qualifications, their annualised equivalent income is 
only 92 per cent of that of such males.
Even after standardising for differential length of life and differing family experiences 
(but not for labour force participation differences), the incomes of the better educated 
remain substantially higher than those of the less well educated, with the annualised 
equivalent incomes of female graduates being about one-third higher than those of 
women without any tertiary qualifications. The incomes of male graduates are some 
38 per cent higher than the annualised equivalent incomes of around $16,000 per year 
received by males with only secondary qualifications.
This is particularly interesting, because it represents a reversal of the relative positions 
apparent when personal disposable income was used. That is, while the annualised 
disposable incomes of female graduates were about 1.8 times higher than those of 
women with secondary qualifications, their annualised equivalent disposable incomes 
were only 1.3 times higher (Table 6.4). In contrast, while the annualised disposable 
incomes of male graduates were 1.4 times higher than those of males with secondary 
qualifications, their annualised equivalent disposable incomes were also about 1.4 
times higher. Thus, taking account of family circumstances markedly reduces the 
degree of relative inequality amongst women with different educational achievements 
but has little impact upon the relative disparity amongst men.
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6.3 LIFETIME INCOME BY FAMILY STATUS
How does marriage affect the lifetime incomes of men and women ? How much does 
having children lower lifetime standards of living ? Such questions are of vital 
importance to policy-makers, as every budget they reconsider the level of cash 
transfers to families and of tax allowances provided to those with dependent spouses 
and children.
Lifetime Incomes of Women
To answer such questions women were divided into the following five groups:
- women who never married and never had children (6 per cent of the total);
- women who never married but had children (4 per cent);
- women who married at least once but never had children (5 per cent);
- women who married at least once and had one or two children (60 per cent);
- women who married at least once and had three or more children (25 per cent).
It should be recalled that ’marriage’ was defined in the model to include those who 
lived in ’marriage-like’ de-facto relationships so that, for example, the women who 
never married group comprises those who were never legally married and never lived 
in marriage-like common law relationships during their lifetimes.
Married and unmarried women who never had children have fairly similar lifetime 
labour force profiles; both groups average about 38 to 41 years of participation in the 
labour force, and work almost 1,800 hours a year on average during those years they 
do enter the labour force. Annualised lifetime earnings are consequently also similar, 
at over $10,000 per year (Table 6.5).
As one would expect, women with children spend less years in the labour force, fewer 
years working full-time full-year, and also work fewer hours when they do enter the
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labour force. The earned income of women with children, and particularly of women 
who were married and had three or more children, is correspondingly lower. A 
substantial part of the inequality of income apparent between women with different 
marital and child status is thus due to these different patterns of labour force 
participation, with the annualised earned incomes of married women with three or 
more children amounting to only 64 per cent of those of married women without 
children and 69 per cent of those of never married women without children.
The investment income of married women is significantly higher than that of never 
married women, reflecting the pooling of investments within marriage. 
Superannuation pension levels are, however, fairly similar, with the notable exception 
of never married women with children. Such women are less likely to benefit from 
occupational superannuation than never married women without children, while also 
being doubly disadvantaged because they do not pick up the pensions of deceased 
husbands, as do married women. Adding together these components of original 
income, married women who never had children emerge with the highest annualised 
original incomes of about $13,000 a year, trailed by never married women and then 
by ever married women with children. Married women who had three or more children 
have particularly low original incomes of just over $9000, some two-thirds of those 
received by married women without children (Figure 6.10).
To what extent do the cash transfers for children and the various family-related 
income tax allowances offset these inequalities in original income ? Never married 
women with children receive about twice as much income from pensions and benefits 
as other women, principally because of the large amounts of sole parents pension 
received. All never married women receive higher annualised age pension than 
married women, presumably because the single pension rate is higher than half of the 
married pension rate. Women with children receive higher child transfers and, to a 
lesser extent, education transfers, via family allowance, FIS and SAS. However, such 
transfers do little to compensate for the lower earned incomes of women with children.
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Table 6.5: Average Lifetime Income and Tax Measures for Women by Lifetime 
Family Status
Measure
Never Married Ever Married
No child 
(n=117)
1+ child 
(n=70)
No child 
(n=107)
1-2 child 
(n=1189)
3+ child 
(n=505)
1. TOTAL LIFETIME MEASURES 
- earnings 607,665 564,730 680,300 503,885 431,905
- original income 715,215 661,735 842,935 649,415 577,500
- gross income 796,140 801,785 913,095 733.765 675,105
- income tax paid 179,120 169,605 224,110 161,980 137,135
- disposable income 617,020 632,185 678,985 571,780 537,965
- equivalent Inc 1,028,520 1,241,280 1,241,280 1,161,695 1,069,165
2. ANNUAUSED LIFETIME MEASURES ( i*  divided by years of life -  15)
- earnings 10,060 9,630 10,765 8,105 6,955
- investment 1,380 1,360 2,140 1,830 1,790
- superannuation 255 90 260 310 295
- maintenance 0 0 0 40 80
-TO TA L ORIGINAL 11,700 11,080 13,165 10,285 9,120
- sole parent pen 0 1,210 70* 245 245
- age/inv pension 1,015 905 815 810 810
- benefit 130 75 110 45 20
-TO TA L PENSION 
OR BENEFIT 1,145 2,195 995 1,100 1,080
- child transfers 0 110 1* 135 350
- education trans 15 40 15 30 45
-TO TA L GROSS 12,860 13,430 14,170 11,540 10,595
- income tax 2,890 2,810 3,500 2,565 2,160
-DISPOSABLE INC 9,965 10,615 10,680 8,980 8,440
- SHARED INC 9,965 10,615 10,965 10,750 10,575
- EQUIVALENT INC 16,610 15,315 19,250 18,320 16,755
- EQUIV INC(60:40 split) 16,610 15,315 18,045 15,905 14,440
3. AVERAGE MEASURES 
-years of life 76.6 74.6 80.3 79.0 78.9
-yrs  labour force 37.9 35.8 40.7 34.2 31.6
- yrs any unemp exp’d 4.3 5.2 4.7 4.1 3.6
-yrs  worked full­
time, full-year 26.3 24.0 28.2 20.6 17.6
- hours in labour force 
during yrs in l.f. 1,769 1,722 1,790 1,644 1,561
- hours employed p.a. 1,697 1,633 1,706 1,564 1,484
- av. wage rate $9.25 $9.40 $9.65 $9.00 $8.85
*  Sole parent’s pension comprises supporting parents benefit plus widow’s pension, and a small number 
of married women without children receive Class B widow’s pension, payable to widowed women aged at 
least 50 without children. All income figures rounded to nearest $5. Totals may not sum due to rounding.
# Although they have not had any children of their own, married women without children may marry male 
sole parents and thus receive child transfers in respect of their stepchildren.
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Figure 6.10: Annualised Lifetime Original, Gross and Disposable Income of 
Women by Lifetime Family Status
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14000-
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* The categories are from left: never married women without children; never married women with children; 
ever married women without children; ever married women with one or two children; and ever married 
women with three or more children.
Gross income is shown in the first column, and equals original income plus cash transfers.
After payment of income tax, married women without children still have the highest 
annualised disposable incomes, but the combined impact of sole parent transfers and 
the sole parent rebate have resulted in a reversal of the relative positions of never 
married women, with never married women with children having higher annualised 
disposable incomes than their counterparts without children.
ANNUALISED INCOME $
N.M. 0 CH N.M. 1+ CH MRR, 0 CH MRR, 1-2 CH MRR, 3+ CH 
MARITAL AND CHILD STATUS *
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Lifetime Incomes of Men
Not suprisingly, marital status and the presence of children have a dramatically 
different effect on men’s lifetime income profiles. In the model, all children were 
assumed to remain with the mother upon divorce, and this, allied with high divorce 
and remarriage rates, suggested that the number of children fathered was not the 
most appropriate indicator to capture the impact of children upon men’s lifetime 
welfare. Instead, men were categorised by the number of years they spent in a family 
with one or more dependent children present. Men were thus divided into the 
following categories:
- never married men (15 per cent of the total);
- ever married men who spent 0 years in a family with dependent children (3 per 
cent);
- ever married men who spent 1 to 14 years with dependent children present (19 per 
cent);
- ever married men who spent 15 to 20 years with dependent children (28 per cent);
- ever married men who spent more than 20 years with dependent children (36 per 
cent).
Married men received annualised earnings which were about $2,000 higher each year 
than those of never married men, principally because of the higher hourly earnings of 
married men (Chapter 4), with all married men receiving annualised earnings of 
between $16,000 and $17,000. Married men who spent 15 years or more in 
households with dependent children spent marginally more years in the labour force, 
more years working full-time full year, and also averaged somewhat longer hours once 
in the labour force. Superannuation and investment income also showed little 
variation by marital and child status (Table 6.6).
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Table 6.6: Average Lifetime Income and Tax Measures for Men by Lifetime 
Family Status
Measure
Never
Married
Ever Married by No of Years Children Present
(n=289)
0
(n=56)
1 to 14
(n=369)
15 to 20 
(n=549)
21 + 
(n=718)
1. TOTAL LIFETIME
- earnings
MEASURES
796,680 935,535 855,795 950,970 986,210
- original income 907,385 1,045,820 961,265 1,072,264 1,116,515
• gross income 953,385 1,084,630 1,000,790 1,112,920 1,160,045
- income tax paid 265,945 319,100 289,160 323,435 339,550
- disposable income 687,440 765,530 711,630 789,490 820,495
- equivalent inc 1,145,905 1,286,370 1,128,575 1,181,330 1,125,610
2. ANNUALISED LIFETIME MEASURES (7e. divided by years of life - 15)
- earnings 14,360 16,340 16,125 16,230 16,680
- investment 1,380 1,260 1,425 1,480 1,605
- superannuation 415 530 370 480 470
-TO TA L ORIGINAL 16,150 18,130 17,920 18,190 18,755
- pension 565 450 470 470 490
- benefit 140 135 130 130 140
-TO TA L PENSION 
OR BENEFIT 710 585 605 600 630
- child transfers 0 0 0 5 10
- education transfers 25 20 20 25 25
-TO TA L GROSS 16,885 18,730 18,545 18,815 19,420
- income tax 4,660 5,615 5,425 5,470 5,690
-DISPOSABLE INC 12,225 13,120 13,120 13,340 13,725
- SHARED INC 12,225 12,440 11,835 11,340 11,165
- EQUIVALENT INC 20,380 21,910 20,470 19,840 18,710
- EQUIV INC (60:40) 20,380 20,320 22,320 22.685 21,685
3. AVERAGE MEASURES 
- years of life 70.6 74.4 70.5 74.8 75.5
-yrs  labour force 41.9 44.2 41.5 44.4 45.0
-yrs  any unemployment 
experienced 4.0 3.8 3.7 4.5 4.4
-yrs  worked full­
time, full-year 33.6 34.6 33.6 36.2 36.2
- hours in labour force 
during yrs in l.f. 1,997 1,990 2,013 2,036 2,029
- hours employed p.a. 1,927 1,931 1,953 1,969 1,963
- av. wage rate $9.65 $11.15 $10.65 $10.90 $11.20
All Income figures rounded to nearest $5. Totals may not sum due to rounding.
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In comparison to the situation for women, marital and child status thus had little 
impact upon the annualised original incomes of men. After ranking the various groups 
by their personal annualised original incomes, the original income of the top ranking 
female group of married women who never had children was 44 per cent higher than 
that of the bottom ranking group of married women with three or more children. The 
annualised original income of the top ranking group of men who spent more than 20 
years in families with dependent children was only 16 per cent higher than that of the 
bottom group of men who never married. In stark contrast to the pattern for women, 
the personal incomes of men tended to increase with greater exposure to children, 
while those of women decreased.
Cash transfers were of much less importance to the incomes of men (Figure 6.11). 
There was little difference for men in social security cash transfers receipt by marital 
or child status, although unmarried men received marginally more age pension 
because of the higher payment to single pensioners. Men received lower average age 
pensions than women, because of their shorter lifespans. The major importance of 
the social security system to women was again emphasised as, despite 
unemployment and sickness benefit being payable to the male in married couples, 
cash transfers received by men were about half those paid to women.
While the annualised gross incomes of unmarried men were some $2000 lower than 
those of married men, after allowing for the payment of income tax this difference had 
been halved. Ever married men who spent more than 20 years in families with 
dependent children had the highest annualised disposable incomes, some 12 per cent 
higher than those of never married men, who received the lowest place. Again, the 
degree of dispersion of annualised disposable incomes by marital and child status was 
lower than that for women, as married women with no children received annualised 
disposable incomes some 27 per cent higher than those of married women with three 
or more children.
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Figure 6.11: Annualised Lifetime Original, Gross and Disposable Incomes of 
Men by Lifetime Family Status
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MARITAL AND CHILD STATUS *
* The categories are from left: never married; ever married with no dependent children; ever married with 
1 to 14 years spent in a family with dependent children present; ever married with 15 to 20 years spent with 
dependent children and ever married with 21 or more years with dependent children present.
Taking Account of Family Circumstances
The picture changes dramatically, however, once account is taken of family 
circumstances. Ever married women without children enjoyed the highest incomes, 
both when personal annualised disposable income was used as the yardstick and 
when the income measure was broadened to take account of income sharing between 
couples or extended again to take account of dependent children and economies of 
scale. The relative rankings of other women changed greatly, however, once family 
circumstances were taken into account, as summarised in Figure 6.12.
836901^934
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Figure 6.12: Annualised Lifetime Disposable, Shared and Equivalent Incomes of 
Women as a Percentage of the Incomes of Ever Married Women Without 
Children
ncome as % of Income of Married Women Without Children
100-
Disposable Inc Shared Income Equivalent Inc
Income Concept
Marital and Child Status 
®  « MM. 0 CH -  - N.M. 1+ CH • • MflR, 1-2 CH — • MfiR, 3+ CH
Note: The legend categories are from left: never married wtihout children; never married with children; ever 
married with one or two children and ever married with three or more children.
While never married women with children occupied second place in the income 
distribution ladder when annualised disposable income was considered, their relative 
position slipped when shared disposable income was used (as they had no other adult 
whose income they could share in) and dropped sharply when equivalent income was 
used. Thus, once their sole support of their children was taken into account, never 
married women with children suffered the lowest lifetime standard of living of any of 
the groups considered, with an annualised equivalent income which was only 80 per 
cent of that enjoyed by married women without children. Never married women 
without children also fared poorly, once their lack of access to the higher income of
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a husband was recognised, with their equivalent annualised income amounting to just 
over 85 per cent of that of married women without children.
Conversely, the low personal incomes of married women with children were partly 
offset by their presumed sharing in the incomes of their husbands, so that their shared 
disposable incomes were substantially higher than their personal disposable incomes. 
However, once the additional children whom this income had to support were 
considered, their position deteriorated, although for those with only one or two children 
the decline was not as marked. In contrast, the annualised equivalent incomes of 
ever married women with three or more children were only slightly higher than those 
of never married women without children and were only some 87 per cent of the 
equivalent incomes achieved by married women without children.
The relative positions of men also changed greatly once the impact of family 
circumstances was incorporated. While married men who spend more than 20 years 
in a family with dependent children had the highest annualised disposable incomes, 
their standard of living dropped precipitously once their dependents were considered, 
so that both their shared and equivalent incomes were lower than any of the other 
categories of men (Figure 6.13). Ultimately, their annualised equivalent incomes 
reached only 85 per cent of those enjoyed by ever married men without children. The 
relative position of ever married men who spend 15 to 20 years in a family with 
dependent children also declined, although not as sharply, with their annualised 
equivalent incomes amounting to just over 90 per cent of those won by ever married 
males without children.
The equivalent incomes of never married men and married men who spent one to 14 
years in a family with dependent children were similar, averaging some 93 per cent 
of the incomes of their married counterparts without children. This suggests that the 
adverse effect of having to share income with a spouse was therefore more than 
offset for married men without children by the income of that spouse. In addition, it
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Figure 6.13: Annualised Lifetime Disposable, Shared and Equivalent Incomes of 
Men as a Percentage of the Incomes of Ever Married Men Without Children
ncome as % of Income of Married Male Without Children105-
100-
123
Shared Income 
Income Concept
Equivalent, Inc
Marital and Child Status
-  - NEVER MRR -  - MRR, 1-14 - - MRR, 15-20 ■»—  MRR, 21+
Note: The legend categories are from left: never married; married with 1 to 14 yrs with dependent children; 
ever married with 15 to 20 yrs with children and ever married with more than 20 yrs with children.
should be emphasised that the groups do not have the same characteristics, so that 
the males within each family group differ by more than just their family status.
6.4 LIFETIME INCOME BY UNEMPLOYMENT 
STATUS
In the model, the number of years in which more than one hour of unemployment was 
experienced was recorded, and all cohort members can thus be categorised by the 
number of years during their lifetimes when they experienced any unemployment.
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Males
As Table 6.8 demonstrates, there were not marked differences in the number of 
lifetime hours spent in the labour force for men with different unemployment 
experiences. There were, however, major differences in the percentage of those 
hours spent unemployed rather than employed. For example, for men who 
experienced unemployment in more than 10 years of their lives, almost 10,000 hours 
were spent unemployed, compared to some 2000 hours for those who experienced 
unemployment in only one to five years of their lives. As a result, annualised earnings 
declined with increasing years of unemployment, from around $18,600 during each 
year of adult life for those males who never experienced any unemployment, to only 
$13,000 for those males who experienced any unemployment in more than 10 years.
Figure 6.14 shows the annualised original, gross and disposable incomes of males 
ranked by years of unemployment experienced. The amount of unemployment and 
sickness benefit received increased for males with greater years of unemployment, 
from $95 on average during each year of adult life for those with between one and five 
years of unemployment to $390 per year for those with more than 10 years of 
unemployment. Unemployment benefit in Australia does not approach earnings 
replacement rates, so that such benefits did relatively little to counteract the lower 
original incomes of the chronically unemployed. Consequently, while the annualised 
original incomes of men who never experienced any unemployment were 1.53 times 
greater than those of men who experienced unemployment in more than 10 years of 
their lives, their annualised gross incomes were still 1.47 times greater. The cash 
transfer system thus did relatively little to offset the disadvantage experienced by the 
chronically unemployed.
The income tax system had a greater impact in equalising the incomes of those with 
different unemployment characteristics, as Figure 6.15 also illustrates. While the 
gross incomes of those who experienced unemployment in more than 10 years of their
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Table 6.7: Average Lifetime Income and Tax Measures by Lifetime 
Unemployment Status for Males
No. of Years in Which Any Hours of Unemployment Experienced
Measure 0
(n=723)
1 to 5 
(n=636)
6 to 10 
(n=391)
11 + 
(n=231)
1. TOTAL LIFETIME MEASURES
- total earnings 1,064,855 857,710 881,445 746,605
- ORIGINAL INCOME 1,233,065 956,445 981,460 808,790
- GROSS INCOME 1,268,370 996,115 1,030,330 868,580
- DISPOSABLE INCOME 865,285 722,485 747,600 659,990
- EQUIVALENT INCOME 1,258,695 1,088,380 1,126,585 1,020,815
- Hours in labour force 87,765 87,570 91,300 89,685
- Hours unemployed 0 1,995 5,100 9,870
2. ANNUAUSED LIFETIME MEASURES (i.e. divided by years of life -15)
- Earnings 18,560 15,220 14,915 12,885
- ORIGINAL INCOME 21,260 16,850 16,525 13,900
- Benefit 0 95 215 390
- Total Cash Transfers 525 620 765 955
- GROSS INCOME 21,785 17,470 17,290 14,855
- Income Tax Paid 6,930 4,810 4,750 3,585
- DISPOSABLE INCOME 14,855 12,660 12,540 11,270
- Shared family income 12,625 11,085 11,000 10,200
- EQUIVALENT INCOME 21,520 18,930 18,815 17,390
- Equiv. income (60:40 split) 23,935 21,135 21,005 19,530
3. AVERAGE MEASURES
- Years of life 73.7 72.5 75.1 74.3
- Av. years in labour 
force 43.5 43.1 44.8 44.9
- Av. years any unemp. expe­
rienced (>1 hr per yr) 0 3.1 7.7 14.7
- Av. hrs. in labour force 
during yrs. in lab. force 2015 2030 2035 2000
- Av. hrs. employed per year 
employed 2015 1978 1920 1775
- Average lifetime hourly 
wage rate $12.15 $10.05 $10.25 $9.40
All income figures rounded to nearest $5. Totals may not sum due to rounding.
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Figure 6.14: Comparison of Annualised Lifetime Original, Gross and Disposable 
Incomes by Sex and Lifetime Unemployment Status
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lives were less than 70 per cent of those who were never unemployed, their 
disposable incomes were about 76 per cent of those of the never unemployed. Once 
account was taken of income sharing within families, the living standards of males 
showed less variation by unemployment status, with the annualised equivalent 
incomes of the chronically unemployed amounting to slightly more than 80 per cent 
of those of never unemployed males.
The relatively minor differences between the incomes of those males who experienced 
between one and five years of unemployment and those who experienced 
unemployment in six to 10 years of their lives are surprising, and appear to be due 
to stochastic factors. Those in the six to 10 years of unemployment category had 
slightly higher hourly wage rates than those in the one to five years category, and also 
spent slightly more hours in the labour force; these differences were sufficient to 
almost offset the negative financial impact of the additional hours they spent with low 
incomes while unemployed. This emphasises again that those in each unemployment 
category are not matched samples who only differ in the number of years they 
experience unemployment; those in each group also differ in many other respects, 
such as the number of years they survive and in their educational status.
Females
For women, additional years of unemployment were also associated with lower 
earnings and lower original incomes (Table 6.9). Although women received higher 
cash transfers than men, this was due to their higher receipt of pensions and child 
transfers rather than benefits. The average amount of unemployment and sickness 
benefit received by women was lower than that for men, with those who experienced 
unemployment in more than 10 years during their working lives receiving only $140 
on average during each year of adult life in benefit, compared to the $390 received 
by men in the same unemployment status category. This was partly due to 
unemployment benefit being paid to the male in married couples and partly due to
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Figure 6.15: Annualised Lifetime Original, Gross, Disposable and Equivalent 
Incomes by Unemployment Status as a Percentage of the Incomes of the Never 
Unemployed by Sex
MALES
Income as % of Income of Never Unemployed Men
100-
Original Income Disposable Inc Equivalent Inc
Income Concept 
Years of Unemployment Experienced 
“ S™ 1 to 5 yrs ■ X 6 to 10 yrs ■ ¥■ 11+ yrs
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Income as % of Income of Never Unemployed Women
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Table 6.8: Average Lifetime Income and Tax Measures by Lifetime 
Unemployment Status for Females
No. of Years in Which Any Hours of Unemployment Experienced
Measure
00 
o 
Is- 
CD 
IIc
1 to 5 
(n=687)
6 to 10 
(n=446)
11 +  
(n=177)
1. TOTAL LIFETIME MEASURES 
- total earnings 594,705 470,780 452,465 407,990
- ORIGINAL INCOME 769,700 603,765 576,800 509,010
- GROSS INCOME 848,345 693,830 672,045 614,540
- DISPOSABLE INCOME 643,600 547,740 537,860 503,620
- EQUIVALENT INCOME 1,197,990 1,096,995 1,089,635 1,054,735
- Hours in labour force 57,825 55,300 57,913 60,450
- Hours unemployed 0 1,955 4,680 8,475
2. ANNUAUSED LIFETIME MEASURES (i.e. divided by years of life - 15)
- Earnings 9,665 7,625 7,210 6,495
- ORIGINAL INCOME 12,270 9,625 9,040 8,035
- Benefits 0 30 80 140
- Total Cash Transfers 1,185 1,365 1,420 1,565
- GROSS INCOME 13,455 10,990 10,460 9,605
- Income tax paid 3,250 2,320 2,105 1,760
- DISPOSABLE INCOME 10,200 8,670 8,355 7,845
* Shared Family Income 11,425 10,460 10,170 9,800
- EQUIVALENT INCOME 19,085 17,340 16,970 16,365
- Equiv. income (60:40 split) 16,810 15,225 16,975 14,410
3. AVERAGE MEASURES
- Years of life 78.0 78.5 79.7 80.1
- Average years in labour 
force 34.6 33.2 34.6 35.8
- Av years any unemp. exper­
ienced (> 1 hr per yr) 0 3.2 7.6 14.1
- Average hrs in labour force 
during years in labour force 1640 1630 1650 1670
- Av hrs employed per year 
employed 1640 1565 1500 1425
- Average lifetime hourly wage 
rate $10.15 $ 8 .7 0 $ 8 .3 5 $7.85
All income figures rounded to nearest $5. Totals may not sum due to rounding.
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more women being barred from receipt of unemployment benefit by the income of 
their spouse.
As Figure 6.14 makes clear, although women who experienced more years of 
unemployment did receive slightly higher cash transfers, this was not sufficient to 
offset their lower original incomes, so that annualised gross income declined sharply 
by unemployment status. (Although, again, it must be emphasised that the never 
unemployed group were better educated than those who experienced unemployment, 
and their resultant higher hourly wage rates also contributed to their higher gross 
incomes.)
As Figure 6.15 illustrates, both cash transfers and income taxes reduced the 
disparities apparent amongst women with different unemployment histories, with the 
annualised disposable incomes of women who experienced any unemployment in 
more than 10 of their working years amounting to about 77 per cent of those received 
by never unemployed women during each year of adult life. The inequalities apparent 
between women by unemployment status were again reduced once account was 
taken of income sharing within the family, with the annualised equivalent incomes of 
women in the 10 or more years category comprising more than 85 per cent of those 
of women who never experienced any unemployment.
6.5 CONCLUSION
There are major differences in lifetime income by educational qualification, with males 
with degrees earning about 1.83 times as much during their entire lifetimes as males 
without any tertiary qualifications and female graduates earning 2.34 times as much 
as females without any tertiary qualifications. These differences are reduced 
somewhat when the longer lifespans of the better educated are considered, with the 
annualised earnings of male and female graduates amounting to 1.76 and 2.18 times
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the incomes of males and females without tertiary qualifications respectively.
Because the less well educated tend to spend less years in the labour force and work 
fewer hours when in the labour force than the better educated, these remaining 
disparities are due in part to differential labour force participation patterns. While it 
is not clear that the greater hours of leisure experienced by the less well educated 
should be regarded as a voluntary choice, an attempt was made to standardise labour 
force participation rates, so that at least the relative magnitude of this effect could be 
better assessed. While the adjustment can only be regarded as very approximate, the 
imputed pre-tax total lifetime earnings of male graduates after standardising for 
different labour force participation patterns were about 1.53 times higher than those 
of males with no tertiary qualifications, while the relevant figure for females was about 
1.36. The enormous difference to the apparent relative advantage of female 
graduates caused by standardising labour force participation patterns suggested that 
studies which did not account for this in calculating rates of return were likely to be 
highly misleading.
Lifetime income and welfare also varied greatly by family status. While women with 
children generally had lower earned, original, gross and disposable incomes than 
those without children, relative rankings changed once account was taken of family 
circumstances. Sole parents who never married had the lowest lifetime standard of 
living, followed by never married women without children. While all married women 
enjoyed higher equivalent incomes on average than never married women, standards 
of living declined with increasing numbers of children. Ever married women without 
children had the highest equivalent income, while ever married women with three or 
more children had the lowest equivalent incomes among married women, and were 
only slightly better off than never married women without children.
The personal original incomes of men showed relatively little variation by marital and 
child status but, after incorporating the effect of family circumstances, the equivalent
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incomes of married men declined with increasing years spent in a family with 
dependent children. Men who never married were not, however, as relatively 
disadvantaged as women who never married, as their annualised equivalent incomes 
exceeded those of ever married males who spent more than 14 years in a family with 
dependent children. For both men and women, the highest lifetime standards of living 
were achieved by marrying but not having children.
Finally, lifetime welfare was also adversely affected by repeated experiences of 
unemployment with, for example, the annualised disposable incomes of males who 
experienced any unemployment in 11 or more years during their lifetimes amounting 
to only 76 per cent of those of males who experienced no unemployment.
This chapter has ranked individuals by various lifetime characteristics and examined 
the differences in their income and lifetime standard of living. In the following chapter 
another tack is taken, with individuals being ranked by their lifetime income, and the 
characteristics and differing fortunes of those with high and low lifetime incomes then 
being analysed.
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CHAPTER 7: THE DISTRIBUTION OF LIFETIME 
INCOME
7.1 INTRODUCTION
While in Chapter 6 those with varying lifetime experiences were identified and their 
lifetime incomes were analysed, this chapter reports the results when individuals 
are ranked by the amount of equivalent income they receive during their lifetimes, 
and the differing characteristics of those with high and low lifetime standards of 
living are examined. While any of the various lifetime income and tax measures 
available in the model could be used to rank individuals, equivalent income has 
been selected as the measure which best encapsulates lifetime welfare.
If equivalent lifetime income was not used to rank individuals then, for example, a 
never married male with a lifetime income of half a million dollars would be 
regarded as having achieved the same lifetime standard of living as another male 
with the same total lifetime income who for 20 years supported a non-working 
spouse and four children. Thus, the use of equivalent income to try to improve 
comparisons of welfare is now widely accepted and, for example, is endorsed by 
the British Central Statistical Office, who now rank all households by equivalent 
income in their yearly analyses of fiscal incidence in the UK (CSO,1990).
It should be appreciated, however, that no equivalence scale can capture fully the 
differences in the needs of various types of income units due to their differing 
circumstances. Most equivalence scales do not, for example, allow for the possible 
differences in income required by families with severely disabled members. There 
is also extensive debate about whether equivalence scales applicable to low 
income families are equally applicable to high income families and about how to 
measure accurately the differences in income required by those in different
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circumstances (Whiteford,1985). Despite these problems, equivalent income is 
now widely used in cross-sectional income distribution studies to rank different 
types of income units (eg. Kakwani, 1986; O’Higgins et al, 1981, 1988). The 
alternative of assuming that those with the same monetary income but very 
different needs have the same standard of living is seen as even more 
unacceptable.
As discussed in Chapter 5, it is also not immediately obvious how to make sense 
of lifetime income measures. If the income received by an individual in every year 
of life is summed, and the population is then divided into deciles of total lifetime 
income, many of those in the lowest income decile will simply be those who died 
at a younger age. Their lower lifetime incomes will thus reflect the reduced 
number of years in which they earned income, rather than necessarily pointing to 
a low lifetime standard of living. Measures of tax and transfer incidence will be 
similarly distorted as, for example, those who died early will have received no age 
pension, and the transfer system might therefore falsely appear to be regressive.
To circumvent these problems, the incomes received by the cohort in every year 
of life were summed and then annualised lifetime income measures were derived, 
as discussed earlier, by dividing the various lifetime totals by years of life minus 
15. However, when the cohort were ranked by their annualised lifetime equivalent 
incomes, those with higher annualised incomes tended to be those who died at an 
earlier age (although the trend was not very marked for men). Because those who 
died soon after retirement did not experience a substantial number of years of low 
post-retirement income, those with higher annualised lifetime incomes tended to 
be those who died while still comparatively young and, conversely, those with lower 
annualised lifetime incomes tended to be those whose lifetime original incomes
i
were spread over more years because they died at a later age. This trend is 
illustrated in Tables 7.1 to 7.4 where, particularly for women, higher annualised 
incomes are associated with shorter lifespans.
This effect could be a result of using the government-endorsed equivalence scale
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implicit in the Australian social security system in 1990. As the social security 
system does not assume that needs decrease with age (and thus, for example, a 
single invalid pensioner aged 40 is paid the same rate as a single age pensioner 
aged 70), the equivalence scale derived from it does not differentiate by age. 
Similarly, the costs of work (eg. travel, clothing) are not explicitly incorporated into 
rates of payment made under the social security system so that, even though the 
income test might differ by source of income, an equivalence scale derived from 
the social security rate structure does not differentiate by labour force status.
There is no universally accepted up-to-date equivalence scale for Australia which 
takes account of the number and age of children, the number and age of adults, 
and the labour force status of all adults in the income unit. However, the standard 
costs scales developed by Henderson in the 1970s, based upon 1954 New York 
expenditure data, have been widely used in the past in Australia (1975). Although 
it is not clear how relevant these scales are to Australia in the 1990s, the scales 
can nonetheless be used to construct an equivalence scale which incorporates 
differences in costs by age and labour force status (although many would question 
the desirability of an equivalence scale which assumed that elderly people had 
fewer needs than younger people simply because of their age).
Consequently, tests were carried out to examine the effects of using a significantly 
different equivalence scale upon the results, and to see whether the use of the 
Henderson scales would eliminate the phenomenon of lower lifespans being 
correlated with higher annualised equivalent income. In the event, the scales 
introduced the reverse phenomenon of increases in lifespan for women being 
associated with higher equivalent income. Consequently, in all of the following 
analysis the equivalence scale used is that implicit in the 1990 social security 
system. This equivalence scale is very similar to the DHSS equivalence scale 
used by the British Central Statistical Office to rank families (CSO,1990), and 
further sensitivity analysis using this DHSS scale therefore produced results very 
similar to those using the Australian social security scale. While sensitivity analysis 
conducted in fiscal incidence studies by Kakwani (1986) and the British CSO
/
(1987) suggested that it was the use of an equivalence scale which profoundly 
affected the results rather than the precise scale used, this result has been 
disputed by Buhman et al (1988), and it should therefore be recognised that use 
of a markedly different equivalence scale might appreciably change the results.
Sections 7.2 and 7.3 describe the patterns of income distribution and redistribution 
found when first males and then females are divided into deciles of annualised 
lifetime equivalent income. Section 7.4 broadens the analysis to take account of 
presumed income sharing within the family unit, and discusses how the marked 
differences between the personal incomes of men and women are attenuated once 
family circumstances are considered. Section 7.5 briefly discusses the lifetime 
income distribution for the cohort as a whole.
7.2 THE LIFETIME INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF 
MALES
As one might expect, higher lifetime original (ie. pre-tax, pre-transfer) incomes are 
the product of higher earnings, greater investment income and increased access 
to occupational superannuation, with investment income being much more 
unequally distributed across income deciles than earnings, and the distribution of 
superannuation income being highly skewed towards those in the top three deciles 
of lifetime income (Table 7.1).
These trends are reflected in Figure 7.1, which shows the composition of 
annualised lifetime gross income by quintile groups, ranked by annualised lifetime 
equivalent income. For the bottom 20 per cent of males, cash transfers contribute 
an average 10 per cent of gross income during each year of adult life, and 
earnings almost all of the remainder. For the top quintile, earnings are relatively 
less important, cash transfers almost non-existent, and investment income and 
superannuation together make up almost 20 per cent of annualised gross income.
Table 7.1: Annualised Lifetime Income Characteristics of Decile Groups of Men, Ranked by Deciles of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent
Disposable Income
MEASURE
DECILE OF ANNUALISED LIFETIME EQUIVALENT DISPOSABLE INCOME
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average
Earnings 6,840 8,890 10,940 12,385 13,715 15,445 16,945 19,580 23,430 32,785 16,105
Investment income 200 300 445 470 650 1,050 1,180 2,020 2,885 5,740 1,495
Superannuation 0 5 0 5 30 80 125 375 1,115 2,745 450
ORIGINAL INCOME 7,040 9,200 11,385 12,860 14,400 16,575 18,250 21,975 27,435 41,270 18,050
Invalid pension 45 40 25 15 5 10 5 15 5 5 15
Age pension 665 785 750 680 570 470 420 250 115 25 475
Unemployment and other benefits 230 185 140 145 140 140 120 110 95 50 135
Education transfers 45 35 30 25 25 25 30 30 20 15 20
TOTAL CASH TRANSFERS* 985 1,040 945 860 740 650 575 405 235 100 655
GROSS INCOME 8,025 10,240 12,335 13,720 15,140 17,220 18,825 22,380 27,675 41,370 18,705
Income tax paid 1,110 1,745 2,400 3,005 3,595 4,375 5,130 6,690 9,300 16,890 5,430
DISPOSABLE INCOME 6,915 8,495 9,935 10,720 11,545 12,845 13,695 15,690 18,375 24,480 13,275
Shared disposable income (family unit) 5,985 7,550 8,595 9,500 10,320 11,220 12,225 13,565 15,525 20,740 11,525
Equivalent disposable income (family unit) 10,050 12,795 14,530 16,140 17,600 19,115 20,905 23,265 26,750 35,505 19,675
Equiv income - 60:40 split within couples 11,205 14,290 16,340 18,075 19,970 21,425 23,420 25,940 29,945 38,745 21,945
Lifetime education services income # 38,610 36,960 39,320 40,660 42,745 41,585 40,290 42,740 43,105 44,895 41,360
*  Includes small amount of child transfers (family allowance and sole parents pension for male sole parents). # This is the total amount of education services income received during the entire 
lifetime (ie. it has not been annualised). All income figures rounded to nearest $5. Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Table 7.2: Other Characteristics of Decile Groups of Men, Ranked by Deciles of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Disposable Income
DECILE OF ANNUALISED LIFETIME EQUIVALENT DISPOSABLE INCOME 
MEASURE ________________________________________________________________________________________________
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average
1. LABOUR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS
Av years in labour force (gt one hr per yr) 39.7 43.4 42.9 43.8 44.4 44.7 44.6 44.0 45.0 45.2 43.8
Av years any unemployment experienced (> 1 hr per yr) 5.5 5.1 4.0 4.4 4.9 4.5 4.0 3.8 3.7 2.1 4.2
Av years worked full-time full year 31.3 34.2 34.6 35.5 35.8 36.2 36.4 36.3 36.6 36.5 35.3
Av years of self-employment 13.6 11.8 9.3 8.6 8.8 8.6 8.2 7.2 8.4 10.2 9.5
Total hours in l.f. during lifetime 80743 86931 86679 88674 90084 90680 90589 89391 91255 91198 88624
Av hours in labour force 1996 1999 2018 2030 2030 2034 2030 2031 2032 2025 2022
during yrs in labour force
Average hours in employment per yr in l.f. 1897 1918 1953 1961 1955 1968 1969 1972 1977 1995 1957
Average hours of unemployment per yr in l.f. 99 81 65 69 75 66 61 69 55 30 65
Average hourly wage rate $5.28 $6.66 $7.61 $8.79 $9.43 $10.24 $11.24 $12.68 $15.10 $20.77 $10.78
2. MARITAL AND CHILD STATUS
Per cent ever married 81 88 86 85 90 86 87 84 89 78 85
Per cent ever divorced 22 33 27 29 29 26 33 31 33 32 29
Av no years with dependent children present 15.7 16.8 16.9 16.8 17.8 16.2 15.9 15.0 15.8 12.8 16.0
Average years married for ever married 40 40 40 41 42 39 39 38 38 34 39
3. EDUCATION
Av years of education 13.5 13.7 13.6 13.9 14.2 14.1 13.9 14.2 14.2 14.7 14.0
Av no of years attended govt schools 9.4 9.5 9.1 9.1 9.1 8.2 8.4 8.8 9.8 8.1 8.9
Av no of years attended private schools 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.8 3.5 3.4 2.3 4.2 3.1
Av years tertiary education 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.1 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.0
Per cent with degree 9.10 9.6 12.1 17.2 19.7 19.2 18.2 23.7 25.3 33.7 18.8
Average years of life 71.6 76.9 74.2 75.7 74.8 73.8 73.5 71.5 72.5 72.5 73.7
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Figure 7.1: Sources of Annualised Lifetime Gross Income for Men, Ranked 
by Quintile Groups of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Disposable Income
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Those males who received sufficient income to place them in the top 10 per cent 
of the distribution received on average about $32,800 in earnings every year, 
around $5,700 in investment income and about $2750 in superannuation 
payments, resulting in an annualised original income of almost $41,300 (Table 7.1). 
In contrast, those males who were placed in the bottom 10 per cent of the income 
distribution averaged only $6850 of earnings, about $200 of investment income and 
no occupational superannuation, leading to a total original income of some $7,000.
The dispersion of earnings for males is shown in Figure 7.2, with just under 30 per 
cent of all males receiving annualised earnings between $10,000 and $15,000 (the 
midpoints of the various earnings ranges are shown on the vertical axis). Some 
70 per cent of all males in the bottom decile received annualised earnings of 
between $5,000 and $10,000 during each year of adult life, and only 10 per cent 
received more than $10,000. In contrast, about one-quarter of males in the top
i »
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Figure 7.2: Frequency Distribution of Annualised Earnings for Males
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decile of annualised equivalent income received annualised earnings of between 
$25,000 and $30,000, and almost 10 per cent received more than $50,000 a year.
As Table 7.2 shows, the higher earned incomes of those in the top half of the 
income distribution were due in part to their higher hourly wage rate, with the 
average hourly lifetime wage rate of $20.75 received by the top decile being almost 
four times higher than the $5.30 averaged by males in the bottom decile. 
However, those in higher income deciles also spent substantially more years in the 
labour force and, when in the labour force, spent significantly more hours in 
employment and fewer hours unemployed. For example, those in the top decile 
averaged 45.2 years in the labour force and 1995 hours of employment during 
each of those years, while those in the bottom decile averaged only 39.7 years in 
the labour force and 1895 hours of employment per year during those years.
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The higher average wage rates received by those at the top of the income 
distribution were associated with more years of education and, in particular, with 
the attainment of a degree. Of all those who gained a degree during their lifetimes, 
only 26 per cent received incomes which placed them in the bottom four income 
deciles, while 44 per cent were in the top three deciles and almost 20 per cent in 
the top decile. For those who achieved only secondary school qualifications, only 
3 per cent reached the top income decile and 17 per cent the top three income 
deciles, while 41 per cent were clustered in the lowest quintile. Those with some 
tertiary qualifications were fairly evenly spread throughout the income distribution.
How did government programs affect this original income distribution ? Cash 
transfers from the government were progressive, and made the gross income 
distribution more equal than the original income distribution. Education and social 
security transfers amounted to 12.2 per cent of the annualised gross income 
received by the lowest income decile, declining to 0.002 per cent for those in the 
highest income decile.
Those with lower lifetime incomes received more in unemployment and other 
benefits, reflecting the greater period of time they spent unemployed. Disability 
also affected lifetime income, with the incidence of severe disability during working 
years and the associated receipt of invalid pension being concentrated upon those 
in the bottom three income deciles.
Average age pension received declined as original income and superannuation 
receipt increased, although those in the lowest income decile averaged somewhat 
lower age pension receipt than those in the next three deciles, apparently as a 
result of their significantly shorter lifespans (71.6 years for those in the lowest 
decile compared to 76.9 years for those in the second decile). The absolute value 
of education transfers showed no definite pattern by income decile, with those in 
the bottom deciles being more likely to receive SAS in respect of their student 
children and those in the top deciles being more likely to recieve TEAS or PGA 
when they were themselves students.
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Income tax payments were also progressive, amounting to 13.8 per cent of the 
annualised gross income of those in the bottom decile and rising to 40.8 per cent 
of the gross income of the top decile. Figure 7.3 shows the absolute amounts of 
annualised taxes paid or transfers received by decile of lifetime annualised 
equivalent income. For example, those in the highest income decile received less 
than $100 a year in transfers but paid out almost $16,900 a year in income tax, 
leaving a net deficit each year of around $16,800.
The variation in the amount of cash transfers by decile is insignificant in 
comparison to that of income tax, with the latter thus having the major impact upon 
reducing the variance of incomes. As Figure 7.3 demonstrates, even for the lowest 
income decile, average taxes paid exceeded average transfers received, in 
marked contrast to the results derived from ’snapshot’ cross-section studies of tax- 
transfer incidence.
Figure 7.3: Amount of Annualised Lifetime Cash Transfers Received and 
Income Tax Paid by Men, Ranked by Deciles of Annualised Lifetime 
Equivalent Income
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These effects are also captured in Figure 7.4, which shows how the dispersion of 
incomes is reduced at each stage of the tax-transfer system. For example, at the 
original income stage shown at the left hand side of the graph, the annualised 
original income of the top quintile of $34,000 is some 4.2 times greater than the 
$8,000 received each year on average by the bottom quintile. After adding any 
cash transfers received to their original income, this dispersion is narrowed 
somewhat, with the annualised gross income of the top quintile being about 3.8 
times the gross income received by the bottom quintile. Income taxes have a 
much greater impact, with the disposable incomes of the top quintile falling to just 
over $21,000, about 2.8 times more than the annualised disposable income 
received each year by those in the bottom quintile.
Figure 7.4: The Effect of Cash Transfers and Income Tax Upon the Lifetime 
Income Distribution of Men, Ranked by Quintile Groups of Annualised 
Lifetime Equivalent Income.
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The impact of the tax-transfer system upon the income distribution can also be 
graphically illustrated using Lorenz curves, which plot the cumulative share of 
income against the cumulative share of households. The curve representing 
complete equality of income is thus a diagonal line from the bottom left hand 
corner of the graph to the top right hand corner: the more unequal the distribution 
of income, the more the Lorenz curve sags down away from the line of complete 
equality.
As Figure 7.5 shows, both lifetime transfers and taxes were progressive, as the 
distribution of disposable income was much more equal than the distribution of 
gross income, which was in turn more equal than the distribution of original 
income. For example, the share of original income received by men in the bottom 
10 per cent of all men, ranked by amount of original income received, was only 3.2 
per cent; after the receipt of transfers this share had increased to 3.7 per cent of 
gross income and, after the payment of income taxes, to 4.5 per cent of disposable 
income. Similarly, the share of income accruing to the highest income recipients 
was sharply reduced by the tax-transfer system. While the top 10 per cent of 
males received 24.5 per cent of original income, they gained only 23.7 per cent of 
gross income and 19.5 per cent of disposable (ie. post tax-transfer) income.
The imputed value of total (not annualised) income received from use of pre­
school, primary and secondary school and tertiary education rose as lifetime 
income increased (Table 7.1). As shown in Table 7.2, those in higher deciles were 
more likely to attend private schools which, as discussed in Chapter 5, received 
a lower government subsidy than public primary and secondary schools. However, 
the lower education outlays received by those in higher income deciles while they 
were in primary and secondary school were more than offset by the imputed value 
of the tertiary education they received later in life. While the distribution of dollar 
education outlays was thus slightly pro-rich, the incidence of such transfers was 
still progressive, as they amounted to a smaller proportion of gross income for 
those in higher income deciles (see Harding, 1984:19-22 for a fuller discussion 
of the difference between distribution and incidence).
Figure 7.5: Lorenz Curves of Annualised Lifetime Original, Gross and 
Disposable income for Men.
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Note: Unlike the tables above, where individuals were ranked only once by their annualised equivalent 
incomes, individuals are re-ranked to produce each of the above Lorenz curves. To derive the Lorenz 
curve for original income all individuals are ranked by their original income, while to construct the Lorenz 
curve for disposable income all individuals are first ranked by their disposable income.
Although marital and child status seemed to have less impact upon men’s lifetime 
income than education and labour force participation, it was notable that among 
those in the top decile only 78 per cent had ever married; for those who did marry 
the average number of years married was 34; and that the average number of 
years spent in a family with dependent children present was only 12.8. All of these 
were the lowest figures recorded for any decile.
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7.3 THE LIFETIME INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF 
FEMALES
Women’s annualised lifetime earnings were about half of those of men, and the 
relative gap between the average earnings of the top and bottom deciles was 
slightly lower, with the top decile earning 4.6 times as much a year on average as 
the bottom decile (Table 7.3). Women’s earnings were also less dispersed, as a 
comparsion of Figures 7.6 and 7.2 demonstrates, with about 40 per cent of all 
women receiving annualised lifetime earnings of between $5000 and $10,000 a 
year (the midpoints of the various earnings ranges are shown in Figure 7.6). 
Almost one-third of women in the top decile of annualised lifetime equivalent 
income received earnings of between $10,000 and $15,000 a year, with just under 
10 per cent receiving more than $25,000 a year. In marked contrast, about 90 per 
cent of women in the bottom decile received average earnings of less than $5000 
during each year of adult life.
Investment income and superannuation were again more unequally distributed than 
earnings. The absolute amount of maintenance income recevied showed no clear 
pattern by decile, with those in the middle of the income spectrum tending to 
receive higher average amounts of maintenance.
As Figure 7.7 illustrates, cash transfers were a much more important source of 
lifetime income for women than for men, amounting to almost 30 per cent of gross 
income for women whose annualised lifetime equivalent income placed them in the 
bottom quintile. In contrast, they comprised a negligible proportion of the gross 
income received during each year of adult life for women in the top quintile. 
Despite the lower absolute amounts of investment income received by women, 
such income was a more significant component of their gross income than for men, 
because of the substantially lower earned incomes of women. The relative 
contribution made by superannuation was also more equal by quintile for women, 
reflecting their receipt of such pensions upon the death of their husbands.
Table 7.3: Annualised Lifetime Income Characteristics of Decile Groups of Women, Ranked by Deciles of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent
Disposable Income
DECILE OF ANNUALISED LIFETIME EQUIVALENT DISPOSABLE INCOME
MEASURE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average
Earnings 3,260 4,555 5,390 6,260 6,545 8,365 9,790 10,230 11,750 15,110 8,125
Investment income 330 510 530 745 925 1,535 1,870 2,740 3,550 5,180 1,790
Superannuation 45 30 80 230 215 220 275 345 590 885 290
Maintenance 20 40 25 50 60 55 65 30 40 45 45
ORIGINAL INCOME 3,655 5,130 6,025 7,285 7,745 10,180 11,995 13,345 15,940 21,220 10,255
Invalid pension 30 5 45 20 1 5 10 5 5 0 15
Age pension 870 1,240 1,150 1,090 1,020 920 770 510 400 175 815
Sole parents pension 460 420 355 295 290 205 160 165 105 105 255
Unemployment and other benefits 65 55 55 45 55 45 45 40 40 30 50
Child transfers (FA, FIS) 165 195 170 170 185 170 175 160 160 150 175
Education transfers 40 45 35 40 35 30 25 30 20 20 25
TOTAL CASH TRANSFERS 1,630 1,955 1,815 1,660 1,590 1,370 1,180 910 735 480 1330
GROSS INCOME 5,285 7,085 7,840 8,945 9,330 11,550 13,180 14,250 16,670 21,700 11,585
Income tax paid 520 865 1,080 1,430 1,570 2,250 2,970 3,380 4,475 6,850 2,540
DISPOSABLE INCOME 4,765 6,220 6,765 7,515 7,765 9,300 10,210 10,875 12,195 14,850 9,050
Shared disposable income (family unit) 5,925 7,475 8,230 8,980 9,790 10,635 11,570 12,460 14,105 17,460 10,665
Equivalent disposable income (family unit) 9,575 12,065 13,410 14,750 16,120 17,585 19,205 21,070 23,925 29,910 17,765
Equivalent income - 60:40 split within couples 8,540 10,755 12,005 13,105 14,145 15,515 16,865 18,375 20,995 26,060 15,640
Lifetime education services income 36,920 39,085 38,075 39,790 40,180 42,630 42,220 42,570 41,730 43,915 40,710
All income figures rounded to nearest $5. Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Table 7.4: Other Characteristics of Decile Groups of Women, Ranked by Deciles of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Disposable Income
DECILE OF ANNUALISED LIFETIME EQUIVALENT DISPOSABLE INCOME 
MEASURE ___________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 9  10 Average
1. LABOUR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS
Av years in labour force 28.5 30.1 31.2 33.2 33.2 37.3 37.1 36.5 36.3 38.5 34.2
Av years unemployment experienced 5.5 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.5 3.8 4.1 3.7 3.5 2.8 4.1
Av years worked full-time full year 15.6 16.4 18.4 19.6 20.0 23.3 23.0 22.7 23.2 24.9 20.7
Av years of self-employment 5.7 4.2 4.2 4.7 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.9 5.3
Total hours in l.f. during lifetime 46027 48271 51400 54942 55417 63109 62386 61990 61925 66582 57,205
Average hours in labour force 1571 1564 1605 1627 1646 1673 1659 1678 1681 1709 1640
during yrs in labour force 
Average hours in employment per yr in l.f. 1438 1467 1520 1541 1558 1610 1588 1616 1619 1659 1560
Average hours of unemployment per yr in l.f. 133 97 85 86 88 63 71 62 62 50 80
Average hourly wage rate $5.35 $6.66 $7.06 $7.74 $7.88 $8.89 $10.32 $10.45 $12.11 $13.88 $9.05
2. MARITAL AND CHILD STATUS
Per cent ever married 85 89 86 89 94 91 92 94 93 95 91
Per cent ever divorced 29 31 31 35 34 31 33 26 24 30 32
Per cent ever sole parents 23 28 25 33 28 24 27 21 16 23 25
Av no of years with dependent children present 19.6 20.5 19.3 19.4 20.4 19.1 19.7 18.2 18.3 18.4 19.4
Av no of children born 1.87 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.8
Av years married for those ever married 37 35 33 36 36 36 38 38 38 37 37
Av yrs of sole parenthood for sole parents 9.3 9.3 9.2 7.7 8.9 8.1 8.2 8.7 7.5 7.4 8.4
3. EDUCATION
Average years of education 13.2 13.6 13.5 13.8 13.7 14.2 14.1 14.2 14.0 14.4 13.9
Av no of years attended govt schools 9.9 9.2 9.0 8.7 8.6 9.2 9,1 8.6 8.8 8.2 8.9
Av no of years attended private schools 2.2 2.9 3.0 3.4 3.4 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.2 4.0 3.1
Av years tertiary education 2.1 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.0 2.9 3.1 2.9 3.1 2.7
Per cent with degree 7.1 11.1 12.1 12.1 21.1 24.0 23.1 24.1 23.6 29.1 18.6
Average years of life 81.6 80.4 78.2 79.7 79.1 79.3 78.3 76.8 77.8 76.5 78.8
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Figure 7.6: Frequency Distribution of Annualised Lifetime Earnings for 
Females
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Figure 7.7: Sources of Annualised Lifetime Gross Income for Women,
Ranked by Quintile Groups of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Disposable 
Income
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To an even greater extent than was apparent for men, the variation in the lifetime 
earnings of women resulted from different labour force participation patterns (Table 
7.4). Women in the bottom decile averaged only 28.5 years of labour force 
participation, compared with 38.5 years for women in the top decile. Hours of 
employment once in the labour force also showed greater variation, with the 1,660 
hours per year averaged by women in the top decile being 15 per cent higher than 
the 1,440 hours averaged by women in the bottom decile. Although still an 
important contributor to lifetime earnings inequality, the hourly wage rate of women 
showed less dispersion than that of men, with hourly earnings ranging from $5.35 
for those in the bottom decile to around $13.90 for those in the top decile.
Education was also a significant factor affecting lifetime earnings, with increased 
lifetime income being associated with greater attendance at private schools, more 
years of tertiary education and, in particular, the gaining of a degree. Sixteen per 
cent of those who gained a degree achieved the top equivalent income decile while 
only 16 per cent were placed in the bottom five deciles. Amongst those who had 
only gained secondary school qualifications, only 4 per cent made the top income 
decile and 39 per cent were in the bottom quintile. Those with some tertiary 
education were again spread quite evenly across the income spectrum.
Average cash transfers received by women were about double those received by 
men and were again highly progressive, amounting to 30.8 per cent of gross 
income for those in the lowest income decile and declining to 2.2 per cent of gross 
income for those in the top decile. For women, characteristics such as being 
severely disabled and potentially eligible for an invalid pension or being. 
unemployed were less likely to result in receipt of pension or benefit than for men, 
because the income of husbands more frequently made them ineligible under an 
income test which took the income of both partners into account. Despite this, low 
lifetime income was clearly associated with increased unemployment and higher 
unemployment benefit payments (Table 7.4).
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The amount of sole parent pension received was much higher for women in lower 
deciles. Interestingly, this was not due to those in low income deciles having a 
much greater likelihood of ever experiencing sole parenthood, as the percentage 
ever experiencing sole parenthood did not show a clear trend by income decile but 
fluctuated greatly (Table 7.4). However, amongst those who experienced sole 
parenthood during their lifetimes, an increased number of years spent as a sole 
parent was correlated with reduced lifetime equivalent income. The amount of age 
pension received again declined as occupational superannuation increased, so that 
those in lower income deciles received more age pension.
Income fax was again progressive, amounting to 9.8 per cent of gross income for 
those in the lowest income decile and rising to 31.6 per cent of gross income for 
those in the top decile. Figure 7.8 charts the absolute amount of transfers 
received and income taxes paid by deciles of annualised lifetime equivalent 
income. While even for men in the lowest lifetime equivalent income decile the 
amount of transfers received did not exceed taxes paid, women in the bottom four 
deciles received on average more in transfers during each year of adult life than 
they paid in income tax. Only women whose income was sufficiently high to place 
them in the top half of the lifetime income distribution paid more in taxes than they 
gained from transfers.
Figure 7.9 shows the impact of cash transfers and income tax on the average 
annualised lifetime incomes of women, ranked by quintiles of annualised equivalent 
income. The gap between the average incomes of the top and bottom quintiles 
was reduced by cash transfers, as shown by the narrowing of the gap between the 
top and bottom lines in Figure 7.9 when moving from original to gross income. 
While the annualised lifetime original income of the top quintile was 4.2 times that 
of the bottom quintile, their gross incomes of about $19,000 were only 3.2 times 
greater than those of the lowest quintile. Income taxes further reduced these 
income differentials, so that the average lifetime disposable incomes of the top 
quintile were only 2.5 times those of the bottom quintile.
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Figure 7.8: Amount of Annualised Lifetime Cash Transfers Received and 
Income Tax Paid by Women, Ranked by Deciles of Annualised Lifetime 
Equivalent Income
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Figure 7.9: The Effect of Cash Transfers and Income Tax Upon the Lifetime 
Income Distribution of Women, by Quintile Groups of Annualised Lifetime 
Equivalent Income.
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As the Lorenz curves in Figure 7.10 also indicate, the effect of taxes and transfers 
was to make the income distribution progressively more equal. For example, the 
bottom 10 per cent of women received only 2.3 per cent of annualised original 
income but 3.8 per cent of disposable income, while the top 10 per cent of women 
received 24.9 per cent of original income but only 19.4 per cent of disposable 
income.
Figure 7.10: Lorenz Curves of Annualised Lifetime Original, Gross and 
Disposable Income for Women.
CUMULATIVE % OF ANNUALISED INCOME RECEIVED100
100
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While the marital and child status of men had relatively little effect on their lifetime 
standard of living, for women marital and child status played an important role in 
determining where they would be placed in the lifetime income distribution. As
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discussed in Chapter 6, women’s lifetime equivalent incomes increased with 
marriage and decreased with greater family size. This was again reflected in Table 
7.4, where a lower percentage of women in the bottom income decile had ever 
married compared to women in higher deciles, while women in the top decile were 
the most likely to have ever married but had also borne fewer children.
7.4 TAKING ACCOUNT OF INCOME SHARING 
WITHIN THE FAMILY
While the above analysis has dealt with the personal incomes received by men and 
women, the personal income distribution does not show the standard of living 
achieved by each sex, because it takes no account of income sharing within the 
family unit. As discussed in Chapter 5, shared disposable income shows the 
income distribution which results if income is split equally between adults in 
married couples. As one would expect, taking account of such sharing reduces the 
disposable income of men (Table 7.1) and increases the disposable income of 
women (Table 7.3).
However, a better measure of living standards is provided by equivalent income, 
as it incorporates the effect of both income sharing, the presence of dependent 
children and economies of scale. Once account was taken of presumed income 
sharing between couples, the standard of living of women rose sharply. Although 
the absolute values of equivalent income simply reflect the equivalence scale used, 
the distribution of equivalent income can be validly compared to that of disposable 
income.
As Figure 7.11 demonstrates, the distribution of income, once account is taken of 
needs, is more equal for both men and women than the distribution of personal 
disposable income, with the shift in the Lorenz curves showing the combined effect 
of taking account of income sharing within, and the composition of, the family unit.
2 8 3
Interestingly, while the distribution of disposable income is more unequal amongst 
women than amongst men, the distribution of equivalent income is less unequal 
amongst women than amongst men.
Figure 7.11: Lorenz Curves of the Annualised Lifetime Disposable and 
Equivalent Incomes of Men and Women
CUMULATIVE % OF INCOME RECEIVED
CUMULATIVE % OF MALES OR FEMALES
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In addition, although the lifetime standard of living of men is higher, the disparity 
is much less than a comparison of the personal disposable incomes of men and 
women might suggest. Figure 7.12 contrasts the absolute levels of average 
personal (not shared family) disposable and equivalent income received by women 
in each decile of female annualised lifetime equivalent income with those received 
by men in comparable male deciles. While the average disposable income of 
women in each decile is about 65 to 70 per cent of that of men in the comparable 
male decile of lifetime equivalent income, the equivalent income of women is some 
90 per cent of that of men in comparable deciles.
Figure 7.12: Annualised Lifetime Disposable and Equivalent Incomes of 
Women, Ranked by Deciles of Annualised Equivalent Income, As Percentage 
of Comparable Incomes of Men
WOMEN’S INCOME AS % OF MEN'S
DECILE OF LIFETIME ANNUALISED EQUIVALENT INCOME
|  Disposable §  Equivalent
These results assume, of course, that income is shared equally within the family 
unit. Research by Pahl (1990), Edwards (1981) and Vogler (1989) has suggested 
that this is not always the case, and that women tend to fare less well than men, 
particularly if they are not contributing to earned income. Consequently, the bottom
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lines in Tables 7.1 and 7.3 show the effects of changing the assumption that 
income is equally shared between married couples, instead assuming that income 
is split 60:40 in the husband’s favour (the same Australian government equivalence 
scale is used in both cases).
As expected, assuming less equal sharing of income within the family unit results 
in an increase in the equivalent disposable incomes of men and a decrease in 
women’s incomes. For example, the equivalent income of men ranked in the 
bottom decile of all men rises by about 11 per cent to $11,200 when a 60:40 
income split is assumed, while that of women in the bottom decile of women falls 
by almost 15 per cent to $8540. Thus, if this degree of unequal sharing is 
assumed, the equivalent incomes of women in the bottom decile amount to only 
three-quarters of the income of men in the lowest decile of men - a rather more 
unequal result than the 95 per cent of the incomes of such men shown in Figure 
7.12. This suggests that income distribution might be more sensitive to the 
assumed distribution of income within the family than many economists have 
traditionally appreciated.
7.5 THE DISTRIBUTION OF LIFETIME INCOME 
FOR THE ENTIRE COHORT
While the preceding analysis has examined the lifetime incomes of men and 
women separately, most analyses of income distribution consider the entire 
population. Consequently, this section briefly examines the characteristics of 
lifetime income for the whole of the simulated cohort. Even though the entire 
cohort is ranked by annualised equivalent income, so that the enormous 
differences between the personal incomes of men and women are not as apparent 
as if the cohort was ranked by a measure which did not take account of family 
circumstances, women still tend to be clustered at the bottom of the income 
distribution and men at the top.
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Almost one-quarter of all men were ranked in the top two deciles of annualised 
equivalent income, ^nd 13 per cent of all men were in the top decile. In contrast, 
only 7 per cent of all women scraped into the top decile, while 23 per cent were 
clustered in the bottom quintile. Despite this, men still comprised 43 per cent of 
the bottom decile of annualised equivalent income, and such men amounted to just 
under 9 per cent of all men.
As one would expect, the ’averaging’ of the incomes of men and women means 
that the original, gross and disposable incomes by decile are higher than those 
recorded for women only in Table 7.3 and lower than those achieved by men only 
in Table 7.1. Similarly, average cash transfers are lower and income taxes paid 
by each decile are higher. However, combining the records of men and women 
created greater dispersion of income across deciles, so that the annualised lifetime 
disposable income of the top decile was 3.6 times greater than that of the bottom 
decile.
For the population as a whole, the distribution of annualised lifetime disposable 
income was therefore still very unequal, with the bottom 10 per cent of all 
individuals receiving 3.7 per cent of all such disposable income. The bottom half 
of the income distribution received just under one-third of all annualised lifetime 
disposable income, while the top decile received one-fifth of all such income.
Those in the top decile again tended to spend more years on average participating 
in the labour force, with the bottom decile participating in the labour force for an 
hour or more for only 33.1 years, while for the top decile the comparable figure 
was 42.9 years. Hours worked per year once in the labour force also showed 
great variation, ranging from 1750 hours per year on average for those in the 
bottom decile to 1920 hours for those in the top decile - a difference of about 10 
per cent. Average hourly wage rates also varied greatly, from $5.40 for those in 
the bottom decile to almost $18 an hour for those in the top decile.
Table 7.5: Annualised Lifetime Income Characteristics of the Cohort, Ranked by Deciles of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Disposable
Income
MEASURE
DECILE OF ANNUALISED LIFETIME EQUIVALENT DISPOSABLE INCOME
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average
Earnings 4,785 6,375 7,740 8,860 10,235 11,650 13,240 14,555 17,985 25,640 12,110
Investment income 270 390 560 670 825 1,195 1,670 2,155 3,270 5,430 1,645
Superannuation 25 20 60 150 100 125 195 425 605 2,000 370
ORIGINAL INCOME * 5,085 6,810 8,375 9,720 11,185 13,000 15,135 17,155 21,880 33,090 14,145
Invalid pension 35 25 35 15 10 5 5 15 5 0 15
Age pension 810 1,050 945 910 795 690 555 365 240 70 645
Sole parents pension 255 230 195 160 120 85 75 70 60 30 125
Unemployment and other benefits 140 110 105 90 95 100 80 80 75 50 90
Child transfers (FA, FIS) 95 110 100 100 90 80 85 75 75 50 85
Education transfers 45 40 30 35 25 30 30 25 25 15 30
TOTAL CASH TRANSFERS 1,380 1,565 1,410 1,305 1,135 995 835 625 480 215 995
GROSS INCOME 6,465 8,375 9,785 11,025 12,320 13,995 15,970 17,775 22,360 33,305 15,140
Income tax paid 770 1,210 1,655 2,085 2,550 3,195 4,000 4,785 6,895 12,675 3,980
DISPOSABLE INCOME 5,695 7,165 8,130 8,945 9,770 10,800 11,970 12,990 15,465 20,635 11,160
Shared disposable income (family unit) 5,960 7,500 8,400 9,240 10,060 10,880 11,900 12,925 14,860 19,225 11,095
Equivalent disposable income (family unit) 9,790 12,385 13,895 15,410 16,840 18,360 20,025 22,155 25,310 32,990 18,720
Equivalent inc- 60:40 split within couples 9,690 12,175 13,845 15,300 16,915 18,405 20,030 22,275 25,465 33,735 18,785
Lifetime education services income 37,930 38,725 39,310 40,065 41,500 42,125 42,120 41,115 43,360 44,090 41,035
Average years in labour force 33.1 36.2 36.5 37.8 39.9 41.2 40.6 40.5 40.9 42.9 39.0
Average hours in labour force 1750 1765 1785 1820 1855 1845 1850 1870 1870 1920 1830
Average hours employed 1630 1675 1705 1730 1785 1770 1790 1810 1810 1880 1760
Average hourly wage rate 5.40 6.55 7.35 8.15 8.50 9.65 10.60 11.45 13.50 17.95 9.90
Average years of education 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.8 14.0 14.1 14.1 14.0 14.3 14.5 13.9
Percent female 56.8 58.4 55.9 53.7 50.6 48.4 50.6 45.8 46.3 34.3 50.1
Av no of yrs dependent children present 17.7 19.3 17.9 18.7 18.4 17.9 17.8 16.7 17.6 14.7 17.7
* Includes maintenance. All income figures rounded to nearest $5. Totals may not sum due to rounding.
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Years of education were again strongly correlated with higher lifetime incomes, with 
the top decile undertaking an average 14.5 years of education, compared to the 
average for all males of 13.9 years and for the bottom decile of 13.4 years. The 
adverse impact of children upon lifetime monetary welfare was also apparent, with 
those in the top decile spending only 14.7 years in families with dependent children 
present - well below the population average of 17.7 years.
7.6 CONCLUSION
Even on a lifetime basis, major inequalities in income were apparent. Males in the 
top decile of annualised lifetime equivalent income received almost six times as 
much pre-tax, pre-transfer income during each year of adult life as males in the 
bottom decile, while similar inequalities were observed for females. Higher lifetime 
original incomes were associated with higher earnings and investment income, and 
access to occupational superannuation. These factors were in turn correlated with 
education, family status and patterns of labour force participation.
The top 10 per cent of males, ranked by the amount of annualised original income 
received, gained almost one-quarter of all lifetime original income, while the 
bottom 10 per cent of all males received only three per cent of such income. 
Similarly, the top 10 per cent of females also gained one-quarter of lifetime original 
income, while those in the bottom 10 per cent reaped only two per cent of the total.
Both cash transfers and income taxes were progressive, and helped to offset these 
inequalities in factor income. For example, cash transfers accounted for 12 per 
cent of the average gross income received during each year of adult life by males 
in the top decile of annualised lifetime equivalent income, but declined sharply as 
income increased, to well under one per cent of the gross income of males in the 
top decile of equivalent income.
Average cash transfers received by women were about double those received by
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men, due to the combined effects of payment of child transfers to the mother, 
pensions for sole parents and widows, and greater age pension payments to 
women (due to their longer lifespans). Such transfers were again highly 
progressive, amounting to about 45 per cent of the total income received during 
each year of adult life for women in the bottom decile of annualised lifetime 
equivalent income, but only two per cent of the gross income of those in the top 
decile. Cash transfers thus made the lifetime distribution of income significantly 
more equal.
Income taxes were also progressive, amounting to 14 per cent of the gross income 
of males in the bottom decile of annualised lifetime equivalent income, and 
increasing steadily to reach 41 per cent of gross income for those males in the top 
decile. The average rates paid by women were lower, due to their lower lifetime 
incomes, but still increased from 10 per cent of the gross income of females in the 
bottom decile to 32 per cent of gross income for females in the top decile of 
annualised lifetime equivalent income.
The joint impact of the higher income taxes paid and lower cash transfers received 
by men, resulted in males making a net loss from the operation of the tax-transfer 
system. Even those males in the lowest decile of lifetime equivalent income paid 
slightly more in income taxes every year on average than they received in cash 
transfers. In marked contrast, women in the bottom four deciles of female 
annualised lifetime equivalent income received more in cash transfers during each 
year of adult life than they paid in income tax. Only the top 50 per cent of women 
made a net loss.
The personal incomes received by males during their lifetimes were much higher 
than for females, with the annualised lifetime disposable income for males of 
$13,275 being about one-third higher than the average $9,050 received by 
females. However, once income sharing within families was taken into account, the 
differences between the lifetime standards of living of men and women were much 
less pronounced, with the average annualised equivalent incomes of women
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amounting to 90 per cent of those of men.
This, however, assumed completely equal sharing of income within the family unit, 
and varying the presumed share of family income accruing to women in married 
couples suggested that such conclusions about the relative lifetime welfare of men 
and women were very sensitive to the sharing assumptions adopted. For example, 
if husbands were assumed to receive 60 per cent of the combined income of the 
couple, then the average equivalent income of women fell to only 71 per cent of 
that of men.
The above discussion therefore summarises the results produced by the simulation 
about the distribution and redistribution of lifetime income in Australia. How do 
these results compare to those for annual income ? This is the area to which we 
now turn, in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 8: LIFETIME VS ANNUAL INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION AND REDISTRIBUTION
8.1 INTRODUCTION
In addition to providing a longitudinal profile, the model can be used to provide a 
simulated cross-section sample, by simply using every observation for every year 
of life for cohort members aged 15 and over. The thousands of records in the 
model can therefore be treated as separate observations, rather than as simply 
another year in the lifepath of a given individual. The synthetic cross-section 
population thus created has records for individuals of every age, just as a snapshot 
cross-section survey of the income distribution of a country does. Others involvedf
in lifetime microsimulation modelling have also used this technique to create a 
synthetic annual distribution (Wolfson, 1989b:51; Blinder, 1974; Davies et al, 
1984:51).
However, such a sample (and the inequality measures derived from using it), will 
not be directly comparable to the results of other cross-section surveys of income 
in Australia, because the characteristics of the simulated population will be different 
to those of the current Australian population, in ways which have a major impact 
upon the income distribution. (For example, as shown graphically in Chapter 2, 
because of lower death rates now than in the past, the simulated population 
contains many more over-60 year olds than the 1986 Australian population.)
In addition, most studies use the family or household as the income unit, while in 
the following analysis the individual is used. Many of those who have no income 
of their own, such as dependent teenage students or married women not in the 
labour force, live in families where other members earn income and are assumed 
to share this income. The distribution of family or household income is therefore
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significantly more equal than that of persons.
It is possible to group the individuals in the synthetic cross-section sample into 
nuclear families and then to use the family as the income unit. However, such 
results cannot then be compared to the lifetime results discussed in Chapter 7. As 
individuals move in and out of families and households during their lifetimes, a 
lifetime income distribution using the family as the income unit cannot be 
constructed. The most that can be done to capture the effect of family 
circumstances, as discussed earlier, is either to attribute to married individuals half 
of the joint income of the couple, or to assign to individuals an equivalent income 
which takes full account of the size, composition and income of the family in which 
they live.
In addition, while it would be possible to amend the records included in the 
synthetic cross-section sample (eg. to exclude full time students below a specified 
age who have no other income), for the initial analysis all records of those aged 
15 and over have been included, as these are then exactly the same records as 
those used in the lifetime income profiles and they can thus be directly compared. 
This does mean, however, that many of those in the lowest simulated annual 
income decile are full-time students without income.
In Section 8.2, all the records for every year of life have therefore been treated as 
separate observations, and the resulting population has been ranked into deciles 
of annual equivalent disposable income. The annual income distribution of males 
and then females is first considered, and then the income distribution of all 
individuals is examined. These results thus provide a guide to the inequality of 
annual income, rather than lifetime income.
In Section 8.3 the distributions of lifetime and annual income are compared. The 
Gini indexes for lifetime and annual income, using a number of different concepts 
of income, are examined first. The second part ranks the cohort into deciles of 
annualised lifetime equivalent and annual equivalent income, and examines the
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extent of mobility by constructing transition matrices between the two. The extent 
to which the high or low incomes of those captured in cross-section surveys 
provide a guide to their lifetime welfare is thus examined.
Section 8.4 contrasts the lifetime and annual incidence of taxes and transfers, and 
compares the concentration coefficients of taxes and transfers on a lifetime and 
annual basis. Section 8.5 attempts to derive a clearer picture of the relative 
importance of intra-personal and inter-personal redistribition achieved by taxes and 
transfers, by comparing the distribution of cash transfers by decile with the 
distribution of the income taxes used to finance those cash transfers. Finally, 
Section 8.6 examines the annual and lifetime incidence of education outlays.
8.2 ANNUAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY DECILE
All of the following results use the individual as the income unit, and these results 
can therefore be directly compared to those in the preceding chapter. While the 
income distribution is thus extremely unequal, it is nonetheless conceptually 
comparable to the income distribution which would be obtained, for example, by 
using the person (rather than income unit) records on the 1986 Australian Income 
Distribution Survey (although the actual results would be different because the 
characteristics of the pseudo-cohort are different to those of the 1986 Australian 
population).
The Distribution of Men’s Annual Income
As Figure 8.1 shows, the components of annual income are dramatically different 
to those for lifetime income. When the population are ranked by the amount of 
annual equivalent income received, about half of the income of the bottom quintile 
is derived from social security and education cash transfers, reflecting the large 
numbers of students and age pensioners. Investment income is more evenly
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spread across quintiles, due to the investment income received by the elderly. 
Similarly, rather than being concentrated upon those at the top of the income 
distribution, as was the case with lifetime income, superannuation income is also 
somewhat more equally distributed, as retirees are scattered across the annual 
income deciles.
The composition within each decile is also very different to that apparent for 
lifetime income. Many of those in the bottom annual equivalent income decile are 
full-time students with little or no income, while the aged are concentrated in 
deciles two and three (Table 8.1). The proportion within each decile who are in the 
labour force rises sharply as income increases, from only 37 per cent for the 
bottom decile to 95 per cent for the top. Lifecycle influences upon income are also 
evident, with the aged being concentrated in the bottom third of the income 
distribution, those in their thirties and forties with children in the middle, and those 
in the ’empty nest’ stage of the lifecycle and with fewer children being placed in the 
top deciles (O’Higgins et al, 1988).
The distribution of annual income is far more unequal than that of lifetime income. 
The original income of the top decile is 75 times greater than that of the bottom 
decile and 19 times greater than that of the second bottom decile. Cash transfers 
are extremely progressive and, for example, double the income of the second 
lowest decile, while amounting to a negligible proportion of gross income for the 
top decile. Income taxes are also progressive and, as Figure 8.2 shows, the net 
effect of the tax-transfer system is to raise the income of males in the lowest three 
deciles while substantially reducing the income of the top half of the income 
distribution. For example, the top decile of males receive almost no cash transfers 
but pay almost $19,700 in tax, leaving the net deficit of just under $20,000 shown 
in Figure 8.2.
Figure 8.3 illustrates the impact of taxes and transfers by quintiles of annual 
equivalent income, and shows how the distribution of income is narrowed at each 
stage. Income tax has a much more significant equalising effect than transfers,
Table 8.1: Characteristics of Decile Groups of Men, Ranked by Deciles of Annual Equivalent Income
MEASURE
DECILE OF ANNUAL EQUIVALENT DISPOSABLE INCOME
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average
Earnings 395 2,040 3,670 9,250 14,005 16,785 20,285 23,075 26,935 41,140 15,760
Investment income 235 370 670 910 920 1,105 1,470 1,885 2,340 5,375 1,530
Superannuation 5 45 95 385 375 725 710 705 1,030 1,105 520
ORIGINAL INCOME 635 2,460 4,435 10,540 15,300 18,615 22,465 25,670 30,305 47,620 17,805
Invalid pension 0 95 40 40 15 0 0 0 0 0 20
Age pension 0 2,040 2,440 730 140 95 5 0 5 0 545
Unemployment and other benefits 35 320 335 220 150 95 60 35 20 5 130
Education transfers 70 130 25 15 15 5 5 5 5 0 25
TOTAL CASH TRANSFERS* 105 2,585 2,840 1,005 320 195 70 40 30 10 720
GROSS INCOME 740 5,045 7,270 11,545 15,615 18,810 22,535 25,710 30,330 47,630 18,525
Income tax paid 0 60 525 1,865 3,340 4,610 6,145 7,560 9,860 19,710 5,370
DISPOSABLE INCOME 740 4,985 6,745 9,680 12,275 14,200 16,390 18,150 20,470 27,920 13,155
Shared disposable income (family unit) 770 4,630 5,935 7,805 9,765 11,630 13,685 15,930 18,630 25,705 11,450
Equivalent disposable income (family unit) 1,325 7,865 10,195 12,970 16,165 19,435 22,975 27,095 32,430 45,485 19,595
Equiv inc - 60:40 split 1,445 8,485 11,410 14,775 18,450 21,990 25,865 30,180 36,045 50,165 21,880
Av no dependent children 0.15 0.31 0.42 0.72 0.77 0.66 0.61 0.47 0.32 0.19 0.46
Per cent married 29.9 40.9 59.3 69.5 70.7 65.8 62.9 57.1 55.7 52.7 56.5
Per cent above retirement age 10.7 45.1 53.7 26.4 13.4 13.0 7.4 6.4 6.6 6.5 18.9
Per cent in labour force 36.6 46.0 44.2 72.2 84.4 86.5 92.4 93.8 94.1 95.4 74.6
Average age 36.9 • 54.1 56.5 46.0 42.0 42.9 41.7 42.3 44.3 47.1 45
* Includes child transfers (FA, FIS). All income figures rounded to nearest $5. Totals may not sum due to rounding.
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Figure 8.1: Sources of Annual Gross Income for Men, Ranked by Quintile 
Groups of Annual Equivalent Income
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Figure 8.2: Amount of Cash Transfers Received and Income Tax Paid by 
Men, Ranked by Deciles of Annual Equivalent Income
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due to the smaller magnitude of transfers received relative to taxes paid. While the 
original annual income of the top quintile is about 19 times greater than that of the 
bottom quintile of males, their gross income after the inclusion of cash transfers 
is about 10 times greater, while their average annual disposable income of around 
$25,000 is only about 7 times greater than that of the bottom quintile. As 
comparison with Figure 7.4 demonstrates, this is still a much more unequal 
distribution of income than that for lifetime income, where the annualised lifetime 
disposable income of the top quintile was less than three times greater than that 
of the bottom quintile.
Figure 8.3: The Effect of Cash Transfers and Income Tax Upon the Annual 
Income Distribution of Men, Ranked by Quintile Groups of Annual Equivalent 
Income
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This effect is also illustrated in Figure 8.4, which plots the Lorenz curves of annual 
original, gross and disposable income. The curve tracing the distribution of annual 
original income lies well below the comparable curve for annualised lifetime original
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income plotted in Figure 7.5, and both the annual gross and disposable income 
curves are also well below and to the right of the applicable lifetime curves. While 
the top 10 per cent of males receive 31 per cent of total original income, they 
receive only 24 per cent of total disposable income. Similarly, the bottom 20 per 
cent of males receive less than one per cent of total original income, but 2.7 per 
cent of total disposable income. Figure 8.4 traces the differential impact of taxes 
and transfers very clearly, with the equalising impact of transfers being apparent 
in the significant distance between the curves for original and gross income for 
individuals at the lower end of the income spectrum, but with income taxes having 
a much more important impact at higher income levels.
Figure 8.4: Lorenz Curves of Annual Original, Gross and Disposable Income 
for Men
CUMULATIVE % OF ANNUAL INCOME RECEIVED100'
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The Distribution of Women’s Annual Income
For women in the lowest two quintiles of annual equivalent income, cash transfers 
are extremely important, amounting to 70 per cent of all income received for those 
in the bottom quintile (Figure 8.5). Even though the dollar amount of investment 
income received by women in the lowest quintile is low, their meagre other income 
still makes it an important source of income. The lower earnings of women in all 
deciles makes both investment and superannuation income more significant 
income sources than for men.
Figure 8.5: Sources of Annual Gross Income for Women, Ranked by Quintile 
Groups of Annual Equivalent Income
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Those who have retired are clustered in the lower four deciles of annual equivalent 
income, and they receive minimal earned incomes and higher than average age 
pension (Table 8.2). Sole parents are also concentrated in the lower half of the
99999
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income distribution, while those in the middle deciles tend to be married women, 
many of whom have children (Table 8.2). As a result, the average amount of 
family allowance and FIS received is highest for those in the middle deciles. 
Students with little or no other income are clustered in the bottom decile.
As one would expect, given the lifetime results, women receive much more benefit 
from the social security system than men. Although on an annual basis women 
receive less in unemployment and sickness benefits than men (partly because 
these benefits are paid to the husband in married couples), they receive higher 
amounts of age pension on average (because of their lower original incomes and 
also because more are single) and higher sole parents pension and child related 
transfers. Because of their lower incomes, women also pay less income tax than 
men.
As a result, the profile of net gain or loss from the tax-transfer system is very 
different for women than for men, as comparison of Figures 8.2 and 8.6 shows. 
While men in the top 70 per cent of the male income distribution incur a net loss 
from the combined effect of the tax-transfer system, only the top 50 per cent of 
women make a net loss. On an annual basis, women in the bottom half of the 
income distribution are thus net winners from the tax-transfer system, receiving 
more in benefits than they pay in taxes (Figure 8.6).
The impact of first transfers and then the tax system is demonstrated in Figure 8.7, 
where the two together result in a marked narrowing of income differentials. The 
annual original incomes of women are less dispersed than those of men, with the 
top quintile receiving about 25 times as much original income as the bottom 
quintile. After taking account of both cash transfers received and income taxes 
paid, the annual disposable incomes of the top quintile of some $18,000 are only 
about 6 times greater than those of the bottom quintile. This is far more unequal, 
however, than the lifetime results shown in Figure 7.9, where women in the top 
quintile of annualised lifetime equivalent income had disposable incomes which 
were not even three times greater than those of women in the bottom decile.
- Table 8.2: Characteristics of Decile Groups of Women, Ranked by Deciles of Annual Equivalent Income
MEASURE
DECILE OF ANNUAL EQUIVALENT DISPOSABLE INCOME
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average
Earnings 295 785 760 2,005 4,705 6,920 9,800 13,150 15,400 25,120 7,895
Investment income 310 290 485 1,310 1,470 2,065 1,670 1,755 4,785 4,500 1,865
Superannuation 35 45 25 350 590 435 485 485 295 545 330
ORIGINAL INCOME * 640 1,125 1,300 3,715 6,815 9,465 12,020 15,470 20,525 30,215 10,130
Age and invalid pension 105 2,375 3,390 2,110 610 245 70 5 5 0 890
Unemployment and other benefits 40 135 70 60 55 40 30 20 10 5 45
Sole parents pension # 0 1005 520 535 260 80 35 15 5 5 245
Total child transfers 70 150 100 180 260 240 225 195 130 90 165
Education transfers 60 65 15 35 45 35 20 15 10 5 30
TOTAL CASH TRANSFERS 275 3,770 4,130 2,950 1,250 650 375 250 160 105 1,390
GROSS INCOME 915 4,895 5,425 6,660 8,065 10,115 12,395 15,720 20,685 30,320 11,520
Income tax paid 0 15 105 555 1,050 1,665 2,410 3,505 5,430 10,400 2,515
DISPOSABLE INCOME 915 4,880 5,320 6,110 7,015 8,450 9,985 12,220 15,250 19,915 9,005
Shared disposable income (family unit) 890 5,160 5,695 7,045 8,885 10,600 12,575 14,780 17,315 22,760 10,570
Equivalent disposable income (family unit) 1,535 8,150 9,520 11,405 14,005 17,030 20,355 24,310 29,475 40,790 17,660
Equiv inc - 60:40 split 1,385 7,745 8,815 10,295 12,355 14,900 17,850 21,335 26,105 34,805 15,560
Av no dependent children 0.17 0.39 0.27 0.53 0.78 0.74 0.71 0.63 0.44 0.32 0.50
Per cent married 31.1 26.7 36.8 48.4 58.8 62.6 61.4 61.3 57.6 73.1 51.8
Per cent sole parents 0 11.4 4.0 7.7 8.5 7.5 6.6 5.8 2.5 1.6 5.6
Per cent above legal retirement age 28.5 50.6 69.6 51.1 27.7 21.9 16.1 12.6 19.3 11.6 30.9
Per cent in labour force 25.1 26.0 18.1 34.7 54.0 62.6 71.1 79.2 77.2 88.4 53.6
Average age 40.9 53.4 61.9 53.5 44.4 43.0 42.6 42.7 47.0 47.4 47.7
*  Includes maintenance. # Includes widows pension. All income figures rounded to nearest $5. Totals may not sum due to rounding.
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Figure 8.6: Amount of Cash Transfers Received and Income Tax Paid by 
Women, Ranked by Deciles of Annual Equivalent Income
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Figure 8.7: The Effect of Cash Transfers and income Tax Upon the Annual 
Income Distribution of Women, Ranked by Quintile Groups of Annual 
Equivalent Income
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Although the gap between the average disposable incomes of the top and bottom 
quintiles of women is lower than the comparable gap for males, women’s annual 
incomes are more unequally distributed than men’s, as Figure 8.8 demonstrates. 
Because such a large proportion of women have little or no personal income, the 
original income distribution of women is far more unequal. However, cash 
transfers play a major role in creating a more equal distribution of income among 
women, as shown by the substantial distance between the original and gross 
income curves. The top 10 per cent of all women receive 36 per cent of total 
original income, while the bottom 20 per cent receive less than one per cent. After 
the combined impact of the tax-transfer system, the share of total disposable 
income received by the former group falls to 26 per cent, while the share received 
by the latter increases to 1.2 per cent.
Figure 8.8: Lorenz Curves of Annual Original, Gross and Disposable Income 
for Women.
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The Distribution of Annual Income for the Whole Population
While the preceding analysis has dealt with men and women separately, it is also 
possible to combine their records to derive a synthetic cross-section distribution for 
the entire population. The results are summarised in Table 8.3 and show that, 
once again, women tend to be clustered in the lower income deciles, even though 
all individuals have been ranked on the basis of their annual equivalent income. 
For example, women comprise almost 60 per cent of all individuals in the second, 
third and fourth bottom deciles.
However, it is interesting to note that women are less concentrated towards the 
lower end of the income spectrum on an annual basis than on a lifetime basis. For 
example, while 42 per cent of those in the top decile of annual equivalent income 
are female, only one-third of those in the top decile of annualised lifetime 
equivalent income are female. This suggests that annual income distributions 
overstate the relative lifetime income position of women, perhaps because the 
additional years that women spend in receipt of low post-retirement incomes lowers 
their average lifetime incomes.
The standard lifecycle effects found in all studies of annual income distributions are 
again apparent, with families with children being concentrated in the middle of the 
income distribution and the elderly being clustered in the bottom third of the 
distribution. The average age within deciles varies correspondingly, with the 
average 39 years for those in the bottom decile reflecting the averaging of the ages 
of young full-time students and poor elderly people. Age in the second and third 
deciles averages 54 to 59 years, due to the predominance of retired individuals, 
and then declines smoothly over the following four deciles as the composition 
within deciles shifts to middle-aged families with children. Finally, average age 
rises again for the top two deciles, reflecting the increases in equivalent income 
which occur when children leave home but parents are still in the labour force. 
The notable correlation between annual income and labour force participation
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found in other studies is also evident (CSO, 1990), with labour force participation 
rates increasing steadily with annual equivalent income, rising from 31 per cent for 
those in the bottom decile to 92 per cent for those in the top decile.
Social security and education cash transfers are again heavily biased in favour of 
those in the lower half of the income distribution, with some leakage of child 
transfers towards those near the top of the income spectrum, due to the non- 
income-tested nature of family allowances. Income taxes also show great 
variation, with those individuals in the top decile paying 39 per cent of their total 
gross income in income tax, while those in the second bottom decile pay less than 
one per cent of their gross income in tax on average.
The annual income distribution of the entire population is again much more 
unequal than the lifetime distribution. For example, while the annual disposable 
income of the second bottom decile of just under $5,000 amounts to one-fifth of 
the annual disposable income received by the top decile, the annualised lifetime 
disposable income of the second bottom decile of about $7,000 amounts to about 
one-third of the income of the top decile (Table 7.5).
Because both males and females are included in the table, shared disposable 
income is the same as disposable income, as the losses incurred by males when 
the income measure is shifted to shared disposable income are exactly 
counterbalanced by the gains made by females. For the same reason, equivalent 
income when a 60:40 split within the family is assumed is the same as the 
standard equivalent income measure, which assumes equal sharing.
The annual equivalent income measure shown in Table 8.3 is conceptually 
comparable to that found in annual income studies which use the family as the 
income unit (although the definition of even the family income unit is slightly 
different, because the simulation treats full-time students aged 15 and over as 
separate income units). However, one can partially eliminate this effect by ignoring 
the bottom decile, with the annual family equivalent income of those in the second 
bottom decile of $8000 being just under one-fifth of that received by the top decile.
i.
Table 8.3: Annual Income and Other Characteristics of the Population, Ranked by Deciles of Annual Equivalent Income
MEASURE DECILE OF ANNUAL EQUIVALENT DISPOSABLE INCOME
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average
Earnings 355 1,320 1,785 4,670 8,760 11,585 14,975 18,150 21,180 33,780 11,655
Investment income 275 325 595 1,180 1,305 1,540 1,475 1,845 3,615 4,870 1,705
Superannuation 20 45 55 420 450 490 565 640 630 885 420
ORIGINAL INCOME * 645 1,695 2,460 6,300 10,545 13,640 17,045 20,670 25,445 39,560 13,800
Pension 45 2,855 3,350 1,760 440 200 30 10 5 5 870
Unemployment and other benefits 40 215 180 140 110 70 50 30 15 5 85
Total child transfers 35 85 70 115 140 125 110 90 60 35 85
Education transfers 65 95 25 30 30 15 10 10 5 5 30
TOTAL CASH TRANSFERS 180 3,245 3,620 2,045 720 410 205 140 85 50 1,070
GROSS INCOME 830 4,945 6,080 8,340 11,265 14,050 17,250 20,805 25,525 39,610 14,870
Income tax paid 0 30 250 995 1,975 2,960 4,135 5,505 7,600 15,340 3,880
DISPOSABLE INCOME 830 4,915 5,830 7,345 9,295 11,090 13,115 15,305 17,930 24,270 10,990
Shared disposable income (family unit) 830 4,915 5,830 7,345 9,295 11,090 13,115 15,305 17,925 24,270 10,990
Equivalent disposable income (family unit) 1,430 8,015 9,785 12,055 14,985 18,160 21,605 25,680 30,900 43,225 18,585
Av no dependent children 0.16 0.35 0.34 0.61 0.79 0.71 0.66 0.55 0.38 0.24 0.48
Per cent married 30.5 32.9 45.1 59.3 65.7 65.0 62.5 60.0 56.9 62.4 54.0
Per cent above legal retirement age 26.1 52.0 64.3 43.5 23.6 20.2 14.4 12.9 15.8 12.8 28.6
Per cent in labour force 30.9 34.6 28.8 50.4 68.6 74.9 82.7 87.0 86.2 92.4 63.6
Average age 39.0 53.8 59.3 50.3 43.0 42.8 42.0 42.7 45.6 47.3 46.6
Per cent female 50.4 58.6 59.1 57.0 53.9 52.3 50.8 48.9 48.8 41.8 52.2
*  Includes maintenance. All income measures rounded to nearest $5. Totals may not sum due to rounding
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8.3 LIFETIME VS ANNUAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Annual and Lifetime Income Distribution
While cross-sectional studies of the income distributions of industrialised countries 
have typically found income to be very unequally distributed (Sawyer, 1976), 
suspicions have been voiced that the lifetime distribution of income would be much 
more equal. Many have pointed out that much apparent income inequality is simply 
due to the sampled income units being at different stages of their lifecycles and 
that, for example, one would expect retired households or teenagers just entering 
the workforce to have substantially lower incomes than those in their peak working 
years in full-time jobs (Paglin, 1975; Polinsky, 1973; Blinder, 1974:102).
The results reported above suggest that lifetime income is very much more equally 
distributed than annual income. However, it must be emphasised that the results 
apply to a steady state world, and simply show the distributions of lifetime and 
annual income which would exist if current conditions continued for a number of 
generations. In the real world there is likely to be redistribution between 
generations (Altmann and Atkinson, 1982).
Table 8.4 reports the Gini coefficients and the coefficient of variation for different 
types of income, on both an annual and lifetime basis, produced by the simulation 
model. As suggested by the results presented earlier, the distribution of annualised 
lifetime earnings, as measured using the Gini coefficient, is about 50 per cent more 
equal than the distribution of earnings revealed in the synthetic annual snap-shot. 
Because of the substantial number of women with low lifetime earned incomes, the 
distribution of annualised lifetime earnings is more unequal for women than for men. 
On a lifetime basis, the substantial gap between the earnings of men and women 
means that the Gini for the cohort as a whole is higher than for either of the sexes 
taken separately.
The lifetime original income distribution is also much more equal than the annual
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Table 8.4: Gini Coefficients and Coefficients of Variation of Selected 
Annualised Lifetime and Annual Income Measures
ANNUALISED LIFETIME ANNUAL
MEASURE
Gini Coefficient Gini Coefficient
Coefficient of Variation Coefficient of Variation
MALES
Earnings .286 0.552 .542 1.047
Original income .320 0.630 .510 0.999
Gross income .299 0.592 .470 0.930
Disposable income .232 0.434 .398 0.725
Equivalent income .200 0.374 .356 0.656
FEMALES
Earnings .333 0.643 .685 1.466
Original income .352 0.671 .606 1.239
Gross income .296 0.567 .507 1.035
Disposable income .246 0.450 .447 0.827
Equivalent income .183 0.332 .349 0.644
ALL
Earnings .353 0.686 .623 N 1.260
Original income .363 0.719 .568 1.142
Gross income .323 0.645 .501 1.017
Disposable income .259 0.485 .433 0.799
Equivalent income .193 0.360 .354 0.653
distribution produced by the synthetic cross-section, with the Gini coefficient for 
annualised lifetime original income for males of 0.320 being some 37 per cent 
lower than the Gini of 0.510 found for annual original income of males. The lifetime 
distribution of original income is more unequal than that of earnings, because 
investment income and superannuation are more unequally distributed across 
lifetime income deciles than are earnings, so the Gini for annualised lifetime original 
income is higher than that for lifetime earnings. However, the reverse is true for the 
annual distribution, where the Gini for annual original income is lower than that for 
earnings, because of the number of elderly with lower incomes receiving investment 
and superannuation income. In other words, in the annual income distribution, 
investment and superannuation income tend to offset the inequalities in earned 
income, while in the lifetime income distribution they reinforce the inequalities in 
earned income.
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As noted earlier, the original income distribution of females is much more unequal 
than that of males, because of the significant proportion of women with little or no 
personal income. This is reflected in the higher values of the Gini coefficients for 
both the annual and annualised lifetime original incomes of women. Once again, 
however, the distribution of lifetime original income is massively more equal than 
the distribution of original income captured in the synthetic cross-section snapshot, 
with the relevant Gini for annualised lifetime original income of 0.352 being about 
42 per cent lower than the comparable annual Gini for female original income.
The distribution of both annual and lifetime gross income for males is more equal 
than that of original income, reflecting the equalising effect of cash transfers. Such 
transfers result in an 8 per cent decline in the Gini for annual gross income and a
6.5 per cent decline in the Gini for lifetime annualised gross income, to 0.470 and 
0.299 respectively. The inequality of incomes is further reduced by income taxes, 
with the Gini coefficient for annual disposable income for males falling to 0.398. 
Once again, the distribution of annualised lifetime disposable income is far more 
equal, as demonstrated by the Gini coefficient of 0.232 - amounting to only 58 per 
cent of the value of the relevant annual Gini.
The enormous importance of cash transfers to women was again emphasised by 
the sharp decline in the Gini coefficient when the gross income distribution of 
women was considered. The perhaps suprising extent to which cash transfers help 
to equalise the income distribution of women was demonstrated in the 16 per cent 
decline in both the annual and lifetime Ginis when moving from the original to gross 
income measures, although the marked disparity between the inequality of annual 
and lifetime income remained.
Income taxes again reduced the inequality of income, resulting in a Gini of 0.246 
for the annualised lifetime disposable income distribution of women. This was 
slightly more unequal than the comparable distribution for men, as shown in the 
Lorenz curves upon which these coefficients were based, which were plotted in 
Figure 7.11.
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While the equivalent income measure is not strictly comparable, as it effectively 
switches from using the individual as the income unit to using the family as the 
income unit, the equivalent income of males is again more equally distributed than 
any of the personal income measures, with a Gini for annualised lifetime equivalent 
income of 0.2. Similarly, while all the above figures on the personal incomes 
received by women suggested that the lifetime standards of living experienced by 
women would differ greatly, the disparities apparent in personal income were 
reduced once income sharing within households was considered, with the Gini for 
annualised lifetime equivalent income for women falling to 0.183. Thus, many of 
those women with low personal incomes belonged to families where the spouse 
received substantial income.
When the cohort as a whole was considered, the lifetime income distribution was 
more unequal than the lifetime income for either sex considered separately, as 
there was a larger gap between the incomes of low income women and high 
income men. However, on an annual basis, combining men and women tended to 
average the Gini coefficients apparent for each sex. The Gini for annualised 
lifetime original income of 0.363 was slightly more than 60 per cent of ,that for 
annual original income. A similar gap was observed between the annualised 
lifetime and annual Gini coefficients for the other income measures.
How do these findings compare with those of other studies? Davies et al observe 
that on the basis of existing estimates "about one-half of annual earnings inequality 
(according to conventional measures) disappears when one looks at lifetime 
earnings" (1984:635). Using longitudinal data for a sample of American males born 
between 1917 and 1925, Lillard found that "inequality in earnings at any stage of 
the lifecycle for men over 30, as measured by either the coefficients of variation of 
the Gini coefficient is 50 per cent larger than inequality in human wealth" (with the 
latter being his term for lifetime earnings)(1977:49). This relative gap seems 
comparable to that produced in the simulation for males.
Blomquist simulated lifetime earnings and income for Sweden, based upon two
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sample surveys six years apart of the same respondants, and found that the Gini 
coefficient for simulated pre-tax lifetime income was also about half that of annual 
income (with the precise figure ranging from 44 to 53 per cent depending upon the 
income concept used and the age of those in the annual income distribution) 
(1976:249). However, while this would support the finding in the HARDING model 
of a substantial gap between the inequality of lifetime and annual income, the 
inequality of lifetime income simulated by Blomquist was much lower than that 
found in the current study, with his Gini co-efficient for pre-tax income of 0.122 
being less than half that of the 0.299 Gini found for male annualised lifetime gross 
income in the model.
Soltow’s study of the Norwegian city of Sarpsborg found that while annual Gini 
ratios averaged 0.183 over the period 1928-1960, the 33 year Gini for the same 
sample was 0.134 - about 27 per cent less (cited in Blinder, 1974:103). Blinder 
himself, based on his 1974 simulation, suggests that the Gini ratio for lifetime 
income "might be around 0.25 to 0.30" of that for annual income, and for the 
’egalitarian society’ version of his model found the lifetime Gini to be 0.295, 
compared to an annual Gini of 0.43 (1974:104,137). Bourguignon and Morrison 
found less difference than this, but their sample only included relatively elite 
workers and also did not include the years immediately following labour force entry, 
both of which would reduce the apparent inequality of lifetime earnings (1983:68).
On the whole, the magnitude of the difference between lifetime and annual income 
produced by the model does not appear out of step with existing studies, although 
the relative inequality of both seems somewhat higher than found in some studies. 
On the other hand, when used to simulate a synthetic cross-section distribution, the 
Canadian DEMOGEN lifetime model produced Gini coefficients for annual earnings 
which were very close to those generated by the HARDING model (Wolfson, 
1988:231). As Wolfson observed, "the Gini coefficients for earnings may appear 
a bit high, but it should be noted that they are computed across all individuals in 
each age-sex group, not just those with positive earnings" (1988:232).
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It thus seems likely that the observed differences between the magnitude of the 
Gini coefficients produced by the model and found in some other lifetime studies 
may be due to variations in the definition of the income unit or in the sample 
considered. For example, both the annual and lifetime samples in the model 
included the records of students aged 15 and over with little or no other income 
who had not yet entered the workforce, and this group are often excluded from 
lifetime studies. It would be possible at some stage in the future to delete those 
records, and examine the resultant effect upon the relevant Ginis, but there is no 
obvious reason, apart from the desirability of checking comparable results against 
those of other studies, why years with little or no income should be excluded from 
the calculation of lifetime income.
Annual-Lifetime Transition Matrices
The above results therefore suggest that much of the inequality apparent in annual 
income distributions is due to the sampled income units being at different stages 
of their lifecycles. A corollary is that many of those in the bottom decile of income 
in a cross-section survey will not remain in the bottom decile once lifetime income 
is considered. Another way of examining the issue is therefore to construct 
transition matrices, which show how many of those in a particular decile in the 
synthetic cross-section sample remain in the same decile of lifetime income.
Males
The results indicate that the decile of annual equivalent income achieved by males 
in a cross-section survey does provide some indication of their relative position in 
the distribution of annualised lifetime equivalent income. As Table 8.5 shows, 
almost one-fifth of males remained in the same decile of both annual and lifetime 
income, while 44 per cent either remained in the same decile or moved up or down 
by only one decile. As with all transition matrices, there was less movement at the 
extremes of the income distribution. For example, of those males who were in the 
bottom decile of annual equivalent income, almost 46 per cent were placed in the 
bottom three deciles of lifetime equivalent income. The position of males who were
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in the top decile of annual equivalent income was even more stable, with almost 
half remaining in the top decile of lifetime income and about 85 per cent achieving 
a place in the top three deciles of lifetime income. Thus, for about half of those 
males captured in a cross-section study who are in the top decile of annual 
equivalent income (presumbly because they are of prime working age and earning 
high incomes), their privileged annual position provides an accurate guide to their 
relative lifetime position.
Table 8.5: Transition Matrix of Decile of Annual Equivalent Income by Decile 
of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Income for Males
Decile of Male 
Annualised 
Lifetime 
Equivalent Inc
Decile of Male Annual Equivalent Income
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 22 23 18 14 10 6 4 2 0 0
2 14 18 16 14 13 11 8 4 1 0
3 10 15 15 14 14 12 10 7 3 0
4 10 12 13 12 12 11 12 10 7 1
5 9 9 11 11 12 12 13 12 9 3
6 8 7 10 11 10 11 13 14 11 5
7 8 6 7 10 10 10 11 14 15 8
8 7 5 5 7 8 11 11 14 19 13
9 6 3 3 5 7 10 11 13 19 23
10 5 2 1 2 3 5 7 9 17 48
Females
Do the same conclusions apply to women? The relative position of women in a 
cross-section study appears to provide a slightly less accurate indicator of their 
relative lifetime position than for men, but the difference is very marginal. Some
17.5 per cent of women remained in both the same annual and lifetime income 
decile, compared to 18.2 per cent of men (Table 8.6). About 44 per cent either 
remained in the same decile or moved up or down by only one decile. However, 
those women who were in the bottom decile were more likely to stay there than 
men, with 27 per cent failing to improve their relative position, while those women 
in the top decile of female annual equivalent earnings were less likely to maintain 
their relative advantage than men in the top decile, with just under two-fifths of
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those in the top decile of annual income also being placed in the top decile of 
annualised lifetime equivalent income.
Table 8.6: Transition Matrix of Decile of Annual Equivalent Income by Decile 
of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Income for Females
Decile of Fema 
Annualised 
Lifetime 
Equivalent Inc
le Decile of Female Annual Equivalent Income
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 27 17 16 11 12 8 5 3 1 0
2 14 16 19 13 13 11 9 5 2 0
3 10 13 17 13 12 12 11 8 3 0
4 9 12 13 12 12 12 12 10 5 2
5 9 10 11 12 11 11 11 12 9 4
6 7 8 8 13 10 10 12 13 12 7
7 7 9 6 10 9 11 11 13 14 11
8 6 6 4 8 9 10 12 13 17 14
9 5 5 3 5 8 10 11 12 18 23
10 4 3 2 3 4 6 7 11 19 40
Whole Population
Finally, does it make any difference if the entire population is considered, rather 
than just males or females? Table 8.7 indicates that considering both sexes 
together does not markedly alter mobility patterns, with 18.1 per cent remaining in 
the same decile of lifetime income and 44 per cent either staying in the same 
position or moving up or down by only one decile. This suggests again that 
although cross-section income surveys provide some guide to the likely relative 
income position of respondents during their entire lifetimes, it can certainly not be 
assumed that those who have high incomes - or more particularly, very low 
incomes - in a cross-section survey will remain rich or poor respectively during 
their entire lifetimes.
The extent of ’slippage’ appears, however, to again be greater for those with low 
incomes than for those with high incomes in cross-section surveys. Thus, five per 
cent of those who were placed in the bottom decile of annual income managed to
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achieve the top decile of lifetime income, although one-quarter of those in the 
bottom decile still remained in the bottom decile of lifetime income. Similarly, the 
high incomes recorded by some of those who made the top decile of annual income 
represented a brief period of relative wealth (perhaps due to a few years of high 
employment income), with almost 10 per cent of these slipping into the bottom half 
of the income distribution once lifetime income was considered. For 44 per cent of 
those in the top decile of annual income, however, their relative advantage was 
maintained during their lifecycle and they thus achieved the top decile of lifetime 
income.
Table 8.7: Transition Matrix of Decile of Annual Equivalent Income by Decile 
of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Income for Whole Population
Decile of Life 
Time
Annualised 
Equivalent Inc
Decile of Annual Equivalent Income
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 25 20 18 12 11 7 4 2 0 0
2 13 17 18 13 13 10 8 5 2 0
3 11 14 16 13 12 12 11 7 3 1
4 9 11 13 13 12 12 12 10 6 2
5 9 10 11 12 11 11 12 13 12 6
6 8 8 9 11 11 11 12 13 12 6
7 7 7 7 10 9 11 12 14 14 9
8 7 5 4 7 9 11 11 13 17 14
9 6 4 3 5 7 9 11 13 19 22
10 5 2 1 2 3 5 7 10 17 44
8.4 LIFETIME VS ANNUAL TAX-TRANSFER 
INCIDENCE
Fiscal incidence studies of the impact of taxes and transfers during a single year 
have repeatedly found the incidence of cash transfers and income taxes to be 
progressive (Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977; Ross, 1980; ABS, 1987b). However, 
many have argued that such snapshot analyses of incidence were likely to 
overstate the redistributive impact of the state, and that over a longer time period 
the contribution made by taxes and transfers to equalising income distribution might
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be much less significant. The results of this model certainly suggest this is the 
case, perhaps to a much greater extent than was anticipated.
Cash Transfers
The lifetime and annual incidence of cash transfers for men and women is shown 
in Figure 8.9. For both sexes, cash transfers appear far more progressive on an 
annual basis than on a lifetime basis. For men, annualised lifetime cash transfers 
are progressive, amounting to about 12 per cent of annualised lifetime gross 
income for those in the bottom decile of annualised lifetime equivalent income and 
declining to well under 1 per cent of income for those in the top decile. The annual 
incidence is far more striking, with cash transfers comprising more than half of the 
income of those in the second decile of annual equivalent income (dominated by 
age pensioners) but less than two per cent of gross annual income for those in the 
top half of the annual equivalent income distribution.
For women, cash transfers are even more important, reaching 30 per cent of 
annualised gross income for those in the bottom decile of annualised lifetime 
equivalent income. However, on an annual basis the apparent redistributive impact 
of cash transfers is remarkably different, with such transfers reaching about 75 per 
cent of gross income for those in the second and third deciles of annual equivalent 
income. (As discussed earlier, many of those in the bottom decile of annual income 
for both men and women are full-time students with little or no private income who 
are not receiving education cash transfers.)
It is also possible to contrast the difference between the lifetime and annual 
distribution of transfers by constructing concentration curves of transfers received. 
Such curves are similar to Lorenz curves for income, but instead plot the cumulative 
percentage of transfers received against the cumulative percentage of individuals. 
It is important when interpreting the curves to appreciate that the vertical axis 
shows the cumulative percentage of individuals, who are not ranked into income 
deciles or ranked on the basis of their income, but who are ranked by the amount 
of cash transfers received.
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Figure 8.9: Lifetime and Annual Incidence of Cash Transfers by Sex
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As Figure 8.10 shows, on an annual basis a striking 70 per cent of men receive no 
cash transfers at all during the year. Amongst all men, 70 per cent of all transfers 
paid out during the year are chanelled towards only 10 per cent of men. However, 
during their entire lifetimes only 7 per cent of men receive no cash transfers at all.
The bottom 10 per cent of men, ranked by amount of annualised lifetime cash 
transfers received, gain only 0.1 per cent of total cash transfers received by all men 
during their entire lives. The bottom 50 per cent receive 13 per cent of total cash 
transfers, while those in the top 10 per cent of cash transfer recipients receive just 
over one-quarter of lifetime cash transfers paid to men.
For women, the annual distribution of cash transfers is more equal, reflecting in part 
the pervasiveness of child transfers, although 30 per cent of women still receive no 
cash transfers at all during a single year. Those in the fourth decile receive only 
1.2 per cent of all cash transfers, while those who are among the top ten per cent 
of cash transfer receivers gain slightly more than 40 per cent of all cash transfers.
The lifetime distribution of cash transfers is very much more equal, with only 0.005 
per cent of women receiving no cash transfers during their entire lives and those 
in the bottom 10 per cent of cash transfer receivers gaining 1.1 per cent of total 
transfers. Of all cash transfers paid to women during their entire lives, those in the 
top 10 per cent of recipients take 23 per cent of total transfers.
Can these results be compared with any other lifetime studies? The above results 
cannot be directly contrasted with those produced by Davies et al, as the incidence 
of cash transfers produced by their microsimulation model is not reported, but they 
also find that "over the lifetime transfers are less heavily concentrated in the bottom 
two deciles of the population than in the annual data" and that "the decline in the 
relative importance of transfers as income rises is also less marked" on a lifetime 
than on an annual basis (1984:640). (Their model does not include any full-time 
students so their bottom two deciles of annual income consist largely of the elderly, 
who are concentrated in deciles two and three in Figure 8.9.)
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Figure 8.10: Concentration Curves of Lifetime and Annual Cash Transfers 
Received for Men and Women
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Figure 8.11 traces the lifetime and annual incidence of income taxes for men and 
women. When assessed against annual income the incidence of taxes appears 
highly progressive, rising from zero per cent of gross income for those in the 
lowest annual equivalent income decile to more than 40 per cent of gross income 
for those in the top 10 per cent of the distribution. This 40 per cent figure appears 
quite high, perhaps because, as described in Chapter 5, no explicit account is taken 
of possible tax evasion. In addition, although the impact of tax avoidance should 
be partially captured through the taxable investment incomes imputed in the model 
being lower than they would be in the absence of tax avoidance, it is possible that 
the original IDS data tape from which investment incomes were estimated did not 
measure such incomes very accurately (due, for example, to respondents 
understating the extent of negative gearing or other negative taxable investment 
income).
On a lifetime basis, annualised lifetime income taxes are much less progressive but 
nonetheless do still contribute to a more equal income distribution, rising from about 
14 per cent of annualised lifetime gross income for the decile of males with the 
lowest lifetime standard of living, to 41 per cent of gross income for the most 
affluent decile. However, the annual and lifetime incidence by decile of equivalent 
disposable income is strikingly similar from the sixth decile onwards, and the 
proportion of gross income paid in tax by the top decile is much the same on both 
a lifetime and annual basis.
For women, the bottom quintile of women pay a negligible proportion of their gross 
income in tax during the single year captured in the synthetic cross-section 
snapshot. The percentage of gross income paid in tax rises sharply as annual 
equivalent income increases, reaching about 33 per cent for the top 10 per cent 
(significantly lower than for men because of women’s lower taxable incomes). 
When the basis of measurement is changed to annualised lifetime gross income, 
the annualised lifetime income tax paid by the decile of women with the lowest
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lifetime standard of living averages 10 per cent of their gross income, while the top 
decile pay slightly more than three times this amount.
The above results are comparable to those of Davies et al, who also found that on 
a lifetime basis the top decile of income units paid about three times as much of 
their gross income in income tax as the bottom decile (1984:643). However, 
income tax as a percentage of gross income was lower in their simulation, 
amounting for both males and females to 7.3 per cent for the bottom decile and
20.5 per cent for the top decile (compared with 12 per cent and 38 per cent 
respectively for the HARDING model - Table 7.5). It is not clear whether this is due 
to differences in the income tax systems in Canada and Australia, to different 
income simulation (for example, their model excluded superannuation), or other 
unknown factors.
Figure 8.12 traces the concentration curves of lifetime and annual income tax paid, 
and shows that, on an annual basis, 30 per cent of men and 40 per cent of women 
contribute almost no income tax. The top 10 per cent of female income tax payers 
contribute just over half and the top 10 per cent of male taxpayers about 45 per 
cent of all income tax collected in a single year from each sex. Once again, on a 
lifetime basis the burden of income tax is more equally spread, and in the lifetime 
simulation there are no men or women who live past the age of 20 who do not pay 
any income tax during their entire lives. Individuals in the lower half of the lifetime 
income tax distribution contribute just under 20 per cent of all annualised lifetime 
income tax collected, while those in the top 20 per cent contribute just over half of 
all income tax raised.
These results are also outlined in Table 8.8, which shows the concentration 
coefficients (conceptually similar to the Gini coefficients presented earlier for 
income) of cash transfers and income tax. For men, the concentration coefficient 
for annual cash transfers of 0.85 emphasises the skewed distribution of cash 
transfers reported earlier, where about 70 per cent of men receive no cash transfers 
at all. The coefficient for lifetime cash transfers is about 40 per cent lower, at
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Figure 8.11: Lifetime and Annual Incidence of Income Tax for Men and 
Women
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Figure 8.12: Concentration Curves of Lifetime and Annual Income Tax Paid 
by Men and Women
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0.496. The coefficient for annual income taxes for men is lower, reflecting the more 
equal distribution of tax burdens than of cash transfer receipts, but is still 40 per 
cent higher than the coefficient for annualised lifetime income taxes for men.
For women, the coefficient for annual cash transfers is lower than for men because 
such transfers are more equally distributed among women, but is a striking 89 per 
cent higher than the coefficient for lifetime cash transfers, recognising that almost 
all women receive cash transfers at some point during their lifecycle. On the other 
hand, both annual and lifetime income taxes are less equally distributed among 
women than among men, although the relative gap between the lifetime and annual 
distributions is similar, with the concentration coefficient for lifetime income taxes 
of 0.484 amounting to about two-thirds of the comparable annual coefficient.
Finally, for the population as a whole, the lifetime coefficient for cash transfers 
amounted to just under 60 per cent and that for income taxes about 70 per cent of 
the comparable annual coefficients, emphasising the more equal distribution of the 
benefits of cash transfers and the burden of income taxes when the entire lifetime 
is considered.
Table 8.8: Concentration Coefficients and Coefficients of Variation for Lifetime 
and Annual Distributions of Cash Transfers and Income Taxes
Measure
ANNUALISED LIFETIME ANNUAL
Concentration
Coefficient
Coefficient 
of Variation
Concentration
Coefficient
Coefficient 
of Variation
MALES
Cash transfers .496 0.671 .852 2.255
Income tax .465 0.683 .648 1.514
FEMALES
Cash transfers .377 0.664 .713 1.486
Income tax .484 1.034 .726 1.951
ALL
Cash transfers .458 0.829 .780 1.775
Income tax .505 1.130 .698 1.753
325
8.5 CASH TRANSFERS AND ADJUSTED 
INCOME TAXES
While the above analysis has suggested that annual incidence studies overstate 
the degree of income redistribution achieved by government taxes and transfers, 
and that both transfers and taxes are accordingly less progressive when measured 
against lifetime than against annual income, the precise direction and magnitude 
of income redistribution achieved is masked by the amount of income taxes paid 
greatly exceeding the amount of cash transfers received. Because income taxes 
help to finance a wide range of other publicly provided goods and services, in 
addition to cash transfers, they necessarily exceed cash transfers.
One way around the problem is to calculate the total amount of cash transfers 
received by the entire cohort during their whole lifetimes, and then work out the 
percentage of total income taxes collected which would exactly finance those 
transfers. In the event, 27.6 per cent of total lifetime income taxes collected from 
both males and females equalled total lifetime cash transfers received by males 
and females, so in the following analysis 27.6 per cent of income tax paid (termed 
adjusted income tarf has been compared with the cash transfers received by each 
decile and by each sex. This is equivalent to assuming that this proportion of the 
income tax paid by each individual is expressly devoted to the provision of cash 
transfers, and that the proportion does not vary by amount of income tax paid or 
other characteristics. The ambiguities involved with making this sort of assumption 
have been eloquently spelled out by Le Grand (1987).
Disregarding these theoretical difficulties for the present, Figure 8.13 shows the 
lifetime pattern of redistribution for males, ranked by deciles of annualised lifetime 
equivalent income. For example, the bottom decile received $985 on average in 
cash transfers and contributed $305 of the income tax used to finance all cash 
transfers, resulting in the net gain shown in the horizontally striped section of 
Figure 8.13 of almost $700. Similarly, the top decile of males received only $100 
in annualised cash transfers (Table 7.1) but paid $4,660 in adjusted annualised
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income tax, leaving the net loss shown in the vertically striped section of Figure 
8.13 of just over $4,500. Only the bottom 30 per cent of all males received more 
in transfers each year than they paid on average in adjusted income taxes .
The profile for women is very different, as shown in the bottom graph in Figure 
8.13. While the bottom decile of women, ranked by female annualised equivalent 
income, received $1,630 in annualised cash transfers they paid only $145 in 
adjusted annualised income tax, resulting in a net gain of some $1,500. However, 
as the figure illustrates, the bottom 70 per cent of women emerged as winners 
when cash transfers were compared with those income taxes which financed them. 
There is clearly, therefore, substantial redistribution of income from men to women 
during the lifetime.
The picture for the entire population is shown in Figure 8.14. In addition to 
redistribution from men to women, there is also redistribution of income from those 
with higher to those with lower lifetime incomes. The bottom sixty per cent of all 
individuals make a net gain when the cash transfers received on average each 
year are subtracted from adjusted income taxes paid, with these gains being 
matched by the absolute losses made by the top forty per cent of individuals. 
However, as the solid coloured area in Figure 8.14 demonstrates, a significant 
proportion of income taxes paid during the lifetime are returned to the same 
individuals in the form of cash transfers during some other period of their lifecycle.
This average picture, however, disguises the major differences apparent within 
income deciles. For example, for those individuals in the bottom decile of 
annualised lifetime equivalent income, all of the adjusted income taxes paid out 
during the years of higher income are recouped through cash transfers received 
at some other point during their lifetimes. Even for those in the fifth decile of 
annualised lifetime equivalent income, some 45 per cent of adjusted annualised 
lifetime income taxes paid are devoted to intra-personal redistribution and returned 
to them via cash transfers, with the remaining 55 per cent being channelled 
towards other individuals with lower lifetime incomes.
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Figure 8.13: Difference Between Average Annualised Cash Transfers 
Received and Average Annualised Adjusted Income Taxes Paid, by Sex and 
Decile of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Income
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Figure 8.14: Difference Between Average Annualised Cash Transfers 
Received and Average Annualised Adjusted Income Taxes Paid, by Decile 
of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Income
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The extent to which annual snap-shots of tax-transfer incidence overstate the 
degree of inter-personal redistribution and understate the magnitude of intra­
personal redistribution is emphasised in Figure 8.15, which compares average 
cash transfers received during a single year with the adjusted income taxes paid 
during that year. As comparison with Figure 8.14 illustrates, the apparent gains 
made by those in the bottom half of the income distribution on an annual basis are 
susbstantially reduced once the entire lifetime is considered. This indicates that 
many of those appearing as net beneficiaries from the tax-transfer system in any 
given year become net payers during other years of their life and, conversely, 
many of those paying high income taxes in Figure 8.15 would change to net 
beneficiaries if sampled 10 or 20 years later.
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Figure 8.15: Difference Between Average Annual Cash Transfers Received 
and Average Annual Adjusted Income Taxes Paid, by Decile of Annual 
Equivalent Income
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8.6 LIFETIME VS ANNUAL INCIDENCE OF 
EDUCATION OUTLAYS
While the preceding discussion has dealt exclusively with the incidence of taxes 
and cash transfers, the annual and lifetime incidence of education outlays has 
been a subject of considerable debate in Australia, due to the recent and 
controversial introduction of the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (effectively 
a scheme for making tertiary students pay for their studies later in life). The higher 
incomes of graduates have always been apparent, and concern about the extent 
to which the state should subsidise the attainment of degrees which markedly 
improve the lifetime circumstances of recipients has been fuelled by a number of 
studies suggesting that tertiary outlays are monopolised by higher income groups.
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After studying evidence about the distribution of benefits in kind in the UK, for 
example, Barr concluded that "middle-class children receive a disproportionate 
share of educational resources" and that "the finance of university education is 
almost certainly regressive" (1987:419). Similarly, Le Grand argued that education 
outlays in the UK show "a distribution which is markedly pro-rich" (1982:57).
This conclusion was disputed by Harding, using Australian data, who argued that 
although higher income groups received more dollars of education spending than 
lower income groups, such outlays amounted to about the same proportion of 
income, so that the incidence of education outlays was proportional and left the 
income distribution basically unchanged (1984:64). However, both authors pointed 
out that because of data limitations their results only considered education outlays 
as a percentage of gross househoid income, and suggested that because higher 
income households with children tended to be concentrated towards the middle 
and upper ends of the annual income spectrum, an analysis based on equivalent 
household income or some other measure might produce quite different results.
The results reported below in Figures 8.16 and 8.17, which suggest that outlays 
on both education services and education transfers are progressive when 
measured against lifetime equivalent income, are thus of considerable interest. 
Taking all outlays on education services first, Figure 8.16 shows that the imputed 
total (not annualised) value of such services received over the course of the entire 
lifetime amounted to about 10.5 per cent of the total gross lifetime income of 
women in the bottom decile of female annualised lifetime equivalent income and 
just over 8.5 per cent of the total gross lifetime income of men in the comparable 
bottom deciles of males.
Although the sexes received fairly equal dollar amounts of education services 
income, the lower earned incomes of women meant that education services 
amounted to a higher percentage of the lifetime gross incomes of women than of 
men, but appeared equally progressive for both sexes. Similarly, although 
education transfers amounted to only a small proportion of gross lifetime income,
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their net effect appeared to be progressive on a lifetime basis.
Figure 8.16: The Lifetime and Annual Incidence of Education Cash Transfers 
and Imputed Education Services Income by Sex
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However, this only shows the net effect of all education outlays. It is possible that, 
for example, the progressive effect of outlays on schooling might be partially offset 
by regressive outlays on tertiary education. Consequently, the incidence of each 
of the components of education outlays for the cohort as a whole are examined in 
Figure 8.17. The results suggest that outlays on primary schooling (including pre­
schools), and secondary schooling are both progressive on a lifetime basis.
Outlays on TAFE are also progressive, declining from about 1.1 per cent of the 
gross lifetime income of those in the bottom decile of lifetime annualised equivalent 
income to only 0.25 per cent of the income of the top decile. The picture for
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outlays on universities (including colleges of advanced education) is not, however, 
as clear cut. Although such outlays do decline from about 1.3 per cent of the total 
lifetime gross income of the bottom decile to 0.6 per cent of the income of the top 
decile, for those in the bottom 60 per cent of the income distribution such outlays 
are roughly proportional to income. The combined effect of all tertiary outlays, 
comprising outlays on TAFE and universities, is also shown in Figure 8.17 and is 
again progressive, although the incidence is roughly proportional for those in the 
middle of the income spectrum.
Moving from education services to education cash transfers, outlays on SAS are 
progressive, as would be expected since they are provided to lower income 
families while their children are at school. Outlays on TEAS and Post-Graduate 
Awards, however, are roughly proportional across most of the income spectrum, 
indicating that many of those who benefit from such income-tested allowances 
while they are students go on to earn high lifetime incomes.
Although the incidence of education services outlays is therefore progressive on 
a lifetime basis, such outlays are not as progessive as outlays on social security 
and education cash transfers. In addition, the progressive incidence does not 
imply that lower income groups receive more dollars in education services than 
higher income groups - indeed, as shown in Table 7.5, those in the top decile of 
annualised lifetime equivalent income receive about $6,000 more in imputed 
lifetime education services income than those in the bottom decile.
Although the results for the annual incidence of education outlays for individuals 
are not presented below, such outlays and transfers appear highly progressive on 
an annual basis, as they are primarily received by students with little or no other 
income. However, such results cannot be compared with other annual studies of 
education incidence which do not regard such students as separate income units, 
or which do not use the individual as the income unit.
3 3 3
Figure 8.17: The Lifetime Incidence of Education Cash Transfers and Imputed 
Education Services Income
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8.7 CONCLUSION
The results of the model suggest, as has long been suspected, that in a steady- 
state world, lifetime income in Australia would be much more equally distributed 
than annual income. Although the precise results depend upon the income 
measure used, the annualised lifetime disposable incomes of both men and women 
appear to be about 40 per cent more equal than annual disposable incomes. For 
example, the Gini coefficient for the distribution of male annualised lifetime 
disposable income of 0.232 amounts to only 60 per cent of the relevant Gini 
coefficient for annual income.
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This suggests that much of the inequality apparent in annual cross-section surveys 
is due to the sampled income units being at different stages of their lifecycle. The 
results of a transition matrix confirmed this, with just under 20 per cent of 
individuals remaining in the same deciles of both annual equivalent income and 
annualised lifetime equivalent income, and about 45 per cent either remaining in 
the same decile or moving up or down the income distribution by only one decile.
Although the lifetime incidence of both cash transfers and income taxes was 
progressive, such goverment programs were much less redistributive than annual 
incidence studies would suggest. The lifetime concentration coefficients for cash 
transfers and income taxes amounted to about 60 and 70 per cent respectively of 
of the relevant annual coefficients. For the cohort as a whole, cash transfers 
amounted to 21 per cent of the annualised gross income of the bottom decile, 
declining to well under one per cent of the gross income of those ranked in the top 
10 per cent of annualised lifetime equivalent income. Similarly, income taxes 
accounted for only 12 per cent of the gross lifetime income received by those in 
the bottom decile of annualised equivalent income, rising to 38 per cent of 
annualised gross income for those in the top decile.
Despite this progressivity, much of the income redistribution achieved was intra­
personal, transferring resources from one part of an individual’s life to another, 
rather than representing inter-personal redistribution from those with higher to 
those with lower lifetime incomes. Analysis of the redistributive impact of cash 
transfers against the volume of income taxes which exactly financed those cash 
transfers, suggested that there was marked income redistribution from men to 
women, as well as from those indiviudals in the top four deciles of annualised 
lifetime equivalent income to those in the bottom six deciles.
Finally, analysis of education outlays suggested that such outlays were progressive 
on both an annual and lifetime basis, but that outlays on tertiary education services 
and tertiary cash transfers were much less progressive than those on school 
services and SAS.
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The above results therefore contrast the lifetime distribution of income with the 
synthetic annual income distribution generated by the model, and analyse the 
lifetime and annual incidence of government income taxes and cash transfers. 
Such results tell us nothing, however, about how different types of individuals fared 
during their lifecycles, only about the final result. The next chapter therefore turns 
to consideration of the years of poverty and years of plenty which occur during the 
lifecycle.
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CHAPTER 9: INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND
REDISTRIBUTION OVER THE LIFECYCLE
9.1 INTRODUCTION
While Chapter 6 analysed the lifetime incomes of those with various lifetime 
characteristics and Chapters 7 and 8 contrasted the lifetime and synthetic cross- 
section income distributions, it is also possible to examine the records during every 
year of life for those with particular lifetime characteristics and thus derive a picture 
of lifecycle income distribution and redistribution.
In Section 9.2, the lifecycle profiles of those with different lifetime standards of 
living are discussed, and the extent of intra-personal and inter-personal income 
redistribution is examined. In Section 9.3 the variations in lifecycle income patterns 
by lifetime marital and child status are compared and, for example, the varying 
fortunes of the never married are contrasted with those who married and raised 
large families. Finally, in Section 9.4 the variation in lifecycle profiles by highest 
educational qualification achieved is analysed.
9.2 LIFECYCLE INCOME BY LIFETIME 
STANDARD OF LIVING
The Lifecycle Income of Males
As many studies of earnings profiles have found, the earnings of males increase 
sharply during their twenties and early thirties, with the accumulation of human 
capital and increasing age and experience (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990). The 
rate of increase slows during the thirties and forties and, as Figure 9.1 shows, the 
annual earnings and income of males in the simulation peak at ages 40 to 44. 
During the fifties and early sixties, average annual income declines, due not only
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to the declining hourly wage rates traced in Table 9.1 (1), but also to reductions 
in hours worked and to voluntary or involuntary withdrawal from the labour force.
While some males are still working in their late sixties, with earnings averaging 
about one-quarter of the average annual income of males aged 65 to 69, earnings 
are negligible during the seventies. Income during retirement drops steeply, with 
average income being about one-third of that achieved during peak working years. 
Sources of income also show dramatic change, with income from age 70 onwards 
being fairly equally split between investment income, private occupational 
superannuation, and cash transfers from the state in the form of age pension.
Figure 9.1: Average Amounts of Income Received Each Year by Age by Males
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(1) Some longitudinal studies have found that the earnings of males increase constantly until retirement 
due to the effect of economic growth each year upon real earnings (Ruggles and Ruggles, 1977). 
However, the earnings of younger cohorts increase at a faster rate and the relative wages of older 
workers therefore decline. As discussed in Chapter 4, the model abstracts from economic growth, and 
it is this relative decline which is therefore picked up in the simulation.
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The average picture for men, however, disguises major variations in lifecyle income 
by those who achieve different standards of living during their lifetimes. It is 
possible to isolate those whose lifetime income placed them in the bottom 10 per 
cent of males, after taking account of variations in family circumstances, and then 
go back and identify what happened to those males during each year of life. 
Figure 9.2 takes those in the lowest decile of males, ranked by annualised lifetime 
equivalent income, and shows the amount of income they received by source of 
income during their lifetimes.
For those in the bottom decile, earnings and income peak somewhat earlier, at 
ages 35 to 39, reflecting their lower educational achievement. Although the vertical 
axis in Figure 9.2 is scaled differently to that in Figure 9.1, the peak income of 
around $12,500 of the bottom decile is about half that of all males. Further, while 
cash transfers were such an insignificant source of income for males on average 
that they could not even be identified in Figure 9.1 for those below retirement age, 
for males in the bottom decile cash transfers made a minor contribution to income 
even during the prime working years, reflecting the greater incidence of 
unemployment and sickness.
The disadvantage experienced by the bottom decile continued into retirement, 
where occupational superannuation was non-existent and investment income 
minimal. They thus relied on age pension after retiring from the workforce, which 
provided an average income of around $4,500 - about half of the average 
retirement income enjoyed by males on average.
This lifecycle profile stands in stark contrast to that of males in the top decile of 
annualised lifetime equivalent income, whose income peaked later at ages 45 to 
49 and who benefited from high incomes during their thirties, forties and fifties 
(Figure 9.3). The peak income received by the top decile was more than twice 
that received by males on average and more than four times that received by the 
bottom decile. Investment income formed a more significant source of income 
during their entire lives and contributed about a third of total income during 
retirement, with the balance coming from occupational superannuation.
Table 9.1: Income and Other Characteristics of Males by Age
AGE
MEASURE 15-20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80+
Earnings 5,660 13,775 19,605 22,780 24,600 25,600 24,320 22,300 20,150 12,360 3,065 810 305 20
Investment inc 185 425 1,205 1,265 1,315 1,325 1,535 1,760 1,745 1,625 3,020 2,800 2,850 2,630
Superannuation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 730 1,940 2,555 2,735 2,910
T O T A L  O R I G I N A L 5 , 8 4 5 1 4 , 2 0 0 2 0 , 8 1 0 2 4 , 0 4 0 2 5 , 9 1 5 2 6 , 9 2 0 2 5 , 8 5 0 2 4 , 0 6 0 2 1 , 9 1 0 1 4 , 7 1 5 8 , 0 2 5 6 , 1 6 5 5 , 8 9 0 5 , 5 5 5
Pension 10 5 10 5 5 15 10 35 35 115 2,495 2,960 3,090 3,230
Benefit 205 400 195 140 105 110 120 95 95 95 0 0 0 0
Education trans 115 95 20 10 15 15 20 15 5 5 0 0 0 0
T O T  T R A N S F E R S * * 3 3 0 5 0 5 2 2 0 1 6 0 1 2 5 1 3 5 1 5 5 1 5 0 1 3 5 2 1 5 2 , 4 9 5 2 , 9 6 0 3 , 0 9 0 3 , 2 3 0
GROSS INCOME 6,175 14,705 21,035 24,200 26,040 27,060 26,005 24,210 22,045 14,925 10,520 9,125 8,980 8,790
Income tax 1,060 3,254 5,790 7,225 8,190 8,760 8,540 7,850 6,990 4,415 2,265 1,735 1,620 1,445
D I S P O S A B L E  I N C 5 , 1 1 5 1 1 , 4 5 0 1 5 , 2 4 5 1 6 , 9 7 5 1 7 , 8 5 0 1 8 , 2 9 5 1 7 , 4 6 5 1 6 , 3 6 0 1 5 , 0 5 0 1 0 , 5 1 0 8 , 2 5 5 7 , 3 9 0 7 , 3 6 0 7 ,3 4 5
EQUIVALENT INC 8,384 17,775 21,405 21,385 22,300 24,570 25,470 26,120 24,620 18,105 14,950 13,690 13,155 12,540
% Married 2.1 22.1 51.4 67.7 72.3 73.2 73.0 71.6 69.9 68.1 65.1 60.9 53.0 37.8
Av no children 0.018 0.226 0.662 1.218 1.386 1.115 0.648 0.230 0.061 0.015 0 0 0 0
% in Labour Force 68.0 95.4 98.0 98.5 99.2 99.0 95.7 92.8 89.8 60.9 24.1 6.2 2.9 0.4
% Work F T * 70.0 89.4 94.7 95.5 95.8 96.1 95.4 90.8 85.4 80.9 72.6 58.6 53.1 62.5
% Exp Any Unemp# 25.1 22.0 10.5 6.6 5.9 6.4 7.1 6.1 5.7 6.1 0 0 0 0
Hourly wage rate* 6.75 8.75 9.90 11.15 11.95 12.45 12.65 12.80 13.05 13.00 10.65 12.45 10.10 5.60
Av hrs worked pa* 1366 1711 2063 2116 2118 2131 2125 2045 1979 1912 1278 1142 1128 1053
% with degree 0 8.1 15.1 17.1 18.3 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.1 19.0 19.0 19.8 20.5 24.0
% sec sch only 42.5 39.3 24.8 16.9 11.8 9.1 8.9 8.9 8.8 9.0 8.9 9.4 9.6 9.0
Notes; * denotes average for those in the labour force (not average for whole age group).
# Per cent unemployed is the percentage experiencing any unemployment during a year, and thus looks higher than standard cross-section unemployment rates during a single 
point in time.
** Includes small amount of child transfers for male sole parents.
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Figure 9.2: Average Amounts of Income Received Each Year by Age by Males
Placed in the Lowest Decile of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Income
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Figure 9.3: Average Amounts of Income Received Each Year by Age by Males 
Placed in the Highest Decile of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Income
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The standard of living achieved by the top decile during retirement was also far 
higher, with the average income after age 65 of around $30,000 being more than 
three times as much as that achieved by males on average. The relative drop in 
standard of living in retirement was also less, due to the cushioning impact of 
superannuation, with average retirement incomes being well over half the income 
achieved during the peak working years. (As age pension in Australia is income- 
tested on current income, and bears no relationship to past earnings, the top decile 
of males received no cash transfers in retirement.)
The preceding figures simply trace gross income received during the lifecycle, 
thereby taking account of transfers but not taxes. One would expect the relative 
advantage enjoyed by the affluent during their lifecycles to be reduced once 
income taxes were deducted from income. In addition, one of the interesting 
questions which can be analysed using the simulation is the extent to which the 
state redistributes income across the lifecycle of individuals, taxing individuals 
during the relatively affluent peak working years and redistributing this income via 
cash transfers to the leaner years of retirement.
The average picture for all males is shown in Figure 9.4, where income taxes from 
labour force entry until retirement massively exceed transfers, but transfers exceed 
taxes from age 65 onwards. It must be emphasised that although average taxes 
are far greater than average cash transfers received during the lifetimes of men, 
this does not mean that the welfare state is ’failing’: income taxes are used to 
finance a very wide range of other services, such as education, health, housing, 
transport and defence, and many of these services provide a direct benefit to 
individuals which a broader incidence study would incorporate. The current study 
merely shows how cash income is redistributed across the lifecycle and, as a 
result, taxes necessarily exceed transfers because they finance so many other 
services.
Once again, the picture for those with varied lifetime standards of living is markedly 
different. For those with the lowest lifetime standard of living, the income tax paid
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Figure 9.4: Average Income Tax Paid or Cash Transfers Received by Age by 
Males
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out during the working years was almost fully recouped during retirement (as was 
shown in Table 7.1, where average taxes were only slightly higher than average 
transfers received during each year of life by the bottom decile). While Figure 9.5 
initially appears to suggest that total transfers received during retirement by those 
in the lowest decile of annualised lifetime equivalent income are actually greater 
than taxes paid in earlier years, this is not the case. As demonstrated in Chapter 
7, the average age of death for men in this decile is 71.6 years and thus, in 
practice, many of them do not live long enough to more than recoup their income 
tax.
The lifecycle pattern of taxes and transfers for those in the top decile of annualised 
lifetime equivalent income is plotted in Figure 9.6. Cash transfers are negligible 
throughout the entire lifecycle, while average income taxes peak at around $25,000 
a year while the top decile are in their late forties, and decline to an average 
$10,000 a year when they retire.
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Figure 9.5: Average Income Tax Paid or Cash Transfers Received by Age by
Males Placed in the Lowest Decile of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Income
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Figure 9.6: Average Income Tax Paid or Cash Transfers Received by Age by 
Males Placed in the Highest Decile of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Income
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As discussed in Chapter 8, it is difficult to measure accurately the degree of intra 
and inter-personal income distribution achieved by income taxes and transfers, 
because income taxes so greatly exceed transfers. Once again, in an attempt to 
identify the direction and magnitude of redistribution more clearly, 27.6 per cent of 
the amount of tax paid by all taxpayers has been calculated for every year (termed 
adjusted income fax). At this level, the absolute amount of all income tax paid by 
all men and women in the simulation exactly equals the amount of all cash 
transfers received by all men and women.
It is then possible to calculate the cumulative amount of adjusted income tax paid 
by particular groups and deduct the cumulative amount of cash transfers received, 
thereby showing the net cumulative gain or loss at different stages of the lifecycle. 
As Figure 9.7 demonstrates, for men as a whole, cumulative adjusted income tax 
exceeds cumulative cash transfers, unless such men live beyond the age of 90. 
As the average age of death for all men is about 74 years of age, on average men 
make a net loss of around $50,000 during their lifetimes. In other words, at death 
men have on average paid out just under $90,000 in adjusted income tax and 
received just under $40,000 in cash transfers. For all males, therefore, about 45 
per cent of their adjusted income tax payments are devoted to intra-personal 
redistribution, or the transfer of income from one part of their life to another; the 
remaining 55 per cent represents inter-personal redistribution, from men to women.
Although this represents the average picture for males, there are significant 
differences among males. (It should also be remembered that this only represents 
the average picture for survivors: those males who die before retirement age 
experience a net loss.) Figure 9.7 also shows the average profiles for those in the 
top and bottom deciles of annualised lifetime equivalent income. Males in the 
bottom decile essentially break even during the working years, moving ahead only 
in retirement. As the average age of death for men with the lowest lifetime 
standard of living is about 72 years, men in this decile on average receive about 
$38,000 more in cash transfers during their lifetimes than they pay out in adjusted 
income tax.
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In contrast, men in the top decile, who die at the average age of about 72.5 years, 
have on average paid out about $260,000 more in adjusted income tax during their 
lifetimes than they have received in cash transfers. For men in this decile, only 
about two per cent of the adjusted income tax which they pay during their lifetimes 
is received back in the form of cash transfers, so that intra-personal redistribution 
for those in this decile is minimal.
Figure 9.7: Cumulative Gain or Loss From Taxes and Transfers During the 
Lifecycle for Males
CUMULATIVE CASH GAIN OR LOSS $100000
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Note: The average age of death is 73.7 yrs for all males, 71.6 yrs for males in the lowest decile and
72.5 yrs for men in the top decile.
The graph shows cumulative annualised cash transfers received by a given age minus cumulative 
adjusted annualised income taxes paid by the same age.
Despite these apparently very major transfers of income from men with high 
lifetime standards of living to men with low lifetime standards of living, the 
distribution of income remains very unequal over the lifecycle. A clearer picture 
of the extent to which living standards across the lifecycle are being equalised is
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provided in Figure 9.8, which traces the equivalent income per year of males 
ranked into quintiles on the basis of their annualised lifetime equivalent family 
income. In other words, the total amount of equivalent income received by all 
males during their lifetimes was first calculated; second, this was divided by years 
of life minus 15 to derive annualised equivalent income, and third, all males were 
then ranked by ascending amount of annualised lifetime equivalent family income 
and divided into five equal groups. After all males were assigned to one of these 
groups, it was then possible to go back and re-examine the income received by 
those in each group during each year of life, taking full account of transfers 
received in that year, income taxes paid in that year and the number of adults and 
children being supported by that income in that particular year.(1)
Once account was taken of needs, the disparity between living standards before 
and after retirement was somewhat reduced, thereby indicating that, during the 
peak working years, the advantage of higher income was partly offset by the need 
to support more people with that income. Equivalent income during retirement 
amounted to about 52 per cent of peak equivalent income received during the 
working years for males on average; for those in the top and bottom fifth of the 
lifetime distribution of equivalent income, equivalent income amounted to about 63 
and 60 per cent respectively to the highest equivalent income achieved while in 
work.
Living standards were most unequal during the late forties and early fifties, when 
those in the top quintile benefited from an annual equivalent income which was 
about three times greater than that of the bottom quintile. In retirement, the 
differences in living standards narrowed, with the bottom eighty per cent of the 
population having a relatively comparable standard of living, but the gap between 
the top 20 per cent and the rest of the population widening.
(1) As discussed in Chapter 5, it is the equivalent income of the income unit which is calculated and 
attributed to all adults within the income unit. This means that during the years when a male is part of 
a married couple, any income of the wife is included in the calculation of equivalent income. During 
the years when the male is single, his equivalent income is simply his own income after application of 
the relevant equivalence scale.
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Figure 9.8: Annual Equivalent Income by Age For Males, Ranked by Quintile
of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Income
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The Lifecycle Income of Females
As with males, the average earnings of females increase sharply during their 
twenties and thirties, peaking at ages 40 to 44 (Figure 9.9). However, even though 
the average hourly wage rate of females rises steadily during their twenties and 
thirties (Table 9.2), average annual earnings dip during the early thirties, in 
response to the declines in labour force participation during the peak child bearing
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and raising years. Investment income increases during the early fifties, as the 
family responsibilities of women decrease and more income is available for 
investment, remaining at about the same level until retirement from age 60 
onwards, when both the absolute level of investment income and its relative 
contribution to total income increase again.
Figure 9.9: Average Amounts of Income Received Each Year by Age by 
Females
Cash transfers remain a more significant source of income during the entire 
lifecycle for women than for men, due principally to the payment of child-related 
cash transfers to mothers rather than fathers. During the peak working years, 
women’s personal incomes are much lower than men’s: while Figures 9.1 and 9.9 
are drawn to different scales on the vertical axis, at their height the average 
incomes of women are about 60 per cent of those of men. In retirement, however, 
the average incomes of men and women are much more equal, at about $9,000
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a year. While males surviving past the age of 70 receive higher superannuation 
payments than women, the absolute amount of investment income received by 
women is slightly higher, as they inherit income-producing assets from their 
husbands.
Once again, the aggregate picture glosses over the enormous differences in 
income during the lifecycle for women at different ends of the income spectrum. 
Figure 9.10 shows the lifecycle pattern for women whose lifetime income and 
family circumstances placed them among the bottom 10 per cent of all women, 
ranked by annualised lifetime equivalent income. Such women received very low 
earned incomes, peaking at only $6,000 a year, with average earnings slumping 
during their late twenties and thirties as they remained at home with children.
Average yearly investment income was also negligible, at a few hundred dollars a 
year, and superannuation in retirement almost non-existent. Cash transfers 
remained an important source of income during their lifetimes, rising in the late 
twenties and thirties with child transfers, declining in the fifties as children left 
home, and rising again in retirement, when they formed by far the most significant 
component of post-retirement income.
For those women in the top decile of annualised lifetime equivalent income, cash 
transfers were an insignificant source of income during both pre and post­
retirement (Figure 9.11). The earnings profile was much more similar to that of all 
males where, despite the slight dip caused by family responsibilities in the early 
thirties, earnings continued to rise to peak at just over $25,000 in the forties, 
roughly the same absolute level as was achieved by males on average (Figure 
9.1). Although the average invesment income for women in the top decile was 
lower than that for men in the top decile, it was a very important source of income, 
with both investment income and superannuation rising in the eighties as spouses 
died and the surviving wives inherited assets and occupational pension 
entitlements. Women in the top decile were also more likely than other women to 
remain in the labour force after the statutory retirement age was reached, with 
some 21 per cent still working on a full or part time basis in their late sixties.
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Figure 9.10: Average Amounts of Income Received Each Year by Age by
Females Placed in the Lowest Decile of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent
Income
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Figure 9.11: Average Amounts of Income Received Each Year by Age by 
Females Placed in the Highest Decile of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent 
Income
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Table 9.2: Income and Other Characteristics of Females by Age
AGE
MEASURE 15-20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80+
Earnings 4,605 9,420 10,025 10,575 12,450 14,115 13,550 12,865 10,005 3,675 1,600 860 0 0
Investment income 135 255 815 875 1,055 1,045 1,015 2,515 2,390 3,455 3,495 3,550 3,565 1,765
Superannuation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 550 790 1,005 1,290 3,720
T O T A L  O R I G I N A L * * 4 , 7 4 5 9 , 6 8 5 1 0 , 8 8 5 1 1 , 5 4 0 1 3 , 6 3 5 1 5 , 2 7 5 1 4 , 6 7 5 1 5 , 4 2 0 1 2 , 4 1 0 7 , 6 8 0 5 , 8 8 0 5 , 4 2 0 4 , 8 5 0 5 , 4 9 0
Pension 95 355 410 430 430 330 290 425 595 2,165 2,835 3,075 3,230 3,315
Benefit 160 225 75 30 20 20 40 10 10 0 0 0 0 0
Education transfers 110 75 20 20 40 50 45 25 5 5 0 0 0 0
Child transfers 25 140 350 540 525 350 145 40 10 0 0 0 0 0
T O T  T R A N S F E R S 3 9 0 8 0 0 8 5 0 1 ,0 2 0 1 ,0 1 5 7 5 0 5 1 5 5 0 0 6 2 0 2 , 1 6 5 2 , 8 3 5 3 , 0 7 5 3 , 2 3 0 3 , 3 1 5
GROSS INCOME 5,135 10,485 11,735 12,560 14,650 16,025 15,190 15,920 13,030 9,850 8,715 8,490 8,085 8,805
Income tax 690 1,875 2,420 2,780 3,520 4,100 3,915 4,295 3,300 1,865 1,530 1,380 1,150 1,365
D I S P O S A B L E  I N C 4 , 4 4 0 8 , 6 1 0 9 , 3 1 5 9 , 7 8 0 1 1 , 1 3 0 1 1 , 9 2 0 1 1 , 2 7 5 1 1 , 6 2 5 9 , 7 3 0 7 , 9 8 5 7 , 1 8 5 7 , 1 1 0 6 , 9 3 5 7 , 4 4 0
EQUIVALENT INC 7,880 16,365 18,750 19,295 21,010 23,225 23,825 24,565 21,200 15,660 13,310 12,810 12,460 12,860
% Married 7.4 34.2 58.9 69.2 71.5 71.9 69.9 68.2 64.5 59.7 52.3 42.6 29.8 12.0
Av no children 0.087 0.438 1.008 1.519 1.521 1.109 0.538 0.166 0.041 0.007 0.001 0 0 0
% in Labour Force 62.0 84.8 75.3 72.5 77.0 81.2 77.7 70.2 59.3 27.3 9.9 5.5 0 0
% Work F.T.* 49.2 79.5 73.1 70.3 74.0 77.8 78.4 88.5 88.7 87.7 83.5 85.9 0 0
% Exp Any Unemp# 20.2 21.0 14.9 11.8 10.4 10.1 10.6 5.9 6.7 0 0 0 0 0
Hourly wage rate* 6.75 8.30 9.40 10.20 10.60 10.95 10.80 10.30 9.50 8.15 10.65 10.35 0 0
Av hrs worked pa* 1182 1433 1513 1511 1617 1684 1704 1849 1849 1758 1786 1858 0 0
% with degree 0 9.1 15.1 16.7 18.0 18.7 18.7 18.7 18.9 19.3 19.6 19.7 19.9 22.0
% sec sch only 37.6 42.8 32.0 23.9 17.5 13.4 12.5 12.5 12.4 12.6 12.7 12.7 12.6 11.5
Note: *  denotes average for those in labour force.
** Includes maintenance. All income figures rounded to nearest $5. Totals may not sum due to rounding. 
# % unemployed is % experiencing any unemployment during year.
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The tax-transfer system generates a significant amount of lifecycle income 
redistribution for women, providing transfers during the twenties and thirties, when 
family responsibilites are at their height, and after retirement in the early sixties. 
As a comparison of Figures 9.4 and 9.12 demonstrates, cash transfers are more 
important for women than for men during working years, although in retirement the 
average value of cash transfers is similar. The amount of income tax paid during 
the lifecycle is much lower, reflecting the reduced taxable incomes of women 
compared to men, and peaks at only around $4,000, less than half of the peak for 
men.
Figure 9.12: Average Income Tax Paid or Cash Transfers Received by Age by 
Females
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The lifecycle pattern of taxes and transfers for those with the highest and lowest 
levels of lifetime standard of living is strikingly at odds with the picture on average. 
As Figure 9.13 illustrates, women in the lowest decile of lifetime equivalent income 
received much more in transfers during their lifetimes than they paid in taxes and,
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with the exception of the 45 to 49 years age range, received more in transfers than 
they paid in income tax during every year of their life.
The profile for women in the top decile is again more similar to that of males in the 
top decile, with income tax rising steeply during the twenties and thirties and 
declining in retirement. The characteristic twin-humped pattern of cash transfers 
for women in again evident, although cash transfers remain very low, never 
exceeding $1,000 (Figure 9.14).
As with men, it is possible to compare cumulative adjusted income tax with 
cumulative cash transfers received - ie. to compare the amount of cash transfers 
received against the amount of income tax devoted to the provision of cash 
transfers (27.6 per cent of all income tax paid by men and women). Interestingly, 
the picture for all women is similar to that of men in the bottom decile of annualised 
lifetime equivalent income, in that cumulative adjusted taxes paid essentially equal 
cumulative transfers received during the working years, but net gain increases 
sharply in retirement, when transfers outpace adjusted taxes.
The average age of death for all women is around 79 years, so on average women 
make a net gain of about $40,000. (This is lower than the male average loss of 
$50,000 which finances the $40,000 gain of women; because women live on 
average for five years longer than men, the net loss of men has to be shared 
between more women). This means that, for women in general, all adjusted 
income tax payments contribute to intra-personal income redistribution; looked at 
from a lifecycle perspective, all taxes collected during the peak working years are 
redistributed backwards to the years of child rearing and, far more importantly, 
forwards to the years of retirement.
For women belonging to the bottom decile of annualised lifetime equivalent income, 
cash transfers exceed adjusted income tax throughout the lifecycle. At the average 
age of death of 81.6 years, women in this decile have received about $100,000 
more in cash transfers than they have paid in income tax. As Figure 9.15 shows,
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Figure 9.13: Average Income Tax Paid or Cash Transfers Received by Age by
Females in the Lowest Decile of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent income
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Figure 9.14: Average Income Tax Paid or Cash Transfers Received by Age by 
Females in the Highest Decile of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Income
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there is no point in the lifecycle when women with the highest lifetime standards 
of living have received more in cash transfers than they have paid in adjusted 
income tax. Thus, there is not only redistribution from men to women, but also 
from rich women to poor women, ranked by lifetime standard of living.
Figure 9.15: Cumulative Gain or Loss From Taxes and Transfers During the 
Lifecycle for Females
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Note: The average age of death is 78.8 yrs for all females, 81.6 yrs for women in the lowest decile and
76.5 yrs for females in the top decile.
While the above analysis has examined the personal income distribution of women, 
and the extent to which this income is modified during the lifecycle by income taxes 
and transfers, this does not take account of income sharing within families. For 
example, while women in the lowest lifetime equivalent income decile have very 
low personal incomes which never exceed $8,000 a year during their entire 
lifetimes, the low earned incomes of many such women might result from them 
shouldering the child care and other family responsibilities while a male 
breadwinner provides income for the family.
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To compare the standard of living achieved by different women during their 
lifecycles, rather than to just compare their income, equivalent income must be 
used. In Figure 9.16, women have been divided into quintiles on the basis of their 
annualised lifetime equivalent income, and then the annual equivalent income of 
each quintile during every year of life has been plotted. As comparison with Figure 
9.8 demonstrates, the standard of living achieved by women during their lifetimes 
is fairly similar to that of men. The standard of living of those in the bottom quintile 
does not show great variation across their lifecycle, although the flatness of the line 
should not disguise the fact that equivalent income during retirement is still only 
53 per cent of the highest equivalent income achieved during the peak working 
years.
The impact of children upon lifetime standards of living is again clearly apparent, 
as the increases in earned income during the twenties and thirties are offset by the 
greater number of people amongst whom that income must be shared, resulting 
in slow growth in living standards during the late twenties and thirties. For the top 
four quintiles, living standards peak in the early fifties, after child-related 
responsibilites have eased but before the drop in average earnings really begins 
to make an impact. During retirement, real standards of living decline, with 
equivalent income averaging some 53 per cent of the peak level achieved only 15 
years earlier, and the standard of living achieved being somewhat lower than that 
won during the early twenties.
While the equivalent incomes of most quintiles of women at a given age are 
somewhat lower than the equivalent incomes of men in comparable quintiles (due, 
for example, to single men typically having higher incomes than single women), the 
difference is far less pronounced than examination of personal incomes would 
suggest. However, the disparity between the equivalent incomes of men and 
women in their top respective quintiles is greater than the difference apparent at 
lower quintiles. For example, the peak equivalent incomes of men in the top 
quintile are 10 per cent higher than the peak equivalent incomes of women in the 
top quintile.
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Figure 9.16: Annual Equivalent Income by Age For Females, Ranked by
Quintile of Annualised Lifetime Equivalent Income
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9.3 LIFECYCLE INCOME BY LIFETIME FAMILY 
STATUS
Males
For males, marital status and the presence of children made relatively little 
difference, in comparison to women, to either sources or amount of income 
received, or to the amount of income tax paid or cash transfers received. 
However, while all married males had fairly similar income profiles, never married
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males received less income during their lifetimes than ever married males.(1) For 
example, Figures 9.17 and 9.18 show the amount of income received by age by 
never married men, and by married men who spent more than 21 years in a family 
with dependent children. The peak incomes of the latter are a few thousand 
dollars higher than those of the former, and the hump shaped pattern of earnings 
is more pronounced for the ever married group during their forties.
In addition, while there is little difference in the pattern of receipt of transfers or 
payment of taxes amongst married males, never married males pay less income 
tax than married males, due to their lower taxable incomes (Figures 9.19 and 
9.20). Never married males also receive higher cash transfers in retirement than 
married males, presumably because the age pension for single people is higher 
than half the married pension, and because spouse income does not result in any 
reduction of pension.
A clearer picture of redistribution between males by marital and child status can 
be gained by comparing their cumulative cash transfers received during their 
lifetimes with the cumulative income tax required to finance all cash transfers (ie.by 
taking the standard 27.6 per cent of all income taxes paid). Figure 9.21 traces the 
cumulative loss of never married males and those who married and spent more 
than 21 years in families with dependent children. Once again, such males pay 
more in adjusted income taxes during their prime working years than they receive 
in cash transfers, so their cumulative net loss increases steadily until retirement 
age is reached. In retirement, the net loss of the never married group is reduced 
at a faster rate than that of the ever married group, due to their higher age
(1) During construction of the model, the marital status of males was not used as an explanatory factor 
affecting labour force participation (due both to the problems of adding an additional explanatory factor 
and to tests suggesting that marital status was not a significant factor, once education and age had 
been controlled for - see Chapter 4). However, whether males were married or divorced was used in 
the simulation of hourly wage rates, with the wage rates of both married and divorced men generally 
being higher than those of unmarried men. Marital status was also used in the simulation of 
investment income and divorce emerged as a significant explanatory variable in the modelling of 
superannuation receipt for males.
Figure 9.17: Average Income Received Each Year by Age by Never
Married Males
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Figure 9.19: Average Income Tax Paid or Cash Transfers Received by Age 
by Never Married Males
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Figure 9.18: Average Income Received Each Year by Age by Ever Married
Males Who Spent 21 or More Years in a Family With Dependent Children
30000
20000
10000
NCOME $
15-19 20-2125-29 30-3135-39 lO-H 15-49 50-5155-59 60-6! 65-69 70-71 75-79 BO-
AGE
^  Earnings PI Investment Income
9  Superannuation HI Cash transfers
Figure 9.20: Average Income Tax Paid or Cash Transfers Received by Age 
Ever Married Males Who Spent 21 or More Years w ith Dependent Children
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pension. However, at the average age of death, of 70.6 years for the never married 
group and 75.5 years for the ever married group who spent more than 20 years 
in families with dependent children present, both groups have still incurred a 
substantial net loss. The figures suggest that there is a minor amount of 
redistribution from married to never married males.
Figure 9.21: Cumulative Gain or Loss from Adjusted Taxes and Transfers 
During the Lifecycle for Never Married Males and Married Males With More 
Than 20 Years in Families With Dependent Children
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Note: The average age of death for never married men is 70.6 years and 75.5 years for ever married 
men with 21 or more years with dependent children.
There are, however, major differences in the equivalent income during the lifecycle 
of men by lifetime marital and child status (Figure 9.22). As one would expect, for 
men with children, roughly the same amount of income is shared amongst more 
people, and their equivalent income is commensurately lower. The impact of 
dependent children and, to a lesser extent spouses, is particularly marked for men 
from ages 25 to 55, when the equivalent income of ever married men with no 
children and, to a reduced extent, of never married men without children, is
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significantly higher than that of men with children.
The equivalent income of men with children declines smoothly with the number of 
years spent in a family with dependent children, with those who spent more than 
20 years in such a family experiencing the lowest equivalent income during the 30 
years from ages 25 to 55. From age 25 to 40, the equivalent incomes of men who 
spent 15 or more years with dependent children does not increase, and even 
declines in the early thirties despite increases in earned income, reflecting the 
demands placed upon family income during the years of family formation and 
growth. In contrast, the equivalent income of ever married men without children 
continues to increase rapidly during this period, as increases in earned income are 
directly reflected in rising living standards. From age 55 onwards, when the impact 
of children has faded, the equivalent incomes of men by their lifetime marital and 
child status are very similar.
Figure 9.22: Annual Equivalent Income by Age For Males by Lifetime Family 
Status
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Females
The personal incomes of women, on the other hand, show the impact of lifetime 
marital and child status far more clearly than those of men. Figure 9.23 traces the 
average incomes received by ever married women who never had children. The 
dip in earnings apparent in Figure 9.9 for all women no longer exists, as those 
without children remain in the labour force for extended periods and have an 
earnings profile like that of males. Investment income picks up in the fifties and 
remains at much the same level until retirement, when it shows further growth.
The incomes during the lifecycles of ever married women who had three or more 
children are plotted in Figure 9.24; the dip in earnings during the twenties and early 
thirties is once again apparent, and the earned incomes of such women remain low 
relative to those of other women during all of their lives. Child transfers are 
significant during the 30 years after age 20, with cash transfers dropping only in 
the fifties before increasing again because of age pension during the sixties.
Figures 9.25 and 9.26 contrast the average income tax paid and cash transfers 
received each year by ever married women with no and three or more children. 
The twin peaks of cash transfers are clearly apparent for women with three or 
more children, while the profile of cash transfers for those with no children is 
essentially flat until retirement age. Those with no children pay substantially more 
income tax due to their higher earned incomes in particular, and their income tax 
payments peak at an earlier age than those for women with three or more children, 
reflecting the delayed labour force entry or re-entry of those with such heavy family 
responsibilties.
Once again, to isolate the direction of redistribution between women it is necessary 
to compare cumulative transfers received with the income taxes used to finance 
them. Figure 9.27 plots the extent to which cumulative taxes exceed cumulative 
transfers, and shows clearly that there is redistribution from women without children 
towards those with children. Sole parents who never marry receive the highest net 
gain, having received some $90,000 more in transfers during their lifetime than 
they paid in adjusted income tax by the time they died at the average age of 75.
Figure 9.23: Average Income Received Each Year by Age by
Ever Married Females With No Children
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Figure 9.25: Average Income Tax Paid or Cash Transfers Received 
by Age by Ever Married Females With No Children
NCOME TAX PAP OR CASH TRANSFERS RECEIVED7500
5000
2500
1549 20-24 25-29 30*31 35-39 4044 4549  50-54 55-50 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 00+
____________________AGE________________
-v - Income tax ■ °  Cash transfers
Figure 9.24: Average Income Received Each Year by Age by Ever
Married Females With Three or More Children
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Figure 9.26: Average Income Tax Paid or Cash Transfers Received 
by Age by Ever Married Females with Three or More Children
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Similarly, during their whole lifetimes, there is no point at which the cumulative 
average adjusted income taxes paid by married women with three or more children 
exceed their average cash transfers received. Both married and unmarried women 
without children have similar net loss profiles until retirement, when single women 
move ahead because of the family structure of age pension. Ever married women 
without children are the only group not to make a substantial net gain; on average, 
they die at about age 80, just at the point when cumulative cash transfers 
marginally exceed the same level as cumulative adjusted income tax payments.
Figure 9.27: Cumulative Gain or Loss From Adjusted Income Tax and Cash 
Transfers During the Lifecycle, for Females Ranked by Family Status
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Note: The average age of death for never married women without children is 76.6 years; for never 
married women with children is 74.6 years; for ever married women without children is 80.3 years; for 
ever married with one or two children is 79 years and for ever married with three or more children is 
78.9 years (Table 6.5).
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Nonetheless, despite these transfers, ever married women without children enjoy 
higher standards of living than any of the other groups considered during the 
lifecycle. The equivalent incomes each year of women with different lifetime 
marital and child profiles are traced in Figure 9.28. Those who became sole 
parents and never married have the lowest equivalent incomes for three decades 
from age 20 onwards, which suggests that the substantial social security and tax 
assistance received by this group does not begin to compensate them fully for the 
additional costs involved with the sole support of children.
Ever married women without children achieve the highest standard of living, and 
fare better on average than any of the other categories of women during every 
year in their entire lifecycles. Although never married women without children 
attain a higher standard of living during their twenties and thirties than married 
women with children, they are outpaced during their forties, when the children of 
such married women leave home but they continue to benefit from the higher 
incomes of their husbands.
The impact of large family size upon living standards is pronounced, as shown by 
the very low growth in the standard of living of women with three or more children 
during their twenties and thirties. However, the equivalent incomes of such women 
rise rapidly during their forties as their children leave home and they enter the 
labour force, and by the age of 50 the equivalent incomes of women who had large 
families is almost at the same level as those married women who had no or less 
than three children.
In retirement, ever married women also fare better then never married women, as 
they share in the incomes of spouses, although the degree of income dispersion 
is much less marked than during the prime working years.
While these results might suggest that the equivalence scales implicit in the 
Australian social security system are too generous towards those with children 
such scales, as mentioned earlier, are almost identical to the British DHSS scales
3 6 6
in their treatment of children, and according to the British Central Statistical Office 
these scales are not out of step with international practices (CSO, 1990).
In addition, it must also be stressed again that the differences apparent between 
men and women with different lifetime family characteristics are not only due to 
their family status. Those who have children are not identical to those who do not 
have children in all other respects, and the results also reflect these discrepancies.
Figure 9.28: Annual Equivalent Income by Age for Females Ranked by 
Lifetime Marital and Child Status
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9,4 LIFECYCLE INCOME BY LIFETIME 
EDUCATION STATUS
Males
As the results outlined in Chapters 6 to 8 have already made clear, those with 
higher educational qualifications achieve higher lifetime incomes and are more 
likely to belong to deciles with the highest lifetime standards of living. However, 
the analysis to date has not analysed the relative advantage enjoyed by the better 
educated at different stages of the lifecycle. While at ages 15 to 19 the average 
incomes of those who only ever achieve secondary qualifications are higher than 
the incomes of those who go on to earn degrees, graduates make great gains 
during their early twenties, so that by age 25 to 29 the average incomes of 
graduates are already about one-third higher (Figures 9.29 and 9.30). The relative 
earnings advantage enjoyed by graduates continues to increase; when graduate 
incomes peak at ages 45 to 49, at about $38,000, they are then receiving about 
twice as much income as males with secondary qualifications only. In retirement, 
those who never achieved any tertiary qualifications receive minimal 
superannuation and are largely dependent on cash transfers. In contrast, 
graduates receive about twice as much income in retirement as those with 
secondary qualifications only, with superannuation and investment income 
contributing the bulk of post-retirement income.
The differing patterns of receipt of cash transfers and payment of income tax are 
illustrated in Figures 9.31 and 9.32; the income tax profile of those with secondary 
qualifications is relatively flat, reflecting the lower incomes received during the 
lifecycle, while the profile for graduates is steeply humped, with income taxes 
peaking at more than double the amount paid by those with secondary 
qualifications. In retirement, those with secondary qualifications for the first time 
become net beneficiaries, receiving more in age pension than they pay in income 
tax. Those with degrees continue to pay more in income tax than they receive in 
cash transfers, even in retirement.
Figure 9.29: Average Income Received Each Year by Age by
Males With Secondary School Qualifications Only
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Figure 9.31: Average Income Tax Paid or Cash Transfers Received 
by Age by Males With Secondary School Qualifications Only
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Figure 9.30: Average Income Received Each Year by Age by
Males With Degrees
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Figure 9.32: Average Income Tax Paid or Cash Transfers Received 
by Age by Males With Degrees
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The direction of redistribution achieved by the tax-transfer system can be more 
clearly grasped by comparing the cumulative distribution of cash transfers with the 
income taxes which financed those cash transfers (27.6 per cent of all income tax 
paid). While there is redistribution from those with tertiary qualifications towards 
those with secondary qualifications, this redistribution is never sufficient to make 
any of the three categories of males considered net gainers (Figure 9.33).
Although those with secondary school qualifications do begin to receive 
substantially more in cash transfers than they pay in adjusted income tax after 
retirement (reflected in the cumulative net loss line in Figure 9.33 beginning to 
curve upwards for this group after age 64) when they die at the average age of 73 
they are still net losers, having paid out more in adjusted income tax during their
Figure 9.33: Cumulative Gain or Loss From Adjusted Income Tax and Cash 
Transfers During the Lifecycle for Males by Highest Educational Qualification 
Achieved
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Note: The average age of death is 73.0 yrs for those with secondary qualifications, 73.4 yrs for those 
with some tertiary qualifications and 75.1 yrs for graduates.
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lifetimes than they recoup in cash transfers. Similarly, when graduates die at the 
average age of 75, their cumulative loss still exceeds $100,000.
Finally, Figure 9.34 traces the standard of living enjoyed by males with different 
educational achievements, after taking full account of all income taxes paid, cash 
transfers received, and family composition and size. From age 25 onwards, 
graduates enjoy substantially higher living standards than other males, with the 
differences being greatest during the forties and fifties and narrowing somewhat 
in retirement. Although those with some tertiary qualifications (particularly those 
who gained trade qualifications during their teens) enjoyed higher equivalent 
incomes for the first 10 years after labour force entry, they were outpaced during 
their mid twenties by those with degrees.
Figure 9.34: Annual Equivalent Income by Age For Males by Highest 
Educational Qualification Achieved
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Females
The lifecycle income profiles of women by educational qualification achieved are 
very different, with women with secondary qualifications only being more likely to 
drop out of the labour force upon marriage or childbirth. Their income thus first 
peaks at ages 20 to 24, before slumping during the years of family formation, and 
subsequently peaking again at ages 40 to 44, when labour force participation rates 
again rise. Female graduates, on the other hand, maintain much more consistent 
labour force attachment, and this is reflected in the continuous increases in 
earnings for the three decades following labour force entry. The impact of family 
formation is, however, still clearly apparent if the profile of women with degrees is 
compared to that of men with degrees (Figure 9.30), with the income of female 
graduates increasing at a slower rate from age 25 onwards, and peaking five years 
later at ages 50 to 55.
Cash transfers are a significant source of income for women with secondary 
qualifications only during much of their lifecycle, but attain particular importance 
during retirement, when they are the major source of income. For female 
graduates, cash transfers are less significant and comprise less than one-third of 
post-retirement income (although they are more important for female graduates 
upon retirement than for male graduates, because the latter receive substantially 
higher superannuation payments).
The patterns of lifecycle payments of income tax and receipt of cash transfers are 
again strikingly different, as Figures 9.37 and 9.38 illustrate. While cash transfers 
during the prime working years are only about $1,000 lower than the income taxes 
paid each year by women with secondary qualifications, income taxes far exceed 
cash transfers for female graduates. Once retired, the average cash transfers 
received each year by women with secondary qualifications are far greater than 
their annual income tax liabilities, while for women with degrees, although cash 
transfers do exceed income taxes in retirement, the discrepancy is not very large.
Figure 9.35: Average Income Received Each Year by Age by
Females With Secondary School Qualifications Only
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Figure 9.37: Average Income Tax Paid or Cash Transfers Received 
by Age by Females With Secondary School Qualifications Only
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Figure 9.36: Average Income Received Each Year by Age by
Females With Degrees
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Figure 9.38: Average Income Tax Paid or Cash Transfers Received 
by Age by Females With Degrees
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While Figure 9.38 shows clearly that women with degrees pay far more in income 
tax than they receive in cash transfers during their lifecycle, firm conclusions about 
the magnitude and direction of redistribution are difficult to draw, because the 
income taxes paid by female graduates finance a wide range of other services in 
addition to the provision of cash transfers. It is easier to decide whether such 
women are net winners or losers if the volume of cash transfers received is 
compared directly with the income taxes which finance such transfers (ie. 27.6 per 
cent of total income taxes).
Figure 9.39 plots the cumulative gain or loss made when such cumulative adjusted 
income taxes are subtracted from cumulative cash transfers received, and the 
conclusions reached are very different. Women with degrees live on average until 
about age 81, when the net loss which occurred during their working lives has 
been whittled away by the cash transfers received during retirement, so that such 
women make an average gain of just under $15,000.
Women with some tertiary qualifications essentially break even during their working 
lives, with the amount of adjusted income tax paid each year being fairly equal to 
the value of cash transfers received, so that by age 59 they have made a net 
contribution of only some $5,000 to the pool of money which finances cash 
transfers. In retirement, they begin to be net beneficiaries, and by the average age 
of death at about age 79 they have received around $40,000 more from the ’cash 
transfers pot’ than they have contributed. Women with secondary qualifications 
alone are net winners during their entire lifecycles and have made a net gain of 
some $75,000 by the time they die at the average age of 78.
The substantial amount of redistribution which occurs, however, reduces but in no 
way eliminates the inequality of original income, so that female graduates still enjoy 
a significantly higher standard of living throughout their lifecycle (Figure 9.40). 
While the equivalent incomes of women without degrees plateau during their forties 
and early fifties, those of female graduates continue to show strong growth, so that 
income differentials are at their height at ages 50 to 55. The equivalent incomes
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Figure 9.39: Cumulative Gain or Loss From Adjusted Income Tax and Cash 
Transfers During the Lifecycle, for Females Ranked by Highest Educational 
Qualification Achieved
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Note: The average age of death is 77.8 yrs for secondary qualifications only, 78.5 yrs for those with 
some tertiary qualifications and 80.6 yrs for graduates.
of all three groups slump during retirement, although female graduates feel the 
pinch most strongly as their earned incomes drop sharply, so that the degree of 
inequality by educational achievement lessens after age 65.
As comparison of Figures 9.34 and 9.40 suggests, males achieve a higher 
standard of living than females with comparable educational qualifications 
throughout all of the prime age working years, although living standards in 
retirement show less discrepancy by sex, with the exception that the equivalent 
income of male graduates in retirement is a few thousand dollars higher than that 
of female graduates.
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Figure 9.40: Annual Equivalent Income by Age for Females by Highest
Educational Qualification Achieved
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9.5 CONCLUSION
The tax-transfer system has a profound effect on lifecycle income, redistributing 
income from the years of work to years of retirement (intra-personal redistribution) 
and between individuals with different charactersitics (inter-personal redistribution). 
Aggregate income taxes paid are so much greater than aggregate cash transfers 
received that they make accurate identification of the magnitude and direction of 
redistribution very difficult: the easiest way to analyse the type of redistribution 
occurring is therefore to compare cash transfers received with the income taxes 
used to finance those cash transfers (termed adjusted income tax, and amounting 
to 27.6 per cent of all income tax payments).
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When cumulative cash transfers were compared with cumulative adjusted income 
tax paid, the following groups emerged as net winners, and were thus the 
beneficiaries of inter-personal redistribution from other taxpayers;
- males with the lowest lifetime standard of living (ie. in the bottom decile of males 
ranked by annualised lifetime equivalent income);
- all females on average;
- females with the lowest lifetime standard of living (ie. in the bottom decile of 
women ranked by annualised lifetime equivalent income);
- never married females who did and did not have children and ever married 
females who had children;
In other words, for all of the above groups, on average all adjusted income tax paid 
was received back in the form of cash transfers at some other point in the lifecycle.
The following groups were net losers, and thus paid more in adjusted income tax 
than they received in cash transfers during their lifecycle;
- all males on average;
- females with the highest lifetime standard of living (ie. in the top decile of women 
ranked by annualised lifetime equivalent income);
- ever married females without children;
Even for these groups the amount of intra-personal redistribution was substantial. 
For example, for males on average, about 45 per cent of all adjusted income tax 
paid was recouped at some point in their lifecycle. However, for those with the 
highest lifetime standards of living, very little of the adjusted income tax they paid 
contributed to the redistribution of income from one part of their own life to another. 
For males in the top decile of annualised lifetime equivalent income, around two 
per cent of their adjusted income tax payments were returned to them in the form 
of cash transfers, while for females in the top decile the figure was around 4 per 
cent.
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Despite the scale of these transfers, living standards during the lifecycle for those 
with different characteristics remained highly unequal. Most groups faced 
precipitous falls in their standard of living upon retirement, perhaps indicating that 
the state could play a larger role in intra-personal income redistribution. In 
addition, although living standards for both men and women tended to become 
more equal after the age of 50 when most children had left home, those with 
children had very much lower living standards than those without children during 
the thirty years after age 20. While there is continuing debate about the extent to 
which the decision to have children is a private choice - and thus about the extent 
to which the state should intervene to support families with children - it is clear 
that the child transfers available in 1986 were not sufficient to prevent families with 
children experiencing much lower living standards than those without children for 
more than one-third of their lives.
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION
The original purpose of this study was to examine lifetime income distribution and 
redistribution in Australia. In the absence of any comprehensive Australian 
longitudinal data, it became clear that analysing such issues would require the 
simulation of lifetime profiles, and a number of methods of creating synthetic 
lifetime records were investigated. In the event, the techniques of dynamic 
microsimulation appeared to provide the best method of capturing the constant 
changes in the circumstances of individuals over time revealed by overseas panel 
data.
It should, however, be appreciated that the construction of dynamic microsimulation 
models is a relatively recent development in the social sciences, and that such 
models remain to be comprehensively tested and validated. Vast amounts of both 
cross-sectional and longitudinal data are required to build such models, and major 
problems are created by the difficulty of separating out the age, cohort and period 
effects embodied in the data used to set the various parameters in the models, and 
by the improvisation required when available data are inadequate.
Construction of a dynamic cohort model for Australia, where no longitudinal data 
are available, is an even more challenging task. While comparison of the results 
of the model with existing Australian cross-sectional data suggested that the model 
had achieved realistic profiles at any given age, there is simply no way of knowing 
whether the dynamic linkages in the model are accurate. For example, while the 
labour force participation rates by age, sex and education produced by the 
simulation closely match those found in the 1986 Australian Income Distribution 
Survey, this does not necessarily mean that the labour force participation patterns 
of individuals over time are correctly captured. As a result, all of the results of the 
model can only be regarded as indicative rather than definitive.
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Apart from the very major problems created by data deficiencies, other restrictions 
should also be emphasised. First, most of the results only deal with the distribution 
of money income, and the income base does not include such items as fringe 
benefits, imputed rent or the imputed value of usage of goods and services 
provided by the government. Similarly, with the exception of education outlays, 
only the redistribution of cash income by government is assessed, and indirect 
taxes and most government services are currently excluded from the scope of the 
model.
Second, a number of important assumptions were made when imputing receipt of 
cash transfers and payment of income taxes, with such transfers or taxes assumed 
to be fully incident upon those receiving them or legally liable to pay them, and 
their burden or benefit assumed to be equivalent to their monetary value. No 
account has been taken of the underground economy or tax evasion, and the 
extent of tax avoidance was probably underestimated in the simulation.
Third, the redistributive effect of government was analysed while implicitly 
assuming that the distribution of pre-tax pre-transfer income would remain the 
same in the absence of government. This ’zero-government counterfactual’ is 
clearly invalid, but exactly how the distribution of income would change if 
government disappeared is difficult to quantify.
Fourth, only Federal government income taxes and cash transfers were modelled, 
and incorporation of taxes levied or benefits paid by state and local governments 
could appreciably change the results.
Fifth, the results of the model are obviously dependent upon the various 
parameters built into it. For example, if different assumptions were made about 
differential mortality rates, dynamic labour force profiles, the degree of earnings 
mobility and so on, then different results would be produced. While it would be 
highly desirable to conduct sensitivity analysis in the future, to assess the extent
to which the most important conclusions would be affected by changes in such 
parameters, it has not been possible to include such analysis in the present study.
In addition, equivalent income has been used extensively to rank members of the 
pseudo-cohort, and use of an equivalence scale which was markedly different to 
that implicit in the Australian social security system at January 1990 could 
appreciably change the results.
In conclusion, it must be recognised that a broader definition of income, the 
inclusion of other Federal services and taxes or other tiers of government, other 
assumptions about the incidence and valuation of taxes and transfers, a different 
counterfactual, changes in key parameters, or use of a different equivalence scale 
could markedly change the conclusions reached about the distribution or 
redistribution of lifetime income.
Lifetime vs Annual Income Distribution
With these caveats in mind, the simulation produced the following results. First, 
the distribution of lifetime income, after taking account of differential length of life, 
was much more equal than the distribution of annual income. Although the precise 
results depended upon the income measure used, the annualised lifetime 
disposable income of both men and women was about 40 per cent more equal 
than annual disposable income, when measured using Gini coefficients.
This indicates that a substantial proportion of the inequality apparent in cross- 
section analyses of income distribution is simply due to the sampled income units 
being at different stages of their lifecycles, rather than to inter-personal differences 
in lifetime income. This impression was also confirmed by an annual-to-lifetime 
equivalent income transition matrix; when all individuals were ranked by their 
annual equivalent income, about one-fifth of the individuals remained in the same 
decile of lifetime equivalent income, while around 45 per cent either remained in 
the same decile or moved up or down by only one decile. Those with lower annual
381
incomes were more likely to be placed in higher lifetime deciles than those with 
higher annual incomes were to be placed in lower lifetime deciles, so that income 
at a single point in time was a more reliable indicator of relative lifetime position for 
those with high incomes than for those with low incomes. Overall, therefore, the 
relative positions occupied by individuals captured in surveys at a single point in 
time appear to provide a reasonable indicator of their relative lifetime position in 
about half of all cases.
Lifetime vs Annual Tax-Transfer Incidence
Analysis of the redistributive impact of income taxes and cash transfers over the 
lifetime, suggested that annual tax-transfer incidence studies do markedly overstate 
the redistributive impact of such programs, but that they are nonetheless still 
progressive on a lifetime basis in Australia. For example, income taxes amounted 
to zero per cent of the annual gross income of individuals in the bottom decile of 
annual equivalent income, but reached about 38 per cent of the gross income of 
those in the top decile of annual equivalent income. Such annual results are 
similar to those found in other studies of tax incidence at a single point in time, with 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics finding that in 1984 income taxes amounted to 
zero per cent of the gross income of households in the bottom decile and about 
30 per cent of the gross income of households in the top decile (although these 
results were for households rather than individuals, and such households were 
ranked by gross income rather than equivalent income - 1987b:22). The lifetime 
incidence of income taxes found in the model is very different to the annual 
incidence, rising from 12 per cent of annualised lifetime gross income for 
individuals in the bottom decile of annualised lifetime equivalent income to 38 per 
cent of gross income for those in the top decile.
Similar differences in the lifetime and annual incidence of cash transfers were also 
apparent. While cash transfers amounted to almost 60 per cent of the gross 
income of individuals in the bottom quintile of annual equivalent income, they did 
not even reach one per cent of the gross income of those in the top decile of
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annual income. On a lifetime basis, cash transfers accounted for 20 per cent of 
the annualised lifetime gross income received by those in the bottom quintile of 
equivalent income, declining to under one per cent of the annualised gross income 
of those individuals in the top decile of annualised lifetime equivalent income.
The difference between the annual and lifetime incidence of taxes and transfers 
simply demonstrates that many of the high income taxpayers captured in cross- 
section income surveys must have experienced lower incomes in earlier years or 
later in life and, similarly, that many of the cash transfer recipients in annual 
surveys either go on to earn reasonable incomes later in life or enjoyed higher 
incomes earlier in their lives when they were in the workforce. This is confirmed 
by comparison of the annual and lifetime concentration coefficients for income 
taxes and cash transfers. The coefficient for the annualised lifetime distribution of 
income taxes was almost 30 per cent lower than that for annual income taxes, 
while the lifetime coefficient for cash transfers was just under 60 per cent of that 
for annual cash transfers. This indicates that, over the whole lifetime, the benefit 
of cash transfers and the burden of income taxes is much more equally distributed 
than annual incidence studies suggest.
Nonetheless, despite this more equal distribution, even when assessed against 
lifetime income, both income taxes and cash transfers were definitely progressive, 
and redistributed cash income from those with higher to those with lower lifetime 
incomes. This indicates that both programs achieve the promotion of vertical 
equity, which is one of their major goals.
Intra vs Inter-Personal Income Redistribution
Although some have suggested that government programs of income redistribution 
simply shift income from one part of an individual’s lifecycle to another, funding the 
transfers received while studying or retired from the income taxes collected from 
the same individual during the prime working years, the above finding indicates that 
this is not the case. Income taxes finance the provision of so many other services,
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in addition to cash transfers, that simply comparing total income taxes paid with 
total cash transfers received masks the extent of intra-personal and inter-personal 
income redistribution which is being achieved. To circumvent this problem, cash 
transfers were also compared with only those income taxes which financed them. 
Some 28 per cent of all income taxes paid in the simulation would exactly finance 
all cash transfers received, so these adjusted income taxes were contrasted with 
the transfers received by different groups.
The results suggested that about 45 per cent of all the adjusted income taxes paid 
by males were returned to them in the form of cash transfers at some other point 
in their lifecycle, while the remaining 55 per cent were devoted to inter-personal 
redistribution. While this was the average picture for all males, males in the bottom 
four deciles of annualised lifetime equivalent income recouped all of the adjusted 
income taxes they paid through cash transfers. The picture was very different for 
women, for whom, on average, all adjusted income taxes paid were recouped via 
cash transfers. Once again, however, the average picture disguised major 
variation amongst women, with the top quintile of women, ranked by annualised 
lifetime equivalent income, incurring a net loss.
Relative Position of Men and Women
Government income tax and cash transfer programs thus resulted in substantial 
redistribution of income from men to women. This should not be overstated, as 
part of the losses made by many husbands were no doubt recouped by their wives 
through child transfers, and total family income might therefore not have been 
affected, despite the transfer of resources from husbands to wives. The lifetime 
redistribution of income from men to women also reflects the relatively 
disadvantaged position of women, who receive much lower earned incomes during 
their lifetimes, and thereby pay less income tax than men. In addition, women are 
more likely to experience sole parenthood than men and thus benefit from transfers 
to sole parents, and also live longer on average, thereby benefiting from more 
years of age pension.
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Despite this redistribution of resources from men to women, women received much 
less income during their lifetimes than men, with the average annualised lifetime 
disposable income of $9050 received by women during each year of adult life 
amounting to only 68 per cent of the comparable disposable incomes of men. 
However, this only reflects income personally received by men and women. Any 
comparison of relative living standards requires that account be taken of presumed 
income sharing within the family unit as, for example, the low earned incomes of 
many women might not provide an accurate guide to their economic welfare if they 
were sharing in the income of an employed spouse.
To take account of family circumstances and needs, the equivalent disposable 
income recieved by the family unit was calculated and attributed to each partner 
within married couples (while, for single people, equivalent income was simply their 
disposable income divided by the relevant equivalent scale). Once income sharing 
within married couples and the needs of families were both considered, the 
annualised lifetime equivalent incomes of women averaged 90 per cent of those 
of men (with men still enjoying higher lifetime living standards because they 
received higher average incomes than women during the years they were single).
However, although economists typically assume equal sharing of resources within 
the family unit, recent empirical research has suggested that such equal sharing 
does not always occur. Consequently, when a 60:40 income split by married 
couples in favour of the husband was assumed, the equivalent incomes received 
by women during each year of adult life amounted to only 71 per cent of those 
achieved by men. This suggested that assessments of relative welfare might be 
more sensitive to the assumptions made about income sharing within the family 
than many economists have traditionally appreciated.
Lifetime Income By Education
Lifetime income varied greatly by education, family status, and unemployment 
status. Those with higher lifetime incomes tended to be the better educated, those
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who spent more years in the labour force and more hours employed once in the 
labour force, and those who married but did not have children.
Male graduates earned 1.7 times as much income on average during each year 
of adult life as males who only achieved secondary school qualifications; after also 
also including investment income and superannuation, their annualised lifetime 
original incomes were 1.8 times higher. However, these differences were 
ameliorated by income taxes and cash transfers, so that their annualised lifetime 
disposable incomes were only 1.5 times greater.
The discrepancies between the lifetime incomes of women by education status 
were even more marked. The annualised lifetime earnings of female graduates 
were on average 2.2 times greater than those of women who had no tertiary 
qualifications, while their original incomes in each year of adult life were 2.3 times 
greater. These inequalities were once again reduced by the tax-transfer system, 
so that the annualised lifetime disposable incomes of women with degrees were 
some 1.8 times higher than those of women with only secondary school 
qualifications.
These figures thus suggested that the income forgone during years of study was 
more than recouped by higher earnings later in life. However, particularly for 
women, higher earnings were the product of many more hours in the labour force, 
as well as an increased hourly wage rate. For example, women with degrees 
averaged an extra 605 40-hour weeks in the labour force during their lifetimes, 
compared to those with only secondary school qualifications.
Most studies of the private rate of return to education do not take such additional 
work effort into account, and simply examine the total annual earnings of those 
with and without degrees. However, while the extent to which shorter working 
hours reflect voluntary or involuntary choice is clearly debatable, standardising for 
differential patterns of labour force participation indicated that the relative income 
advantage derived from higher education was reduced once such factors were
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taken into account. Indeed, the decline in the relative advantage for female 
graduates was so great that it suggested that studies which did not take differential 
labour force participation patterns into account could be highly misleading.
Despite this, higher education definitely paid. This was emphasised by the lifetime 
incidence of education outlays, where outlays on both universities and tertiary cash 
transfers were proportional across most of the income distribution, rather than 
being progressive. This suggested that the recent introduction of the Higher 
Education Contribution Scheme in Australia would help to improve the lifetime 
progressivity of such outlays.
Lifetime Income By Family Status
While family status had relatively little impact upon the personal earned incomes 
of men, it had a major effect upon the personal incomes of women, with women 
without children having much higher labour force participation rates, and thus 
earnings, than those with children. The earned incomes of ever married women 
with three or more children were particularly low, amounting to only 65 per cent of 
the annualised lifetime earnings received by ever married women without children.
However, for both men and women, having children resulted in a significantly lower 
lifetime standard of living (measured in purely monetary terms) while, for women, 
remaining single also resulted in reduced lifetime welfare. Amongst women, 
female sole parents who never married experienced the lowest lifetime standard 
of living, with an annualised equivalent lifetime income which was one-fifth lower 
than that of ever married women without children. The equivalent incomes of 
never married women, and those of ever married women who had three or more 
children, were reasonably similar, amounting to about 87 per cent of the annualised 
equivalent income of ever married women without children. Those married women 
who had only one or two children fared much better, with an equivalent income 
only five per cent lower than their counterparts without children.
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Similarly, ever married men who spent more than 20 years in a family with 
dependent children present had lower lifetime living standards than men in the 
other four family status groups considered, with an annualised equivalent lifetime 
income which amounted to only 85 per cent of that of ever married men without 
children. Those men who never married, or who married but spent between one 
and fourteen years in a family with dependent children, achieved equivalent 
incomes which were about 93 per cent of those won by ever married men without 
children. For both men and women therefore, lifetime income was maximised by 
marrying but not having children.
These findings were emphasised by examination of welfare during the lifecycle. 
Both men and women with children experienced lower average equivalent incomes 
than those without children for the thirty years following the age of 20. Living 
standards tended to become much more equal after the age of 50, once children 
had left home. However, the equivalent incomes of never married women were 
below those of married women after this age, as they did not share in the benefits 
of the higher incomes earned by husbands. Living standards in retirement were 
well below those achived during the prime working years, with post-retirement 
equivalent incomes being similar to those received in the early twenties.
In conclusion, the simulation suggested that the distribution of lifetime income was 
about 40 per cent more equal than that of annual income, even though the top 
decile of individuals ranked by annualised lifetime equivalent income still enjoyed 
disposable incomes which were 3.6 times greater than those of the bottom decile. 
Cash transfers and income taxes were both less progressive when measured 
against lifetime income than annual income, but nonetheless redistributed income 
from those with high to those with low lifetime incomes.
Further education resulted in significantly higher lifetime incomes, even after taking 
account of differential labour force participation patterns, while having children 
dramatically reduced lifetime equivalent income. While much of the income 
redistribution achieved by government cash transfers and income taxes was intra­
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personal, the pronounced slump in living standards during the years of retirement 
and family formation and growth suggested that perhaps even more could be done 
to equalise living standards across the lifecycle.
Future Uses of the Model
While this summarises the results of the first version of the HARDING model, much 
remains to be done in the future. It would be useful, given the concern with the 
potential costs of the ageing of the population, to extend the model to include the 
institutionalised aged, and to simulate aged parents returning to live in the 
households of their children. Incorporation of indirect taxes, and of other 
government services apart from education, is also a high priority, so that a more 
comprehensive picture of the impact of government upon income distribution and 
redistribution can be derived. In addition, changing key parameters within the 
model, and examining the effects upon the results, is an important task for the near 
future.
It would also be interesting to use the model to assess reforms made to the social 
security and income tax systems since 1986, and to examine the lifetime impact 
of possible future policy reforms. For example, the Australian government has 
introduced major changes to the system of child transfers since 1986, and the 
above analysis indicates that such reforms are likely to have further reduced 
remaining inequalities in lifetime income, and to have directed resources to those 
stages of the lifecycle where individuals typically experience lower standards of 
living.
There is also the possibility in the future of using the same dynamic 
microsimulation techniques to construct a sophisticated dynamic population model, 
which would involve projecting a cross-section sample, such as that in the 1986 
Australian Income Distribution Survey, forward through time. Australian policy 
makers contemplating changes to government programs would then have access 
to static microsimulation models, which gave them detailed estimates of the
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immediate cost of such changes and of the characteristics of winners and losers; 
to dynamic cohort models, which provided estimates of the likely impact upon the 
lifetime income distribution and analysed whether such reforms were well-targeted 
towards those areas of the lifecycle where individuals experienced the lowest 
standards of living; and to dynamic population models, which would chart the cost 
and distributional implications of such changes over the next few decades.
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APPENDIX 1: THE 1986 AUSTRALIAN INCOME DISTRIBUTION
SURVEY
Many of the parameters in the model were estimated using the 1986 Australian 
Income Distribution Survey (IDS) micro data tape. In particular, the labour force 
participation, earnings and other income parameters were estimated from this data 
source.
The survey covered both rural and urban areas in all States and Territories, and 
covered both private and special dwellings. Private dwellings are houses, flats, 
home units, garages, tents and any other structures used as private places of 
residence at the time of the survey. Special dwellings are hotels, boarding houses, 
construction camps, caravan parks, etc.
The survey included all persons aged 15 or over except:
(a) certain diplomatic personnel of overseas governments, customarily excluded 
from census and estimated populations;
(b) overseas residents in Australia;
(c) members of non-Australian defence forces (and their dependants) stationed 
in Australia;
(d) persons who migrated to Australia after 30 June 1986; and
(e) students in boarding schools and residents of institutions such as hospitals 
and sanatoria, and inmates of gaols, reformatories, etc.
The survey was based on a multi-stage area sample of private dwellings and non­
private dwellings, and covered about one-sixth of one per cent of the population 
of Australia. The survey was conducted throughout Australia in the period 
September to December 1986. The information was obtained by trained 
interviewers in a personal interview conducted with each resident aged 15 or over 
in the selected dwelling. Respondents were asked to refer to personal records 
such as taxation assessment or return forms, group certificates, pay slips, etc. to 
enhance the accuracy of the data. Persons with income from their own business
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who did not know their annual income were asked if the interviewers could call 
back when their records were available. Call-backs were made in February to 
March 1987.
The estimates provided in the IDS tape are subject to two types of error:
1. Sampling error
This is the difference which would be expected between the estimate and the 
corresponding figure that would have been obtained from a collection based on the 
whole population using the same questionnaires and procedures.
2. Non-sampling error
These errors can occur whether the estimates are derived from a sample or from 
a complete enumeration, and are usually referred to as non-sampling errors. 
Three major sources of non-sampling error are:
(a) inability to obtain comprehensive data from all persons included in the 
sample. These errors arise because of differences which exist between the 
characteristics of respondents and non-respondents.
(b) errors in reporting on the part of both respondents and interviewers. These 
reporting errors may arise through inappropriate wording of questions, 
misunderstanding of what data are required, inability or unwillingness to 
provide accurate information and mistakes in answers to questions; and
(c) errors arising during processing of the survey data. These processing
errors may arise through mistakes and data recording.
Definitions of Variables
The following variable definitions were used in the 1986 IDS, and therefore also 
used in the model.
Dependent child. Person aged under 15 years, or aged 15 to 20 years and a full­
time student, who has a parent/guardian in the income unit and is neither a spouse 
nor parent of anyone in the income unit.
Earned income. Gross income from wages or salary, and from own business, 
trade or profession.
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Employed person. Person aged 15 years or more, who in his or her main job:
(a) Worked for one hour or more for pay, profit, commission or payment in kind 
in a job or business, or on a farm (including employees, employers and self- 
employed persons); or
(b) worked for fifteen hours or more in a family business or on a farm; or
(c) was an employee who had a job but was not at work and was on paid 
leave; on leave without pay for less than four weeks prior to the placement 
date; stood down without pay because of bad weather or plant breakdown 
at their place of employment for less than four weeks prior to the placement 
date; on strike or locked out; on workers’ compensation and expected to 
be returning to their job; or receiving wages or salary while undertaking full­
time study; or
(d) was an employer or self-employed person who had a job, business or farm, 
but was not at work.
Full-time workers. Persons were classified as full-time workers on the basis of 
the kind of work in which they were mostly engaged during 1985-86, full-time work 
being defined as work occupying 35 hours or more per week.
Full-year, full-time workers are those who had worked in Australia for at least 48 
weeks during the year 1985-86 and had been engaged mostly in full-time work. 
A person who had worked for 25 weeks full-time and 23 weeks part-time would 
have been classified as a full-year full-time worker; however, it should be noted 
that most persons who work for a full year engage in either full-time or part-time 
work, but not in both.
Full-year, part-time workers are those who had worked in Australia for at least 
48 weeks during the year 1985-86 and had been engaged mostly in part-time work.
Gross weekly income was defined as the sum of amounts usually received per 
week at the time of interview. It includes moneys received from wages or salary, 
government pensions and other regular payments such as superannuation, 
maintenance, etc. It also includes derived weekly equivalent amounts of income 
received usually from own business, partnerships, interest, rent, dividends, etc. 
during 1985-86.
Income Unit. A group of people who live together and form a single spending 
unit. In the IDS, income units comprise the following: (i) married couple income 
units; (ii) one-parent income units and (iii) one-person income units.
Interest, rent, dividends, etc. includes gross income from interest on savings, 
bonds, debentures, etc., dividends from stocks and shares, net income from rental 
of a house or other property and net royalties. Current income from these sources 
was estimated by deriving a weekly equivalent of amounts received from these 
sources in 1985-86.
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Labour force. Persons were classified as being in the labour force if they were 
employed or unemployed.
Married couple income units consist of husband and wife and dependent children 
(if any) as defined. De facto relationships are included.
One-parent income units consist of a parent and at least one dependent child.
One-person Income units consist of persons who are not included in married 
couple or one-parent income units. Non-dependent children living with their 
parents are classed as one-person income units.
Other private income comprises income from ’superannuation’, ’interest, rent and 
dividends’ and ’other sources’.
Other sources refers to gross income from other than wages or salary, own 
business, government pensions and benefits, superannuation or interest, rent or 
dividends. It comprises gross income from items such as private educational 
scholarships, maintenance or alimony, a trust or will, and an annuity. Income paid 
at regular intervals and received by a beneficiary under a will, settlement, deed, gift 
or instrument or trust was included. However, a lump sum payment from any of 
these sources was not regarded as Income.
Own business, trade or profession (including income from a share in a 
partnership). In these cases, income was defined to be net of business 
expenses. If income had not been received in 1985-86 or a loss had been made, 
income from these sources was recorded as nil. Current income from these 
sources was estimated by deriving a weekly equivalent of amounts received from 
these sources in 1985-86.
Part-time workers. Persons classified as part-time workers on the basis of the 
kind of work in which they were mostly engaged during 1985-86, part-time work 
being defined as work occupying less than 35 hours a week.
Part-year, full-time workers are those who had worked in Australia for less than 
48 weeks (during the year 1985-86 and had been engaged mostly in full-time work. 
A person who had worked for 24 weeks full-time and for 23 weeks part-time would 
have been classified as a part-year, full-time worker; however, it should be noted 
that most persons who work for less than a year engage in either full-time or part- 
time work but not in both.
Part-year, part-time workers are those who had worked in Australia for less than 
48 weeks during the year 1985-86 and had been engaged mostly in part-time work.
Superannuation comprises gross income from regular payments made to a 
person or his survivors by a former employer, either directly or through a 
superannuation fund, insurance company, etc. Any lump sum payment received
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by a person on his retirement was excluded.
Unemployed persons are those aged fifteen years and over who were not 
employed during the survey week, and
(i) had actively looked for full-time or part-time work at any time in the four 
weeks up to the end of the survey week and;
- were available for work in the survey week, or would have been 
available except for temporary illness (i.e. lasting for less than four 
weeks to the end of the survey week); or
- were waiting to start a new job within four weeks from the end of 
the survey week and would have started in the survey week if the job 
had been available.
(ii) were waiting to be called back to a full-time or part-time job from 
which they had been stood down without pay for less than four 
weeks up to the end of the survey week (including the whole of that 
week) for reasons other than bad weather or plant breakdown.
Wages or Salary was defined as the gross income from all wage or salary jobs 
and limited liability companies before the deduction of tax. The value of items such 
as payments in kind, employer contributions to board or rent, gratuities and tips, 
etc. were not recorded as income.
395
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aaron, H and M McGuire (1970). "Public goods and income distribution", 
Econometrica, 38:6, November, pp 907-920.
Abowd J M and A Zellner (1985). "Estimating gross labor-force flows", Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics, Vol.3, pp 254-283.
Altmann, R.M. (1981). "Take-up of supplementary benefit by male pensioners", 
ESRC Programme on Taxation Incentives and the Distribution of Income 
Discussion Paper no. 25, London, London School of Economics.
Altmann, R M and A B Atkinson (1982). "State pensions, taxation and retirement 
income: 1981-2031" in M Fogarty (ed), Retirement Policy - The Next Fifty Years, 
London, Heinemann.
Altonji, Joseph G. (1986). "Intertemporal substitution in labour supply: evidence 
from micro data", Journal of Political Economy, 94:3, pt2, June, pp S176-S215.
Anderson, D S and A E Vervoon (1983). Access to Privilege: Patterns of 
Participation in Australian Post-Secondary Education, Canberra, Australian National 
University Press.
Atkinson, A B (1983). The Economics of Inequality (2nd edition), Oxford, 
Clarendon Press.
Atkinson, A B and F A Cowell (eds)(1983). Panel Data on Incomes, ICERD 
Discussion Paper No 2, London School of Economics , July.
Atkinson, A B and Holly Sutherland (1988). "TAXMOD", in A B Atkinson and Holly 
Sutherland (eds), Tax-Benefit Models, STICERD Occasional Paper No.10, London, 
London School of Economics.
Atkinson, A B, J Gomulka, and N H Stern (1989). "Spending on alcohol: evidence 
from the family expenditure survey 1970-1983", STICERD Taxation, Incentives and 
the Distribution of Income Programme, Discussion Paper No 114, January.
Atkinson, A B, and J Micklewright (1990). "Unemployment compensation and 
labour market transitions: A critical review", STICERD Taxation, Incentives and the 
Distribution of Income Programme, Discussion Paper No.143, January.
Atkinson, A B, F. Bourguignon, and C Morrisson (1988). "Earnings Mobility", 
European Economic Review 32, pp 619-632.
396
____________ (1990). "Empirical studies of earnings mobility: a survey" (mimeo),
London School of Economics, forthcoming in the Fundamentals of Pure and 
Applied Economics Series, London, Harwood.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (1984). Social Indicators, No 4, Canberra.
__________ (1986a). Child Care Arrangements, Australia, November 1984, Cat
No 4402.0, Canberra.
__________ (1986b). Pre-Schools and Child Care Centres, 1986, Cat No 4202.3,
Queensland Office, Brisbane.
__________ (1987a). National Schools Statistics Collection, Australia 1986, Cat
No 4211.0, Canberra.
__________  (1987b), The Effects of Government Benefits and Taxes on
Household Income, Cat No 6537.0, Canberra, AGPS.
__________ (1987c). Tertiary Education Australia 1985, Cat No 4218.0, Canberra.
__________ (1987d). Deaths Australia 1987, Cat No 3302.0, Canberra.
__________ (1987e). Births Australia 1986, Cat No 3301.0, Canberra.
__________ (1988a). Estimated Resident Population by Marital Status, Age and
Sex, Australia, Cat No 3220.0, Canberra.
__________ (1988b). Marriages, Australia 1987, Cat No 3306.0, Canberra.
__________ (1988c). Divorces, Australia 1987, Cat No 3307.0, Canberra.
__________ (1988d). Births, Australia 1987, Cat No 3301.1, Canberra.
__________  (1988e). Family Formation Survey: Australia, Cat. No. 3223.0,
September.
__________ (1989). Disabled and Aged Persons, Australia ,1988, Preliminary
Results, Cat No 4118.0, Canberra.
Australian Taxation Office (1988). Taxation Statistics 1985-86, Canberra, AGPS.
Ballard, C L, J B Shoven, and J Whalley (1985). "General equilibrium 
computations of the marginal welfare costs of taxes in the United States", 
American Economic Review, 75: 1, March, pp 128-138.
Barna, T (1945). Redistribution of Incomes Through Public Finance in 1937, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
397
Barr, N (1987). The Economics of the Welfare State, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson.
Barro, R J (1974). "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?", Journal of Political 
Economy, 82, pp 1095-1117.
Bascand, G M and M G Porter (1986). "Taxes and incentives - the leaky bucket," 
in John G. Head (ed) Changing the Tax Mix, Australian Tax Research Foundation, 
Conference Series No. 6.
Baudelot, Christian (1983)."The individual evolution of earnings in France: 
1970-1975", in A B Atkinson and F A Cowell (eds), (1983).
Bentley, Phillip, D J Collins and N T Drane (1974). "The incidence of Australian 
taxation", Economic Record, 50.
Benus, Jacob and James N. Morgan (1975). "Time period, unit of analysis and 
income concept in the analysis of income distribution", in James D. Smith (ed) 
(1975).
Berger, Mark C (1985). "The effect of cohort size on earnings growth: a re­
examination of the evidence", Journal of Political Economy, 93: 3, June, pp 
561-573.
Blanchfiower, D and A Oswald (1990). "Working Internationally", Discussion 
Paper No. 371, Centre for Labour Economics, London School of Economics, 
London, January.
Blinder, A S (1974). Toward an Economic Theory of Income Distribution, 
Cambridge (Mass), MIT Press.
Blomquist, Nils S (1976). The Distribution of Lifetime Income: A Case Study of 
Sweden, Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, Dept, of Economics, Princeton.
Blomquist, Nils S (1981). "A comparison of distributions of annual and lifetime 
income: Sweden around 1970", Review of Income and Wealth, 27:3, pp 243-264.
Bound, J, C Brown, G J Duncan, and W L Rodgers (1989). "Measurement error 
in cross-sectional and longitudinal labor market surveys: results from two validation 
studies", prepared for the symposium "Panel Data and Labor Market Studies", held 
in Amsterdam, December 15-17, 1988 University of Michigan.
Bourguignon, F and C Morrisson (1983). "Earnings mobility over the life-cycle: a 
30 yrs panel sample of French cadres", in A B Atkinson and F A Cowell (eds), 
(1983).
398
Bradbury, B, J Doyle and P Whiteford (1990). "Trends in the disposable incomes 
of Australian families 1982-83 to 1989-90", Social Policy Research Centre 
Discussion Paper No 16, University of New South Wales, January.
Break, George F (1974). "The incidence and economic effects of taxation" in Alan 
Blinder, R Solow, George Break, P Steiner and 0  Netzer, (eds) The Economics of 
Public Finance, Washington, The Brookings Institution.
Brooks, Clive and Paul A. Volker (1985). "Labour market success and failure: an 
analysis of the factors leading to the workforce destinations of the Australian 
population", in Paul A Volker (ed).
_________ (1986). "The probability of leaving unemployment: the influence of
duration, destination and demographics", Economic Record, 62:178, pp 296:309.
Brown, C V (1983). Taxation and the Incentive to Work, 2nd edition, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press.
Brown, A and A J Fox (1984). "OPCS longitudinal study -10 years on", Population 
Trends, 37, pp 7-14.
Brown, C V and P M Jackson (1990). Public Sector Economics, 4th edition, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Browning, Edgar K and William R Johnson (1979). The Distribution of the Tax 
Burden, Washington DC, American Institute for Public Policy Research.
Browning, Martin, Angus Deaton and Margaret Irish (1985). "A profitable approach 
to labour supply and commodity demand over the life cycle", Econometrica, 53:3, 
pp 503-544.
Buhman, B, L Rainwater, G Schmans, and T M Smeeding (1988). Equivalence 
scales, well-being, inequality and poverty: sensitivity estimates across ten countries 
using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database", Review of Income and 
Wealth 34: 2, June, pp 115-142.
Bureau of Labour Market Research (1983). Retired, Unemployed or at Risk: 
Changes in the Australian Labour Market for Older Workers, Research Report No 
4, Canberra, AGPS.
_(1985a). Who’s in the Labour Force? A Study of Labour Force
Participation, Research Report No 7, Canberra, AGPS.
__________ (1985b). Youth Employment Patterns, Research Report No 9,
Canberra, AGPS.
_(1986). Unemployment and the Labour Market: Anatomy of the
Problem, Research Report No 9, Canberra, AGPS.
399
Caldwell, Steven B (1990). "Static, dynamic and mixed microsimulation: choosing 
optimal strategies", Department of Sociology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. 
July.
Carlton, Dennis W and Robert E Hall (1978). “The distribution of permanent 
income", in Griliches et al, 1978.
Carmichael, Gordon A (1986a). "Factors associated with marriage timing in 
Australia", Australian Population Association Third National Conference, Adelaide, 
3-5 December.
___________ (1986b). "Birth order in Australian vital statistics", Journal of the
Australian Population Association, 3: 1, May, pp 27-39.
Carmichael, Gordon A and Peter F McDonald (1988). The Rise and Fall of 
Divorce in Australia, 1968-1986, mimeo, Australian Institute of Family Studies.
Cartter, A M (1955). The Redistribution of Income in Post-war Britain, New 
Haven, Yale Press.
Cass, B (1986). Income Support For Families With Children, Social Security 
Review, Issues Paper No 1, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
October.
Central Statistical Office (UK) (1981). "The effects of taxes and benefits on 
household income, 1979", Economic Trends, 327, pp 104-131.
 (1987). "The effects of taxes and benefits on household income,
1985", Economic Trends, No. 405, July, pp 101-119.
 (1989). Social Trends, London, HMSO.
 (1990). "The effects of taxes and benefits on household income,
1987", Economic Trends, No. 439, May, pp 84-118.
Chapman, B J (1988). "An economic analysis of the Higher Education Contribution 
Scheme of the Wran Report", Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion 
Paper No 1966, Australian National University, October.
Chapman, B J and T T Chia (1989). "Financing higher education: private rates of 
return and externalities in the context of the tertiary tax", Centre for Economic 
Policy Research, Paper No 213, Australian National University, June.
Chapman, B J and P Miller (1983). "Determination of earnings in Australia: an 
analysis of the 1976 census", in Keith Hancock (ed), Japanese and Australian 
Labour Markets: A Comparative Study, Australia-Japan Research Centre, 
Canberra, Australian National University.
400
Choi, C Y and L T Ruzicka (1987). "Recent trends in fertility and family formation", 
Journal of the Australian Population Association, 4: 2, November, pp 123-136.
Clark, A and J Tarsh (1987). "How much is a degree worth?", Education and 
Training UK 1987, London, Policy Journals.
Clark, Kim B and Lawrence R Summers (1979). "Unemployment insurance and 
labour market transitions", in Martin Neil Bailey (ed), Workers, Jobs and Inflation, 
Washington, Brookings Institution.
Collins, D J and N T Drane (1981). "The incidence of commonwealth social 
welfare payments, 1975-76 to 1980-81", Sydney, Centre for Studies in Money, 
Banking and Finance, Working Paper 8108, Macquarie University, October.
__________ (1982). "The incidence of expenditures on social welfare cash
payments in the 1981 -82 Federal Budget", Sydney, Centre for Studies in Money, 
Banking and Finance, Working Paper 8251B, Macquarie University, May.
Commissioner of Taxation (1988). Taxation Statistics 1985-86. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service. December.
Creedy, J and P E Hart (1979). "Age and the distribution of earnings", The 
Economic Journal, 89: 354, June, pp 280-293.
Creedy, J, P E Hart,, A Jonsson and N A Klevmarken (1981). "The distribution of 
cohort incomes in Sweden, 1960-1973: a comparative statics analysis", in N 
Anders Klevmarken and Johan A Lybeck (eds), The Statics and Dynamics of 
Income, Bristol, Tieto.
Crockett, Geoff (1987). "Socio-economic backgrounds of students in tertiary 
education in Australia: some additional evidence", Australian Bulletin of Labour, 13: 
2, March, pp 120-125.
Danziger, S and M Taussig (1979). "The income unit and the anatomy of income 
distribution", Review of Income and Wealth, 25: 4, December, pp 365-375.
Dasverma, B. (1982). Differential Mortality in Australia, Phd thesis submitted to 
Department of Demography, Australian National University, Canberra.
David, Martin (1971). "Lifetime income variability and income profiles", 
Proceedings of Annual Meeting of American Statistical Association, August, pp 
285-92.
______________ (1985). "Introduction: the design and development of SIPP",
Journal of Economic and Social Measurement, 13:3/4, 215-224.
401
Davies, James B (1979). "Life cycle savings, inheritance and the distribution of 
personal income and wealth in Canada", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London School 
of Economics.
Davies, J, France St-Hilaire and J Whaliey (1984). "Some calculations of lifetime 
tax incidence", American Economic Review, 74:4, September, pp 633-649.
Department of Education (1980). Relationships Between Government and Non- 
Government School Enrolments in Australia, unpublished mimeo by 
Commonwealth Department of Education Schools Commission Study Group, 
November.
______________(1986). Annual Report, 1985-86, Canberra, AGPS.
Department of Employment (UK)(1973). "Low pay and changes in earnings", 
Department of Employment Gazette, April.
Department of Employment, Education and Training (1987a). Schooling in 
Australia: Statistical Profile No 1, Canberra, AGPS.
______________(1987b). Completing Secondary School in Australia: A Socio-
Economic and Regional Analysis, Research and Statistics Branch, Canberra.
 (1987c). Annual Report, 1986-87, Canberra, AGPS.
_____________ (1987d). 1984 Survey of Full-time Student Finances, Canberra,
AGPS.
______________(1988a). Report on Progress of Postgraduate Research Award
Holders; 1979 Cohort, Program Assessment Branch, Canberra, AGPS.
___________ (1988b). Assistance for Postgraduate Students: Achieving Better
Outcomes, Canberra, AGPS.
Department of Social Security (1986a). Characteristics of Pensioners, 30 June 
1986, Development Division, Canberra.
___________ (1986b). Six Monthly Statistical Bulletin, June 1986, Development
Division, Canberra.
 (1986c). Annual Report 1985-86, Canberra, Australian Government
Publishing Service.
Dilnot, A W (1990). "The distribution and composition of personal sector wealth 
in Australia", Australian Economic Review, 1st Quarter, pp 33-40.
402
Dodge, David R (1975). "Impact of tax transfer and expenditure policies of 
government on the distribution of personal income in Canada", Review of Income 
and Wealth. March, pp 1 -52.
Duncan, Greg J (ed) (1984). Years of Poverty, Years of Plenty, Ann Arbor, 
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.
Duncan, Greg J and Saul D Hoffman (1984). "Dynamics of work hours, 
unemployment and earnings", in Greg Duncan (ed) (1984).
Duncan, Greg J and Martha S Hill (1985), "Toward a longitudinal definition of 
households", Journal of Economic and Social Measurement, 13 :3 & 4, pp 
361-377.
Dunlop, Y, T Healy and P J McMahon (1983). "Australian models of labour force 
participation: a critical review", in Andre Kaspura (ed) (1983).
Dunsmuir, William, Richard Tweedie, Lloyd Flack and Kerry Mengerson (1988). 
"Modelling of transitions between employment states for young Australians", 
Australian Graduate School of Management, University of NSW, Working Paper 
No 88-010, June.
Dyer, Kenneth F (1988). "Changing patterns of marriage and mating within 
Australia", Australian Journal of Sex, Marriage and Family, 9:2, May, pp 107-119.
Easterlin, Richard A (1980), Birth and Fortune, London, Basic Books.
Eccles, Sandra (1984). "Overview of women’s employment in Australia", in Mavis 
Hoy (ed).
Eckstein, Zvi and Kenneth I Wolpin (1989). "Dynamic labour force participation of 
married women and endogenous work experience", Review of Economic Studies, 
56: 3, No 187, pp 375-390.
Economic Planning Advisory Council (1987). "Aspects of the social wage: a review 
of social expenditures and redistribution", Council Paper No 27, Canberra, EPAC, 
April.
Edwards, Meredith (1981), Financial Arrangements Within Families, Canberra, 
National Women’s Advisory Council.
Elder, Glen (ed) (1985). Ufe Course Dynamics: Trajectories and Transitions, 1968- 
1980. New York, Cornell University Press.
Eyland, E A and L W Johnson (1987). "Dynamics of long-term unemployment 
among Australian youth", 57th ANZAAS Congress, Section G, James Cook 
University, Queensland, 24-28 August.
403
Falkingham, Jane (1990). “LIFEMOD", mimeo, Welfare State Programme, London 
School of Economics, London.
Fase, Martin M (1971). "On the estimation of lifetime income", Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 66:336, December, pp 686-692.
Freeman, Richard B (1979). "The effect of demographic factors on age-earnings 
profiles", Journal of Human Resources, 14:3, pp 289-318.
Friedman, Milton (1957). A Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton, New 
Jersey, Princeton University Press.
Galler, Heinz (1989). "Policy evaluation by microsimulation - the Frankfurt model", 
21st General Conference of the International Association for Research in Income 
and Wealth, Lahnstein, August 20-26.
Galler, Heinz P and Gert Wagner (1986). "The microsimulation model of the Sfb3 
for the analysis of economic and social policies", in Orcutt et al (eds).
Gallagher, Phil (1990). "Australian tax-benefit and microsimulation models: an 
overview", Background paper for OECD Panel on the Use of Microsimulation 
Methods in Social Policy Development and Decision Making, Paris, July 9-10.
Garfinkel, Irwin and Robert Haveman (1977). "Earnings Capacity, Economic 
Status and Poverty", in Marilyn Moon and Eugene Smolensky (eds), (1977).
Gegesy, Ferenc, Margit Juhasz and Peter Szivos (1989). "The Hungarian 
microsimulation system", 21st General Conference of the International Association 
for Research in Income and Wealth, Lahnstein, August 20-26.
Ghez, Gilbert R and Gary S Becker (1975). The Allocation of Time and Goods 
Over the Life Cycle. New York, Columbia University Press.
Gillespie, Irwin (1965). "Effect of public expenditures on the distribution of income", 
in Richard Musgrave (ed), Essays in Fiscal Federalism, Washington, The 
Brookings Institute.
Glennerster, H and W Low (1990). "Education and the welfare state: does it add 
up?", in J. Hills (ed) The State of Welfare, Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
Goodin, Robert E and Julian Le Grand (1987). Not Only the Poor, London, Allen 
and Unwin.
Griliches, Zvi, Wilhelm Krelle, Hans-Jurgen Krupp and Oldrich Kyn (eds) (1978). 
Income Distribution and Economic Inequality. New York, Halsted.
Groenewegen, Peter (1979). Public Finance in Australia: Theory and Practice. 
Sydney, Prentice-Hall of Australia.
404
Hagenaars, Aldi (1989). "Female labour supply in microsimulation models", 
mimeo, to be published in J.K. Brunner and H G Peterson (eds) Prospects and 
Limits of Simulation Models in Tax and Transfer Policy; (forthcoming).
Hain, Winifried and Christof Helberger (1986). "Longitudinal microsimulation of life 
income", in Orcutt et al (eds).
Harding, Ann (1982). "An introduction to the social wage", Social Security Journal. 
December, pp 13-21.
_________ (1984). Who Benefits ? : The Australian Welfare State and
Redistribution, Sydney, Social Welfare Research Centre, Reports and Proceedings 
No 45.
_________ (1990). "Dynamic microsimulation models: problems and prospects",
London School of Economics, Welfare State Programme, Paper No. 48.
Hart, P E (1976a). "The comparative statics and dynamics of income distribution", 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 139:1, pp 108-125.
___________ (1976b). "The dynamics of earnings", Economic Journal, 86,
September, pp 551 -565.
Hayden, Martin (1982). "Factors affecting participation by young people in tertiary 
education: a review of recent Australian literature and research", in 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commision, Learning and Earning, Volume 2, 
Canberra, AGPS.
Head, Brian (1980). "Inequality, welfare and the state: distribution and 
redistribution in Australia", Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology. 16(3), 
November, 44-51.
Health Targets and Implementation Committee (1988). Health for All Australians. 
Report of the Committee to Australian Health Ministers, Canberra, AGPS.
Heckman, James J (1976). "A life-cycle model of earnings, learning and 
consumption", Journal of Political Economy, 83, S3-S45.
Heckman, James J and Thomas E MaCurdy (1980). "A lifecycle model of female 
labour supply", Review of Economic Studies, 47: 1, pp 47-74.
Heike, H D, O Hellwig and A Kaufmann (1987). "Experiences with the Darmstadt 
microsimulation model (DPMS)", International Workshop for Demographic 
Microsimulation, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Budapest, 
Hungary, November 30-December 1.
Hellwig, Otto (1989a). "A chronology of microsimulation models and software", 
mimeo, Augsburg University, April.
405
_______________(1989b). "Microsimulation software - state of the art and outlook",
Fifth Conference on Software for Statistics, Heidelberg, April.
________________(1989c). "Programming a microanalytic simulation model using
software engineering", Fourth International Symposium on Computer Simulation in 
the Social Sciences, Nuremburg, June 27-29.
Henderson, R F (1975). Poverty in Australia, Commission of Inquiry into Poverty, 
Canberra, AGPS.
Hogue, C R and P O Flaim (1986). "Measuring gross flows in the labor force", 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, Vol 4, pp 111 -121.
Howe, B (1989). Child Poverty, Inequality and Social Justice, paper presented at 
Child Poverty Policy Review, Brotherhood of St. Laurence, Melbourne.
Hoy, Mavis (1984). Women in the Labour Force: Proceedings of a Conference, 
Bureau of Labour Market Research, Monograph Series No 4, Canberra, AGPS.
Huther, Michael, Matthias Muller, Hans-Georg Peterson and Bernd Schafer (1989). 
"Microsimulation of alternative tax-transfer systems for the Federal Republic of 
Germany", 21st General Conference of the International Association for Research 
in Income and Wealth, Lahnstein, August 20-26.
Ingles, David (1981). Statistics on the Distribution of Income and Wealth in 
Australia. Research and Statistics Branch, Development Division, Department of 
Social Security. Research Paper No 14, Canberra, October.
Ingles, David, Wayne Jackson, Andrew Podger, and Judy Raymond (1982). 
Taxation Expenditures: Submission by the Department of Social Security to the 
Inquiry into Taxation Expenditures by the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Expenditure. Canberra, Policy Review Branch, Development 
Division, Department of Social Security. Research Paper No. 17, March.
Joshi, Heather, Richard Layard and Susan Owen (1981), "Female labour supply 
in post-war Britain: a cohort approach", Centre for Labour Economics, London 
School of Economics, Paper No 79, London.
Juster, F T (1977). The Distribution of Economic Wellbeing, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Ballinger.
Kakwani, Nanak (1983). Redistribution Effects of Income Tax and Cash Benefits 
in Australia. Centre for Applied Economic Redsearch. Paper No. 18, University 
of New South Wales, January.
_______________(1986). Analyzing Redistribution Policies: A Study of Australian
Data, Melbourne, Cambridge University Press.
406
Kaspura, Andre J (1983). Labour Force Participation in Australia: Proceedings of 
a Conference, Bureau of Labour Market Research, Canberra, AGPS.
Kennedy, Bruce, (1989). "Mobility and instability in Canadian earnings", Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 22:2, pp 383-394.
Killingsworth, M R (1983). Labour Supply, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.
King, Anthony (1987). "The distribution of current disposable incomes: an 
estimation using techniques of microanalytic simulation", National Institute of 
Economic and Industry Research, Working Paper No 1, November, Melbourne.
King, Anthony, Will Foster and Ian Manning (1990). "Microsimulation at NIEIR: 
development and applications", Paper presented at the Social Policy Research 
Centre Workshop on Tax-Benefit Models and Micro-Simulation Methods, Sydney, 
1 June.
King, Raymond J R (1980). "Recent trends in marriage and remarriage in 
Australia", Australian Journal of Sex, Marriage and Famiiy, 1:1,  Febuary, pp 
15-26.
Kitagawa, Evelyn M and Philip M Hauser (1973). Differentials in Mortality in the 
United States: A Study in Socioeconomic Epidemiology, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
Klevmarken, N Anders (1983). "Pooling incomplete data sets", Statistical Review, 
5, pp 69-88.
Layard, Richard (1977). "On measuring the redistribution of lifetime income", in M 
S Feldstein and R P Inman (eds), The Economics of Public Services, London, 
Macmillan.
Lee, Sun-Hee, Len Smith, Edouard d’Espaignet and Neil Thomson (1987). Health 
Differentials for Working Age Australians, Canberra, Australian Institute of Health.
Le Grand, J (1982). The Strategy of Equality - Redistribution and the Social 
Services. London, George Allen and Unwin.
__________ (1986). "On researching the distributional consequences of public
policies", STICERD Paper No 6, London School of Economics, March.
__________ (1987). "Measuring the distributional impact of the welfare state:
methodological issues", in Robert E Goodin and Julian Le Grand (eds).
Lillard, Lee A (1977). "Inequality: earnings vs human wealth", American Economic 
Review, 67:2, pp 42-53.
407
Lillard, Le© and Yoram Weiss (1978). "Experience, vintage and time effects in the 
growth of earnings: American scientists 1960-1970", Journal of Political Economy; 
86: 3, June, pp 427-448.
Linke, R D , L M Oertal and N J M Kelsey (1985). "Participation and equity in 
higher education: a preliminary report on the socio-economic profile of higher 
education students in South Australia, 1974-1984", Australian Bulletin of Labour, 
11:3, June, pp 124-141.
MaCurdy, Thomas E (1981). "An empirical model of labour supply in a lifecycle 
setting", Journal of Political Economy, 89: 6, December, pp 1059-1085.
Maddala, G S (1983). Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in 
Econometrics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Martin, Jean and Amanda White (1988). The Financial Circumstances of Disabled 
Adults Living in Private Households, Office of Population Cenuses and Surveys, 
Social Survey Division, London, HMSO.
Martin, Jean, Howard Meltzer and David Elliot (1988). The Prevalence of Disability 
Among Adults, Office of Population Cenuses and Surveys, Social Survey Division, 
London, HMSO.
Mathews, Russell (1980). "The structure of taxation" in John Wilkes (ed), The 
Politics of Taxation, Sydney, Hodder and Stoughton.
McGranahan, D (1979). International Comparability of Statistics on Income 
Distribution, Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
McRae, Ian (1986). "What happens to the young unemployed - some facts from 
the Australian longitudinal survey", Bureau of Labour Market Research, Technical 
Paper no 39, Canberra, September.
Merz, Joachim (1986). "Structural adjustment in static and dynamic 
microsimulation models", in Orcutt et al (eds).
_____________ (1987). "Labour force participation, market wage rate and working
hours of married and unmarried women in the Federal Republic of Germany", 
SFB3 Working Paper No 249, Universities of Goethe, Frankfurt and Mannheim, 
August.
______________(1988). Microsimulation, Paper prepared for Eighth International
Symposium on Forecasting, ISF 88, Amsterdam, June 12-15.
Miller, Paul W (1981). "The rate of return to education - the evidence from the 
1976 Census", Centre for Economic Policy Research, Paper No 25, Australian 
National University, Canberra.
408
Miller, Paul W and Paul A Volker (1983). "Married women and the labour force: 
aspects of supply analysis", in Andre Kaspura (ed).
Moon, Marilyn and Eugene Smolensky (eds)(1977). Improving Measures of 
Economic Well-Being. New York, Academic Press.
Morgan, James (1974), Five Thousand American Famiiies - Patterns of Economic 
Progress, 1, Ann Arbor, Insitute of Social Research, University of Michigan.
Morgan, James and Greg J Duncan (1986), "Experience with the panel study of 
income dynamics", in G H Orcutt et al (eds).
Moss, Milton (1978). "Income distribution issues viewed in a lifetime income 
perspective", Review of Income and Wealth, 24:2, pp 119-136.
Mugford, S R (1980). "Social integration, social networks and marital pathology: 
the case for heterogamy", Australian Journal of Sex, Marriage and Family, 1: 4, 
pp 163-178.
Musgrave, R and P Musgrave (1984). Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 4th 
edn, London, McGraw Hill.
Musgrave, R A, K E Case and H Leonard (1974). "The distribution of fiscal 
burdens and benefits", Public Finance Quarterly, Vol 2, pp 259-311.
Nakamura, Alice and Masao Nakamura (1985). The Second Paycheck: A 
Socioeconomic Analysis of Earnings, London, Academic Press.
OECD (1985). "Moving in and out of unemployment: the incidence and patterns 
of recurrent unemployment in selected OECD countries", OECD Employment 
Outlook, September.
O’Higgins, Michael, Jonathon Bradshaw and Robert Walker (1988), "Income 
distribution over the lifecycle", in R Walker and G Parker (eds), Money Matters: 
Income, Wealth and Financial Welfare, London, Sage.
O’Higgins, Michael and Patricia Ruggles (1981). "The distribution of public 
expenditures and taxes among households in the United Kingdom", Review of 
Income and Wealth, June, pp.298-326.
Orcutt, Guy (1957). "A new type of socio-economic system", Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 58, pp 773-797.
Orcutt, Guy, M Greenberg, J Korbel and A Rivlin (1961). Microanalysis of 
Socioeconomic Systems: A Simulation Study. New York, Harper and Row.
Orcutt, Guy, Steven Caldwell and Richard Wertheimer (1976). Policy Exploration 
Through Microanalytic Simulation, Washington DC , Urban Institute.
409
Orcutt, Guy, Joachim Merzand Hermann Quinke (1986). Microanalytic Simulation 
Models to Support Social and Financial Policy, New York, North-Holland.
Paass, Gerhard (1986). "Statistical match: evaluation of existing procedures and 
improvements by using additional information", in Orcutt et al, (eds).
Paglin, Morton (1975). "The measurement and trend of inequality: a basic 
revision", American Economic Review, 65: 4, pp.598-609.
Pahl, Jan (1989). Money and Marriage, Macmillan, London.
__________ (1990). "Household spending, personal spending and the control of
money in marriage", Sociology, 24:1, pp 119-138.
Peacock, Alan T. and P R Browning (1954). "The social services in Great Britain 
and the redistribution of income", in Alan T. Peacock (1954) (ed), Income 
Redistribution and Social Policy, London, Johnathon Cape.
Peacock, Alan T. and Robin Shannon (1968). "The Welfare State and the 
Redistribution of Income", Westminster Bank Review, August, 30-46.
Pech, J (1986). The Greatest Asset since Child Endowment? A study of Low- 
Income Working Families Receiving Family Income Supplement, Social Security 
Review, Paper No 9, Department of Social Security, Canberra.
Phelps, E (1972). Inflation Policy and Unemployment Theory, London, Macmillan.
Picot, Garnett (1986). Modelling the Lifetime Employment Patterns of Canadians, 
mimeo, Statistics Canada, Social and Economic Studies Division, Ottawa.
Piggott, John (1987). "Statistical incidence studies: an economic perspective" in 
Peter Saunders (ed), Redistribution and the Welfare State: Estimating the Effects 
of Government Benefits and Taxes on Household Income, Sydney, Social Welfare 
Research Centre, Reports and Proceedings No 67.
Polinsky, A M (1973), "A note on the measurement of incidence", Public Finance 
Quarterly, 1: 2, pp 219-230.
Power, Colin and Frances Robertson (1987). "Participation and equity in higher 
education: socio-economic profiles of higher education students revisited", 
Australian Bulletin of Labour, 13: 2, March, pp 108-119.
Powles, John (1977). "Socio-economic health determinants in working age males" 
in M Diesendorf and B Furnass (eds), The Impact of Environment and Lifestyle 
on Human Health, Society for Social Responsibility in Science (ACT), Canberra.
Prest, A R (1955). "Statistical calculations of tax burdens", Economica, 32:87, pp 
234-243.
410
Psacharopolous, G (1973). Returns to Education: An International Comparison. 
Amsterdam, Elsevier.
Quality of Education Review Committee (1985). Quality of Education in Australia, 
Canberra, AGPS.
Raymond, Judy (1987). Bringing Up Children Alone: Policies for Sole Parents, 
Social Security Review, Issues Paper No. 3, Canberra, AGPS.
Reynolds, Morgan and Eugene Smolensky (1977). Public Expenditures, Taxes 
and the Distribution of Income: The USA, 1950,1961, 1970, New York, Academic 
Press.
Richardson, Sue and Keith Hancock (1981). "The distribution of lifetime earnings 
in Australia", mimeo, National Institute of Labour Studies, Flinders University, South 
Australia, July.
Rose, David (1989). "Micro-social change in Britain: an outline of the role and 
objectives of the ESRC Research Centre of Micro Social Change in Britain to the 
year 2000", mimeo, ESRC Research Centre of Micro-Social Change, University of 
Essex, July.
Ross, David P (1980), The Canadian Fact Book on Income Distribution, Ottawa, 
Canadian Council on Social Development.
Ross, Russell (1986). "Analysis of the 1980 Sydney survey of work patterns of 
married women: further results", Economic Record, 62:178, September, pp 325- 
337.
Ruggles, N D and Richard Ruggles (1977). "The anatomy of earnings behaviour", 
in F. Thomas Juster, The Distribution of Economic Well-being, Cambridge, 
Massachussets, Ballinger.
Saunders, Peter (1982). Equity and the Impact on Families of the Australian Tax- 
Transfer System, Institute of Family Studies, Monograph No. 2, Melbourne.
__________ (1984). "Evidence on income redistribution by governments", Paris,
OECD Economics and Statistics Department, Working Paper No 11, January.
Sawyer, M. (1976). "Income distribution in OECD countries", Economic Outlook, 
Paris, OECD.
Schmahl, W (1983). "Income analysis based on longitudinal data from social 
security earnings records: the relative earnings position (age-earnings profile) and 
the individual replacement rate of German workers" in A B Atkinson and F A 
Cowell (eds).
411
Schweder, Tore (1989). "Complex life history modelling: Some methodological 
issues", mimeo, Department of Statistics and Computing, Norway, April.
Schiller, Bradley R (1977). "Relative earnings mobility in the United States", 
American Economic Review, 67:5, pp 926-941.
Scitovsky, Tibor (1973). "Inequalities: open and hidden, measured and 
immeasurable", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science: Income Inequality. 409, pp 112-119.
Shorrocks, A F (1976). "Income mobility and the Markov assumption", Economic 
Journal, 86:343, pp 566-578.
Simons, H (1938). Personal Income Taxation, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press.
Social Welfare Policy Secretariat (1981). Report on Poverty Measurement. 
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.
Soltow (1965). Toward Income Equality in Norway. Madison, Wisconsin, 
University of Wisconsin Press.
Stark, Thomas (1977). The Distribution of Income in Ten Countries. Royal 
Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth (UK), Background Paper no. 
4, London, HMSO.
Summers, Robert (1956). "An econometric investigation of the size distribution of 
lifetime average annual income", Technical Report No. 31, Department of 
Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, U.S.A.
Sutherland, Holly (1989). "Constructing a tax-benefit model: what advice can one 
give?", 21st General Conference of International Association for Research in 
Income and Wealth, Lahnstein, August 20-26 (forthcoming in Review of Income 
and Wealth).
Thatcher, A R (1971)."Year to year variations in the earnings of individuals", 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, A-134, Part 3, pp 374-82.
Treasurer (1987). Budget Statements 1986-87. 1988-87 Budget Paper No. 1. 
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.
Treasury (1982). Taxation Expenditures. Submission to House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Expenditure, May. Canberra, Treasury.
Trevedi, P K and C Kapuscinski (1985). "Determinants of inflow into 
unemployment and the probability of leaving unemployment: a disaggregated 
analysis", in Paul A Volker (ed).
412
Victorian Ministry of Education (1986). Movements of Pupils in Primary and 
Post-Primary Education, 1986, Schools Division, Melbourne.
Vogler, C (1989). "Labour market change and patterns of financial allocation within 
households", The Economic and Social Research Council Social Change and 
Economic Life Initiative Working Paper No 12.
Volker, Paul A (1984). "Female labour supply: an overview of research in 
Australia", in Mavis Hoy (ed).
____________ (ed) (1985). The Structure and Duration of Unemployment in
Australia: Proceedings of a Conference, Bureau of Labour Market Research, 
Monograph Series No 6, Canberra, AGPS.
Warren, Neil A (1979), "Australian tax incidence in 1975-76: some preliminary 
results", Australian Economic Review, No 3.
Webb, A L and Jack Sieve (1971). Redistribution and the Welfare State, London, 
Willmer Bros.
Weiss, Yoram and Lee A Lillard (1978). "Experience, vintage and time effects in 
the growth of earnings: American scientists 1960-1970", Journal of Political 
Economy, 86:3, pp 427-448.
Wertheimer, Richard, Sheila R Zedlewski , Joseph Anderson and Kristin Moore 
(1986). "Dynasim in comparison with other microsimulation models", in Orcutt et 
al (eds).
West, Leo H T, Terry Hore, Christopher N Bennie, Patricia A Browne and Beverly 
M Kermond (1986). Students Withdrawing from Full Time Higher Education, 
Melbourne, HEARU, Monash University.
Westoby, A (1977). "The Individual’s Private Investment in Education" in The 
Planning of Higher Education, The Private Demand, Open University.
Whiteford, P. (1985). A Family’s Needs: Equivalence Scales, Poverty and Social 
Security, Research Paper No 27, Development Division, Department of Social 
Security, April.
Whiteford, P and J Doyle (1989). "Take-up Family Income Supplement", mimeo, 
Social Welfare Research Centre, University of New South Wales.
Williams, Trevor (1987). Participation in Education, Australian Council for 
Educational Research Monograph No 30, Hawthorn, Victoria.
Winter, David (1990). "A cohort analysis of the reporting of chronic morbidity in the 
general household survey, Welfare State Programme", Paper (forthcoming), 
London School of Economics.
413
Wolfson, Michael (1988). "Homemaker pensions and lifetime redistribution", 
Review of Income and Wealth, 34:3, pp 221 -250.
__________________(1989a). "The CEPHID project: Canada’s elderly-projecting
health, income and demography", mimeo, Statistics Canada, Ottawa, February.
__________________(1989b). "Divorce, homemaker pensions and lifecycle
analysis", Population Policy and Review, 8, pp 25-54.
Wran, Neville, Meredith Edwards, R G Gregory and Michael Gallagher (1988): 
Report of the Committee on Higher Education Funding, Canberra, AGPS.
